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This dissertation explores discourses about parenthood and subject ideals as they 
manifest in two Swedish parental web communities. The aim is to examine the per-
ceived division of responsibility between the parents themselves and the institutions 
of the welfare state and furthermore to map out and deconstruct tensions between 
demands understood to be assigned to the parent and to society, respectively. The 
empirical material consists of extracts from web community conversations collected 
between 2006 and 2015. They are analysed using a deconstructive approach and by 
applying analytical tools stemming from discourse psychology. This means that the 
texts inserted in the parental web communities are investigated both for how they 
are rhetorically composed as well as for how the writer in question positions herself 
in relation to ‘facts’. Theoretically, the material is probed by three large concepts 
that have guided the analysis – those of discourse, power and distinctions. They are 
broken down to more delimitated concepts such as governmentality, discipline and 
technologies of the self, derived from the works of Michel Foucault, and distinction 
and misrecognition, which originate from Pierre Bourdieu. Perspectives of class and 
gender are intertwined in the analysis. 
The analysis reveals a core metaphor about parenthood that seems to organise 
the content: Parenthood is conceptualized as work. The notion about parenthood as 
work is a residue from a more comprehensive ideal of the citizen-subject as morally 
upright, self-interested and hard-working, and from a view point about the world 
that emphasises the mental capacities of the subject and downplays structural ine-
qualities or maldistribution of resources. In the web community conversations the 
parent appears to have a particular task assignment: To deliver human raw material 
(in the shape of the child) to a society full of demands. Hence, there is a bond es-
tablished between the parent and the state/the society. In community conversations 
a notion of a particular societal promise of meritocracy manifests – if the subjects 
receive equal possibilities of refining themselves they now have the responsibility of 
transforming the possibilities into a good life. 
The ideals for how to achieve the proper moral refinement are visible in the in-
terpretative repertoires of the communities. The repertoires are versions of the world 
and prescriptions for how the world idealistically ought to function. The core rep-
ertoire was labelled Mind over matter. It summarises community opinions about the 
relation between the interior qualities of the subject and the external factors of the 
world and stipulates that things that take place in the psyche of the human being 
affect the material world, not the other way around. Three other repertoires regu-
late conceptions about the ideal subject. The first, Morality comes first, regulates the 
preferred constitution of the subject (who should focus on becoming morally sound 
and self-interested instead of formulating demands directed at the welfare state). 
The second, You should reap what you sow, revolves around expectations (the subject 
should expect returns that relate precisely to the amount of time or work invested 
in a particular venture). The third repertoire, Don’t take the easy way out governs the 
discursively preferred work ethic of the subject (when working on one’s refinement 
and when wanting to achieve something one cannot allow oneself any type of short-
cuts). In the empiric material no repertoires are found that regulate society’s tasks 
or responsibilities. Municipalities, political parties, boards and committees, law en-
forcement or taxes are absent as perceived prime movers of a subject. This discursive 
soil is the foundation of the prevailing community contempt for poor subjects, long-
term ill, or unemployed, who are considered manifesting defect subjectivity and 
having neglected the duty to work with oneself. Economic situation is disentangled 
from the structural position of class and class is instead read as culture and behaviour 
which is thought of as possible to modify. The dissertation finds analytical connec-
tions between the preferred ideals and the transfer of a societal crisis embodied in 
neoliberal austerity programmes to a sense of uneasiness amongst the parents in 
community conversation, who imagine society falling apart, not because of austerity 
regimes but because of the people depending on them. 
5Förord. (Preface)
Långt före jag påbörjade forskarutbildningen hörde jag det – att skriva en avhandling 
är en kollektiv process. Det framstod som helt rimligt för mig redan då – man får 
ju förstås hjälp och råd av sina handledare och av kollegor vid seminarier. Exakt hur 
kollektiv denna process skulle bli hade jag dock ingen aning om. Hur långt ett förord 
kan tänkas bli när alla som doktoranden vill tacka har omnämnts vet vi när den här 
texten skrivits klart men att det finns många att tacka råder det inget tvivel om.
Mitt varmaste tack vill jag rikta till mina handledare, Kristian Daneback och 
Ingrid Sahlin. Sex års handledning kan inte summeras på några korta rader men det 
som står ut för mina ögon när jag ser tillbaka är ert solidariska stöd i alla väder. Ni 
har outtröttligt intresserat er för mina idéer, mina första darrande utkast, mina mest 
besynnerliga påståenden, mina frågor och irrvägar (de senare har ni diskret breddat 
och jämnat ut till mer farbara vägar, vilket inte minst är värt att tacka för). Under 
vissa uppförsbackar var det som om ni omärkligt ställde er bakom mig och sköt på 
och när det kanske brakade iväg lite väl fort i vissa utförslöpor utgjorde ni broms. Ska 
jag nämna några särskilda insatser utöver handledningen skulle det kanske vara hur 
Kristian introducerade mig på en av de mest sympatiska konferenssammanhang jag 
varit på – Cyberspace i Brno – utöver att lotsa mig in på de teoretiska fälten kring vir-
tuella kommunikationsarenor, och jag vill också lyfta fram det faktum att utan sam-
talen med Ingrid och de teoretiska perspektiv hon introducerade på masterkursen 
Teoretiska perspektiv på exkludering och social kontroll hade jag aldrig fått för mig 
att jag kunde ha en plats att fylla på en forskarutbildning. Jag vill också särskilt tacka 
min läsgrupp, Hanna Wikström och Lena Sawyer. På er hade jag höga förväntningar 
och ni lyckades med konststycket att överträffa dem. Er läsning av mitt manus har 
varit framåtlutad, noggrann och oavlåtligt intresserad och ni har gjort er tillgängliga 
för funderingar och samtal när jag behövt. I mitt lite kraftlösa tillstånd mot slutet av 
arbetet blev ni den injektion jag behövde.
Men avhandlingstexten har förstås granskats av fler. Idéseminariet blev en bra 
start tack vare Tobias Davidssons sonderande frågor och hjälp att se de teoretiska 
möjligheterna i föräldraforumen. Under planseminariet lotsade Therése Wissö mig 
vidare genom att peka på alla de möjliga vägar som låg framför mig och genom 
frågor som fick mig att förstå vad jag betraktade som det viktigaste i mitt empiriska 
material. På mellanseminariet fick jag stor hjälp av Sara Uhno och Tobias Daviddson 
som hjälpte mig att vässa mitt ärende och under slutseminariet ställde Eva Palmblad 
de viktiga och breda frågorna om samhällskontext och kopplingar till intilliggande 
forskning. Jag är skyldiga er alla stort tack! 
6Stödet i min doktorandgrupp har förstås varit ovärderligt. Tack Julia Bahner, Tobias 
Davidsson och Rakel Berman för sammanhållning och klappar på axeln när energin 
tröt. Tobias ingick också i det ”exkluderingsnätverk” som jag startade tillsammans 
med Susanne Liljeholm Hansson och Frida Petersson och det arbetet vi gjort har va-
rit en extra stimulans, liksom det informella nätverk som min doktorandgrupp ska-
pade med tre doktorander från Socialhögskolan i Lund: Erik Eriksson, Ann-Kristin 
Lassen och Vanna Nordling. Likaså har samtalen om högt och lågt med Majsa Allelin 
utgjort det perfekta botemedlet mot det sittsår jag trodde att jag skulle utveckla un-
der det sista året framför datorskärmen. 
Institutionen för socialt arbete här på Göteborgs universitet ska också tackas för 
allt det andra som måste fungera för att en avhandling ska bli till – planering, admi-
nistrativt stöd och inte minst den ”kollegiala korsett” som bör finnas för att dokto-
randen ska komma ihåg var avhandlingen så småningom ska landa. Tack alla! Särskilt 
vill jag tacka Jari Kuosmanen som uppmuntrade mig att söka forskarutbildningen 
efter att 2006 ha examinerat min c-uppsats och mina kursansvarskollegor Björn An-
dersson och Torbjörn Forkby för att det är så roligt att samarbeta med er. Ett postumt 
tack vill jag rikta till Maren Bak som handledde mig genom mastersuppsatsen och 
som någon gång i mitten av avhandlingsskrivandet när jag slokade av missmod inför 
mina bristande förmågor tog mig till en bardisk och bestämt förkunnade att hon 
trodde på mig. Det var också Maren som ideligen påminde om hur viktigt resten av 
livet är, det som ligger utanför prestationer och uppsatta mål. Jag saknar dig.  
Jag vill tacka alla mina goda vänner som jag haft förmånen att få lära känna och 
jag vill tacka Laila Vianden som tagit det fina fotot på avhandlingens omslag. Ett 
stort tack går till mina föräldrar Ingegerd och Claes, för att ni så envist tror på mig, 
intresserar er för allt jag gör och för att ni hjälpt och avlastat under avhandlingsar-
betet. Ett varmt tack också till min syster Sofia för att du är ett handfast stöd och en 
fin vän. 
Det sista och innerligaste tacket går till min familj: Knut, Valter och Robert. 
Robert vill jag tacka särskilt för allt hushållsarbete och alla ensamma kvällar du axlat 
medan jag ”bara skulle jobba lite till” och för din osvikliga lojalitet och din vanvör-
diga humor. Knut och Valter – er vet jag inte alls hur jag ska tacka, till det är ni allt 
för underbara. 
Majorna
14:e september 2016
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1. Introduction
1:1 If you cannot deal with yourself you cannot deal with a child either. A 
tragic insight I’?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
totally dysfunctional families and environments. The children are innocent 
but the adults can choose. 
 
Of course things can happen after the children have arrived. You can take 
ill, become unemployed etcetera. Perhaps you should have the possibility of 
forcing people into interventions? The mere threat would perhaps make some 
people deal with things? 
 
Apart from that some parents are just lazy. They are really capable, but they 
don’t give a damn about raising their kids and they don’t meet a whole lot of 
demands. A relative of mine who has been working a lot with teenagers has 
told me several times about parent’s that just couldn’t be bothered with their 
13-year old being out drunk all night. When my relative and her colleagues 
drive the teenager home the parents are sitting there drinking and think it’s 
great to get rid of the kids, so that they won’t bother them. There are many 
explanations, many problems and many solutions but I feel that in general, 
we should try harder to make people see the responsibilities that come with 
parenthood. 
(Posting inserted in The Parent Place parental web community 2012) 
 
1:2????????????????????????????????? ???????‘lazy’ as you say, but that is not a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Social Welfare Board. How can one make lazy parents assume responsibil-
ity?  
(Answers posting above) 
 
1:3 A kick in the arse? Two, if they don’?????????????????????????????   
(Answers posting above)
This conversation about problematic parents is taken from a Swedish parental web 
community. The topic is familiar to the participants and reappears in a multitude 
of virtual conversations on a regular basis. Perhaps this conversation is also familiar 
to the reader who has never entered a parental community – because it has been 
represented in television shows, in discussions in workplace lunchrooms, in the blo-
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gosphere and in mass media debate – conversations about the decline of school re-
sults, child obesity, parents who spend too much time on Facebook, the dangers of 
computer-games, or the need for parents in disadvantaged residential areas to assume 
more parental responsibilities in order to solve the problem of juvenile delinquency. 
The conversation is particular at the same time as generic.  
The content of the thread1 that opened up this chapter manifests several recur-
rent themes in the conversation about problematic parenting in this parental web 
community: The firm belief that parents can make a choice whilst their children 
cannot, the image of lazy parents who could perform better if they really wanted to, 
and the suggestion of using force to make ‘bad’ parents become good ones.2 Another 
feature of this conversation is how society is brought into the perceived practices 
of the parent. The nick3 who starts the conversation highlights a recurrent tension 
in the community conversations, a tension between the amount of responsibility 
assumed to be taken by the parent and the amount assigned to the social agencies 
of the welfare state. We may understand the tension as a matter of a labour division 
between the family and the state – a question concerning tasks in the social repro-
duction: Who should do what? This labour division and its representations constitute 
the basis of the research questions of this dissertation. The particular nick cited above 
represents a fairly typical position in the parental web communities in not stating 
how illness or unemployment should be considered. She merely affirms that there are 
such phenomena but the conceived resolution appears, nevertheless, to be increased 
constraints on the individual parent. 
However, one may still wonder why the need to ventilate family and parenting 
issues has arisen in the first place. Why is it not a private concern that is discussed 
with intimate friends or family, or handled in the separate institutional spheres of the 
Social Services, the school system or in health services such as maternity welfare insti-
tutions? The simple answer to this question is: Because these issues do not solely be-
long to the dimensions of privacy or the concrete domains of institutional care. They 
transcend into issues of politics, subjectivity, personal worth and societal morality. 
In short, concepts of ‘the family’ are ideological constructions of different societal 
organisations (Chambers, 2001). Matters of the family are formatted in an intersec-
tion between the personal and the political/the institutional. My interest lies in the 
1 See Glossary in Appendix.
2 Another vital feature of conversation is that the term ‘parent’ often tends to mean ’mother’. This is 
a recurrent phenomenon, which will be commented on and discussed later in this chapter, when 
the aim and research questions have been presented.
3 See Glossary in the Appendix.
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way that the latter is found in the former, or the way politics operates in discourses 
about the personal. My ‘hunting ground’ is two Swedish parental web communities. 
However, I do not consider the processes pointed out to be isolated to this concrete 
area but to be generic in relation to a wide array of areas, situations, and processes.
The chapter will continue with a presentation of the ways in which families and 
parents have been viewed by the political and institutional domains, where they 
make up a part of a discussion about the relation between the state and the subject. It 
will be followed by a layout of how we can understand the representations of family, 
i.e. ways of talking about and understanding family, and a brief introduction to the 
empirical arena from which the postings included in this study have been collected. 
At the end of the chapter I shall present the research problem addressed by the dis-
sertation, as well as the overall aim and questions that guided analysis.
Politics of parenting: Reforms and responsibilisation
The importance of sound parenthood for enabling children to become functioning 
citizens has been emphasised for many decades. It has been part of political aims 
as well as of a private sense of decency (Bergman et al., 2011: 7). Nevertheless, al-
though the very importance of parenthood remains unchallenged the notion of what 
sound parenthood is and how a functioning parent should be constructed changes 
over time. If in the past, as noted by Val Gillies (2008 a), families were considered 
a more intimate and less regulated space, the contemporary political notion instead 
leans towards ‘regulating individual subjectivity and citizenship at the level of the 
family’ (ibid.: 1080). Society is comprehended as if achieved in, and by, families, 
where the child is described as vulnerable and dependent on adequate parenting 
(ibid.: 1079; Wall, 2010). Hence, being a parent is not just a part of existence, nor 
simply a category of people or a particular experience, as the frames and conditions 
for parenthood are dependent on time, place and structures of power. Parenthood 
has its own forces of government, which we may want to conceptualise as a politics 
of parenting (Gillies, 2008 b). Moreover, society’s interest in the family does not only 
have consequences for parents and children. The concept of family enables wider 
cultural ideals to be recomposed, i.e., notions of societal fellowship (Bergman et 
al., 2011). The time and space in this particular study has as its starting point two 
Swedish parental web communities, but consists of such forces as Swedish welfare 
politics, neoliberal discourse, and other globalized and material schema relevant for 
what becomes personal accounts of parenthood.
When studying the past century in Western societies it becomes obvious how the 
very construct of parenthood has changed, at least in some senses. In the preindus-
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trial epoch the relation between the family and the state was primarily a contract be-
tween the latter and the father of the family, although both the father and the mother 
were considered responsible for fostering the child. Their respective functions were, 
however, conceptualised as different – the function of the father was to provide for 
the family and to discipline the child, whereas the mother was considered the provid-
er of love and intimacy. It was only as late as the eighteenth century that the child was 
described as an individual in its own right for the first time (Ariès, 1962). One of the 
major influential factors for the way family life was organised in the Western world 
during the twentieth century was undoubtedly the growth of the welfare state and 
today it is in the welfare state that political public governing and the intimate spheres 
meet. The institutions of the welfare state share the responsibility for the prosperity 
of the nation’s children with the parents (Bäck-Wiklund & Bergsten, 1997/2001: 
17). Today, the welfare state acts as a complement to the father in his function of pro-
vider whilst the demand on the mother has basically remained the same – her major 
function, at least during the first half of the twentieth century, was that of caregiver. 
This role has gradually become ‘professionalised’ and her perceived influence on the 
child has increasingly been viewed as crucial (ibid.: 57). In fact, one of the charac-
teristic features of contemporary state- and institutional perceptions of parenthood 
is how it is envisioned as decisive for the child. Parents and home environments are 
thought of as the foundations for the fostering of new citizens and become crucial 
for the maintenance of both the nation and the welfare state (Bergman et al, 2011). 
This shift can be noted at institutional levels in the many efforts to create prenatal 
education and ‘parenting classes’, and also stands out at a commercial level, such as 
in the promotion of educational toys and leisure time activities. This cultural under-
standing encompasses a view that parents – and especially mothers – have a duty to 
both control and mould the lives of their children. The discourse of the family has 
become child-centred and, as a consequence, parenthood (motherhood) has intensi-
fied (Wall, 2010: 255). 
This shift of focus is most certainly aided by political incentives. In Sweden, 
political debates about the wellbeing of the nation’s parents and children have been 
ongoing since the industrialization of the country. Political initiatives have been re-
sponsible for the launch of a vast number of welfare reforms in response to per-
ceived societal ills of that particular era. The majority of the reforms targeted work-
ing class families and the putative solution was often to transfer bourgeoisie values 
onto the poor. Throughout the twentieth century intellectuals from the temperance 
movement, the women’s movement and other philanthropic movements launched 
initiatives to both aid and foster working class parents and several family reform 
17
programmes had a biological and eugenic profile (Ohrlander, 1992). The problems 
were believed to emanate from both a lack of fostering and a bad germ plasm, with 
mothers held especially responsible, either because they allegedly had passed on ge-
netically substandard characteristics, or because they had neglected the upbringing 
of the child (ibid.: 300). 
Nevertheless, the focus of the Swedish welfare programme initiatives varied de-
pending on the politics of the time. In the 1930s the demand for labour made wom-
en start working outside of the home, leading to anxious debates about the role of 
the woman – should she or should she not be encouraged to enter employment 
(Platzer, 2006)? This debate focused on middle class women and did not concern 
working class women, as the work they performed outside of the home was consid-
ered ‘normal’ (ibid: 211 f.). A subsequent decrease in the birth-rate induced polit-
ical action, whilst a parallel debate about what type of families should be officially 
sanctioned led to the infamous laws that promoted sterilisation of groups (especially 
women) considered unfit to be parents – poor families, families with many children, 
individuals diagnosed with neurological or psychiatric diseases, and individuals re-
garded as feebleminded (Lundqvist, 2015: 80). After the Second World War the de-
mand for population growth ceased and more comprehensive sociopolitical demands 
were raised, leading amongst other things to the implementation of a child benefit 
that included all families with children, and the universal health insurance. During 
the 1950s themes about the conflicting roles of the mother as both a carer and an 
employee came to the fore, which can be considered as the first move in the direction 
of a social policy focusing upon the individual rather than on the family as a unit. 
Politics now directed its attention towards the issue of making women financially in-
dependent of men, and gender equality gradually emerged as a benchmark for family 
policy. The family was no longer considered to be composed of one bread winner and 
one carer but instead politics emphasised every individual’s right to paid work and a 
joint responsibility for the wellbeing of the family (ibid.: 81). 
Generally, the focus upon impinging factors outside of the family was never as 
strong in Sweden as in the discourse of the family in the late 1960s and the 1970s. 
Parents’ position in the labour market was considered one of the major influential 
factors for the way family life turned out, and for the life chances of the child. Today, 
the formulations in Swedish Government Official Reports (in Sweden abbreviated 
SOU) at the time may come across as striking: ‘The hierarchic structure of the la-
bour market and the organisation of production are thus an obstacle for all children 
to receive an equal start in life’ (SOU 1980:27: 52 f ). The hopes to design parental 
education that was to be combined with renewed political demands to ensure par-
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ents’ possibilities to take part in their children’s life with retained earnings (ibid.: 
53) sound, in comparison, outdated. Today the institutional aspirations of parental 
education are rather formulated as a hope to instill particular skills in the parent that 
may reduce potential damaging factors outside of the family (Littmarck, 2012).
The twentieth century is sometimes labelled ‘the century of the child’, and in 
many respects it was, in view of the child’s improved legal status and social rights 
(Lundqvist, 2015: 87). The last twenty years have accentuated this trend. Children 
are positioned as bearers of civil rights and thought of as competent and at risk si-
multaneously. But when deciphering this outlook we may find that it divides into 
images of two types of children (and thus two types of parents): Children raised by 
an attentive, empathetic and knowing parent, and children who lack such a parent 
(ibid.: 91). Hence, the major institutional aid that welfare agencies such as child 
health centres or family support programmes direct at the parents of today is de-
signed to mediate research findings and parenting techniques to enhance a desired 
parental skill (ibid: 92). The parent is to be made knowledgeable, and by that also 
accountable. The growth of the welfare state becomes, in retrospect, also the growth 
of institutional control – by offering social welfare for families with children, these 
families are assumed to demonstrate cooperativeness and openness (Gleichmann, 
2004: 59).
The shift is something more than trends in institutions and commerce – in broad 
strokes it is a sign of a changed viewpoint on the relation between the subject and 
the state. Nikolas Rose (2000 b) calls this shift responsibilisation: The idea that if 
people behave like responsible citizens a sound type of society will emerge, or the 
assumption that if society provides the resources necessary the citizen who admin-
isters these resources in a prolific manner will access a good life. The trend towards 
responsibilisation encompasses a ‘bottom-up’ view; a standpoint that citizen security 
can be achieved from the basis of local communities and the families living there 
(ibid.: 329). Insofar as conceptions of the family have changed, so have ideas about 
the welfare state. The social interventionist state4 that interferes with the conduct of 
4 The social interventionist state is not a uniform societal organisation that is identical all over 
Europe. The ‘Swedish model’ of the welfare state launched after the Second World War was at 
the time considered as unique in many ways. It distinguished itself by far-reaching attempts of 
decommodification, which appears as the most important feature of the Swedish welfare state. 
Decommodification aimed at making the individual less economically dependent on family and 
relatives by establishing a bond of financial security between the subject and the state. The main 
goal of this social democratic initiative was to enable exit from the labor market with little loss of 
income (Esping Andersen, 1990). The model – based on universalism, centralism, social interven-
tion and consensus – was criticised towards the end of the 80s. It was said to be ineffective and 
standing in the way of the individual’s own capacities and initiatives (Boréus, 1994) and the ‘new 
model’ emphasised exercise of power from below (Premfors, 2000: 163).
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the individual has been replaced by a post-welfare steering that obliges the subject to 
act responsibly out of self-interest. The social is, so to speak, to be governed from the 
inside of a functional subject (Oelkers, 2012: 101 f.). Emanating from this shift an 
ideal of the active citizen, or of an active citizenship, has evolved (Dahlstedt, 2009). 
This would be true of many Western European countries today, including Sweden. 
When focusing on the last two decades, and in particular what happened after 
the global recession of 2008, this shift towards individual responsibility is accentu-
ated further, as discussed by Tracey Jensen (2012). As a way to respond to the reces-
sion similar governmental economic initiatives were launched in several European 
countries. The trend that characterises these initiatives can be summarised in the 
neoliberal notion of austerity; the governmental attempt to reduce deficit and public 
spending, resulting in a diminishing welfare state. Austerity is in various ways in 
focus of governmental economic steering all over Europe and although introduced 
in diverse forms it seems to result in the same political actions – a reconfiguration 
of the relations of responsibility between the state and its subjects, and in stricter 
conditions for subjects who are dependent on financial support. The demands are 
especially strong when the role of parents is debated (ibid.: 1).5
Politicisation of parenthood in the public context
Although ‘responsible parenting’ as a remedy for a perceived malfunctioning society 
is not yet at the very centre of official social policy discourse in Sweden, as is the 
case in the UK (Gillies, 2005 b), we are perhaps not far behind. Issues of where to 
place responsibility and how actively a parent is to participate in the moulding of the 
child are questions that resonate in contemporary Swedish political debate, as well 
as in domains of entertainment and mass media. In terms of disciplining ‘disruptive’ 
families, in 2010 former Swedish Minister of Education, Jan Björklund, suggested 
that parents of ‘unruly’ children should be forced to be present in the school, a kind 
of mandatory parental attendance (Aftonbladet 8 August 2010), a proposal that was 
met with a mixture of approval and derision. The way families and parents are to 
assist in the restoration of a national morality can be noted in a statement from the 
current Prime Minister Stefan Löfven that urges parents to discipline their children 
into performing better at school and by so doing help to improve the falling results 
in the triennial PISA survey (see the statement in Dagens Nyheter 25 May 2015). 
5 Although the concept of austerity is intimately linked with political discourse as it was designed 
after 2008, it is also related to political ambitions launched long before the last recession. In Swe-
den attempts of criticizing the welfare state were articulated as calls for citizen responsibility and 
thrift already in the 1980s (Persson et al. 2010: 36 ff.).
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Although this was nothing more than a suggestion, concrete changes have been car-
ried out in the legislative domains – some to discipline parents, and some to support 
a beneficial development. In 2010 The Swedish Ministry of Justice implemented a 
sharper liability for legal guardians, which in effect meant that parents became liable 
even in cases where they could not be reasonably expected to restrict the liberty of 
action of their child (see Government Office, registration number JU 10.09)6. In 
order to assist a putatively ‘diligent’ family, the former, right-wing Swedish Govern-
ment approved a tax deduction for private tutoring of school children in the home 
(Proposition 2012/13:14)7. Parallel to these disparate formal transformations, tele-
vision and the blogosphere are exploiting a sense of people taking the easy way out 
and promoting an urge to act decisively towards those in society who do not take full 
responsibility for themselves, such as parents on public welfare who are represented 
as not administering money with sufficient resourcefulness.8 Tracey Jensen (2014: 
2.2-2.3) delineates this mass media tendency as ‘poverty porn’ and argues that it 
helps to promote a neoliberal welfare doxa, i.e., it converts a neoliberal crisis to one 
that appears to have originated elsewhere; stemming from people described as overly 
welfare dependent.  
This contraposition of force against some parents and help delivered to others 
constitutes one part of a discourse of austerity where individual morality is linked 
with state finance. Society is described as if threatened and the envisioned restora-
tion is represented as coming from below – society can be rebuilt from the base of 
its individuals (Jensen, 2012:7 f.). In other words, economic recession is discussed as 
an individual problem that can be rectified by particular groups of individuals. One 
such group is the family and my interest lies in the way the family is characterised as 
this presumed solution for societal ills. However, my main interest is not primarily 
the outlook on parents from the side of politics, but the manner in which the objects 
of the discourse – the parents – speak of themselves. Karl Marx (1939/2010: 230) 
6 http://www.regeringen.se/sokresultat/?query=JU+10.09
7 For the whole proposition, see: http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Prop-
ositioner-och-skrivelser/prop-20121314-Skattereduktio_H00314/?text=true
8 One example of this is the TV programme Luxury Trap at the Swedish commercial channel TV 3 
(In Swedish: Lyxfällan). In this television programme families living beyond their means receive 
financial fostering by experts on loans and family budget. Turning to the blogosphere, see for 
instance the statement by local politician Marianne Ohrlander (the chairman of the Social Wel-
fare Board in Trelleborg) that was strongly debated in Sweden during spring 2012. Ohrlander 
stated that parents on financial support needed not be poor if they economised properly (for the 
statement and Ohrlander’s defence of it, see Sveriges Radio: http://sverigesradio.se/sida/ar-
tikel.aspx?programid=96&artikel=5021521). For another viewpoint on poverty as something an 
individual chooses, see well-known Swedish blogger Kissie (http://kissies.se/rika-maste-vara-
odmjuka-det-maste-ni-fattiga-ocksa-vara/).
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has argued that language in itself is a product of society and simultaneously society’s 
verbal expression. This would mean that political rationalities influence how we talk 
and write, and the way we talk and write is an expression of the rationality. ‘Family’ 
and ‘parent’ thus matter as concepts for how things can be discerned and addressed 
in a public context. What we believe we know about the family, our own family and 
other families, forms our approach towards it. Conclusively, if parents are conceived 
of as self-governing subjects administering resources they will probably be debated 
in those terms and we will perhaps end up disappointed in those who fail to govern 
themselves in the desirable fashion. This means that I view the parent as a political 
subject. She is shaped and restricted by politics and a subject who think and act 
influenced by politics.
The parental web community
How are the political rationality of austerity and the high hopes placed upon indi-
viduals to restore a broken society represented in the particular arena focused on in 
this dissertation and in what way can we understand the conditions in which the 
postings9 in the parental web communities are inserted? To understand this type of 
interaction we must know something about the particular environment in which it 
takes place. This headline will comprise of a condensed presentation of the empirical 
arenas where the texts that make up the empiric material for this study were collect-
ed,10 what type of users they attract and the way in which Internet interaction may 
be apprehended.  
A web community is a public site on the Internet that provides the means for 
people to log in and interact by typing messages to each other, or to contact one 
another via e-mails in the backstage arenas. The venue is usually organised around a 
common theme of interest, such as parenting, which make such communities differ-
ent from, for instance, Facebook.11 Communities are usually commercial, meaning 
that they depend upon advertisement revenues for profit. Visiting a community on 
a regular basis is quite common for an Internet user – 46 percent of the total pop-
ulation in Sweden visits communities once in a while (Findahl, 2013). The largest 
Swedish parental communities reach about 50 percent of all Swedish parents with 
children aged 0-6 years and more than 20 000 postings are made each week in over 
9 See Glossary in Appendix. 
10 In Chapter Four I will make a more thorough presentation of the parental web communities, their 
characteristics and the way interaction is designed there.
11 It is worth noting that also Facebook can be constructed in themes or groups that want to debate 
a particular topic but the basic structure of this web site is not organised around any particular 
topic.
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50 000 ongoing conversations (Alstam, Plantin & Daneback, 2016: 137). The inter-
action taking place in these venues is not different to that in people’s everyday life; it 
matters to the people involved and provides new relationships where experiences and 
support can be exchanged (Baym, 2010: 148). 
For ethical reasons (see more in Chapter Four) I have renamed the two parental 
communities – the first one is now called The Parent Place, abbreviation TPP, while 
I named the second one Virtually Extended Family, abbreviation VEF. The two com-
munities register approximately 1, 100, 000 visitors per week and both are operated 
commercially.12 The reason for opting to investigate commercial communities is due 
to the fact that the degree of interaction is considerably higher than in institutionally 
founded counterparts that mainly host experts who communicate with the commu-
nity’s visitors.13 To become a member of the communities the user registers a nick 
name14 (a pseudonym) and agrees to abide by the rules of interaction as formulated 
by the site owner. The majority of the nicks are registered as women, as for instance 
in VEF where 87 percent of the regular visitors are women (Lind, 2013: 20). In TPP 
and VEF nicks who have been members several years communicate with recently 
registered nicks. The former can be considered a kind of veterans who guide and in-
form newcomers about how to behave, but also reproach those that do not confirm 
to the etiquette of this Internet arena – the netiquette.15
In a parental web community people give advice on nutrition, birth, the raising 
of children and how to achieve the ideal relationship with one’s spouse or partner, 
amongst a number of other things. In addition, they make jokes, flirt, support each 
other, complain, and quarrel. Some write about their becoming friends outside of 
the community, while others appear to be enemies. Hence, the notion embraced in 
research performed in the ‘childhood of the Internet’ that the electronic self is very 
different from the offline version has been rejected. Today it is not easy to define 
when one is online and offline, because to a large extent the arenas conflate (Alstam, 
Plantin, Daneback, 2016: 137). 
12 On account of wanting to explore a discourse expressing matters of everyday life I was looking 
for interaction between peers, rather than institutional discourse. I decided to opt for well-known 
and established parental communities that are easy to locate through search engines and where I 
could find texts that were not ‘sanctioned’ by institutions.  
13 TPP and VEF are also visited by experts (in child psychology, pediatrics and so forth) but when 
reviewing these visits I noted that few nicks appeared interested in posing questions, and seem-
ingly preferred the conversations in the regular interactional sections.
14 See Glossary in Appendix.
15 See Glossary in Appendix.
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Research problem
Two perceptions seem to meet in the parental web community: The individual en-
ters conversation with standpoints on parenthood, and with notions about the role of 
the agencies of the welfare state. Exploring the parent as a political subject, or more 
specific a subject that is the result of the politics of self-governance, means studying 
how parents and families have to be performed publically, in an ongoing dialogue be-
tween parents-in-the-flesh and the politically induced ideals of families and parents. 
The parental community comprises an example of this continuous dialogue and, 
moreover, it displays a more comprehensive subjectivity. Other arenas in which this 
dialogue is carried out obviously exist, such as parental classes at child welfare centres 
or pupil-parent meetings at school, to name but a few. What makes the parental 
web community special is the freedom of choice when it comes to participation and 
subject-matters for discussion, and the egalitarian nature of communication. When 
communicating ‘freely’ but still visible to others, how do parents deal with the norms 
of political conduct and with ideas about their responsibilities? The parental com-
munity is, I think, a case where we may catch a glimpse of how the subject is shaped 
by its perceptions of itself, but also how it appears in the eyes of others. The parental 
community can be read as an arena where conversation achieves several types of re-
lations, as described by Colin Gordon (1991):
the relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations involving 
some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and 
communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political 
sovereignty (ibid.: 2 f.).
Comprehended in this fashion the parental web community is a case where the 
subject receives its contours through institutional demands and ideals: The subject 
becomes formatted by and in society and society materialises in the subject. Because 
the web community offers the possibility of writing under a pseudonym and because 
one logs in on one’s own premises a condition of relative freedom could possibly be 
established. It would putatively be possible to articulate almost anything that comes 
to mind, about oneself or about one’s place in society. But is it?
Overall aims and questions
In this dissertation I will explore the ways that parenthood and the division of re-
sponsibility between the parent and the welfare state are expressed and negotiated 
in two parental web communities and furthermore I shall map out and deconstruct 
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tensions between demands assigned to the parent or the individual and to society, 
respectively. 
In a discourse analysis of postings published in two parental communities I will 
ask the following questions:
1. How is the parent narrated and what kind of discursive techniques support 
the narration?
2. How is the division of responsibility between the family and society con-
structed? 
3. What generic subject ideals emerge in the discussions about parenthood? 
How are these ideals to be achieved? How are failures explained?
4. How is the female subject positioned in discussions about family, parent-
hood, dependency and intimacy?
5. How do these various ways to construct generic subject ideals, parents and 
parenthood relate to broader societal contexts?
Representing the postings in general and gender in particular 
Some limitations of the study should be stated. During conversation in the web 
communities the nicks may communicate outside of its frame, through texting and 
e-mail. This communication is a hidden component that cannot be analysed and 
could potentially affect the visible textual interchanges that I have collected. The 
same goes for the technical mediation of conversation: The way that the site itself 
structures interaction. The technical basis, that allows certain types of communica-
tion and precludes others, is not included in the analysis. On the other hand, this can 
be said about all types of interaction; it is partly structured by events that took place 
before or after interaction started, or took place outside of the arena in question. 
Apart from these limitations, the aim of the dissertation is not to produce knowledge 
about the ‘inner’ or more fundamental nature of communication but to explore the 
surface of discourse, the impression that meets the eye when entering.
In matters of representation there is a contemporary tendency to talk about ‘par-
ents’ but really mean mothers (Sunderland, 2006: 503; Jensen, 2009: 1). Hence, 
when reading the postings that discuss parenthood, or when imbibing the political 
suggestions and propositions directed towards parents, we should keep this confla-
tion in mind: Although we use the word parent as a gender neutral noun it hosts 
other connotations. Nevertheless, the term parent will be employed in the analysis, 
instead of mother. I have chosen to do so for two reasons. The first is to stay close to 
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the language used in the parental communities; they use the word parent and there-
fore I do too. The second reason is related to the ambiguities that reside in repre-
senting women. The risk, as I see it, in applying a more gendered terminology is that 
the analysis is read as if it only concerns women (and because of that it is considered 
to matter less). Instead, in the analysis female subject positions are viewed as being 
positions just as universal as those of men. Using the term ‘mother’ instead of ‘parent’ 
would perhaps imply that the dissertation takes a particular interest in female expe-
riences, when it is in fact interested in the comprehensive demands placed upon a par-
ticular type of parent in a particular type of context characterised by the neoliberal 
discourse in contemporary Western societies. Moreover, David Morgan (1999/2004: 
13) points out that the way that families are put up for display may reflect not only 
gender practices but class practices, age practices and so forth. To my mind this 
feature of displaying family makes gender one important aspect of analysis, but it 
does not precede a factor such as class. On the other hand, women’s positions are not 
the same as those of men, because women and men are assigned different places in 
production and reproduction (Kittay, 1999). I obviously do not want to contribute 
to a fantasy parent with no gender, because that would cloud the care tasks that are 
still assigned primarily to women (Jensen, 2009: 1). Therefore there is no reason to 
obscure the fact that in particular discourses gender is a starting point.16 Mainly em-
ploying a non-gendered terminology instead mirrors how I view parenting. It is still 
largely gendered, it still offers women a heavier workload than men and it continues 
to make women the targets of a politically induced and intense sense of responsibility 
and guilt – but this is not the way it should be; parenthood should not be connoted 
with women (Kittay, 1999: xiii f.). As a consequence of the dual possibilities of un-
derstanding gender I have chosen to oscillate between female positions as universally 
applicable on the one hand and taking into account the singularity of the position in 
certain cases on the other. The latter consideration is reflected in the choice to devote 
a particular analytical chapter to positions of femininity (see Chapter Ten), i.e., an 
analysis of women, when they are articulated as women.  
16 The onset of this study is perhaps caught between a rock and a hard place and the oscillation 
between analysing women as ‘generic’ and as gendered subjects is best summarised by Chantal 
Mouffe when explaining the ‘Wollstonecraft dilemma’: ‘to demand equality is to accept the patri-
archal conception of citizenship that implies that women must become like men, while to insist 
that women’s distinctive attributes, capacities and activities be given expression and valued as 
contributing to citizenship is to demand the impossible because such difference is precisely what 
patriarchal citizenship excludes’ (Mouffe, 1993/2005: 80).
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Outline of the book
In this introductory chapter, besides stating research problem, aims and questions, 
a broader introduction to societal comprehensions of the family has been outlined, 
including the concept of responsibilisation in relation to family, and a presentation 
of the empirical arenas. Chapter Two comprises a broader contextual background 
and a compilation of previous research. The theoretical understanding guiding the 
analysis will be outlined in Chapter Three, whilst the dissertation’s methodological 
framing; the collection of material, analytical concepts and ethical considerations, 
are delineated in Chapter Four. The remaining part of the dissertation comprises a 
discourse analysis of the empirical material, divided into seven chapters, followed by 
a concluding chapter that sums up the result.
 The aim of Chapters Five and Six is to describe the communities and introduce 
the way interaction and discourse are formatted. Chapter Five serves as a demon-
stration of generic patterns of self presentation and probes into what type of subject 
positions are generally preferred, as well as what happens to a nick who deviates from 
these preferences. In this chapter both discourse- and interaction preferences will be 
explored to help the reader understand the comprehensive matrix to which all nicks 
have to relate. Chapter Six investigates the discursive foundation of the preferences – 
the propensity to apprehend people, experiences and events through the concept of 
choice. Chapter Seven is devoted to the relation between the subject and society/wel-
fare state institutions and will show the way the subject can relate to other subjects 
through more or less organised relations. Chapter Eight has a twofold aim. First, I 
present the way society is understood as created from within the smaller and more 
intimate unit of the family and show how this tends to mean increased responsibility 
for the parents. Secondly, I analyse how the family is ideally constructed, and how 
this construction relates to bringing up children. The rest of the analytical chapters 
probe into the result of the discursive foundation of choice and the preferred relation 
between the individual and society. Chapter Nine addresses the ideal subject posi-
tions once again, albeit from the position of the subject who does not embody this 
ideal: the unfit subject. I probe into explanations of why particular subjects do not 
reach the ideals and the parental communities’ perceptions of the available remedies 
for bettering oneself. Chapter Ten focuses on the female subject position and the way 
the woman is narrated as a member of the intimate sphere of the family. Her per-
ceived role and function are scrutinised, as well as the potential risks or impediments 
that she faces within this sphere. Chapter Eleven, which is the last of the analytical 
chapters, pieces together the conceptions about femininity and unfitness with focus 
on their interaction in narrative examples of disgust towards particular subjects, in 
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this case that of the poor mother. Chapter Twelve concludes the dissertation in a 
global analysis that condenses the results from Chapters Five to Eleven. In these 
chapters I will demonstrate the way that the concept of choice enables viewpoints 
of subjects as autonomous agents with no or few material needs, and present the 
way these viewpoints lead to a defence of the middle class position at the expense of 
subjects positioned elsewhere.
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2. Settings: Politics, institutions, 
research
Laying bare discourse and looking at the techniques applied to make them look true 
is one thing, but analysing what thoughts might mean and what has shaped them 
is another. John B. Thompson (1988: 367) argues that any cultural analysis needs 
three components – a social-historical setting/analysis, a discourse analysis and an 
interpretation of the former two as they interrelate. The symbolic forms, of which 
language is one, must be related to the historically specific contexts in which they 
are carried out, disseminated and received. In the previous chapter, I introduced the 
idea that notions about society are brought into the perceived expectations on par-
ents and I suggested that there is a possible tension in the location of responsibility 
– when is the parent assigned responsibility and when is responsibility placed within 
the institutional domains? In this study, the communities are used as an example of 
a particular phenomenon that can be labelled the responsibilisation of the parent. But 
if discourses about society operate in these negotiations on responsibility; what do 
we mean by society? Why is responsibility made to be so important in this particular 
era? In what ways does it affect the subjects of this study – parents? Bearing in mind 
the advice from John B. Thompson this chapter provides a contextual backdrop 
against which the aim of the dissertation should be comprehended. 
The chapter is divided in two main sections. The first section comprises a pres-
entation of contemporary political development and the transformation of the wel-
fare state and the second contains an introduction to research relevant for this study. 
Initially I will present the big picture: Politics and the welfare state and the way they 
are organised by contract theory; the cornerstone of liberalism. Thereafter, I will 
provide an account of contemporary political organisation and its institutions in 
which parenthood is practiced, monitored and measured, as well as pointing out the 
political and normative preferences of these institutions. The Chapter ends with a 
brief overview of the concrete parental practices and institutional demands linked to 
these preferences, as mirrored through previous research. 
Politics, liberalisation and the welfare state
I have stated that I wish to explore a discursive intersection between two ideas: Ideas 
about the role of the parent and ideas about the role of the welfare state. However, 
employing a concept such as the welfare state requires delimitations. What is the 
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welfare state, considering it is defined and operated so differently in various coun-
tries and contexts? There are an abundance of definitions available to delineate it, as 
well as differences between welfare states, even in cases when they can all be labelled 
universal. In the dissertation it matters less whether the welfare state is defined as, 
for example, corporatist, liberal or social democratic (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and 
in the analysis I settle for a more simplistic understanding. The welfare state is here 
defined as a social system for the reproduction of the population of a state and, 
hence, a meeting between state politics and the way of life of its population (Ther-
born, 1991: 53). In that capacity it is a type of state organisation of resources from 
which everybody (to some extent, or implicitly) gains, depends upon and to which 
everyone is assumed to feel more or less compelled to contribute. It is also thought 
of as the most effective way to achieve de-commodification (ibid.: 27 ff.).17 In the 
dissertation the welfare state is related to class politics because the welfare state agen-
cies ‘redistribute resources and life chances, and regulate risk stemming from market 
dependency’ (Svallfors, 2004: 119). Thus, the welfare state may regulate the ways 
that class positions, subsistence and social outcomes are intertwined. When the nicks 
in the communities refer to institutions of the welfare state, my assumption is thus 
that this is generally the way they understand it.18
Having said that, at present the welfare state is changing rapidly and presumably 
the hopes, demands and ideas about it are changing too. The current discourse of 
parenting notable in web community conversations as well as in tax debates is not an 
isolated Swedish phenomenon – I comprehend it as a reflection of a form of politics, 
referred to by Nikolas Rose (2000 a) as ethopolitics, in which political problems are 
reduced into moral principles: A politics of conduct grounded in particular values, 
one of which is a reciprocal obligation – a kind of contract relation – between the 
government and its subjects. The contract stipulates a relation between the two – 
if government provides the conditions necessary for a good life, the subjects have 
the responsibility to behave so that they benefit from the conditions (ibid: 1395, 
17 De-commodification should be understood not only as the manner in which individuals or fam-
ilies ‘can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37) but also access to publicly organised welfare services that enable the 
individual to take on paid work (Sainsbury, 1994: 162).
18 The definition is thus initiatory and does not encompass dimensions such as gender, or the way 
that the welfare state regime is both dependent upon and formats gender relations (Bussemaker 
& van Kersbergen, 1994: 9). I assume, however, that when the nicks talk of the welfare state (or 
‘society’) they refer not to the breadwinner model but the individual model where the recipient of 
benefits is the individual, taxation is separate, employment policies are aimed at both sexes and 
where the familial ideology presumes a shared role in matters of earnings and care-responsibili-
ties (Sainsbury, 1994: 152 f.). I assume this because the context in which the nicks live and write is 
Swedish and the Swedish welfare state is organised according to the latter model.
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1397f.). The contract is purely ethical and implies a citizen that can regulate and 
control herself.19 This is not the contract that once set out to ameliorate the hardship 
of the worst-off and was given the authority to force leftover groups into reformation 
and relative safety. Instead, Rose speaks of the emergence of an anti-politic state. 
Political government is gradually disentangled from its powers to calculate and steer 
from within its own core and a share of this responsibility is dislocated to individu-
als, localities, housing estates, schools and parents (ibid: 1400). One of the points of 
departure of this dissertation is that the specific way of negotiating parenting prac-
tises as desirable and productive or undesirable and unproductive, as in the opening 
posting in Chapter One, is re-vitalised by this political shift. 
Liberalism and the free subjects
The shift itself is sometimes called neo-liberal, advanced liberal or simply liberal. The 
particular ‘type’ of liberalism matters less for the dissertation20 but the view of the 
subject does. The way the subject is made to be responsible for her actions in the pa-
rental web community points to a liberal matrix of understanding: She is supposedly 
‘free’ but restrained by ethics.  In what follows I will map out this particular formula 
of freedom and constraint, and show how this perspective on freedom has its roots in 
social contract theory, which in turn presupposes an abstract citizen-subject.
Liberalism, irrespective of the label, encompasses a thoroughgoing notion of in-
dividualism as the perceived core of human beings. It considers the individual as the 
owner of herself and her capacities (Macpherson, 1962). In the framework of liber-
alism the individual is not understood primarily as a part of a societal context (nor 
indebted to any such context) and society is instead comprehended as a number of 
free individuals who relate to each other as ‘owners’ (ibid.: 3). The owner of a body, a 
capacity or ability can transfer them to another owner, such as when a labourer sells 
his/her body to an employer, and so the capacities can be ‘subject to contract’. What 
the diverse forms of liberalism furthermore share is the idea of the homo economi-
cus – the matrix in which people are made subjects. The premise behind the homo 
19 The concept of citizenship is multi-layered. It could mean a subject born in the country or some-
one who has residence permit but was born outside of the country. As I interpret Nikolas Rose, 
when using the term ‘citizen’ he speaks of both of these subjects, whilst early contract theorists 
appear to use the term reserved for the first type of subject. 
20 Disentangling the strands of a generic concept such as liberalism is complicated – political liberal-
ism does not invariably imply economic liberalism, and it does not always come with a doctrine 
about the human subject or the nature of morality (Mouffe, 1993/2005: 41 f.). In this study, lib-
eralism as a broad perspective is applied instead for its dependence on contract theory and the 
latter’s stipulation about subjects collectively deciding the rules of a society, i.e., I am focusing 
upon a particular part of the assumptions of liberalism. 
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economicus is the principle of the market transferred to the subject as self-interested 
and self-realising (Bowles & Gintis, 1993: 84 f.).21 In sum, the liberal visions of the 
way subjects construct a society are highlighted in the words contract, owner and 
self-interest. Carol Pateman labels this particular mix contractarianism (2002: 21): We 
enter into cooperation with others through contracts. Liberalism is the foundational 
ground for a kind of governing that is operationalised not so much by laws and rights 
but by this particular interest, as well as by investment and competition. In that 
fashion liberalism governs without governing, i.e., for the government to function 
its subjects have to be bestowed a great deal of freedom to act (for instance to invest 
and compete), and to choose, as Foucault contends: 
The new governmental reason needs freedom; therefore, the new art of gov-
ernment consumes freedom. It must produce it, it must organise it. The new 
art of government therefore appears as the management of freedom (2008:63).
Nevertheless, no versions of liberalism would have been able to stipulate the indi-
vidual’s right to invest himself in a market place, to exchange or compete, if not for 
contract theory. Contract theory can be considered the foundation of liberal democ-
racies.  The classic form of contract theory, as presented by Carole Pateman (1988: 1 
ff.), suggests that individuals are positioned as naturally free and equal to each other, 
and therefore there can be no valid arguments for subordination. This, one may say, 
is the very foundation of the theory, dating back to the seventeenth century. All men, 
John Locke argues (1690/1823: 106) are in ‘a state of perfect freedom to order their 
actions’ and at the same time ‘all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, 
and from doing hurt to one another’ (ibid.: 107). All social relations, the theory 
suggests, should take on a contractual form and, consequently, a free individual must 
agree to be ruled by another. The reason why the social contract functions – in the 
sense of people actually agreeing upon being governed – is that freedom is such an 
insecure condition that it becomes rational to subordinate oneself to the civil laws of 
a state. This subjection is allegedly not forced, as Pateman summarises (1988: 39 ff.); 
the citizen of a ‘state of nature’ has exchanged insecurity of freedom for civil freedom 
protected by the state.  
As the reader notes, such a theoretical view evokes several questions yet to be an-
swered. What and who is the citizen in a state of nature? On what principles should 
21 Liberalism is sometimes described as a political project that seeks to create a social reality of ex-
change (in the case of liberalism) and competition (in the case of neoliberalism) that it proposes 
already exists (Lemke, 2002: 60): People are like this – therefore society must be created the same. 
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the social contract be founded? How shall a contract be crafted in order for it not to 
be partial and favourable only to some? This is not the place to present a full layout 
of contract theory, but to point out some of its contradictions, which linger on into 
liberalism, and to indicate the way notions of contractual designs influence the pa-
rental communities.
How to achieve a society
The question of who can sign a social contract has been debated since the seventeenth 
century and answered in many ways. The contemporary comprehension of the con-
tract party (the subject who is to sign the contract) can be summarised in what John 
Rawls (1993/2005: 217) calls ‘reasonable citizens’.22 The core issue for these reason-
able citizens comprises identifying the most suitable principles for achieving liberty 
and equality, the only restraint being that the formation of principles must prioritise 
liberty above all other elements (Rawls, 1971: 302). The principles of the contract 
must be construed in such a way (rational and reasonable) that all citizens can em-
brace them, if they free themselves from self-interested affiliations, and the contract 
must contain principles for the distribution of societal resources so that they form a 
neutral morality.23 This is achieved through the ‘veil of ignorance’, meaning that the 
subjects choose principles for society with no knowledge of the strata in which they 
themselves will eventually end up. As a result, standpoints are assumed to be dis-
solved – the subjects will choose principles in a fair way when not aware of their own 
future position. As reasoning subjects, the contract parties become indistinguishable 
from one another and one party would be able to represent all the others. Pateman 
(2002: 41) labels this idea of dissolved standpoints ‘methodological Rawlsianism’ 
and argues that such an idea obscures the fact that when we debate a certain prin-
ciple, the debate itself involves some interpretation being brought to the fore, and 
others being ruled out (ibid.: 45). The presumptions of neutrality should instead be 
comprehended as a process of inclusion and exclusion, where some interpretations, 
values and interests are rendered neutral. 
This relates to a concept such as the welfare state, as well as to the idea of a cit-
izen-subject with rights and responsibilities organizing her life inside that frame: 
22 Rawls delineates a fundamentally deep disagreement between the citizens-to-be. We abide by 
different doctrines and we hold different viewpoints (religious or political), which is what would 
be expected in a heterogenic and pluralistic society (1993/2005: 4). Hence, what is needed is a 
‘mindset’ or a situation that is freed of these tensions.
23 This is one of Pateman’s (2002) main criticisms against contractarianism. She describes the man-
ner in which political philosophy, through the influence of Rawls amongst others, has turned into 
moral reasoning and that this transformation enables a view of democracy as a kind of political 
procedure that lacks connection to articulated political values (ibid.: 40).
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The notions of rights and responsibilities will have to be interpreted. In the parental 
communities, society (in which citizens with rights and responsibilities live) is read 
as an entity separated from the family. This view would come as no surprise if it was 
found to result from liberal influences. This is precisely what contract theory does – 
the fairly chosen principles regulate civil society as if it is not related to the intimate 
spheres of life and political domains are analysed separately from intimate domains 
such as the family (Pateman, 1988: 21). When investigating accounts on the welfare 
state and its subjects the issue, I believe, is to understand the way this separation is 
carried out and what it achieves. Liberalism and contract theory are usually accused 
of flattening political processes into rational procedures with no obvious signs of 
antagonisms, relations of power or conflicts (Mouffe, 1993/2005.: 49). But contra-
ry to the prerequisites of the contract, there is exploitation involved in most social 
contracts that are built upon agreements and that are entered voluntarily (such as the 
employment contract or the marriage contract) (Pateman 1988: 7 f.). If there is a 
tension between the standpoint that society is constructed as a result of politics and 
the standpoint that it is based upon morality, and if notions of appropriate rules and 
principles in civil society are never linked to the reproductive arenas, is it perhaps 
notable in web conversations about daycare, preparing meals and homework?
Representations of deficiency
This being said, we may ask why it matters if the domains of production and repro-
duction are treated as if separate entities in the parental communities. Is there a prob-
lem arising from the separation of the intimate and the public domains, or the idea 
of the reasonable and abstract subject making a deal with other subjects? According 
to Nancy Fraser (1990), there is. Not only does it suppress power relations or diverg-
ing interests, but it de-emphasises some concepts in public debate, especially those 
related to interpersonal affairs of a more intimate nature, or that relate to domains of 
life most often dealt with inside the family. Two such suppressed concepts are those 
of need and dependency. 
Fraser argues (ibid.: 199 ff.) that in late-capitalist welfare state societies, to have a 
need or express needs is part of a political discourse, because needs-talk is an idiom 
in which societal conflicts are manifested and elaborated (ibid.: 202). Certain needs 
can be put in opposition to embraced values, particularly to ‘choice’ (Ball, Bowe 
& Gewirtz, 1996: 89). Choice in turn is a concept that contains notions of con-
sumption, where market forces appear to be conflated with choice and when used 
in the contexts of the under privileged, it is often understood to mean consuming, 
or refraining from consuming, the right kind of goods, i.e., being active or passive. 
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This type of discursive investment into choice particularly moulds contemporary 
perceptions of poverty. Because a calculated choice (such as a choice to ‘invest’ in 
education) is understood to alleviate poverty, poor people are divided into groups, 
one of which is assumed to take action to free the members from poverty, while the 
other does not. This division of the poor into groups with different characteristics 
echoes historical notions of the deserving and undeserving poor. Martha L. Fineman 
(1991: 282) presents the way in which this classification distinguishes between those 
who are considered to have caused or worsened their poverty, and those struck by 
poverty due to reasons beyond their control. In viewpoints such as these, choice has 
eclipsed need.
Family life, however, is demarcated not only by needs being fulfilled but by an-
other relational feature; that of dependency. The child depends upon its caretaker 
and the partners in a relationship depend upon each other to make the daily routines 
function. In terms of reasonable and convertible citizens debating principles for the 
distribution of resources, Eva Feder Kittay (1999: xiii, 185) stresses how need is un-
evenly spread out – we need different amounts of resources depending on what type 
of individual we are. Some subjects become more recipients of care, whilst others 
provide care, i.e. we are not convertible. When assuming a neutral type of subject 
there will always be a necessity to make adaptations for that which is not neutral or 
abstract in the eyes of the societal fellowship. Kittay (ibid.: 80) criticises contract 
theory for the presumption that the party agreeing to the contract holds the same 
amount of freedom and equality over the course of his/her entire lifetime. According 
to Kittay (ibid.: 81), Rawls fails to acknowledge that the parties signing the contract 
will be dependent upon it in different ways due to, for instance, class or race. To this 
critique we may add the work carried out inside the family, especially in the family 
with children. In every individual’s life history there are stages in which dependency 
is unavoidable, such as in early childhood, or in old age and illness. Kittay calls this 
dependency ‘inescapable’ (ibid.: 29) because the frail individual cannot make frail-
ty go away, and because someone will be assigned the non-negotiable task of care, 
that which Kittay labels dependency work. This is another potential component of 
conversation to look for in the parental web communities – what types of situation 
are considered neutral (and thus not up for debate), and what is seen as non-normal 
(and debatable), and how are issues of need and dependency addressed?
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The politics of the Swedish welfare state, triangulation and 
ethopolitics
When summing up this presentation of contract theory, we see that the stipulation 
of neutrality is problematic. Irrespective of Rawls’ intention to create a situation 
where the neutral moral of the contract is formulated by an abstract and reasonable 
individual, it becomes a political fiction (Pateman, 1988: 42). Nevertheless, the re-
birth of a liberal vision of a reasonable and self-interested citizen-subject does not 
only come in one particular shape and it is no longer the property of liberalism, but 
has also become part of its political counterparts. We will now briefly take a look 
at how this happened in Sweden. I will sketch the transformation of the Swedish 
welfare state over the last three decades, as well as the transformation of the political 
party that originally launched it, the Social Democratic Party. In addition, I will 
demonstrate how this process has shaped welfare institutions accordingly.
In the 1980s a re-birth of liberal thought took place in the Western world – a 
blend of aspirations for a regrowth of the economy, support for family values, an-
ticipation of making welfare institutions more effective, support for value pluralism 
and aspirations for international regulation of trade (Rose, 2000 a). In Sweden, as in 
many other European countries, this meant a massive, albeit gradual, reformulation 
of the official discourse on capitalism, private markets and the welfare state. The 
central tenet of the overall social democratic discourse – the primacy of politics over 
economy – was in Sweden reformulated and the way in which the Social Democratic 
Party enabled a compromise between capital and the interest of the working class was 
challenged (Stilhof Sörensen, 2014: 4).24
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is often considered the turning point for 
social democracy all over Europe. Suddenly the political pressure from the left was 
significantly weakened, and instead a presumed consensus of the benefits of a market 
economy in combination with a democratic form of government was established 
24 Historically, the keystone of the socialist compromise can be summarised as an attempt to tame 
‘the beast’ of capitalism to be able to redistribute its profits more evenly by offering the market 
workers who were properly educated, fed and taken care of when ill, as well as industrial peace. 
This compromise secured the capitalist’s possibility to make profit, whilst still ensuring worker’s 
rights and subsistence. In other words, the main idea within the Social Democrat movement 
was to create a societal fellowship that embraced both the capitalist and the worker – an idea 
embodied in the metaphor of the ‘People’s Home’, meant to illustrate the way a society should 
be politically organised to look after all of its citizens. The modern Swedish welfare state was a 
compromise between the state and the market – and the relation between these two was formed 
through a democratic political control. The lifeblood of this control was the public sector built 
upon formal rules, professionalism, a code of ethics and a public sector offering institutional 
welfare service available for all citizens (Stilhof Sörensen, 2014.:6 f.).  
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(Andersson, 2009). During the 1980s the neoliberal trends became more manifest 
in Sweden, and deeply affected the Social Democratic Party. The latter has a lot in 
common with the New Labour in the UK: During this period the dreams of putting 
the means of production into the hands of the workers were relinquished and the 
flirtation with the middle class voters meant that socialist ideology was disallowed. 
Both parties instead chose the political method of triangulation; they placed them-
selves in a ‘third position’ between their previous political position and that of their 
opponents to the right, thereby hoping to attract as many voters as possible. This 
new position is also known as the third way and amongst the prominent figures advo-
cating this model were the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, former Swedish 
Prime Minister, Göran Persson and sociologist Anthony Giddens (ibid.: 12 ff.). 
The third way meant that liberal discourse became close to hegemonic, which 
radically changed the welfare state and its institutions. In the 1990s Sweden saw 
drastic privatisations of the public sectors, including health care, infrastructure and 
education (Stilhof Sörensen, 2014: 10 ff.). The public sector embraced market mod-
els, with authorities and institutions divided and made to act as competing func-
tions. Several institutions and departments were obliged to generate a profit and 
all types of welfare institutions were forced to assess themselves and their perfor-
mances. The market model also generated changes in the way that the individual 
was positioned vis-a-vis welfare institutions. The discourse changed – responsibility 
was gradually moved out of the institutions to each citizen, who was treated as if 
accountable for her health and wellbeing (Hörnfeldt, 2015: 92 f.). In other words, 
the Swedish welfare state has changed drastically. It has become liberalised and is 
built upon a notion of equally free subjects who are no longer adjusted by socialist 
political organisation constructed on the presumption of exploitation within the free 
market, but by a market model of New Public Management. If Sweden in the 1940s 
and 1950s strived to give people a basic social security it is no longer obvious what 
agent is ultimately accountable for welfare provision (ibid.: 88). The assumptions 
about the subject embraced by this type of welfare state are the same, I believe, as 
those presumed in contract theory.
The rebirth of social democracy has interested Nikolas Rose (2000 a). He con-
siders four values as the pillars of the transformation; equal worth, opportunity for 
everyone, responsibility and community. This community orientation paved the way 
for another connection between the personal and the political (ibid: 1396 f.), which 
became ethically imbued: We are free to do what we want, and we should want to do 
the right thing. Ethopolitics is, perhaps, that which has most effectively superseded 
socialist ideology. Just like contract theory, ethopolitics needs a general, unspecified 
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subject as its protagonist and omits assumptions of exploitation and subordination. 
We now have a moral rather than political contract to sign, which plausibly makes 
whether governmental power is in the hands of social democrats or a more articulate 
liberal party less relevant. As I understand it, the third way has had an equalising 
effect on politics, as it has become equated with morality. Having said that, the ques-
tion is how this composite of politics and morality hits the subjects in this study? If 
parents are political subjects responding to politics, in what way are they addressed 
in Swedish political ambitions and by politically assigned institutions?
Swedish gender equality regimes
To become familiar with the ways in which the parent is articulated in political 
discourse we will take a look at one of the areas that is a source of national pride in 
Sweden (Dahl, 2005), the ambitions to promote and facilitate gender equality. To 
comprehend contemporary parenthood in Sweden one must understand the way 
it is intertwined with this type of social engineering – the same type that assisted 
in the design of the Swedish welfare state of the 20th century (ibid.: 49) – and one 
also needs to understand how it has played a role in the construction of Sweden as a 
progressive nation. So, are political ambitions also levelled in this particular domain 
of politics? The answer is perhaps; yes and no. In the following I will present the 
Swedish discourse of gender equality and look at what kind of subject these political 
ambitions assume. 
The situation in the Scandinavian countries differs from that of many industri-
alised countries in the Western world, partly because of women’s relatively extensive 
participation in the labour market, and partly because of the associated reconsider-
ation of the responsibility of the welfare state in relation to the family (Leira, 2002: 
2). When comparing the incorporation of working women in a liberal welfare state 
such as the UK with the social democratically based welfare state of Sweden, one 
will note that the different political traditions impact on policy approaches to social 
reproduction and to women in employment. For example, in the UK resistance 
towards institutional interventions into the family has been stronger than in Swe-
den, while the Swedish responsiveness to demands from the work force, women 
included, has helped to pave the way for an acceptance of state support for, among 
other things, childcare services (ibid.: 23). Nevertheless, a presentation of the official 
gender equality policy in Sweden tells a story of ideology colliding with practice. 
Since the 1970s equality between men and women has been promoted in all sectors 
of the Swedish political administration, and increased parental leave for fathers has 
been an articulate goal in order for women to be able to remain in the labour market, 
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which in turn explains the comprehensive investments in child care (Elwin-Novak & 
Thomsson, 2001). Yet parallel to these investments, statistics indicate that equality 
is far from complete. Women are still the main providers of care for children and 
the elderly, and carry out unpaid household work for twice the amount of time than 
men (SCB, 2011). The impression that first meets the eye would thus be that Swed-
ish family policy does not surmise a neutral subject but a gendered one. The starting 
point is two delimited subjects; the woman and the man, and the heterosexual fami-
ly. (Lundqvist, 2015: 86). This perspective on gender equality has enabled exclusions 
and demarcations; subjects or families that do not fit the discourse. Instead, a specific 
part of the Swedish feminist movement gained support from the welfare state appa-
ratus – the white, heterosexual, educated, able-bodied and monogamous middleclass 
(Dahl, 2005: 66). This, I believe, can in fact be understood as the ‘true’ subject of 
contemporary liberal government – the assumed subject in this type of government 
– and in much the same way as the ethopolitical regime excludes dependent or sub-
ordinated subjects, the Swedish gender equality discourse excludes subjects that do 
not fit in with the prescribed frame, whilst still describing its aspirations as address-
ing everyone. 
How can the non-white, the non-middleclass or non-educated subject be ex-
cluded or considered deviant in times of ethopolitics, especially when the political 
administration articulates the aims of improving equality and equal rights as in the 
case of Swedish gender equality aspirations? According to Malin Rönnblom (2011), 
it is because these aims are reduced to administrative techniques and thereby depolit-
icised. Gender equality, she argues (ibid.: 35 f.) is a problem that does not challenge 
the prevailing order, but confirms it. Rönnblom provides us, I believe, with a prolific 
interconnection between the subject made available in gender equality administra-
tive techniques, and the subject alluded to in ethopolitics. In public discourse gender 
equality is comprehended as an obvious and common political goal from which 
everyone gains. When viewing gender equality in that way, power division issues 
are put aside and by formulating the matter in non-conflicting terms, it is made to 
look as if we all hold the same type of stake and interests. ‘We’ are characterised as 
reasonable subjects who all have a great deal to gain from living our lives in an equal 
fashion. If this ‘we’ is presumed to benefit from equality (rather than for example 
lose power) it makes Swedish gender equality discourse the bearer of much the same 
elements as contractarianism (Pateman, 2002: 21) and its outlook on the subject 
as accountable and free. That which binds these two subjects together is a presumed 
neutrality: Gender equality becomes a sibling of ethopolitics because they both de-
politicise the project. 
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Another similarity between notions of social contracts and of gender equality lies 
in visions of execution and implementation. In Swedish discourse the overarching 
model of thought when an absence of gender equality is to be explained is that peo-
ple lack knowledge, thus knowledge becomes both the problem and the solution. 
Treating the issue in that fashion obscures issues of struggle (Rönnblom, 2011: 43). 
Whilst gender equality has become a question of enhancing accountability and ad-
ministrative implementation and knowledge transfer techniques, the larger political 
scene has gradually become more involved in the same matters. In a political land-
scape that does not allow for conflict and prefers knowledge, administration and 
accountability as solutions to societal ills, it is only to be expected that education 
and training are what is advocated. In gender equality efforts, as well as in contrac-
tarianism, the ‘problematic’ subjects are both ostracised from discourse, while at 
the same time constituting the very object of it: They must become knowledgeable 
and made to assume responsibility. Swedish equality regimes are thereby part of a 
Western feminism that has formatted a racialized and class bound conception of the 
feminine predicament. In other words, it has privileged gender as an analytic starting 
point, and made equality into a sign of cultural belonging when addressing some 
subjects, or lack of belonging when addressing other subjects (Fahlgren & Sawyer, 
2005: 96, 99). As I understand it the subject asked to sign the social contract in 
times of ethopolitics and the subject addressed by Swedish gender equality discourse 
it is based upon a fictitious neutrality and in that sense it is both gendered, and 
not gendered. Individuals who are considered part of the solution (to be an equal, 
knowledgeable and accountable subject) are portrayed as if they have no colour or 
class, whilst the subject singled out as problematic is often coloured and classed. The 
setting is made neutral, due to a lack of political analyses of different (and conflict-
ing) interests. 
Consequently, when probing into venues such as the parental communities one 
needs to take into account the transformations of Swedish welfare agencies, as well 
as the assumptions of reasonable, convertible and accountable subjects that under-
pin both contemporary political debate in general, and the Swedish gender equality 
strivings in particular. In this study, they are assumed to be a backcloth against which 
articulation takes place. 
The politics of parenting: From wealth to warmth
If, as claimed, ethopolitics (and the way it is supported by contract theory) has had 
a levelling effect on politics, this tendency is putatively manifested in the way peo-
ple organise their lives, in the way they are discussed in public discourse and in the 
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design of institutional aid or services. We will continue by taking a look at how the 
ethically preoccupied politics of today approaches the subject of this dissertation – 
parents. 
In times of ethopolitics the images of parents resemble those of the poor or the 
excluded in one particular way: Both categories are viewed from the perspective of 
capability rather than need. In an attempt to understand the contemporary shift in 
the political understanding of parents’ needs and obligations, Tracey Jensen (2010) 
investigates a contemporary fashion for speaking of parenting as a verb and not as 
an ontological category (‘the parent’). The belief in the capacities of parents to me-
diate other variables of social and economic disadvantage can be associated with a 
political agenda about social inclusion and poverty that suggests it is what parents 
do that make a difference for the child, rather than their material or social resources, 
which mostly relate to who they are (in terms of class, education, networks etc.) The 
outlook upon parenting as balancing out factors of detriment and deprivation is thus 
political (ibid: 1 f.). 
In Sweden this tendency is notable in political pleading with parents to act in 
order to prevent certain societal ‘ills’. One example is the appeal from Tomas Tobé, 
member of Parliament and chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Educa-
tion, to Swedish parents in 2014 to reduce the amount of time their children spent 
computer gaming and increase the amount of time they devoted to doing their 
homework, which was described as a ‘handshake’ between the Government and the 
parents.25 The metaphor of handshake is interesting in itself, in that it alludes to 
contracts, or the way we shake hands to seal a contract. But the demand for good 
parenting is not confined to the political domains. In the editorial pages of Swedish 
newspapers the (deficient) capacities of parents are often described as the cause of 
social problems in general. The first exemplary quote comes from an editorial page 
discussing parent’s obligations in relation to homework and the second puts forward 
suggestions of how to prevent teenagers from participating in riots.
I cannot help but find it terrifying that the responsibility that comes with 
children is  apparently a shock for many parents. For instance, for how well 
they do at school. Abdicating from the role of parent as soon as the going gets 
rough is actually not an alternative. It may sound harsh, but if they cannot 
find the time or the energy to assist with homework, then mummy and daddy 
should immediately prioritise their own activities less
25 See Aftonbladet (http.//www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/debattamnen/skola/article18443305.ab.).
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(Editorial pages of Göteborgs-Posten, 14 October 2013) (author’s translation). 
26 
Why do some pick up stones whilst others do not? It is partly about personal 
morality but primarily concerns social control. In both respects the fundamen-
tal problem is inadequate parenthood. It is really very simple: Some boys are 
allowed to run around and ravage among burning cars at 2 a.m., while other 
boys are kept at home by their parents. Most are boys of school-going age 
who attend a school with a range of resources and committed teachers, have 
access to youth recreation centres and sports. Boys who live in a country with 
low difference in income and universities that do not charge fees. Such boys 
can become policemen men or physicians, or live comfortably as taxi drivers 
or warehouse workers. But it is easy to skip school. And it is fun to throw 
stones. Frustration and boredom are replaced by excitement and adventure. 
The parents of these youngsters need to be helped and made to assume more 
responsibility. Other institutions and communities must develop strategies 
to compensate for shortcomings in the home. In the absence of parents, soci-
ety – through the police and the rest of the legal system – has to clearly state 
what is right and wrong. More [people] need to be arrested. Law and order 
must be reinstated. Measures need to be undertaken both from the police and 
the Social Services. Absent parents as well as laughing stone-throwers have 
to be held responsible (Editorial pages of Svenska Dagbladet, 26 May 2013) 
(author’s translation).27 
In political as well as mass media reflections upon school, homework and crime the 
comprehension of life chances through the lens of class appears to be outdated. In-
stead of talking about wealth and its prerequisites or the conditions that lead to eco-
nomic and social hardship, policy makers, editorials and institutions have seemingly 
embraced parenting as a sum of acts occurring in zones of private conduct (Jensen, 
2010: 3 f.): Parenting comes across as a form of citizenship of a private nature. It 
becomes a question of choosing a kind of ‘best practice’ that is already predefined in 
a system of class values, where the middle class parent serves as a role model (ibid.).
The faith in parenting ‘best practice’ is firmly rooted in political reasoning in Swe-
den, as in other countries. In 2010 the same type of formulation was used in a speech 
26 See Göteborgs-Posten (http://www.gp.se/nyheter/ledare/1.2130057-skolan-ska-inte-curla-
foraldrar.).
27 See Svenska Dagbladet (http://www.svd.se/opinion/ledarsidan/de-skrattar-nar-stenarna-kas-
tas_8209788.svd). 
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given by the  former British Prime Minister David Cameron at the launch of the 
project Building Character at Demos28 project to upgrade a sense of parental worth. 
Of course there is a link between material poverty and poor life chances, but 
the full picture is that that link also runs through the style of parenting that 
children in poor households receive. /…/ What matters most to the child’s 
life chances is not the wealth of their upbringing but the warmth of their par-
enting (Cited from Jensen, 2010: 2).
As Jensen points out, in the speech Cameron acknowledges poverty as a possible 
explanation for life outcomes but at the same time disqualifies wealth as an explan-
atory factor for success, and introduces warmth, i.e., a potentially evenly distributed 
capability. Replacing wealth with warmth is a part of rewriting the terms of social 
inequalities that harks back to older distinctions between deserving and undeserv-
ing poor, and, hence, parents who cannot engraft success in their children become 
failures in self-governance more than victims of structural injustice (Gilles, 2005 a: 
837). 
Demos has launched a home page that presents several of its projects. Here, the 
idea that some parents are failures is spelled out, but also the prescribed remedy for 
the broken society, building character: 
There is growing interest in the political and policy importance of a certain 
set of personal attributes – in particular emotional control, empathy, applica-
tion to task, personal agency, an ability to defer gratification – that might be 
summarized as ‘character’ [emphasis added]. The possession of these character 
traits, or character capabilities [emphasis added], is an important predictor of 
a range of individual and collective aspirations, from health and educational 
outcomes to political engagement and civility. (http://www.demos.co.uk/
projects/the-character-inquiry). 
In the quotation, ‘character’ is described as a possession of the individual and linked 
with matters such as political engagement, education and the health of a country. We 
might remember how liberalism views the subject as primarily an owner of proper-
ties and capacities rather than part of a societal organisation. In liberalism we inter-
28 Demos is a British cross-party think tank. See: http://www.demos.co.uk/about for a presenta-
tion of Demo’s activities and projects, including more information on the thoughts behind the 
‘Building Character’ project. 
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relate as ‘owners’ (Macpherson, 1962: 3). Demos seemingly views character as such 
a possession.
The ideal of tough love
As mentioned in Chapter One, the right type of parenting can be apprehended as a 
remedy for a broken society. In that sense one can talk of parenting as a joint nation-
al fantasy; good parenting is perceived as if achieving capable new citizens (Jensen, 
2012). Jensen captures the phenomenon as it crystallises in a kind of desired parental 
practice of tough love (ibid.: 8 f.) – having a correct relational balance between giving 
the child affection and disciplining it. Tough love is a parental ideal as well as an ideal 
for how to heal society; in this discourse the remedy for a wasteful society as well as 
an unstable family is a balance between austerity and thrift. Public spending needs 
to be austere and rigorously calculated, whilst parents need to calculate the perfect 
balance between warmth and discipline, in order to help their children to achieve the 
most out of life. In that sense tough love is perceived as enhancing social mobility.
The aim to cultivate the parental skills necessary for this balancing act is also 
noteworthy in a Swedish context.29 Public support to make parents more able has ex-
isted in Sweden for almost a century, and a range of diverse parental ideals have been 
promoted. In the reasoning about publicly administered parental support in the gov-
ernment report Föräldrastöd en vinst för alla. Nationell strategi för samhällets stöd och 
hjälp till föräldrar i deras föräldraskap (SOU, 2008: 131)30 ‘support’ is understood in 
economic terms – apart from generating the positive development of children it is 
said to have positive effects upon the national economy, as it is depicted as decreasing 
social exclusion, drug abuse, unemployment and illness (ibid: 123). Perhaps even 
more telling is the Governmental Institute of Public Health’s report Nya verktyg för 
föräldrar: förslag till nya former av föräldrastöd (Bremberg, 2004: 48).31 In this report 
public support for parents is considered important because it is helps them obtain a 
necessary balance between ‘warmth’ and ‘frames’; an almost exact replica of the ideal 
of tough love. The report claims that evidence exists that children are not influenced 
by structural conditions but parental practice: ‘The warmth of the parents is more 
important than the family’s material circumstances and is often more important than 
the relationships with friends’ (ibid: 49, author’s translation). The necessary parental 
29 For a Swedish version of this discourse, see for instance the book by David Eberhardt’s Hur 
barnen tog makten (2013) (in English: How the children came in power), addressing issues of parental 
neglect and lack of discipline. Calculated warmth towards the child is notable in Martin Forster’s 
Fem gånger mer kärlek (2009) (in English: Five times more love).
30 In English: Parent support everybody gains. A national strategy for societal support and aid to parents.
31 In English: New tools for parents – suggestions for new forms of parent support.  
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skills are narrowed down to four vital components: warmth, consistency, clearly stat-
ed expectations and a level of self-determination on behalf of the child (ibid: 50). In 
other words, maintaining a good parental practice is envisioned as facilitating social 
mobility and stability, while notions of enhancing redistribution have disappeared 
from Swedish institutional aims of improving the nation’s parents. Class is no longer 
on the agenda, but instead techniques aimed at a subject formulated in neutral terms. 
Family, expectations and class: A selection of previous 
research
The outline above has introduced the reader to the specific political context in which 
parenthood takes place. So far I have not presented how parents actually think and 
act in this particular context. How do they orient themselves in a setting that empha-
sises responsible choice, contract relations and consumerism? How do institutions 
view parents; their role and function, and what demands do they place upon parents? 
The chapter will now change focus and I will present a condensed picture of previous 
research of relevance to the study. This review is not intended to be a comprehensive 
mapping but rather to place the dissertation in a relevant research context. If class is 
reformulated into inner capacities, as was formulated in the Swedish public health 
discourse and by the Demos think tank, it is necessary to include research about the 
relations between the construction of parenthood and class, as well as research on 
institutional expectations of parental practices. The following presentation includes 
studies from Sweden and other parts of Scandinavia, the UK, the US and Canada 
and focuses on the way the parent is perceived by parents themselves and by close 
institutions (such as schools). Other relevant work not presented in this section will 
be introduced in the analytical chapters. 
As the reader has presumably already noted research performed in a British con-
text plays an important part in the setting of the frames of the study. There are two 
principal reasons for this. First, much of the research on the intersections between 
perceptions of class and perceptions of the quality or outcome of parenthood ema-
nates from the UK. Secondly, in the UK class differences in actual living conditions 
are considerable, but have not affected politics/policies very much (Svallfors, 2004: 
132), while in Sweden a political articulation of class has historically been prominent 
(ibid.: 130). This difference makes the British studies an interesting contrast to  the 
present one. In the light of the rapid transformation of the Swedish welfare state and 
the growth of market models (i.e., an articulation of a totally different nature), ap-
plying British research would potentially provide a pertinent contrast to the Swedish 
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discourse about ‘sound parenting’ or presumed ‘decent ways’ of using welfare state 
benefits. 
Another feature of this compilation of research is its starting point: Conceptions 
about class. The concept of class itself has been questioned and criticised for being 
a stretched conceptual net that captures phenomena stemming from highly diverse 
social realities, whilst identifying them as the results of ‘class belonging’. That would 
perhaps make the concept into a ‘theory of everything’ (Pakulski, 1993: 279). In the 
case of the present study, the research reviewed to frame its results is intended to indi-
cate the manner in which parents think of class in terms of suitable ways of behaving. 
This means that my intention in this particular section is to focus upon the cultural 
and personal making of class and class related expectations, and in particular how this 
is done by positioning other parents (mothers) as different, deviant or unfortunate. 
Hence, there will be a focus upon research on the subject that performs class and be-
cause middle class preference often shapes the norms of parenting in general (Gillies, 
2005a: 836), special attention will be devoted to middle class ideals.
Making the middle class
One of the dissertation’s starting points is the contemporary political notion of pa-
rental skills as the prime enabler of upwards social mobility, as it is presented by Trac-
ey Jensen (2010, 2012). But how does this notion trickle down to actual parents? 
In an interview study with middle and working class parents, Val Gillies (2005 b) 
discovers a diffused notion that children who are ‘parented’ the right way will have an 
enhanced possibility of upward mobility. The parents in her study isolate parenting 
practices from their material context and see them as neutral methods that must be 
conveyed to all parents for the public good (ibid: 840). In a follow up study Gillies 
(2008 a) compares working- and middle class mothers’ strategies for securing re-
sources from school. She finds that similar intentions on the part of mothers play out 
differently in the school setting, with the middleclass mother securing resources and 
the working class mother failing to do so, mainly due to the fact that the latter lacks 
the necessary financial and social capital.32 Thus, the chances of upwards mobility are 
in Gillies’ findings not ensured by ‘parenting’.33
32 In addition, Gillies has suggested (2008 a), the working class mother takes a risk in enforcing 
middle class child-rearing models, simply because it is risky to cultivate individuality, taste and 
independence in a child in a social setting where ‘choice and power are limited, hazards are many 
and consequences severe’ (ibid.: 1093).
33 In fact, Gillies has demonstrated (2008 b: 102) how there is a univocal relationship between the 
resources of middle class parents and their child-rearing practices, and how these parents use 
their resources (prestigious contacts, money and legitimate cultural capital) to help their children 
get ahead, whilst working class parents concentrate on helping their children overcome strains 
and trouble at school.
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Middle class ideals can also be investigated in terms of routine matters of life, such 
as the place where one lives, or habits of everyday life. Aspirations for the child can, 
for instance, play a role in the choice of the neighbourhood in which to live. In 
Maja Lilja’s (2015) study of Swedish middle class mothers’ choice of residential area, 
she notes that the women’s accounts are ambiguous. While stating that they want 
their children to grow up in a socially and culturally diverse neighbourhood, in their 
decision-making they in fact avoid diversity. They explain their decisions by using 
accounts about the difference in ‘parental styles’ between home owners and tenants 
(especially tenants with an immigrant background). These alleged differences are 
employed to explain both the decision on where to live and why the middle class 
mothers do not mix with mothers from the housing estates (ibid.: 131). Care, mor-
al responsibilities and place thus become linked together; a feature also displayed 
by Therese Wissö (2012), although examined from another angle. Wissö uncovers 
(ibid.: 183 f.) the manner in which mothers from disadvantaged suburbs are made 
to feel less welcome in the context of ‘open preschools’34 where they describe being 
ignored by middle class parents, or not fitting in to the normative frame for how a 
parent should act, leading to them avoiding to visit these venues. 
Yet another everyday practice in which class (and gender) can be located is in the 
planning and the preparation of the family dinner. Terese Anving (2012) explores 
Swedish mothers of young children and the manner in which they talk about food, 
revealing that accounts about food allow for a hierarchisation of people. Certain type 
of food (such as sugar), and certain places (such as McDonalds) become places of 
identity work, which involves dissociating oneself from particular habits and places 
and stressing other (ibid.: 174 ff.). The mothers host underlying assumptions that 
middle class parents choose healthy food, whilst parents from the working class eat 
with less focus upon health (ibid.: 172). Thus, distinctions made by middle class 
parents relate to discourses of choice, which also affect other areas of life, evident in a 
Swedish interview study conducted by Marie Karlsson, Annica Löfdahl and Héctor 
Pérez Prieto (2013). They demonstrate how concepts of ‘good parenting’ are linked 
to making choices, in this case choices of childcare, and how the parents performing 
choices position themselves against the perceived more problematic ‘non-choosers’. 
Making a choice is almost equated with making an identity claim, and the parents in 
the study use a discourse of choice saturated with a more psychologically imbued un-
34 An open preschool is an initiative that can be organised by the local church or by the munici-
pality. It offers a place for parents of young children to meet and socialise on a voluntary basis 
for a couple of hours every week, before the children are enrolled into the regular municipal 
preschool.
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derstanding of children’s needs. Choosing makes these parents feel accountable and 
responsible: As if children need the parent to choose for them (ibid.: 221). Bridget 
Byrne (2006) also focuses on parental choice and its consequences, revealing the way 
that British middle-class mothering involves classed, raced and/or gendered practices 
in matters of how to choose schools and construct social networks for their children. 
Byrne (ibid.: 1012 ff.) finds that the mothers that are interviewed perform acts of 
making distinctions between ‘types’ of middle-class and choose networks in accord-
ance with what they perceive as their own type. The mothers select appropriate chil-
dren for their child to play with and take an interest in micro-level performances of 
identity to size each other up, all of which is framed under the heading of catering for 
the good of the child. Ten years before Byrne’s study the same pattern of middle class 
mothers’ dislocation of class was demonstrated by Ellen Brantlinger, Massoumeh 
Majd-Jabbari and Samuel L. Guskin (1996). While believing in integrated schools 
these mothers still differentiated poor families from themselves, understanding poor 
parents as disinterested in culture, reading and language, and these attributions were 
not followed by any attempts to understand the reasons for this perceived lack of 
cultural capital (ibid.: 580). The mothers ignored monetary resources as explanations 
for class inequalities in relation to school performance and focused upon differences 
in values (ibid.: 586).35 
But the construction of a middle class identity also implies work performed on 
the child, and strategies of transmission. This is notable in a study by Carol Vincent 
and Stephen J. Ball (2007) on reproduction strategies, where they explore what part 
extracurricular activities play in middle-class parents’ class reproduction strategies. 
They conclude that these activities are a reaction to a sense of anxiety on the part of 
the parents, and that the intention to give the child the right type of habitus is seen 
as an investment in a future envisioned as less than safe and where class belonging 
is a struggle. Market forces playing with mother’s anxieties prepare the ground for a 
frenetic parental activity that maintains social boundaries (ibid.: 1069 ff.). That be-
ing said, acting out a sense of class belonging can be an activity that comes with con-
straints. In an interview study of white middle-class mothers, Simon Duncan (2005) 
shows that many are unable to exercise their preference. Some had no possibilities to 
control the amount of time spent in the workplace, while others had opportunities 
both to work part time and to work from home. Some exhibited a strong career 
focus, while others showed preferences for staying at home once they had become 
35 These identity performances come across as similar to those made in parental communities 
where class and race determine the outcome of the interplay (Hargittai, 2007) and where the 
child is used as an impression management prop (Collett, 2005; Alstam, 2013).
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mothers. These differences, Duncan argues (ibid.: 60, 68), should not be read as 
merely preferences: The dispersed patterns are the result of being caught between a 
normative ideal and an economic reality, or in other words; ideology does not always 
allow for reality. In a Swedish context, Lucas Forsberg (2009) also investigates the 
collision between ideology and practice when studying how middle class dual-earn-
er couples handle time pressure by applying delegating, alternating or multitasking 
strategies. He shows that these strategies create unexpected tensions, such as when 
the child expects the parent to be involved but the parent wants to finish a chore. 
This, Forsberg argues (ibid.: 171 f.), points to the split between ideology and practice 
and he suggests that the time-related household strategies may be about producing 
oneself as an involved parent rather than making efficient use of time.
The making of class is, hence, something performed in the everyday routines of a 
household, but it is also related to realising ideals and norms of a ‘generic’ good par-
enthood. This perceived good parenthood seems to rely on two factors in particular: 
Time and money.36 
Identities, ideals and failures
Regardless of the financial recourses or class position, parenting appears to be evalu-
ated and comprehended, partly, through the eyes of others; a feature that is evident 
in research about parental web communities. While social capital can be gained from 
participating in conversation (Drentea & Moren-Cross, 2005), the community us-
ers also mention constraining forces: Gender stereotypes appear to be fostered and 
the mother is made especially responsible for the behaviour of the child (Madge & 
O’Connor, 2006; Kokkonen, 2009). Research on parental web communities sug-
gests that when parents struggle to achieve the ideal of sound parenthood it is often 
to gain recognition from others, and the situation seems to be similar outside of 
the communities. By interviewing and observing parental practices amongst middle 
class parents in Sweden, Lucas Forsberg (2010) explores parenthood ideals in these 
families and reveals parental norms of involvement and responsibility. Although the 
36 Moreover, the making of class identity sometimes depends on others performing chores in the 
middle class family home, i.e., on having the financial means to pay for these services. In Sweden 
the trend of dual career households and the pressure on women with academic degrees to work 
long hours while also performing unpaid household chores has resulted in the gender equality 
discourse including somewhat surprising elements, as Ellinor Platzer (2006) demonstrates in her 
study of political incentives for domestic services from the 1930s to the present day. These ser-
vices, Platzer argues (ibid.: 216, 218 f.) preserve a particular life style, reproduce gender divisions 
and exploit working class women. Hiring a domestic worker means that marital conflicts about 
household chores are mitigated, whilst simultaneously transferred to someone else. This means 
that the realisation of some middle class women’s identities takes place at the expense of other 
women.
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ideal is one of commitment, it does not only ensure the wellbeing of the child and 
good relationships within the family, but in addition leads to acknowledgement from 
other parents (ibid: 94). Hence, it seems as if parents want to have their parenting 
practices approved by others, as well as evaluate the practices of other parents. Paren-
tal ideals may thus generate an othering; a distinction in which the parent positions 
herself as different from other (worse) parents. In the 2014 study by Päivi Berg and 
Marja Peltola’s about self-perception amongst Finnish parents, this tendency cuts 
across social divisions. Parents from both majority and minority ethnic backgrounds 
rely on images of their parenthood as respectable and the sense of respectability is 
intertwined with a notion of a decent citizenship. Respectability is, however, manu-
factured on the basis of constructions of other parents described as lacking the right 
moral values. The parents in the study considered themselves capable of revealing 
parental practices by studying the habitus of children around them, believing that 
the habitus was proof of parental capabilities (ibid: 9 f.). I found the same tendency 
in an in-depth analysis of a quarrel about proper parenting techniques in one of the 
parental web communities focused on in this study (Alstam, 2013). Irrespective of 
the fact that the child could not be physically evaluated in this arena, the mere de-
scription of it led to the nick receiving reproaches for failing to discipline the child, 
reproaches that were not totally rejected. Instead, the nick that was accused tried 
to prove that she really had been a firm enough mother; a feature of conversation I 
interpret as displaying shared norms of motherhood that cannot be challenged. This 
finding is supported by other studies on self-perception amongst Swedish mothers. 
In an interview study Ylva Elvin-Novak and Heléne Thomsson (2001) find that the 
mothers apply ideals of accessibility, sensitivity and engagement when evaluating 
themselves. According to the mothers, the more accessible, sensitive and engaged 
in the life of the child they manage to be, the more they can function as a vaccine 
against problems. This view was also shared by mothers who, for various reasons, 
were unable to fulfil the ideal (ibid.: 414 f.).37 The ideals of intense mothering led to 
self-reproach amongst the mothers who were interviewed, a feature that was more 
pronounced in single or working class mothers. Mothers on shift work experienced 
an even greater sense of guilt, as their mothering practice was threatened by the 
consequences of their work, such as absence and tiredness (ibid.: 420). This finding 
is also present in the American study on poor mothers’ perception of the ideal of 
37 Glenda Wall (2010) summarises the ideal of engagement and accessibility as one of intensive par-
enting and she points out that it arose as an ideal already after World-War II when child-rearing 
became more and more child-centered, ‘with mothers’ needs and wants becoming firmly buried 
beneath the child’s’ (ibid.: 254).
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intense mothering conducted by Sinikka Elliott, Rachel Powell and Joslyn Brenton 
(2015). The study shows how poor single mothers perform intense mothering in 
another type of setting, where social support often is missing (ibid.: 365) and how 
their ambitions ‘illustrate the profound contradictions and inequalities embedded in 
the ideology of intensive mothering’ (ibid.: 366).
Hence, not everyone can achieve parental ideals. As indicated in studies such 
as those of Duncan (2005), Elvin-Novak and Thomsson (2001) and Elliott et al. 
(2015), the feeling of being a good-enough mother appears easier for middle class 
mothers to achieve, and more difficult to attain when money and time are lacking.
Policy and institutions: Parental support and the school system 
The aim of this study is to investigate the perceived relations and division of labour 
between  parents and the welfare state. I have presented research on parents’ ideas 
about ‘proper’ and ‘less proper’ parenting as interpreted by (mostly middle class) 
parents and will now focus on research on expectations and rationalities embraced in 
political initiatives and in institutions of the welfare state. Mapping out political and 
institutional changes related to the role of parents includes exploring diverse dynam-
ics. This overview of the research has no such overall aim. Instead, I have chosen a 
few institutional examples to demonstrate a particular feature of the view on parental 
functions today. We will take a look at research on policy discourse pertaining to two 
exemplary welfare institutions: Parental education programmes (sometimes referred 
to as parent support) and the school system. 
Two thoroughgoing themes of the contemporary parental education pro-
grammes38 are the desired professionalisation of the parent, and the way that par-
enthood has become public. Today parents have, so to speak, received co-fosterers 
to their children in the form of pedagogues, nurses, politicians and experts from 
the scientific arenas. This means that parents’ possibilities to exercise responsibility 
for the fostering of their children have actually been reduced (Björnberg & Bäck-
Wiklund, 1987). However, this does not imply that the phenomenon of parental 
education has not received criticism. In Sweden in the 1980s, the phenomenon of 
parental support received vigorous critique for the way it obliterated dimensions 
of class in its tutoring. In a 1982 meta study Elina Juusola-Halonen and Ingegerd 
Lundström show that the experience of the educational setting – where parents meet 
and talk in groups – had an inhibitory effect on working class mothers, while serving 
38 Parental education classes in Sweden have been carried out on a large scale since 1980 and often 
take place in maternity centres and child healthcare centres, although they are also hosted by 
municipalities, particularly when offering education and support for parents of older children.
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as a reinforcement for middle class dittos who talked more and felt confident with 
the staff leading the meetings. It seems that a middle class habitus was used, the 
authors propose (ibid.: 19), as a starting point for designing the courses. Lee Gleich-
man (2004) investigates parental education discourse between the years of 1957 and 
1997 and finds that the general transformation in the perspective on parents is the 
manner in which it has changed from images of parental incompetence to images of 
parents as competent consumers who are perceived as wanting to take responsibility. 
Gleichman (ibid.: 256) highlights the particular buzz words that may help us un-
derstand the contemporary image of the ideal parent – guiding concepts appear to 
be those of ‘empowerment’ and ‘mobilisation’, i.e., the parents are conceived of as 
wanting to change and learn. Sofia Littmarck (2012) has studied parental education 
policies of the twenty-first century. In an analysis of a government investigation that 
argues for financial support of parental education39 she explores the type of relations 
that are promoted between state/society, parents and children. Littmarck (ibid.: 13) 
finds that parental responsibility is articulated on three levels: The wellbeing of the 
children, societal welfare and educating oneself in the area of children’s needs and 
parental techniques. Parents are now articulated as experts on their own children, but 
experts who need consolidation and there are few, if any, articulations of structural 
conditions influencing parental techniques. 
A British example of policy research is found in Diane Reay’s (2008) probe into 
the educational policy rhetoric in the Labour Party Manifesto of 2005. She demon-
strates the policy vision of making education compensate for societal inequalities: By 
operationalising parents as lay teachers they are positioned as a driving force of not 
only educational improvement, but of a comprehensive economic and social resur-
gence.  New Labour masked this responsibilisation of the parent through concepts 
of empowerment, although Reay argues (ibid.: 645 f.) that what is really taking place 
is a delegation of work from schools to parents. Consequently, failures in the educa-
tional system are re-constructed into notions of ‘failing parents’. The image of some 
parents as failures is also behind British government initiatives for an expansion of 
the legislation to combat youth crime. In the White paper preparing for the legisla-
tion40 Gillies (2008 b) finds a perceived link between crime and ‘parenting deficit’ 
(ibid.: 98) that disregards redistributive dimensions and instead promotes a view of 
particular (working class) parents as deficient. 
39 The government investigation SOU 2008: 131 is entitled Föräldrastöd en vinst för alla (In English: 
Parental support a gain for everyone). 
40 See the White Paper No More Excuses: a New Approach to Youth Crime in England and Wales (Home 
Office,1997).
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Another example of the current rhetoric on parenting comes from in the US 
where Benjamin Baez and Susan Talburt (2008) uncover how parents, children and 
schools are represented in parental advice pamphlets from schools. Here the parent 
is delineated as the child’s most effective teacher. A particular focus is placed upon 
homework, which is presented as if serving political objectives: It is said to have a 
civic, disciplinary and bureaucratic function. The parent is ‘pedagogicalised’ and the 
authors argue (ibid.: 34) that this move implies more than surrogate teaching – it 
converts the home into a school. Once again, the tendency seems similar in Scan-
dinavia. In a Danish study Hanne Knudsen and Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen (2014) 
discern a kind of ‘hyper-responsibility’ (ibid.: 114) assigned to parents from the side 
of the school, which takes the form of a contractual relation in which parents are 
obliged to define their responsibilities and promise to become a constructive partner 
by ‘seeking out responsibilities’ (ibid.: 115).  In addition, Danish schools provide 
the parents with responsibility games, a kind of social pedagogic game to be played 
at home, or with school personnel. The games have pre-designed answers to choose 
from and are geared to present an impression that almost everything that takes place 
at school is a joint responsibility between the school and the parent. Tentatively, 
this Danish example may be an amplified version of the requests for responsibility 
revealed by Reay (2008) and Baez and Talburt (2008). 
In summary, the political trend of making the parent accountable and responsible 
outlined in Chapter One appears to be evident in previous research. The demand for 
responsibility appears to also have affected the parents themselves and the way they 
understand the role of ‘parenting’. The ideals of responsibility and professionality 
seem to suit the white middle class parent, probably due to the fact that this parent 
has the financial and educational capital, as well as the habitus necessary to comply 
with the discourse. The abstract parent adduced in pamphlets and support appears to 
be reflected upon in terms of contract and self-interest, as well as addressed as if she 
was to invest her child in an insecure market – adverse but still possible to control by 
acting prudently, preventively and responsibly. 
My contribution
In this final section of the chapter, I have concentrated on research exploring the 
intersections between parenthood, class formation and institutional demands – the 
way in which parenthood is formed in a politicised sphere. If it is true that the parent 
of today is reflected upon as a semi-professional with a duty to act preventively and 
responsibly one may assume that parents in general would relate to these ideals. The 
research presented in this chapter implies that they do. But what if we looked into an 
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arena where they can interact more anonymously, or where they at least can decide 
on the level of exposure? Do the characteristics of such an arena change the discourse 
of responsibility, or does it not? When the subject of the institutional appeals and de-
mands receives the possibility of speaking relatively unrestricted, what does she say? 
If Baez and Talburt (2008) probed the fashion in which parents are ‘pedagogicalised’ 
in advice pamphlets, if Littmarck (2012) finds that parents are positioned as a kind 
of experts in governmental investigations and if the parents in a study such as the 
one conducted by Berg and Peltola (2014) display an ideal of respectability, I want 
to explore the putative transport between the institutional level and the level of the 
account, and I want to lay bare the content of this presumed respectability. In the 
eyes of the nicks, what is it? What is it not?  I am interested in how the categorisation 
of the parental subject is performed in these particular sites, (public yet semi-anony-
mous, putatively layman orientated, where the subject enters freely). In these arenas 
politics seems far away, yet subject production is carried out by the targets of political 
ambitions. The dissertation therefore focuses on the content of conversation, rather 
than interaction: It focuses on discourses of parenthood. My contribution to the re-
search field of contemporary parenting ideals and identities is to explore the way that 
dominant political demands are received and negotiated when the parent-subject is 
not obliged to comply with them (because she is writing using a pseudonym or be-
cause she can choose how much she wants to reveal about herself ). The study intends 
to understand how conversations in venues such as the parental web community 
relate to the politics of parenting and what kind of more general subject positions are 
enabled by this particular set of politics. Instead of interviewing parents-in-the-flesh 
or observing them in institutional settings, I decided to capture the junction between 
their identities as parents and the institutional or policy demands as it is displayed 
in mundane Internet conversations. In conversations such as these one may leave 
whenever one wants to, stage a fictitious character or simply avoid discussing certain 
topics. The level of personal agency is thus relatively high. Bearing this possibility 
of agency in mind, this relative freedom; how is the division of labour between the 
parent and the welfare state articulated? 
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3. Discourse, power and distinctions
This chapter will comprise of a presentation of the theoretical perspectives that have 
guided the investigation of the textual interchanges in the two parental web com-
munities focused on in the study. Two perspectives have particularly guided analysis 
– the work of Michel Foucault and that of Pierre Bourdieu.41 Foucault is applied for 
two main reasons – the way in which the arena of the web community can be com-
prehended as a venue of visibility and the way in which the subject is compelled to 
be reflexive in terms of her own actions and thoughts. Bourdieu offers another way 
of understanding the arena as a field of status positions but his work is utilised pri-
marily for two other reasons. First, I will use his concept of distinction; the way taste 
is applied to create and maintain social distances. Secondly, I will apply the concept 
of misrecognition; a concept intended to capture a feature of symbolic capital: How 
it is economic capital that is misrecognised as something else. I understand both of 
these concepts as analytic tools to understand the maintenance and concealment of 
privilege. Because the analysis in part will focus upon concealment it will also em-
ploy the notion of ideology, albeit used in a reduced fashion.
The chapter will start by delineating ways of using language as ways of shaping 
thoughts and practices, and how this is related to power and to displays of taste. 
When taste displays are used to denigrate subjects they can be deemed affective figures 
and when they are part of a discursive formation that makes the subject feel like a 
particular person with a particular social status they can be conceived of as cases of 
interpellation. The latter two concepts, alongside a layout of the way the notion of 
ideology will be used to probe the material, will round off this overview of theoretical 
comprehensions.
Discourse 
The term discourse has been defined in different ways, and used for diverse purpos-
es. The concept is applied theoretically in a number of ways, resulting in diverging 
schools of discourse, such as critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992), discourse 
theory (Laclaou & Mouffe, 1985/2008) and discursive psychology (Potter & Weth-
erell, 1987/2007; Potter, 1996/2012). Various orientations result in different com-
41 I am aware of the fact that Nikolas Rose’s concept of responsibilisation can be considered a theo-
retical one, and as such it can be considered as belonging to this chapter. However, in this study 
responsibilisation is treated as a contextual backdrop chosen to clarify a societal context and as 
such it has undergone a theoretical bracketing, meaning it is not investigated for all of its putative 
meanings, or questioned for all of its possible tensions. 
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prehensions of what a discourse might consist of. It could quite prosaically be delin-
eated as linguistic conventions applied in a specific group of people, or tailored in a 
more technical manner; as the unit of language longer than one sentence. It is often 
deployed as something larger than language – as a system of thought, knowledge 
and world views that are considered natural, normal or true, and thereby intimately 
linked to power and knowledge. The latter view would be a summary of discourse 
according to Michel Foucault (1971:8), who depicted it as something that seeps 
through all we can conceive of or understand; all that is thinkable. Furthermore, 
if discourse regulates what is thinkable it means that we cannot think and speak of 
everything: Discourse disciplines the subject on the inside. 
The theoretical outlook upon discourses in the dissertation does not rest so much 
on this Foucauldian concept of discourses as extensive and structuring beyond the 
conversational level, as such a view in my understanding is situated closer to the 
concept of ideology; a concept that will be addressed towards the end of the chap-
ter. In the forthcoming analysis the view of discourse is, first of all, that it is a way 
to use language applied by large or small but delimited groups of people. Secondly 
I see it as instructive – it is a way to use language about a particular phenomenon 
(in the case of the parental web community the phenomenon may be parenthood, 
intimacy, love, children etc.) to make it come out in a certain way. In the following 
presentation of discourse I will start with discourse as applied in groups of people 
and continue with the way that discourse guide us in understanding a phenomenon. 
A way to use language: Interpretative repertoires
Discourses can be dominant (used by large groups in society and reflecting ideology) 
or they can be local (Hare-Mustin, 1994: 19 ff.). Local discourse determines how a 
group of people (staff employed at an elementary school or people interacting in a 
parental community) speak and write. Hence, definitions of proper parenthood can 
be regulated both by dominant discourse and by these local discourses, which in turn 
at times may coincide. 
Discourse enables versions of the social world to be produced and maintained. 
This activity manifests in interpretative repertoires created by the group in question 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1988). These repertoires are detectable when utterances on a 
topic or a circumstance contain the same relatively consistent language units, and 
sometimes even bounded phrases. An interpretative repertoire is ‘constructed out of 
a restricted range of terms used in a specific stylistic and grammatical fashion. Com-
monly these terms are derived from one or more key metaphors and the presence of 
a repertoire will often be signaled by certain tropes or figures of speech’ (ibid.: 172). 
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This is not to say that every discourse or discursive fragment is coherent. Several 
different discourses may compete in defining a particular social phenomenon, as 
for instance child-rearing, and one single individual in a group can obviously be the 
bearer of several contradictory discourses. Furthermore, the articulation of a particu-
lar discourse is never entirely fixed. Often the discursive entity is nothing in itself, 
but is articulated against its counterpart; each and every entity is defined by what it is 
not (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985/2008: 188 f.). I understand interpretative repertoires as 
smaller commonplace units of discourse – the interpretative repertoire is a semiotic 
resource for discourse. 
Advisory discourse and decorum
In the empiric arenas focused on in the dissertation interaction is performed through 
publicly using language: The nicks launch statements that are embraced or coun-
tered, they recount their days, they tell of joys and sorrows. In other words they make 
their opinions, experiences and world-views public; they publish themselves. The 
next part of this chapter is devoted to the relations between language, the way people 
can be described and how the world for this reason is made to look.
Terry Eagleton (1976/2006) has undertaken to explore the material effects of 
certain language uses according to Marxist thought. Eagleton (ibid.: 48) views rhet-
oric as encoding ideology, as well as designating a putative receiver. The same can 
be said of the form of a text. The metaphors it uses (in other words the interpreta-
tive repertoires) is always ideologically significant (ibid: Introduction). Literature, 
Eagleton asserts (ibid.: 54), is a sphere for struggles, whether fissured by race, class, 
gender, imperialist or nationalist combat, and discourses manifesting through texts 
warrant the misperceptions of the ‘real’ which enable the reproduction of the dom-
inant social relations. Formulated differently, texts steer our attention in particular 
directions. The way Eagleton views literature corresponds with how I conceive of 
the discourses in the parental communities. I understand them as advisory (Fischer, 
1970/2009): A particular discourse instructs us in how to read, but can also create 
a value-oriented interpretation of some part of the world or of a phenomenon. The 
way it is organised produces a real-fiction in the sense of proclaiming something that 
is not exposed to empirical verification and, hence, it is grounded in terms of motive: 
It wants to subvert, provoke, undermine, highlight or celebrate something. In other 
words, interpretative repertoires signal discourse which in turn may signal ideology.
Advisory discourse is a feature that is evident in the parental communities. How-
ever, not all attempts to launch a statement or a worldview are successful. The fact 
that some postings are overruled and rejected may be explained by the lack of skill 
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necessary for a suitable narration. Skill level in turn is related to a sense of what is 
appropriate, i.e., knowledge of social codes. In rhetoric theory this is called decorum: 
The art of expressing oneself in an adequate manner. Decorum can be defined as ‘the 
almost intuitive capacity of adjustment to the situation /…/ and thereby achieving 
just the intended result’ (Lindkvist Grinde, 2008: 297, author’s translation). The 
capacity to adjust oneself to a particular situation can, in turn, be of two sorts; it 
can be a social skill or a matter of linguistic resources.42 In this study decorum is 
understood as textual employment; an activity conducted within the frames of dis-
course. It has an ontological significance, as for instance in what kind of metaphors are 
employed to mirror the world. Robert Hariman (1992/2009) describes decorum as 
political intelligence and as a blend of ‘significant aspects of rhetorical practice, social 
awareness, and political structure into an aesthetic sensibility’ that gives the subject: 
‘the ability to discriminate and imitate signs of status’ (ibid: 152). Nevertheless, this 
political intelligence does not come in one uniform shape. There is a dialectic rela-
tionship between several decorums; a competition of rival versions of what is to be 
considered vulgar, decent or simply displaying ‘style’ (ibid: 155 ff.).43 In the analysis 
I will apply the concept of ontological decorum to analyse the way in which the world 
can be described. 
Summing up: In this study discourse is comprehended as a technique for in-
structing us in how to read – elements are scripted, i.e., pieced together as if belong-
ing to one another, or kept apart as if they did not relate to each other. To analyse 
discourse means to try to discover the way these arrangements are made and the way 
that the writer positions ‘facts’ in her statement or positions herself in relation to 
the facts. When wanting to understand why discourse is constructed one way or the 
other, one also intends to capture the world view it bolsters.
Power
As suggested, discourses are not free-floating entities. The analysis of discourse will 
be made in relation to concepts of power which format it and give it a shape. In the 
analysis power is understood as interpersonal (in the way the parental community 
42 Erving Goffman (1956: 66 ff.) leans towards the social understanding of decorum as he employs 
the concept to understand region boundaries; the front regions where a person is visible to an au-
dience (as one would be when writing in a web community), and the back regions where one can 
relax and recuperate. In this study it is not important if a nick writes a particular posting because 
she pays attention to social rules of conduct. What matters is the content of the posting, not the 
reason for producing it.
43 One example of rival decorums far away from rhetoric is fashion, where the middle class’ taste 
would be considered vulgar by the proponents of haute couture and even more so from a street 
point of view, and where haute couture and street fashion themselves can be rivals.
59
itself formats its members in accordance with its rules of conduct), institutional (in 
the way that the political domains inform the subject of acceptable ways of being) 
and as ideological (in the way it shapes the manner in which we collectively con-
ceive of the world). The analysis applies a Foucauldian perspective on power, paired 
with the perhaps more determinist standpoint of Bourdieu. However, approaching 
Foucault’s stand on power is a delicate matter, as it is both debated and contested. 
Questions about whether or not his theory allows for change to be analysed (Heller, 
1996) have arisen, as well as questions of how conscious the practice of power should 
be comprehended.44 There is not one uniform way of approaching the way Foucault 
conceived of power. Nevertheless, the employment of the concept in this disserta-
tion rests solely on the way he delineates the manner in which the subject receives 
its contours through discourses and institutional arrangements, such as discipline. 
Whilst accepting the manner in which subjectivation works – the way that subjectiv-
ity is constituted by the discourses in which it is formatted (Foucault, 1982) – I will 
leave the possibilities of the subject making a change and the issue of consciousness 
aside. This means that the study investigates the way the subject is influenced by 
ideals. The ideals that inform the conversation will be captured through the concept 
of governmentality and the way that the ideals become situated inside the subject 
will be analysed by means of Foucault’s notion of technologies of the self. Because it 
is, presumably, not possible to introduce a concept such as governmentality without 
presenting the way that discipline works, this overview will continue with an intro-
duction to the latter concept.  
Discipline and governmentality 
Discipline is an art of governing that intensified in the eighteenth century and it is 
another type of power than the one emanating from the law of a state – disciplinary 
power concerns labelling the individual and making her conform. Disciplinary pow-
er replaced the corporal punishments common before the birth of the institutions 
and was more effective in producing obedient and docile citizens (Nilsson, 2008: 
96 ff.) because what discipline regulates is not the law, but the norms. Foucault 
44 To Kevin Jon Heller (1996: 83) the Foucauldian notion of power does coincide with social change, 
because the possibility of an individual to create change is power. Heller asserts (ibid.) that Fou-
cault did not see power as a particular form or a particular type of change. Power is to be com-
prehended as the medium of social change and in that sense value-neutral. On the other hand, 
Foucault does in The Subject and Power (1982: 792) acknowledge that power is a system of differen-
tiations, such as economic and linguistic differences, or differences in competence, which actually 
could be read as Foucault accepting differences in power between the social classes. Nancy Hart-
sock (1990: 169) argues that power for Foucault does not necessarily include the domination of 
one group or class over other groups or classes, but does not preclude it either.
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(1975/2009: 141) described discipline as power’s micro physics. While power exer-
cised by the law acts through prohibition and punishment, the characteristic feature 
of the productive powers of discipline is normalisation. The individual is measured 
according to how s/he stands in relation to a particular norm and s/he does not 
even have to agree on being disciplined. Discipline, according to Magnus Hörnqvist 
(2012: 60 f.), is an intensified and repeated learning process where the individual is 
motivated to behave in a certain way. This would resonate well with web community 
environments, where the nicks seldom break the law, but on occasion offend a com-
mon norm of writing or acting. If a particular style of writing or a particular opinion 
is popular and if opposing that style generates reproaches, the nick will putatively 
feel motivated to conform to it.
The mechanism most central to the disciplinary rationality is the one of visibility, 
explaining why discipline in its most condensed form is represented by the institu-
tional building of Panopticon.45 Discipline operates through the individual being 
seen and categorised by means of differentiation, homogenisation, hierarchisation 
and exclusion, revolving around a split between the normal and the abnormal. The 
disciplinary gaze is a normalising gaze – it is a dressage for training the individual. 
If power is to observe the individual in order to perform the dressage, surveillance 
needs to be permanent in its effects even if it is discontinuous in its actions. Most 
important is that the individual knows s/he is potentially being watched (Foucault, 
1975/2009: 202 ff.). This means that power operates on the body through a system 
of norms – it creates individuals (ibid: 171), i.e., it makes us function in a certain 
way. This is also the case in a web community where certain norms prevail and a nick 
is more easily accepted if expressing herself according to them. The point of using a 
building such as Panopticon as a description of a web community is precisely the fact 
that the nick knows she is potentially being watched by others – but has no idea by 
how many and when the monitoring takes place.
Governmentality or the conduct of conduct on the other hand, is sometimes viewed 
as distinct from discipline, although it is also aimed at moulding human behaviour. 
Whereas discipline aims at reforming identified groups of people through observa-
tion, the government attention is directed towards the population as a whole: ‘the 
improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, et cetera’ 
(Foucault 1991: 100). These objectives are hard to achieve. It is simply too difficult 
to reach out to each and every subject and monitor and regulate its behaviour. In-
stead, government fosters more generic desires, beliefs and aspirations, because this 
45 Typical examples of disciplinary institutions would be schools, prisons or mental hospitals.
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will make the population regulate behaviour without government being physically 
present. Nevertheless, there are links between the fostering of many and the foster-
ing of few, which can be explored through the concept of Panopticon as a form of 
discipline. To operate effectively, discipline should be executed through surveillance 
from all directions and where the eye measuring the subject is not visible. This, Fou-
cault argues, is manifested in the Benthamian visions of the Panopticon46 with its 
inspection tower in the middle, allowing the guard to make the inmate uncertain of 
whether someone is watching or not. This very uncertainty makes the inmate more 
aware of the potential surveillance and, thus, the point is how an actual subjuga-
tion emanates from more or less fictitious relations (1975/2009: 172 ff., 202 ff.). 
A subject with the impression of being observed assumes the coercion from power, 
Foucault contends (ibid.: 201 f.) and becomes the supervisor as well as the super-
vised. The awareness makes power function automatically and surveillance becomes 
a permanent effect even when it is in fact irregular (the guard may or may not be ob-
serving the inmate). Power becomes so complete that it does not have to be exerted. 
The inmate plays both roles, and thus becomes the principle of his own subjection.
The fact that supervision is unreliable makes the subject do what it ought to do, 
not because of the risk of physical punishment, but because it is perceived as the best 
thing to do in case of supervision. An analysis of the conduct of conduct therefore 
combines the government of others with the government of oneself. The concept 
of panopticism can be used to understand how and why the disciplined subject 
internalises certain forms of constraints or values through subjectivation. Trent H. 
Hamann (2009) describes the relation between governmentality and the subject as 
the former giving a leeway of freedom to the latter:
Governmentality is not a matter of a dominant force having direct control 
over the conduct of individuals; rather, it is a matter of trying to determine 
the conditions within or out of which individuals are able to freely conduct 
themselves (ibid: 55).
46 Bentham’s Panopticon has visibility as the main architectural principle. At the periphery of this 
particular prison architecture lies an annular building and at the center is placed a tower with 
wide windows. The windows face the inner side of the ring whilst the annular building is divided 
into cells. The cells are equipped with two windows, one on the inside facing the windows of the 
inspection tower and the other on the outside. The light is hence permitted to flow through the 
cell from one end to the other. In the inspection tower a supervisor is seated, and in each cell a 
prisoner or a patient and Foucault (1975/2009:201) describes each cell as a small theatre stage, 
intended for one actor only, completely individualized and constantly visible.
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This, I believe, is the governmentality of the parental communities, due to the fact 
that the nick writes in a public space where she can be evaluated, as well as having the 
opportunity to evaluate  accounts from other nicks. Governmentality in this sense 
should be understood not only as ‘the conduct of conduct’ but more specifically as a 
continuum of governing; from governing the self to governing others (Lemke, 2001: 
191). 
However, when addressing the web community one must ask whether or not it is 
a case of Panopticon as a situation where the few watch the many, or if it is the other 
way around, considering that in most situations the number of community readers 
exceeds the number of writers. In revisiting Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, Thom-
as Mathiesen (1997: 218 f.) contends that Foucault fails to consider the growth of 
mass mediated societies where the many observes the few, a phenomenon Mathiesen 
conceptualises as ‘synopticism’.47 Mathiesen argues that if Foucault had allowed for 
the significance of mass media, it would have changed his conception of surveillance, 
so that it would have contended that society now displays a situation in which both 
directions are manifest.48 These multiple gazes are what really constitute social con-
trol. In the web community arena the multiple gazes are indeed significant: External 
social control is manifested (web community moderators watch over what is written 
and warn members who have broken the rules, while the nicks regularly correct each 
other), as well as internal control (that makes the nicks internalise a system of norms 
that governs textual behaviour). In short, synoptic surveillance enables a monitoring 
gaze that comes from within, as well as from other nicks: You watch and you are be-
ing watched. In the parental community you are allowed to be both the inmate and 
the prison guard and there are normally more prison guards (readers of a posting) 
than inmates (nicks who write). Hence, governmentality and discipline fertilise each 
other. The conduct of conduct is carried out through disciplinary activities, (panop-
tic or synoptic surveillance) and requires individuals who willingly carry out work to 
become particular subjects. There is a link between governmentality, a fictional type 
of freedom and technologies of the self (Hamann, 2009: 38), or put in another way: 
If the generic ideals are successful they will generate a subject that wants to conform 
to them. To explore this link, Foucault returns to the hermeneutics of the self, as it 
was manifested in the Greek-Roman philosophy during the first two hundred years 
47 The concept is constructed out of the Greek word syn, meaning ‘together’ and opticon, which 
relates to the visual.
48 Mathiesen mainly concentrates on the expansion of television, which in itself is no surprise as the 
article is published in 1997, a few years before the massive spread of interactive Internet use.
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of the Roman Empire A.D., and in early Christian spirituality. The chapter will con-
tinue with a short exposition of these inner formations of the self.
Disciplining the self
Lingering through the whole of antique philosophy an ethic and philosophical prin-
ciple re-occurs in many settings: The principle to speak the truth about oneself, or to 
‘devote yourself to yourself ’ (Foucault, 2015: 23 f.). This devotion is the main prin-
ciple behind the care of the self, understood as a technology with which to handle 
the inner domains of the subject. This care of the self was manifested in many ways. 
The Stoic care of the self was an activity by which the individual executed duties 
towards the soul. Notes on faults committed were supposed to be made in diaries 
or letters, and the rules by which to live memorised. The stoic view appears to have 
embraced an administrative understanding of the subject and was no judgmental 
process (Foucault, 1976/2002: 61 f.); by memorising codes of conduct one instead 
had the opportunity of improving and becoming an ethical subject (Kerr, 2001: 
232). This askesis was not as ascetic as it sounds. It was not a denial of needs but 
an improvement of self-control and a way of understanding what the world was 
about in order to be prepared for whatever might come. The aim of the techniques 
was a subjectivation of the truth: Making the truth of how to live wisely one’s own 
(Foucault, 1976/2002: 62). The Christian care of the self had more to do with pub-
licly confessing sins or inappropriate thoughts, with the aim of reinstating purity. 
The term publicato sui can be applied to the Stoic self inspection, as well as to the 
more extrovert Christian restoration of the self. The publicatio sui that was a private 
endeavour (carried out in diaries or letters) for the Stoics was a public and manda-
tory affair (to confess of one’s sins to the congregation) for the Christians (Foucault, 
1994/1997: 178).  
The image that Foucault puts forward of the differences between the Stoic and 
the Christian inspection of the self appears to give primacy to the Stoic view. Nev-
ertheless, the lack of punishment in the Stoic view does not necessarily mean it is an 
act of freedom either. Self-inspection may be thought of as the subject controlling 
how independent from temptation or pains it can become, in other words it is about 
self-discipline. The Stoic ideal is gaining self-mastery independent of endurance 
(Foucault, 1976/2002: 58) and daily inspection of self-mastery means being under 
supervision according to moral standards. Seen in this light, the care of the self is 
simply a case of norms and values weighing on the subject: Government installs val-
ues that the subject finds attractive, and she will then want to master them.
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Taste is king. Achieving social value in the field
The work performed on the self in the parental communities shares some of the 
characteristics of the Stoic and Christian traditions. The community can be com-
prehended as a place of confessions or as a diary or letter that is published. In both 
cases language is crucial. In these arenas it becomes a resource that is often fought 
for, because it allows the subject to define and evaluate the world in which she and 
others are living. This feature of the parental community connects it to the work 
on distinctions and social value by Pierre Bourdieu. The staging of a suitable self 
by using language in a public environment makes the activity of writing relate to 
forms of capital and how they transform to social value (Bourdieu, 1994/1995). The 
idea that social value should be comprehended as capital seems to be ever-present in 
the writings of Bourdieu, but it is not monetary value alone that determines how a 
hierarchical society is construed; there are several forms of capital and having power 
relates to all of them. Next, I will present the concept of capital – symbolic capital in 
particular – and the way it is related to a misrecognition of the social world and its 
assigned social values in particular fields. Following that I will lay out the two ways 
that the notion of value will be handled in the analysis – as something to attribute to 
others, and as the way we identify ourselves as belonging to a particular category of 
people that carries a certain social value.
Capital, misrecognition and the field
Bourdieu (1977/2011) delineates symbolic capital as any type of asset that endows 
the individual with status in the contexts where it is ascribed value. More precisely 
the concept can be understood as: ‘long-standing dispositions and habits acquired in 
the socialization process, the accumulation of valued cultural objects such as paint-
ings, and formal educational qualifications and training /…/’ that gives an individual 
‘tastes and styles distinct from others’ (Anheier, Gerhards and Romo 1995: 862). In 
a web community one cannot collect valued cultural objects but still display a dis-
position for them, manifest qualifications and training and be distinct from others 
in that sense. 
Symbolic capital is precisely that – symbolic. However, Bourdieu (1977/2011) 
points out that the most essential feature of symbolic capital is that it is really is 
economic capital that is misrecognised or concealed in some way, i.e., economic 
capital is transformed into symbolic capital (ibid.: 183). This means that displaying 
a preference for a particular valued object is an action based upon economic cap-
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ital.49 Disguise and dissimulation are recurrent conceptions in the way Bourdieu 
understands economy and in his writings he differentiates between the self-interested 
and the good-faith economy. The latter is a result of the former disguising itself, not 
acknowledging what it really is and instead devoting just as much time and effort to 
‘concealing the reality of economic acts as it expands in carrying them out’ (ibid.: 
172 ).50 The good-faith economy is built upon misrecognition. There is, as Bourdieu 
puts it, an: ‘institutionally organised and guaranteed misrecognition’ (ibid.: 171) in 
the good-faith economy. We are made to focus upon the symbolic aspects of labour 
and relations of production, which prevents us from seeing economy for what it 
is: ‘interested calculation, competition, or exploitation’ (ibid: 172). Taste is one of 
the symbolic relations of production – instead of saying we have acquired cultural 
capital we say we hold a particular taste. Thus, Bourdieu’s view leans on a Marxist 
understanding of capital as not a thing but a social relation that is expressed through 
money. Exchange involves a level of evaluation or even battle, and there is a corre-
spondence between the evaluation and the receiving of a value. 
Social value is established and fought for in different and particular fields – rooms 
that structure positions (Bourdieu, 1984/1991: 131). The concept of fields is a the-
oretical instrument for the study of the allocation and division of capital and they 
involve both more formal institutions (fields of production) and people affected by 
the works of these institutions (fields of consumption). The fields of production are 
populated by institutions, professionals, politics and so on; the fields of consumption 
include users (such as users of a parental community), performers or clients. 
There are battles staged and prizes to be won in every field. Bourdieu (ibid.: 131 
f.) distinguishes the participants in the battles as either newcomers who want to 
49 This is not to say that an individual with no economic capital has no access to tastes and styles 
distinct from others. Instead, it means that developing a refined taste is easier if conveyed within 
a family that has the financial resources for it, the habitus prepared for it and the social position 
where one’s taste is viewed as significant by others. To have a particular taste, as well as to master 
a particular sophisticated level of one’s native tongue, is an efficient distancing technique that 
preserve certain privileges (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970/2008: 155).
50 According to Bourdieu, there is a ‘socially maintained discrepancy between the misrecognised or, 
one might say, socially repressed, objective truth of economic activity, and the social representa-
tion of production and exchange’ (ibid: 171). A social representation of production and exchange 
is, for example, taste, while the objective truth is the system of production in which money is gen-
erated and distributed and which allows an individual to profess a particular taste. Put in other 
words: Taste (i.e., ‘good’ taste) and money are related, but we do not speak about it. In the eyes 
of Bourdieu, this particular silence is preserved and insisted upon – there is an objective truth 
and a social representation with a gap between the two. This latter suggestion resonates with 
the way Karl Marx (1939/2010: 250) separates the reproduction of capitalists and wage workers 
that forms the base of a capitalist mode of creating profit, and the ‘ordinary economy’ that only 
notices the commodities resulting from that production. It is in the ‘ordinary’ economy that taste 
becomes important.
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position themselves, or veterans trying to protect their authority. The characteristics 
of every position rely on how it is located in relation to other positions, and a po-
sition can be analysed disregarding the individual who holds it.51 When studying a 
field one always needs to lay bare its specific form and structure, as the prizes to be 
won differ between the fields. What is considered valuable within one field can be 
worthless in another. (The nick in a community is one example of this: A preferable 
prize for a nick would presumably not be money or goods, but status). The structure 
of the field can be two things. It may be a condition in the relative difference in 
strength between the individuals engaged in the battle, (for instance in a situation 
where s newcomer begins to constitute a threat to the veterans), or a certain profile 
of the distribution of the field specific capital (amongst a group of farmers this cap-
ital may be land, whereas amongst researchers it would be prestige). The struggle is 
about whether or not to redistribute this capital (ibid: 132). In a community the 
field specific capital probably relates to language and interaction: Who is allowed 
to define the topic for debate, who receives answers, who is brushed-off and who 
is finally allowed to have the interpretative prerogative, but it could also relate to 
who is defined as a good or non-problematic parent. There will always be positions 
that have monopolised the specific capital and the holders of these positions tend 
to adopt preservation strategies, defending orthodoxy. Positions holding less capital 
will aim at transformation, or strategies of heterodoxy. An example of a threat in a 
parental community would be a challenge to a locally fortified discourse professed 
by veterans about what constitutes good parenthood. Heterodoxic activities – such 
as a critique of the norms of good parenthood – forces the veterans to speak, (and in 
this case explain or defend the rationale behind the norm), thus constituting a threat 
to beliefs that are taken for granted. Nevertheless, there is a consensus shared by all 
holders of positions; the game is worth playing. By participating, the game and the 
value of its prizes are reproduced (ibid: 133 f ).52 This means that for the nick who 
defends a local discourse of parenthood, as well as for the nick who questions it, the 
prize of affirmation and social value is equally prestigious. 
51 This means that my main interest lies in how the postings stand in relation to other postings 
(establishing or contesting norms, or using discourse) as opposed to the actual person behind the 
posting, this person’s sentiments while writing, or the putative personal reason for responding in 
one way or another.
52 One reliable indication of a field being constituted is the rise of ‘biographers’ (philologists, his-
torians, researchers) that preserve the procreation of the arena (Bourdieu 1984/1991: 134). My 
writing of this dissertation would be a sign of the parental communities really being a field.
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Distinctions 
To win the game, the player needs to know something about the field specific weap-
ons by which victory can be achieved. A nick who wants to achieve acceptance for a 
standpoint must be capable of two things – presenting it in a way that guarantees ac-
ceptance, and attributing characteristics to other standpoints that make them either 
gain or lose credibility. But to make an audience believe in the standpoint presented 
they must be convinced that it comes from some type of expertise, a particular form 
of knowledge, a valued social position or a certain lived experience. The standpoint 
must come across as credible (as opposed to gossip, slander or tittle-tattle). The nick 
who is able to manifest cultural capital is the nick that the audience believes – she 
stands out from the level of tittle-tattle and has manifested a distinction.  
Bourdieu delineates distinctions as difference (1984/1991: 221; 1991/2012: 
237), and sometimes as taste (1994/1995: 37). Taste, he suggests, is the principle 
behind choice and taste involves both practices and possessions. For a taste to exist 
there must be classified goods (classified as refined/vulgar, good/bad etc.) for the 
taste to act upon. An additional prerequisite is people endowed with the necessary 
principles for classification (i.e., people who are considered fit for the job of making 
distinctions). In sum, distinctions need three components: principles, goods and 
people. In the case of the parental web communities the classification activity obvi-
ously does not only involve goods but also the practices of the parent. The parental 
practices are considered examples of good or bad taste. 
Standpoints on taste are made in every type of field and are relational – they are 
systems of difference and make the subject significant (ibid: 57). If distinctions are 
comprehended as human activities to manifest taste in order to establish differences, it 
has a theatrical ring to it – it must be visibly staged. Erving Goffman (1959: Intro-
duction) suggested that when we present ourselves to others, it is very much like a 
stage play, with the individual performing on a stage. We aim at impression manage-
ment – what we would like the other to see or know about us, and what we would 
prefer to conceal. In order for us to appear trustworthy or competent (necessary 
when we perform rhetoric activities) we need to make investments in social value – 
as for instance when we perform taste displays. This means we can understand how 
self presentation becomes a technique by which distinctions emerge. Furthermore, 
distinctions do not always concern preferences, but dislikes. A potent means of dis-
tinction is the expression of aversion for certain goods or practices, particularly those 
that are valued by the ‘populace’. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to believe that 
we would be given the same amount of social value if everyone conformed to dom-
inant taste displays in a community. A much valued taste, knowledge, or propensity 
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will lose value if it becomes accessible to everyone in the field (Bourdieu, 1984/1991: 
221 f.). A general circulation and appraisal reduces the value that can be achieved 
by manifesting a particular taste (ibid.: 190).53 This indicates that distinctions are 
about producing and maintaining a constant difference, and sometimes moving the 
difference to a place where it cannot be reached by everyone, although the difference 
must still be acknowledged by all participants in the field. 
Affective figures and interpellation
Having said that, we still have not addressed the techniques by which social value is 
administered in these particular venues, which will be explored in the following. In 
the parental communities value can be administered on two levels – a subject not 
participating in the conversation can be labelled in a particular way and thus be given 
a value, or value can be attributed to a subject participating in conversation. I intend 
to analytically capture both phenomena through the concepts of affective figures and 
interpellation. 
The way distinctions produce and maintain difference may help to explain why 
certain narrative figures laden with contempt are applied in these communities. One 
example of such figures is provided by Imogen Tyler (2008), who has investigated 
British media images of ‘The Chav’54, especially those concerned with the young 
‘Chav Mum’, the poor white woman living in disadvantaged residential areas of 
Britain’s large cities. By merging sociological research on class formation and fem-
inist theories on emotions, Tyler has explored how the perceptions of social class 
are emotionally transmitted by for instance describing poor white women as slobs, 
tarts or parasites. During the last decade these types of description have increasingly 
flooded mass media representations and Tyler argues (ibid.: 26 ff.) that the images 
function as a constitutive limit for white middle-class femininity. The figure should 
be comprehended as mocking the lower classes, while at the same time protecting 
the middle-class, which is portrayed as a ‘site of injury’ (ibid.: 23) – a threatened 
and oppressed position. In other words, the concept of affective figures helps us un-
derstand how social classifications generate representational struggles and the nature 
53 However, it is worth pointing out that the social value achieved through distinctions is possi-
bly an unintentional effect. Distinctions can be distinctive without aiming to be so. Distinctions, 
Bourdieu propounds (1984/1991: 23), comprise of an almost somnambulistic ability to appreciate 
what is considered valuable and even to ‘suddenly realise’ that one appreciates the valuable.
54 The figure of the chav is a contemporary descriptive term for British white poor and can be 
considered a kind of folk etymology. Conceptions of the chav have much in common with the 
American concepts of ‘White trash’ and ‘Welfare Queen’.  The chav figure is a discursive creation 
of the underclass as it is understood within a space of consumption and taste. Hence, the focus is 
normally on appearance, and the chav is most often labelled as vulgar (Tyler, 2008: 21).
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of these struggles. In particular historical moments certain social types become over 
determined and represented in distorted ways, expressing societal anxieties. The fig-
ures are deployed to attribute impressive characteristics to subject positions that are 
discursively differentiated from the affective figure, and therefore the affective figure 
has a material and a semiotic result: It constitutes something that is later circulated 
in several types of mass media. If a circulation of this type of contempt is achieved 
a particular affective value is attributed to the figure, and in the case of the chav the 
affect produced is disgust (ibid: 18 ff.). 
As mentioned above, ascribing value onto others can be performed in at least two 
ways. One can ascribe value onto a category not present in the conversation, as in the 
case of the affective figure, or onto somebody who is present. When the latter occurs, 
this person is seen or highlighted as somebody in particular. When we are described 
by someone in the position of defining others or when we recognise ourselves in a 
description, we become aware that we are a particular type of person, or that we 
belong to a certain category. To illustrate this situation Louis Althusser (1971) used 
the verb hail, as in being hailed by a policeman in the street. When turning around 
to respond we acknowledge that we are the one the policeman was addressing; we 
agree upon being categorised. The concept of interpellation concerns a naming that 
constitutes the subject it names (Davis, 2012: 882) and I apprehend it as a work of 
subjectivation – it makes us become subjects. 
This crude definition could be the starting point for the many difficulties that 
arise when putting a concept such as interpellation to use. Althusser (1971: 174) 
described the process of hailing as that which transforms individuals into subjects – 
the person who responds becomes a subject at the moment of response. But if this 
is true, who was there before the hailing took place? Is there no subject before the 
naming of it? The remaining problem in using the concept of interpellation resides in 
understanding the process of transformation. If it is the hailing itself that constitutes 
the subject there would be no one there to respond to the hail, or there would be a 
kind of amorphous mass incapable of answering (Davis 2012: 882 f.). The question 
is what makes the difference between an individual and a subject?55 When I apply 
the concept of interpellation, I will condense subjectivity to mean becoming a par-
55 Althusser (1971: 171) states that there is no sequential order between ideology and the interpel-
lation of individuals as subjects. Ideology fashions the subject, but the subject in turn constitutes 
the ideology of its own society. There is a double constitution; ideology rematerializes in the 
subject and the subject in ideology. This means that ideology and the subject both are fields of 
interdependent practice – ideology materialises by and through its user who is simultaneously 
constituted by ideology. This, as I understand it, also relates to the Foucauldian notion of how 
subjects are not merely the targets of power, but power circulates through subjects, and is carried 
out by subjects. 
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ticular subject. In line with Judith Butler I understand interpellation as being ‘given 
a certain possibility for social existence’ (1997: 2, emphasis added). Consequently, 
to be interpellated is to have qualities attached to oneself that one cannot help but 
acknowledge. The difference between the affective figure and being interpellated is 
that the ‘Chav Mum’ is putatively not in agreement with the condescending image 
of her or she likes her ‘way of life’ or she possibly objects to the label of vulgarity 
imposed on her, whilst the interpellated person at some level agrees with the label 
attached to her.56 For a parental web community this would mean that a nick regis-
tered as a mother cannot help but accept discourses of motherhood that interpellate 
her as warm and caring, or the exact opposite. This example marks the final and very 
vital difference between the affective figure and interpellation: The affective figure is 
mainly applied to trigger disgust, fear or hatred towards a group in society, whilst 
interpellation can be both benevolent and condescending. Interpellation is, I think, 
a kind of soaking of the social world – we understand it by ideological applications. 
Arguably, this makes the subject that performs or accepts the hailing less important, 
and the ideology enabling the hailing more important. Hence, using a concept such 
as interpellation means accepting the notion of ideology. The analysis applies this 
concept in a reduced fashion, and to conclude the chapter I will outline the way it 
will be employed in the analysis.
Ideology
Even though the difference between them is debatable and even though they some-
times collide and are described as organising thought in the same way, in the analysis 
ideology and discourse will be treated as different entities. In the forthcoming ana-
lytical chapters, ideology is comprehended as performing three things in particular. 
It gives structure and coherence to discourse, it provides overarching models (organ-
ising several discourses) according to which a collective of individuals may think, and 
it furnishes us with emotions. Ideology may thus be seen as a system of organisation 
much the same way as described by Brantlinger et al. (1996: 573); a system of rep-
resentations and ideas, i.e., a system of discourses. Hence, the viewpoint of ideology 
applied in the study differs from that of seeing ideology as a system found in political 
convictions of party programmes. In the analysis ideology is instead connoted with 
56 There are, Althusser acknowledges, individuals that resist interpellation but yet, he confidently 
assures, nine out of ten will respond to the hailing regardless if they feel guilty of charge or not 
(Levinson, 1999: 89). This would mean that although a ‘Chav’ protests against being labeled as 
such, she could simultaneously (but without articulating it), become interpellated by the label. 
There would exist cases in which a person becomes an affective figure whilst simultaneously 
becoming interpellated.
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the fashion of treating thoughts and ideas as if they were not the viewpoints of some-
body in particular; the way that certain things, events or conditions are understood 
as obvious, eternal or natural when in fact they are part of a world view (Jaeggi, 
2015: 46). Moreover, ideology is comprehended as generally (although not in every 
instance) in the service of power. 
The viewpoint of ideology in this study is materialistic in the sense of viewing it 
as primarily decided by material conditions (Marx & Engels, 1845/1988). The way 
the concept is used leans on Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and their definition 
of ideology as serving the interests of ruling groups in society, i.e., class society. As 
formulated in The German Ideology (ibid.: 67): ‘The ideas of the ruling class are in 
every epoch the ruling ideas’.57 The Marxist stance also means that analysis assumes 
that material conditions generally decide ideology (ibid: 30)58 although this propo-
sition would not be a sufficient description of the concept as a whole, but merely 
a point of departure. A materialist comprehension of ideology starts with ‘the real 
individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life’ (ibid.: 36 f.).59 This 
intertwines the notion of ideology with that of symbolic capital as economic capital 
that is misrecognised (Bourdieu, 1977/2011): The material condition (the economy 
and modes of production) generally precedes the ideological expression (symbolic 
capital such as taste). 
In summary, ideology as such can be viewed as a large and more ‘stable’ enti-
ty than discourse. If discourse is considered ways of thinking that are temporarily 
fixated, ideology is comprehended as the super structure organising these ways of 
57 A concrete example that may help us to understand ideology as a relation between the ruling 
class and ruling ideas is the egalitarian myth in the US (Boudon, 1990/1994). In this hierarchical 
society the myth enables the middle class to live without guilt, while the poor cling on to a hope 
of upward mobility (ibid: 180) and this myth therefore makes the relation between the groups 
fixated.
58 This particular formulation is indeed found in The German Ideology, although it belongs to a sec-
tion crossed out in the original manuscript. Reading The German Ideology, it is nonetheless clear 
that the aim of Marx and Engels was to dismiss the Hegelian conception of how the real world is 
ordered and dominated by ideas (1845/1988: 34).
59 Today, the relation between the material base and the ideological superstructures is the subject 
of long-spun debates. Although this study is not a contribution to that discussion, I would like to 
add that a ‘safe’ position vis-a-vis the sequential order of these entities is probably not possible. 
Instead, there is an interaction between two different types of force – the economic and produc-
tive forces on the one hand and the superstructure (politics, ideologies etcetera) on the other. The 
latter will eventually begin to develop independently. Generally, economic factors of the base are 
decisive, although this base will be affected by the superstructures created by the very same base, 
since the superstructure is granted some level of autonomy that cannot be easily recovered (See: 
Letter from Friedrich Engels to C. Schmidt, London 27th of October 1890, see: 
 https://www.marxists.org/svenska/engels/brev/1890_10_27.htm).
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thinking. In this study ideology is primarily thought of as tied to material conditions 
associated with class relations in a more profound way than is discourse.
Functions
Applying the notion of ideology derived from a Marxist perspective, which empha-
sises how meaning emanating from the top segments in societal hierarchies are made 
dominant, calls for an expanded layout of the concept, because ideologies may com-
pete with one another and in addition, not all ideologies are equally influential. Ac-
cording to Martha L. Fineman (1991), the point of applying the concept of ideology 
alongside that of discourse is because ideology ‘structures the contours of discourse’ 
(ibid: 289). In other words, a discourse is not formed out of thin air – it is organised 
by something. For example, a discourse of motherhood will look entirely differ-
ent when structured by a conservative ideology, in comparison to when it is struc-
tured by a feminist one.60 This means that ideologies may compete in defining the 
world, implying that we need to expand the definition proposed by Marx and Engels 
(1845/1988). We also need to consider the functions of ideology. In my understand-
ing, ideology is functional in at least three aspects. Firstly, it gives coherence to dis-
courses. This applies to all types of ideologies, and indicates that meaning may not 
only come from societal groups holding power. Nevertheless, there are ideologies that 
become dominant in much the same way as discourses, and when this occurs they 
are so solidified that they become difficult to confront. When an ideology becomes 
dominant its core images and values are so strong that both the proponents and the 
opponents of a particular idea need to invest into them, in order to appear trustwor-
thy (Fineman, 1991: 293). The way I conceive of the Marxist notion of ideology is 
precisely as such a dominant one: It stands out as an intersection between meaning 
and power, sustaining relations of domination (Thompson, 1988: 370). Secondly, 
ideology has a cognitive duty – to help us think collectively (Van Dijk, 2006: 116). 
It feeds into people’s aspirations, longings and needs and orders what is possible 
to dream about or want to achieve, and what is not. Ideologies are maintained by 
groups of people – they are shared representations or belief systems of social groups 
and the ‘axiomatic principles of such representations’ (ibid.: 115). Thirdly, ideology 
60 This, in turn, means that a feminist ideology would come out in one way if structured in relation 
to a conservative ideology, and in another way if contained within a socialist one. It is, I think, 
not always possible to determine the relation of ‘cognitive structural strength’ between ideologies 
(i.e., to answer the question which structures which). This study does not encompass the relation 
between ideologies, but starts from the assumption that a lived experience (such as parenthood) 
and the way the concrete action of having a child, living with it and raising it is performed in 
different discursive settings regulated by overarching models of thought.
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is functional because it produces affects. Affect can be viewed as that which ‘enables 
ideological relations to be internalized and consequently naturalized’ (Grossberg, 
1992: 83). One reason why analysis employs the concept of affective figures is to 
emphasise not only the intellectual contour of ideology but the emotional; how we 
invest into it and get to feel ideology.
Critiquing ideology: Althusser, Foucault and Bourdieu
If discourses of parenthood host some type of ideology, how is it displayed and how 
can it be detected? The theoretical perspectives chosen for this dissertation leave us 
with different answers to these questions. Below I will initiate a discussion about the 
ambiguities that are present at the start of analysing/critiquing ideology – when in 
company with Althusser, Foucault and Bourdieu. I will sketch the researcher’s diverse 
possible positions vis-à-vis the formation of knowledge and power, continue with a 
condensed presentation of the notion of false knowledge (distorted perception) and 
conclude with a brief problematisation of the position of critique.
According to Althusser (1971), there is an ideological character to exercising 
power, and power will ultimately distort the perceptions of the under privileged. In 
this approach Althusser is positioned quite close to the Marxian understanding as 
described in The German Ideology (1845/1988: 42), where ideology is depicted as 
that which arrange the relations between men ‘upside down as in a camera obscura’. 
Whilst for Althusser distortion primarily concerns a subject interpellated by bour-
geois ideology, for Foucault instead all kinds of perception rest upon distortion of 
different types. When using both Althusser and Foucault a difficult matter is their 
different approach to knowledge and power. Whilst Althusser calls for a scientific 
critique of ideology and appoints Marxism-Leninism as the suitable agent for the 
assignment, Foucault suggests no such agent capable of revealing ‘the truth’ (Ryder, 
2013: 153). Althusser and Foucault hold different ontological standpoints in rela-
tion to what can be considered the truth and who is qualified to determine it. Al-
though Foucault embraces the relation between power and knowledge, he does not 
accept the relation between power and the production of false knowledge. Instead 
he employs the concept of regimes of truth (1980: 131); systems of discourses that 
decide what can and cannot be counted as meaningful utterances. Any given regime 
of truth holds its bearers captive and they cannot exit the regime without becoming 
aware of the captivity (Hörnqvist, 2012: 110). Furthermore, all critique of a regime 
of truth must accept its constitutive suppositions to appear trustworthy, which in the 
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end means that it cannot be transcended.61 It seems that the definition of the regime 
of truth is situated close to that of ideology, and the problem of transcending regimes 
of truths and ideologies appears similar. 
My decision to use the concept of ideology, rather than that of regime of truth, 
should not be understood as a standpoint that in every instance there is an absolute 
truth situated somewhere, ready to be uncovered. The reason for applying the con-
cept is to highlight a concealing of something,62 along the lines in which Bourdieu 
uses the notion of misrecognition. This concept is multifarious in the hands of 
Bourdieu. On the one hand it is used to exhibit the way that particular (economic) 
acts are emphasised at the expense of other acts (1977/2011: 172) while on the oth-
er hand it highlights processes in which power is transformed into symbolic forms 
(such as taste) that people profess, regardless of whether or not they gain from them 
(1991/2012: 23). Bourdieu points out the way in which power (held by particular 
groups in society) uses representations of legitimacy to justify domination. Cultural 
and social domination in the given social order is naturalised through a misrecog-
nition that ensures social stratification seems normal and power remains closeted. 
This is a misperception of social life that Bourdieu calls symbolic violence, and one 
expression of this closeted power is the way we embrace ‘good taste’, instead of high-
lighting the economic conditions that enabled it (1998/1999: 47 ff.). The concept 
will be applied for both these meanings. When I use the concept of misrecognition 
I will point in the direction of emphasis: The manner in which things are narrated 
with concealment of certain experiences, positions or lived lives as the end result. 
This means that in analysis the fact that there are elements of which we do not speak 
is more important than whether or not particular ‘facts’ could be found, measured 
and defined as true. In short, what I consider important is how conversations in the 
parental communities are organised not only in what they say or state, but for what 
they do not say and do not state. 
61 Magnus Hörnqvist (2012) argues we should view a regime of truth as a quest for monopoly; it 
is a set of judgments, amongst other sets of judgments, of what is to be regarded as credible and 
suitable. This, Hörnqvist propounds (ibid.: 111 ff.) makes a regime of truth more related to the 
concept of hegemony. Hegemony is the striving of dominant groups in society to expand its per-
spective to subordinate groups. It is never totally solidified, because it can be challenged in the 
margins and it sometimes has to compete with other subordinate regimes of truths. By valuing 
and upgrading the perspectives and experiences of the subordinate groups, other types of knowl-
edge can be released. However, this critical potential can in itself be questioned (ibid.: 113). How 
do we, for instance, know that the new knowledge emanating from the subordinate groups has 
no relation to power? Moreover, much the same as positions of hegemony, neither are ideologies 
and regimes of truths totally solidified (Fineman, 1991).
62 The concealment does not have to be ‘the truth’ but could be an experience, a particular voice or 
lived life. 
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The critic
I have left the question of who is capable of critiquing ideology to the very last sec-
tion of this chapter, thereby partly revealing my own ambivalent position towards 
the matter. Critiquing ideology is not one uniform activity and it involves several 
activities. The critic analyses power to reveal inconsistencies in a phenomenon, an 
utterance or a situation without pointing to what presumably would be the norma-
tively ‘correct’ thing to do; and in addition, critiquing ideology involves applying 
a hermeneutics of suspicion without really having an unbiased point of reference 
to start from (Jaeggi, 2015: 29). Yet, there is possibly one misunderstanding con-
cerning ideology that might lead us to view the critic in a particular light – the idea 
that ideology is either true or false, and thus can or cannot be unmasked. Notwith-
standing, ideology is neither true nor false – it is both. This may appear startling or 
troublesome. If ideology is both true and false, why should we concern ourselves 
with examining it? Rahel Jaeggi (ibid.: 30 f.) uses the examples of ‘freedom’ and 
‘equality’ to illustrate the matter. The contractual notion of freedom and equality 
that capitalism refers to as its principle of organisation is actually evident in capitalist 
society. The capitalist labour contract is entered by free and equal subjects (in the 
formal or legal sense). The labourer is no slave and can end the contract when not 
satisfied. However, for most workers the need to work is compelling if she/he is not 
to starve, and when comparing an owner of the means of production and a worker 
the working conditions as well as negotiation possibilities are not equal: There is a 
material inequality between the parties that is not due to chance. Hence, ‘freedom’ 
and ‘equality’ both exist and do not exist in a capitalist society. As a consequence, the 
critic does not critique the concepts of ‘freedom’ or ‘equality’ but instead the manner 
in which they are understood or their inadequate realisation in different contexts. 
In the case of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ we may find that the norm is understood in a 
way that in fact supports inequality, or that it is not realised by practice. As a conse-
quence, critiquing ideology means two things: Pointing to epistemological mistakes 
and achieving an emancipatory change (ibid.: 33). As I understand it, this implies 
that the position of critic is deeply affected by theoretical choices, as well as stating 
these choices as best as one can. The criteria by which to evaluate whether or not a 
criticism has achieved anything is to examine the ability of the criticism to highlight 
(or even solve) the problems created by a particular ideology (ibid.: 44). As I see it, 
this means that criticism takes place in a community of subjects evaluating, co-cre-
ating or critiquing the critic.  
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Central analytical concepts
This marks the end of the introduction of the theoretical concepts guiding the analy-
sis. Despite a putative sensation of a dense presentation, just three concepts are cen-
tral for the analysis: Discourse, Power (including Ideology) and Distinctions. These 
concepts should be understood as a foundation for analysing empiric data rather 
than a development or critique of theory as such. However, in relation to performing 
an empirically grounded study there are still a few dimensions of these three analyt-
ical concepts that have not been highlighted.
In this dissertation the first central analytical concept, discourse, is applied in the 
study of texts of a particular nature. The postings in the parental communities are 
short, often condensed into two or three sentences and to the unaccustomed reader 
they may sometimes appear rude or provocative. However, they are far from the 
highly offensive or outspoken statements that surface in the communities from time 
to time. Nevertheless, I have focused on situations of tension, disagreement and con-
flict and as a consequence, many friendly exchanges do not appear in the analysis. 
This relates first and foremost to the idea that fractions in themselves illuminate a 
rule, or a framework that is not normally articulated to the same extent. Conflicts 
may occur in situations where some breakdown in normal conduct has taken place, 
or taken-for-granted standpoints are challenged. My interest in conflicts is partly 
inspired by the attempts of ethnomethodology to study the social fabric by inter-
rupting or disturbing it (Potter & Wheterell 1987/2013: 75), although in this case I 
am not the one causing the disturbance. My viewpoint is rather that in a situation of 
textual tension, the discourse will putatively manifest a little more defined.
As mentioned, discourse cannot be delineated from ideology in any straightfor-
ward manner. Having said that, how would the analyst know when she/he is analys-
ing discourse and when she/he probes into ideology? Perhaps the most honest answer 
would be that the analyst cannot be entirely sure. In the case of this study, discourse 
has been scaled down to mean ways of using language (ways to positions elements or 
ways to position oneself in relation to ‘facts’) that instruct the reader/listener to notice 
particular phenomena and disregard others. In my view, to try to detect ideology 
means to study discourses to see if they repeat a particular message or guide the read-
er in the same direction (towards the same type of opinions or worldviews). When a 
cluster of discourses comes across as uniform (manifesting the same message, propa-
gating the same solutions, leaving the reader with the same perception of the world) 
and when the cluster is difficult to challenge it will be labelled ideological.
The second central analytical concept it is employed in two ways. Power is un-
derstood as a relation (a relation with oneself, with others, or with institutions) and 
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as a structure of domination (ideology). I have chosen to intertwine the concept of 
power as it is laid out by Foucault on the one hand and Bourdieu (and to some extent 
Althusser) on the other. For Bourdieu power is more constrained by structure than 
in the case of Foucault, whose emphasis as it is applied in my analysis focuses more 
upon the interior domains of the subject: Why and how we embrace particular ide-
als. Bourdieu’s work instead focuses on conditions of maintenance of power and the 
social determinants of advantage, i.e., the reproduction of power. The primary reason 
for applying a Foucauldian viewpoint is to examine how the subject’s internal relations 
(the individual that seemingly embrace or propagate certain ideals) may be a case of 
governmentality, and the primary reason to employ Bourdieu is for his layouts of 
how power is maintained within certain groups of people in systems of differentiations 
and through certain techniques of distinction. 
The other main difference is between a perspective of power that accepts ideology 
(Bourdieu and Althusser) and the Foucauldian critique of the concept. I have com-
mented above on my understanding of ideology but in addition, I want to point out 
an intersection between Foucault and Althusser when it comes to conceptualizing 
power and the formation of the subject. As put forward by Jason Read (2003: 85 ff.) 
they both conceive of the individual as an effect of institutional structures (which, I 
would like to add, can also be said of the field theory as presented by Bourdieu). They 
conceive of the subject as defined by ideology (Heller, 1996: 93), although they con-
ceptualise it differently. In line with seeing the subject as an effect they give primacy 
to the study of language and discourse before the study of ‘man’. This is also the point 
of departure of the present study. Hence, my reason for including Foucault, Althuss-
er and Bourdieu in the analysis is pragmatic. The intention is to probe the subject as 
constructed both from the outside-and-in (which is covered by Althusser´s notion 
of interpellation), from the inside-and-out (through Foucault’s technologies of the 
self ) and to place this subject in a social representation of symbolic production and 
exchange (covered by Bourdieu´s proposition of misrecognition and distinctions).
As mentioned, the third central analytical concept is that of distinctions. I com-
prehend distinctions as political in nature: They are cases of systematic differentiation 
(although not systematic in the eyes of the subject exhibiting a particular taste). I also 
view them as linked to systems of economic organisation. Much the same as power 
conceals itself in acts of misrecognition, distinctions are a case of power presenting 
itself in a symbolic fashion. Distinctions organise people into groups that are reflec-
tions of economic organisation. Jacques Camatte and Gianni Collu (1972/2008) 
state that capitalism cannot exist without differentiation and that this differentiation 
creates a societal solidarity in smaller groups that tend to compete with each other: 
78
The groups become gangs. The gang is a reproduction of capital in a fictitious form 
– whilst capital denies the principles upon which it is constructed, it simultaneously 
re-enacts them in symbolic forms. This is how I grasp Bourdieu’s (1977/2011:171) 
proposal of a socially repressed economic activity – it is denied but repeated on 
a symbolic level, for instance as the taste embraced by particular groups.63 Each 
and every gang has an internal dynamic to seek recognition, to ask: ‘by what are 
we distinguished?’ and, hence, groups exhibit a tendency to exclude (Camotte & 
Collu, 1972/2008: 160 f., 168). This interrelates with the type of negative taste that 
Bourdieu (1984/1991: 190) delineates: If we all like a particular product its value 
becomes eroded. We thus have to perform activities of distinction to keep particular 
people outside of the circuits of taste, and so I comprehend distinctions as a mean to 
disunite social groups that would potentially benefit from staying united. If distinc-
tions are really capital then capital becomes the way of interaction within the group, 
meaning that the groups arising from distinctions become the reproduction of capi-
tal. A dominant taste – much the same as a dominant idea – can be grasped as dom-
inant material relationships condensed into ideas (Marx & Engels, 1845/1988: 67).
63 Camatte and Collu (ibid.) were certainly not preoccupied with distinctions of taste, but rather 
exemplify the gang by companies, mafia gangs and political organisations. Nevertheless, my in-
terpretation corresponds with theirs in one sense. Camatte (1995: 28) has described the differenti-
ation generated by capitalism as a process whereby the working class becomes more bourgeoisie, 
which resonates with the notion of a class developing taste or aspiring to a particular taste.
79
4. Material and methodological frames
In this chapter I will present the exposition of the material and the methodological 
frames of the dissertation. First, I shall provide more details of the two empirical 
arenas focused on in the study, as well as information about how the data collection 
was performed, and I shall relate some of the limitations of the material collected. I 
will continue with a discussion about the ethical considerations involved in collect-
ing and presenting postings. The chapter will conclude with a description of how 
analysis was conducted, including a presentation of some of the analytical concepts 
applied.
The parental communities
In order to make the unaccustomed reader acquainted with the venues in which 
conversation takes place, this section will contain a presentation of the empirical are-
nas from which I have collected the material. I will introduce the reader to the way 
interaction is structured in the parental communities, as well as to the similarities of 
and differences between the two communities under study.  
Both communities are constructed with different levels of publicity. Most public 
is the interactive section (called community or forum), where the content is ordered 
in themes, such as ‘Pregnant’, ‘Children’, ‘Gardening’, ‘Weight and Body’, ‘Rela-
tions’ etc.64 A slightly more private level is the nick’s personal homepage, where she 
can publish personal information, post pictures and receive public messages. Both 
of these levels can be accessed by anyone who visits the communities. The two most 
private levels are those of groups and personal messages. The groups are created by 
specific nicks and organised around particular themes or interests. To join a group 
one needs an invitation from the founding nick. Personal messages can be exchanged 
in much the same way as within an e-mail system and the user cannot read messages 
from other nicks. The empiric material for this study consists of postings from the 
open and public parts of the communities. 
Any kind of community is defined by its discourse focus (Jones & Rafaeli, 2000: 
218) which is the purpose of the community. At first sight a parental community is a 
clear-cut case – the users log in to discuss issues related to family life. However, when 
inspecting the parental communities this is not always the case. Besides themes con-
64 In the themes the nicks interact the way that was demonstrated in the beginning of Chapter One 
– through short messages, and sometimes pictures or links to articles and blogposts are inserted 
into the postings.
80
cerned with family life, the nicks discuss a vast number of other topics. Delineating 
a web community as parental only covers a part of the topics. The feature the most 
notable is, however, the mix of friends and strangers who interact. Some nicks have 
been using the community for years and know each other fairly well, several have 
become friends, and some are only recently registered. In both communities particu-
lar nicks seem to have gained a status as veterans. They know several other nicks and 
they are less questioned than a newcomer. The veterans can in some instances control 
interaction, by refuting certain topics and initiating others, or by joining in teams/
groups of several nicks who argue against or ridicule other nicks. Yet, scorn and rid-
icule are not allowed to proceed in an unlimited manner as the communities have 
a team of informal moderators, consisting of especially trustworthy nicks who are 
assigned the responsibility of monitoring the conversation by the editorial staff.65 In 
addition, the nicks also monitor each other. They remember postings from months 
or years ago and quote them if they were considered especially absurd or if they want 
to correct another nick’s assertion of how she views a particular issue.
The communities also exhibit differences. An apparent feature is the different lev-
el of activity, which is discernible in more themes in VEF. Another difference relates 
to the communities’ different types of netiquette, where VEF accepts provocation 
and less trustworthy postings to a higher extent than TPP, without the moderators 
interfering. (leading to more frequent trolling66 and flaming67 in this community).68 
One final difference is worth considering. To the best of my knowledge the nicks in 
VEF have never mentioned TPP during the years of observation, whilst it is com-
mon in TPP to quote or ridicule postings from VEF. Hence, the content of VEF 
sometimes appears in TPP, but TPP is never visible in VEF. 
Data collection
When approaching Internet communities the researcher faces a delicate problem of 
having access to an endless amount of material that is freshly produced every minute 
of the day. This surplus of postings constitutes a rich asset and a source of anxiety. 
The predicament is not finding data, but instead knowing when to stop visiting the 
sites for yet more of it. The two communities do not come in one uniform shape 
65 The monitoring ensures that community rules and Swedish law are not broken, that the postings 
are written in Swedish and that advertising is not inserted. The moderators rebuke the nicks who 
overstep the line, or they report them to the editorial staff.
66 See Glossary in Appendix.
67 See Glossary in Appendix.
68 The non-interfering attitude is presumably due to the high level of activity, which makes it more 
difficult to monitor every breaking of the rules.
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– their figures alter depending on the theme and the nicks participating in conver-
sation. Events reported in the media can influence the topics of conversation, which 
in turn change during the day or in the course of a week. Certain themes are more 
popular than others and certain nicks seem to be invested with more authority than 
others. So, the question is not how to get there but to know when to collect, what to 
collect, from whom to collect, where to collect, and how to stop collecting.  
The TPP postings were collected between autumn 2010 and spring 2015, and 
those of VEF between spring 2011 and spring 2015.69 This does not mean that all 
postings were written in this period. When I found a topic of interest I searched for 
postings from before 2010 to see if they remained coherent over time and if they 
were composed of the same discursive elements. This means I have also collected 
postings from between 2006 and 2009. However, there is a legion of postings that 
I neither read nor collected. Considering the vast amount of postings70 produced 
during one day, capturing all of them would be impossible. Because I discovered the 
TPP community in 2009, I had a reasonably profound knowledge of where different 
topics tended to emerge. As a result, I decided not to collect postings from themat-
ically narrow themes but rather from those concerning family related matters with 
titles such as ‘Motherhood’, ‘Teenagers, ’Family Finance’, and ‘Disabled Children’, 
as well as themes allowing for any kind of topic, such as ‘The Floor Is Yours’, or 
‘General Topics’. 
Delimitations of the study object 
The postings collected for the study were written primarily by women. Due to the 
fact that the vast majority of parental community users are women (Sarkadi & Brem-
berg, 2005), collecting postings from nicks registered as women makes sense. Fur-
thermore, research demonstrates that it is the mother who spends the most time 
with the children, is the main provider of childcare and is more engaged in terms 
of the relations between the family and school (Reay and Ball, 1998; Nordenmark, 
2004: 27; SCB, 2012: 39).71 This is part of the explanation for why there is such an 
69 VEF was included into the study after the data collection from TPP had begun. The reasons for 
including VEF was that I wanted to collect material from more than one community to be able to 
reflect upon similarities as well as differences, and to understand which discourses were commu-
nity-specific, and which were more generic.
70 Counting all the postings written in the course of one day on only one of the many themes on VEF 
(in May 2011) revealed that 421 threads were started, responses not included (Lind, 2013: 21).
71 According to SCB (Statistics Sweden) men and women work approximately 7,5 hours per day. 
However, men receive a salary for a larger proportion of these hours as women carry out more 
unpaid work, (i.e., household chores) and spend time with their children (see SCB 2012: På tal 
om kvinnor och män Lathund om jämställdhet 2012 http://www.scb.se/statistik/_publikationer/
LE0201_2012A01_ BR_X10BR1201.pdf.). 
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imbalance in the material when it comes to gender – it is because the narratives about 
children and family life are based upon female experiences and positioning.72 
When discussing the collection of material there is yet another feature of the 
arenas worth mentioning: The postings are mostly produced by women who have 
Swedish as their first language and have not recently migrated to Sweden (Lind, 
2013). The format of an interactive community based on textual exchanges hinders 
the participation of parents with an immigrant background for whom Swedish is 
their second language. Even if parents with an immigrant background register and 
intend to participate, it may well be that they are excluded due to lack of language 
skills. It is thus reasonable to assume that the postings do not reflect society’s heter-
ogenic composition of opinions, but instead mirror the perceptions of women born 
in Sweden or women who have lived in Sweden for several years (ibid.: 21). Even 
so, the perceptions of these women are interesting, because they represent a general 
norm in matters of family that affects all parents in Sweden. However, the predom-
inance of nicks that speak Swedish fluently makes collection uneven in its character 
and receptions of the norm from parents situated outside of it cannot be studied. A 
similar delimitation emanates from the heteronormative structure of the communi-
ties. The conversations about children and family seem to use the heterosexual family 
as a starting point (as well as an end station) and there are few postings articulating 
experiences from other families or relationships. Hence, collection is affected also by 
this imbalance.
Coding, saturation and memos
The texts from the two communities eventually amounted to approximately 3,000 
pages containing hundreds of conversations, making the material appear less man-
ageable. Every gathered conversation was by the time of collection given labels, so 
that they were possible to identify. As Derek Layder (2005: 52) points out, the prob-
lem is choosing what system or coding frame to use. At the time of collection I 
found I had to give every conversation  several labels to make identification possible. 
The labels described the content of conversation, a deviation of a content pattern, 
something that happened in the conversation on an interactional level, or something 
in the conversation illustrating or contradicting a theoretical concept. At one time I 
labelled conversations according to what they seemed to be doing, as recommended 
by Charmaz (2006). This made me look for presumed intentions behind the post-
72 In this study the female gender is understood as an analytical place of tension; it is my aim to 
make its predicament into that of a universal human subject, while simultaneously not conceal-
ing the particular discursive circumstances in which it can articulate itself.
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ings; were they written to persuade the reader, to please, to impress or provoke? I 
particularly searched for postings that appeared to aim at impression management, 
because they could indicate taboos that must be avoided or topics that trigger annoy-
ance (Rivas, 1998/2012: 373). As the labels themselves gradually began to resemble a 
patchwork I removed them and returned to the ‘cleansed’ material. In this sense the 
coding deviated from a grounded theory approach that starts off as an open-coding, 
and gradually becomes more restricted (Layder, 2005: 54). Instead, the data collec-
tion, coding and analysis were parallel processes; categories emerged, and sometimes 
disappeared, only to appear again come later in the analysis. Sometimes the coding 
was leaning towards deductive stances, when I scrutinised the material to search for 
patterns that might validate or counter theory, while on other occasions it was more 
of an in vivo coding (Rivas, 1998/2012: 372) – an open coding that starts from 
language stemming from the material itself. This oscillation required the aim to be 
flexible and somewhat imprecise to begin with, after which it was gradually refined. 
The way I understand the material underwent several changes during collection, 
and knowing when saturation had been achieved was not a straightforward decision. 
Categories are usually deemed saturated when the collection of more material does 
not generate new theoretical insights, or reveal new properties of the core catego-
ries (Charmaz, 2006: 113). However, saturation is not obvious when categories are 
moved around, lumped together in diverging ways, and when different analytical 
levels interfere with each other. Another significant feature of performing discourse 
analysis is that it is the researcher who carries out the individuation of the discourses. 
Hence, the question can be transformed into another one: When am I as a research-
er saturated, rather than the material I gather? I decided to stop collecting material 
when it no longer delivered tentative answers to the research questions. This could 
be a sign of saturation being achieved, or it could be viewed as my own limitation 
as a researcher.
However, coding alone cannot produce the grounds for analysis. Parallel to the 
categorisation process I made memos. Memo-writing can be used for posing ques-
tions to the material and to theory, suggesting tentative connections or contradic-
tions. According to Layder (2005: 58 f.) memo writing consists of two elements. 
Firstly, a continuous rethinking of what the data means and, secondly, elaborations 
and modifications of ideas or theoretical concepts that already play a role in the inter-
pretation process (ibid: 61). This is also the design of my memos. My notes switched 
from reflections on something that happened on a certain day in one of the commu-
nities to attempts at brief theoretical analyses of threads. Attempts of typification lie 
alongside cut-outs from articles or blog posts. Layder (ibid.: 64) describes his memos 
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as an amalgam of blind searching and false leads, systematic connectedness and elab-
orations of ideas. The description is not far from my own experience.
Ethical considerations
In research conducted in and about the Internet, it is necessary to keep the door 
open to multiple interpretations of the arena. At least two approaches are essential: 
The arena is a place of data collection and of interaction (Löfberg, 2008: 60). Early 
cyber ethnography tended to view virtual interaction as a performance of identity, 
where the arena was conceptualised as a place for identity games. Today, few Internet 
researchers use notions of identity gaming and ideas of people lying more on the 
Internet than away from the keyboard have been rejected (Daneback & Månsson, 
2008: 161). Instead, research focuses on the relationships established and there is 
concern about the risk of the researcher disturbing them (Hoser & Nitschke, 2010). 
If data is considered to be produced by people who mean what they say, it leads to 
questions concerning research ethics. Is a community a public place? Are the post-
ings just general public texts? Does a nick have a private life worth consideration and 
protection? How can the collected data be presented?
The Swedish Research Council73 formulates four specific demands that social sci-
ence researchers should adhere to. The demand for information stipulates that the 
researcher must inform the subjects of research about the aim of the research project. 
The demand for consent specifies that the subject of research must consent to partici-
pate and includes the right to withdraw consent. The demand for confidentiality pre-
scribes that data about the research subjects must be treated with the highest degree 
of confidentiality. The demand for utilisation states that the data collected must be 
only used for research purposes (http://www.codex.vr.se).74 Although the demands 
may serve as an introduction to ethical reasoning within the field of Internet re-
search, they must be supplemented with reflections upon this particular, and rapidly 
growing, arena. The AoIR (The Association of Internet Researchers) Ethics Working 
Committee is continuously reworking ethical guidelines for Internet research.75 The 
guidelines are debated and viewed through different ethical lenses, although based 
on a set of recurrently advocated questions to ask when conducting Internet research. 
In my decision-making concerning collection and reproduction of the material I 
have turned to the AoIR because of its particular experience and knowledge of these 
arenas.
73 In Swedish: Vetenskapsrådet.
74 http://www.codex.vr.se/texts/HSFR.pdf 
75 See Ess, Charles and the AoIR ethics working committee (2002).
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Publicity versus privacy. On lurking and the informed consent
I have gathered postings through reading on the communities without signaling 
that I am there. This means I have been ‘lurking’, i.e. reading and collecting without 
participating in the conversation myself. In doing so, I have disregarded the demand 
for information and consent. The reasons behind my decision are as follows; to avoid 
the risk of my presence distorting the material, the fact that the communities in 
question are public places and the nicks anonymous, because the material presented 
in the study has been translated from Swedish into English and because I ensured 
that it did not contain any biographical details. Collecting material in this way is 
ethically sensitive and my decision needs to be reflected upon from several angles. 
As I understand it, the ethical reflection has to be made as a calibration of two im-
portant features of research. On the one hand there are issues of research quality in 
terms of reliability (Sveningsson, 2001: 59) and on the other the need to consider 
the potential harm that the collection method could inflict on the community user.
As a way of obtaining at least a minimal consent I could have posted a communi-
ty announcement that provided information about the research. The reason for not 
doing so relates to what my presence could do to the material and to the fact that I 
had no means of ensuring that the users would continue to write as they normally 
do. Another reason why I refrained from posting an announcement was because 
several of the postings collected date from before the start of research in 2010 and 
2011. Hence, I could not ensure that the information reached everyone. The second 
option could have been to create groups for the purpose of research and invite nicks 
to come there to interact, which would have guaranteed that every participant was 
fully informed about where their text might end up. However, in much the same 
way as posting an announcement, this procedure could change the way the nicks 
wrote and presumably encourage some nicks to enter the group, whilst others would 
be reluctant, leading to an inadequately balanced collection. The third option could 
have been to collect material without consent and later contact the nicks responsi-
ble for the postings I wished to use, and ask for their permission. The reason not to 
obtain consent in this way was based on practical reasons. Hunting down each nick 
whose posting I wanted to include in the analysis would be unfeasible, partly because 
of the vast numbers of postings included, and partly because some nicks register to 
post on a single occasion and then unregister, making them impossible to contact. 
Collecting informed consent from only some nicks would produce a poorly balanced 
set of research ethics. The reason to collect unnoticed by the users was also due to 
the fact that both communities are public but enable users to move the conversation 
to a private space within the community. This resonates with the proposition from 
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AoIR recommending that ‘the greater the acknowledged publicity of the venue, the 
less obligation there may be to protect individual privacy, confidentiality, right to 
informed consent, etc’ (Ess & Jones, 2004: 31). This obligation is also reduced if the 
community provides its user with the possibility of communicating privately within 
the domains of the arena (ibid.). which applies to the communities focused on in 
this study.76 
Nevertheless, dimensions such as private/public are not distinguishable in any 
simple way. Knowing that a community environment is public and behaving ac-
cordingly are two different things, because a community can be understood as public 
or private or both intertwined (Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002)77. This applies to the 
communities included in the present study – labelling them open would be an insuf-
ficient description. The impression of being in a public or private arena78 may change 
during one and the same conversation and in the heat of the moment a nick who is 
normally aware of being in a public space may behave as if there were no bystanders. 
According to the AoIR guidelines, the next question to ask is, consequently, whether 
or not the users appear to assume that the communication is private (Markham & 
Buchanan, 2012: 6). The point is that in an open space such as TPP and VEF one 
can never entirely know the intention or feeling behind a certain posting. I may 
have collected postings from a nick who, at the moment of writing, perceived the 
community as private. This double nature of perception may be grappled with in at 
least two ways. Some claim that if a nick interprets the community as a private are-
na it means that the perceived audience is not the public and the researcher should 
refrain from collection (Seale et al., 2010: 598). Others claim that the presence of 
lurkers (often representing over 50 % of visitors in communities) and the fact that 
membership is unrestricted would substantially reduce the level of responsibility on 
the part of the researcher. People writing in communities ‘have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, and researchers /…/ should be able to treat online communication 
76 At times ethical considerations pertaining to the level of privacy define four levels of publicity. 
The first level relates to arenas that are open to everyone, the second can be called semi-public 
arenas, accessible after registration. The third level is semi-private with membership and regis-
tration and even more requirements necessary to enter – such as belonging to the organisation 
responsible for providing the community. The fourth level can be defined as private, where the 
founder of the arena allows or blocks access (Sveningsson Elm, 2009: 75). 
77 When protected by a password it can be considered private, likewise if one cannot enter without 
being invited by another member or a moderator. This, however, does not mean that all other 
kinds of communities should be viewed as totally public. Conceptions of privacy can vary within 
one and the same community, depending on what kind of theme the nick is visiting and on what 
kind of nick is writing.
78 An arena is not the same thing as a field. I define ‘arena’ simply as the material (or in this case the 
virtual) place in which research took place. Hence, when I speak of arenas I am referring to places 
and when I use the concept of field I am referring to a set of structured positions of status.
87
as public behaviour’ (Kraut et al., 2004: 110). This being said, the mere possibility 
of the nicks perceiving the arena as private is one of the reasons for why it is vital for 
the researcher to spend as much time as possible in the community, to imbibe the 
different cultures of writing. I have spent time in the communities every day since 
2009 (VEF was not included into the scope of the dissertation until 2011) and on-
wards, and I consider my orientation reasonably substantial, although this does not 
put me in a position where I can guarantee that no posting is included that the nick 
may have regretted afterwards79. As a result I took precautions to protect the online 
identities of the nicks, which will be outlined in what follows.
Exposure 
The attempt to protect online identities affected my choices of presentation. For the 
sake of anonymity the communities have received new names. Postings included in 
the analysis were translated into English. As a form of spot check, several of the trans-
lated versions were translated back80 into Swedish again, to check that the version a 
reader may attain from trying to translate it back into Swedish will not resemble the 
original posting. Pseudonyms were removed from the postings. Nevertheless, this 
does not guarantee that there is no risk involved in presenting the translated material 
as there is evidence that even anonymised sets of data that includes enough personal 
information may lead to individuals becoming identifiable (Markham & Buchanan, 
2012: 7).81 (This also applies to research outside the Internet arena). Moreover, my 
79 It is possible to have a posting one regrets removed by a moderator or host. This implies that the 
nicks have a high degree of agency when it comes to what is published. However, the nick cannot 
reclaim written material when resigning from the community. The site operator can keep (and 
sometimes store) material over which the former member has no control (Hoser & Nietschke, 
2010: 182). Nevertheless, if trying to visit the personal web page of a nick who has resigned from 
one of the communities; one will find it no longer exists. 
80 The back translation from the new English version back into Swedish was performed using 
Google Translate.
81 The ethical risks of exposure cannot be straightforwardly understood as a risk to everyone, and 
a risk in all situations and contexts. Malin Sveningsson Elm (2009: 81ff.) describes a situation 
where media and other public areas overflow with people appearing as private individuals re-
lating private situations. Displaying private affairs publically to this extent has made people look 
differently upon what a public arena is and how it should be used. Mobile phones with cameras, 
Instagram and similar types of technology make people potentially visible everywhere and have 
increased people’s media literacy and awareness of potentially being observed. Social control 
becomes more comprehensive as technology moves on and judgments of when one crosses the 
line between private/public, and sensitive/non-sensitive has gradually become more difficult to 
define.
88
analysis cannot encompass the entire context in which something was written82 and 
there is a potential risk that a nick, if reading the analysis, could feel misinterpreted.
Choices pertaining to rendition also depend upon the country and culture in 
which the research is to be published. Yet another recommendation from the AoIR 
concerns how to relate the research to the ethical traditions of the researcher’s and 
the subject’s culture and country (Ess & the AoIR ethics working committee, 2002: 
8). This study was produced in Sweden, and its ethical design is inspired by chat 
room studies by Löfgren (2008) and Sveningsson (2001) where informed consent 
was not collected, mainly because the object of study would disappear if the nicks 
knew that they were being observed, and due to the practical reasons described by 
Löfgren (2008: 63 f.). Nevertheless, the European approach to collecting postings 
in this way is stricter than in the United States. Malin Sveningsson (Ess & the AoIR 
ethics working committee, 2002: 31)83 has contested this notion of ethical restraint. 
Guidelines, Sveningsson argues, provide recommendations for ideal practice that 
must be weighed up against the possibilities of probing into important arenas and 
generating insights into rapidly growing venues that the research community still 
knows little about. Ethical guidelines do have to be measured against the possible 
gains for research and in reality practice may not differ very much between Europe 
and the US. As previous research mainly has focused on user experience and the rea-
sons for visiting the parental communities, I believe that in order to understand part 
of what shapes a contemporary ideal of parenthood, it is important to also grasp the 
actual content produced in these places.
The fact that I do not have informed consent has, nonetheless, enforced restraints 
on which postings to collect, in order not to intrude into the nick’s private com-
munity spheres. For that reason I have not collected texts from the nicks’ personal 
web pages, nor sought membership in any groups, or written messages to nicks. All 
material emanates from the interactive community section, visible to everyone, in-
cluding non-members. Not having consent also affected which postings to include 
in the presentation of the material. Postings that express personal despair of a bio-
graphically revealing character were excluded from the analysis. Postings that contain 
confessions of criminal behaviour or threats of self-harm are not collected, which 
also applies for postings accusing others of such deeds. Names, geographical settings, 
references to age, workplace, children’s names or gender, and the names of children’s 
82 It is often not possible to relate the whole thread, because of its length. Moreover, some threads 
are written as responses to one (or more) threads written earlier that day. To present them all is 
not possible.
83 Posting to the AoIR ethics working group on 25th September, 2002. Retrieved from Ess & the 
AoIR ethics working committee (2002: 31)
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schools have been removed or altered. When making these decisions, I have leaned 
on Kraut et al.’s (2004: 110) factors relevant for whether or not to collect informed 
consent:  
Relevant factors:
1. Is it human subjects research? (see A) If no: Informed consent not required 
2. If yes: Is the research exempt? (see B) If yes: Informed consent not required
3. If no: Can informed consent be waived? (see C) If yes: informed consent 
not required
A. Research involves human subjects if data is collected through intervention 
or interaction with an individual, or if data contains identifiable private 
information (information where the individual can be identified and indi-
vidual had reasonable expectation that no observation was taking place or 
that information was collected for a specific purpose). 
B. Research is exempt if it involves the use of educational tests, survey proce-
dures, interviews or observation of public behaviour, unless: (i) information 
obtained is recorded so that human subjects can be identified and (ii) any 
disclosures of responses outside the research could reasonably place the 
subjects at risk of liability or be damaging to the subject’s financialstanding, 
employability, or reputation, or if research involves the collection or study 
of existing data, document, records… if these sources are publicly available 
or if the information is recorded by the investigator so that subjects cannot 
be identified.
C. Consent can be waived if the following are true: 
The research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects 
The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of 
the subjects 
The research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or 
alteration 
Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional perti-
nent information after participation
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This study is research that involves human subjects in the sense (and only in that 
sense) that the collection (N.B. not the presentation) contains private information.84 
I do not know whether or not the information is identifiable (see A) but my point of 
departure is that the subjects had no reasonable expectation of being observed by a 
researcher.85 Hence, my answer has to be that the study involves human subjects and 
I need to move on to the next question; is my research exempt (see B)? This study 
involves no educational tests or survey procedures but may be labelled a study of 
public behaviour. However, returning to the question of what defines a public arena, 
the answer to whether the study can be exempted cannot be a straightforward yes, 
which leads to the third question; can informed consent be waived (see C)? Consid-
ering the measures I have undertaken to protect the anonymity of the nicks, in my 
view there is no more than a minimal risk to the subjects (see C). The waiver will not 
adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects, due to the decision to translate 
the postings, to not collect every potentially interesting posting, and to exclude or 
alter all personal information. Because of the difficulties involved in contacting the 
nicks, I consider it less likely that I would be able to provide information after the 
collection was performed (see C). Therefore, my answer to question number three is 
that I am in a position where informed consent is not required.
Analytical approach
This study is probably best described as a case study, which involves collecting enough 
information about a social setting, event or group to comprehend how it functions 
(Berg, 2004).86 The analytical point of departure of the study is one of abduction 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008), which means I have oscillated between observations 
of the empirical arenas and the theoretical perspective. It also means that I have fluc-
tuated between an open collection and an intentional search for postings in order to 
answer questions emanating from previous findings or from theory. The choice to 
remain in this both flexible and frustrated position related to my impression of the 
venue’s variability. The analysis was based on several theoretical concepts that were 
found, changed and interwoven in the course of the work. When the data collection 
started I knew that I wanted to look upon the postings in the parental communities 
as the way in which subjectivity occurs under supervision, which made me consider 
84 However, I do not know whether or not the information is accurate or a fabrication.
85 Nicks nevertheless frequently articulate that they count on being observed by strangers.
86 Often when defining a case study it is understood as involving one singular community, family 
or organisation (Rutterford, 1998/2012: 120). This dissertation consists of material from two com-
munities, in order to ensure that the material collected was as rich and detailed as possible. 
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using both Foucault and Goffman, and perhaps intertwining them. Goffman was, 
however, removed from analysis when I decided to privilege discourse before inter-
action as main analytical angle. Quite early during the collection of postings I also 
saw the need for some type of analysis of capital and taste displays, which made me 
choose to apply Bourdieu. This analysis at that point seemed to point in the direc-
tion of a cultural making of class, as the postings orbited around matters of class in 
their recurrent fixation on the perceived bad habits and poor taste of the ‘underclass’, 
which made me include a Marxist perspective in the analysis, albeit mostly as a way 
of reading Bourdieu. All these theoretical strands are all included in the choice of 
the main analytic tools – discourse, power and distinctions. The decision to include 
matters of ideology in the analysis came later when I needed to understand why 
resistance in the communities had adopted what I considered to be a conformist pat-
tern that seemingly validated rather than challenged hegemonic positions. It seemed 
that the discourses of parenting were organised by something that solidified them, 
and I wanted to begin an understanding of what that might be.
Having said that, the mere collection of postings was tentative and at first did not 
so much relate to theoretical choices. During the first mapping of the communities, 
one persistent pattern of content was that of a particularly dubious or questioned 
personhood, which I wanted to examine. I found postings about people described as 
failing in different ways that did not relate solely to their qualities as parents, (they 
were depicted as obese, depressed or negative and irresponsible; represented as if 
they could not afford swimming lessons for their children due to a lack of financial 
priorities or being able to manage a household budget), so I collected postings on 
these themes. A paragon of a certain dubious subjectivity gradually emerged and it 
seemed that these failing subjects were presented as positioned differently in relation 
to an envisioned communality, which made me search for postings that combined 
the element of ‘people’ or ‘parents’ with the element of ‘society’ or ‘institution’ or 
‘welfare’ in various ways. These features of conversation became one route of collec-
tion that later developed into an analysis of the concepts of choice, responsibility and 
the correct version of intimate dependency, but it was not until that moment that I 
saw the need to include contract theory in the analysis.
Sorting out how to study language became a somewhat discouraging endeavour. 
At one point I was deeply enmeshed in rhetorical theory; using different coloured 
markers in the document to highlight how and when nouns, adjectives or verbs were 
employed, or how certain images or metaphors were applied. The intention to make 
a first rough categorisation of metaphors made me run out of colours. Metaphors 
can be sorted by reference (to space, place, directions in space, weight, liquidity etc.) 
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but also according to distance or closeness. They might aim to disguise, highlight 
or provoke. These difficulties in sorting the metaphors made me realise something 
about my analytical level, i.e., I made a decision on how fine-grained I wanted the 
analysis to become. The decision became to primarily map out figures of thought 
and only when having done so intend to understand how language was used to sup-
port or cast doubts on discourse. The decision not to study how and when nouns, 
adjectives and verbs were applied also related to questions of the relative innocence 
in following basic syntactic structures. My analytical point of departure is that many 
of the things we do with words (such as when we use metaphors), we do unknow-
ingly or because language does not give us much choice. However, this makes them 
even more interesting, as they pre-structure how we are allowed to express ourselves 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). I chose to analyse how metaphors can be linked to the 
discourses they support and found that it made the connections between repertoires 
and particular words and bounded phrases become clearer.  
Analytical selections
The selection of material to be included in the analysis was a multi-layered process, 
partly due to my understanding of the arena as having multiple identities and, as a 
consequence, having a flexible aim. I initially read the collected material chrono-
logically from the date when collection began to the date when it ended, but later I 
read it theme by theme. I have broken it down into shorter fragments (consisting of 
language designs, dominant- or subordinate discourses, interactional patterns and so 
forth) that I have pieced together and read as one single document, before return-
ing the fragments into the large document containing all the material. At times my 
intention was to read the texts for what they said, and at other times for what they 
ruled out. During these first readings my questions to the material were very simple. 
I wondered what the nicks were fighting about, in what circumstances they received 
praise or had to defend themselves and I why they kept on coming back to the com-
munities. This was not content analysis in its original form as it was not systematic 
nor intended to be an objective means of describing or quantifying the phenomena 
(Elo & Kyngäs, 2008: 108), but I did notice which words, phrases and metaphors 
that kept recurring, and I wondered why they did so.  
Some methods of probing into the texts were more general in nature and some 
questions to the texts were pervasive. Postings included in the analysis revolve around 
parenthood or subject production (i.e., they relate to the aim and the research ques-
tions) or they relate to the emerging empirical findings (such as the function of 
the concept of choice for some discourses to operate). Some general questions have 
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particularly guided the selection. What (experiences, categories, tastes and interests, 
or ways of being, acting and thinking) and who (in terms of identities) are described 
as acceptable or desirable on the one hand, and what/who as not acceptable or prob-
lematic on the other, and how is language used to support or counter a notion of the 
desirable/problematic? In addition, I have selected postings that offer explanations of 
the problematic state and solutions for making the subject more desirable. Postings 
on parenthood have been selected with the aim of finding common denominators 
for a desirable and problematic parenthood, respectively. I have focused on the at-
tribution of qualities to imagined others as well as qualities incorporated into self 
presentation. Furthermore, postings were selected for analysis when language was 
used to make self presentations, or when textual reproaches for a faulty presentation 
were handed out. Lastly, postings were chosen when they appeared to be breaking a 
pattern of content or language use.
Above all, I have searched the material to find general discursive patterns. The 
challenge for a researcher is perhaps never as apparent as when the intent is to point 
out features that will be labelled common or recurrent, or to state that a norm is 
generally applicable in an arena. In the case of web communities, one aspect of the 
challenge lies in the fact that they appear borderless – there are so many themes and 
threads started every day that it is impossible to catch but a small portion of them. 
Nevertheless, patterns do emerge, although they are multiple and reside alongside re-
sistance to the general mode of writing. When I have defined a pattern as general the 
following circumstances have been in place: Patterns were defined as general when 
they were little contested or received warm-hearted responses, when they reappeared 
on a regular basis and when deviations produced annoyed or surprised reactions. 
These types of pattern may be viewed as concerted appropriate sociocultural rules of 
speaking – rules for acting in a stylistic and contextually appropriate manner (Cohen 
& Olshtain, 2006: 113). This means that a rule can be a rule even if it is contested.
Analysing discourse
The analytical tools applied in the analysis stem from discourse theory and discourse 
psychology. Discourse theory presupposes that social identities (subjects as well as 
objects) are discursive elements and that these elements receive qualities and become 
identified through relations to other elements. Relations can be relations of equality 
or of difference. Every practice that construes a relation between elements in a way 
that changes their identity is an articulation that makes the element into a moment 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985/2008: 157). If the articulation is successful the identity of 
the object becomes partially fixed and every discourse is established as an attempt 
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to restrict the flow of difference that may make it unstable (ibid: 168). In discourse 
theory this striving to fixate discourse and make elements into moments is called a 
closure of discourse. The closure is a result of successful chains of equivalence: Empty 
signs that receive meaning by being connected to other signs (Winther Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 2000: 57f.) with the aim of reducing all other tentative possibilities of 
meaning. However, because it excludes particular meanings of elements in order 
for them to become moments, discourse is potentially threatened by that which 
it has expelled: The moment is at risk of transforming back into an element. That 
which is ‘expelled’ in articulation constitutes the outside of a discourse, a meaning 
or an utterance. When discourse constitutes itself, it expels elements which are made 
to constitute the outside of discourse (Laclau, 2005: 70) and discourse analysis is, 
therefore, the study of how elements are connected or separated through chains of 
equivalence and of what threatens discourse. One way to start an analysis of social 
identities is to explore the subject positions enabled by the discourse and how these 
positions are created through chains of equivalence, but also to investigate everything 
that seems to threaten the descriptions: ambivalences, tensions or incommensura-
bility. This briefly describes the method of deconstruction (Laclau, 1996: 50 f.). 
Deconstruction means to tear the construction apart – to study how objects are 
placed in accordance with schemata (the schemata can be a certain narrative logic, 
a juxtaposition of figures or images, or grammatical rules) (Thompson, 1988: 368).
One of the main starting points in the analysis in this study is the way that phe-
nomena or people are represented. Representation is defined as the way that a group 
comes to life in descriptions of it. Someone speaks about the group – because one is a 
member of the group, because one claims to speak on behalf of the group or because 
one states that one has enough knowledge about the group to be able to describe 
it. When a particular group is represented, a view of society is usually included in 
the representation, because the group as a whole is constituted in contrast to the 
perceived characteristics of other groups (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 2000: 52). 
Particular signs are, however, difficult to sort into groups that are possible to label or 
define. The floating signifier is precisely such a sign; a sign that discourses ‘compete’ 
to define according to their own logic (ibid.: 50).
The analysis will also comprise a study of how this is facilitated by particular 
techniques for making, for instance, a chain of equivalence appear trustworthy. Re-
lating two elements, (say for example ‘fathers’ and ‘violence’), does not help much 
in fixating a discourse of the pathological father, if the audience brushes it off as 
prejudices. The connection between ‘fathers’ and violence’ has to look true; it has to 
be constructed as an undisputable piece of reality, a fact. Discursive psychology has 
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to a great extent directed its attention towards fact constructions (Potter, 1996/2012: 
158). There are two ways to study a factual account – for its offensive and for its 
defensive rhetoric. The former undermines alternative descriptions (by damaging or 
reframing them); the latter aims to resist the undermining and protect its accounts. 
Rhetoric is thus the relation between a description and alternative descriptions. De-
scribed in this way, rhetoric transforms into a battlefield: ‘a feature of the antagonistic 
relationship between versions: how a description counters an alternative description, 
and how it is organized, in turn, to resist being countered’ (ibid: 108). One way to 
protect one’s account is by stating that its source of expertise comes from one’s own 
experience. When a speaker/writer wants to put an experience close to him-or herself 
it is called category entitlement (Potter et al., 1993). The narrator with a specific ex-
perience (of being robbed or of having a disabled child) has a particular entitlement 
to feel sad or troubled. Potter develops the notion into entire categories of people 
(crime victims or parents of disabled children) that in certain contexts are treated as 
especially knowledgeable. People are handled and handle themselves as if they belong 
to a special category of ‘knowers’ (ibid: 393). In contrast, one may want to construct 
the account as neutral, as not emanating from one’s own experience, but emerging 
from a trustworthy source outside of the subject. When the speaker/writer applies 
the device of out-there-ness, she/he constructs versions that appear independent of the 
agent producing it. (Potter, 1996/2012: 116, 150 ff.). This leads to one important 
point: There is a relation between the speaker/writer and the facticity in the pro-
duced version of the world. Lingering through these concepts is a pattern of distance 
and closeness. Depending on the situation it can appear trustworthy to position 
oneself close to the idea or the opinion, or to appear distant from it. 
Analysing ideology
When intending to detect ideological utterances the analyst aims to uncover ways 
in which relations of domination are maintained (Thompson, 1988: 370). For a 
relation of domination to be upheld, it should not be considered as such and so an 
ideological utterance needs to conceal, deny or obscure the nature of domination. 
This can be achieved in a number of ways and in what follows I shall present three 
concepts that I employed in analysis to detect ideological applications: Dissimula-
tion, fragmentation and naturalisation.87
87 Thompson (ibid.) chooses to call the process of naturalization reification. Because I do not wish to 
conflate this application of reification with how the same concept is applied in Marxist theory, I 
will instead utilise the notion of naturalisation that covers processes of representation that make 
the politically induced and historical state of affairs into something outside of time and place, 
naturally occurring and permanent.  
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Ideology may operate through dissimulation, for example by delineating a social 
event or a process in a fashion that highlights one dimension, and clouds another. 
When looking at a piece of text analytically, this means trying to uncover the way in 
which a particular feature is made to look relevant, whilst other features are described 
as irrelevant, or not described at all. Another way of putting it is that this endeavour 
intends to find what is missing in a claim or a narration. Ideology may also shape an 
utterance by fragmentation. In this way, relations of dominance can be maintained by 
fragmenting groups and making individuals appear as if in opposition to each other 
(ibid.).88 If fragmentation is accepted by subordinate groups it would, for example, 
make them turn on each other instead of joining forces, so that the dominant groups 
are unchallenged. Both dissimulation and fragmentation are, I think, parts of an af-
fective figure. Firstly, to be able to talk about ‘The Chav’ one needs to highlight some 
phenomena of the character one wants to illustrate and obliterate others. Secondly, 
a successful affective figure of disgust may achieve a fragmentation between groups 
that might possibly benefit from staying together. This would be the case when mid-
dle class women are led to despise unemployed young mothers living in disadvan-
taged residential areas, i.e., encouraged to see them primarily as bearers of bad taste 
instead of seeing them as belonging to the same sex as themselves and hence poten-
tially being oppressed by the same patriarchal structures. The final concept in the 
analysis of the ideological contours of discourse is naturalisation (Thompson, 1990: 
59). Things and events from the social world are represented as if a.): the outcome of 
natural characteristics and b.): as if they were of a permanent and unchanging nature. 
Ideology may thus operate ‘by representing a transitory, historical state of affairs as if 
it were permanent, natural, outside of time’ (1988: 370). Making highly contingent 
arrangements appear perpetual and inevitable means simultaneously making them 
difficult to critique and realign. 
Alternative routes? On the choice of empiric arenas 
I have now presented my analytical choices in terms of theoretical frames and meth-
odological tools. The remaining unaddressed issue is the degree to which the results 
presented in the upcoming analytical chapters relate to my choice of empiric arena. 
The short answer to such a question is that the venue in which I collected the ma-
terial is strongly related to the results. The analysis would presumably have been 
different had I studied the tension between the perceived demand assigned to the 
parent and to society, respectively, by probing into other types of material. There are 
88 One such fragmentation would be the division of poor into deserving and undeserving (Fineman, 
1991).
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several other empiric arenas in which these tensions could potentially be identified. 
I could for instance have studied parent-nurse conversations in the setting of child 
health centres, or perhaps parent-teacher meetings. I could have investigated groups 
of parents in the open preschools, or chosen other types of texts entirely – such as 
those introduced in Chapter Two; inquests, white papers and institutional reports. 
The reason for not investigating parent-nurse and parent-teacher interaction is be-
cause the aim is not to comprehend direct responses to decrees of responsibility from 
institutional representatives, such as would be the case when a parent interacts with 
an institution. In view of the fact that governmentality is one of the study’s implicit 
themes, the conversation between a nurse and a parent would not begin to answer 
the research questions pertaining to how the subject governs herself and the way in 
which this is perceived as an act of freedom. This implies that to achieve my aim I 
needed to find settings that did not contain direct institutional representation. The 
opposite problem would manifest itself if exploring the ‘big texts’ in a white paper 
or in an institutional report. To state the problem in simple terms – in these texts 
there are no parents responding or reflecting upon what is written. Could I then not 
have met with parents in the open preschool arenas? Would I not have been able to 
ask them questions about their notions of parental responsibilities, as well as their 
view of the responsibilities that society has to assume to enable them to manage the 
task of parenting? Most likely I could, but the troublesome issue would have been 
the lack of anonymity. Because I aimed for ‘free’ negotiations about responsibilities, 
I would have had to perform group interviews. This comes with two disadvantages. 
The first is that I would have posed the questions, thereby potentially steering the 
topics of conversation away from issues of concern for the parents themselves. The 
second disadvantage is that the parents would have had to face the rest of the group 
whilst expressing an opinion. The major advantage of entering a web community in 
the manner in which I have done – unnoticed – is that I could access statements that 
could be launched without the nick ever returning to the community, launched in 
pseudonymity, and with the possibility to approach the other participants in conver-
sation in a far more outright way than when people are sitting face to face. The fact 
that I was not present, either as an interviewer posing questions, or as a participant 
influencing conversation, has enabled me to access the material in a less polished 
version.
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Reading instructions
Presenting the results of a qualitative research collection involves reducing a versatile 
and multilayered material, while protecting the study participants. Next, I will pres-
ent some of the ways by which the presentation of the data will proceed. 
In the analysis I will use the pronoun ‘she’ and ‘her’ when referring to the hu-
man subject. This is because of the fact that the majority of the nicks is registered 
as women (Sarkadi & Bremberg, 2005) and because it presumably are women who 
have delivered the empiric material that compose the foundation for analysis. In 
the analytic chapters I will specify from which community a posting was retrieved 
and the year it was produced. Due to ethical considerations the names of the nicks 
are not written in full. Instead the nicks are named N, followed by a number (N1, 
N2, N3 and so forth). The numbering follows the order in which the nick enters 
into a thread. Postings will be numbered according to chapter and numerical order 
of appearance. In the first analytical chapter this means all postings are marked ‘5’, 
followed by a number for the specific posting (5:1, 5:2, 5:3 etcetera.). In the pres-
entation of threads I indicate if a posting is a response to another posting and specify 
which. When I present single postings I do not specify the postings to which they 
respond but if they were found in extensive threads I will briefly relate the content 
of the thread. When reminding the reader of a particular sentence in a posting I 
will repeat it in italics. All the postings have been translated into English. In the 
translations I have stayed as close as possible to the nicks’s original text, which means 
that I refrained from cleaning the language up, i.e., I retained cursing if the original 
posting contained cursing and I kept a more academic tone of voice in translation 
when the original posting had an academic ring to it. Italics and capital letters in the 
postings have been retained. However, in a few cases the posting that is presented in 
the analysis was partially rewritten due to the fact that some nicks use recurrent fixed 
phrases, exclamations or slang by which they might be recognised. In these cases I 
have chosen to present the posting using another, but similar, fixed phrase. In other 
cases part of the content of a narration was altered because it was biographically 
revealing, or specific in some other sense. Each analytical chapter concludes with a 
summary, followed by a short discussion. 
This marks the end of the presentation of the frames of the dissertation. My over-
all analytical aim has been to find a bridge between contemporary social settings and 
analysis, much the same as required by Thompson (1988), and I believe that a con-
textual set-up such as the one in Chapter Two will allow the analysis to point to the 
way that the economy, politics, institutions and norms inform and guide the con-
versations that are to be presented. Nevertheless, as the reader will note, analytical 
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concepts and theory are not evenly applied in the forthcoming analytical chapters, 
but emphasised in accordance with what is being analysed. 
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5. Attitude, taste and social status
A quick look at the parental communities leads to the impression that they are in-
clusive. All one needs to read postings is Internet access and if one wants to write 
the only requirement is the registration of an e-mail address and a pseudonym. Reg-
istration is free, there are no demands to belong to any kind of organisation to par-
ticipate and the writer does not have to be a parent to be allowed in. All types of 
conversation are allowed, given that they abide by the Swedish law and the rules of 
the community. Still, a closer look reveals that participation is unequal. All types of 
topics are not received in the same fashion, not all postings receive responses and 
some nicks reap less benign responses. Veterans, or groups of veterans, are generally 
received in a friendlier manner and seem to be able to dictate the reception of a post-
ing. Apparently, content, interaction and nicks are viewed differently. These features 
indicates that the parental web communities are fields as described by Bourdieu: 
They structure positions according to laws specific to the field (1984/1991: 131). 
Before entering into an analysis of viewpoints on divisions of responsibility between 
the family and society, we need to become acquainted with the characteristics of this 
field, its battles as well as the prizes the battles may generate, because they are part of 
the soil in which discourses are managed – contested and professed. Consequently, 
the aim of this chapter is to scrutinise what kind of field positions are possible in 
the communities and how these positions are accomplished. I will examine some of 
the narrative effects of particular positions and suggest ways of understanding what 
shapes the preference for particular ways of writing. The analysis focuses on the 
work the nicks perform on each other, (corrections, advice, reprimands etc.), and 
on self-presentation with no element of fostering involved. I will start by looking 
into the work that the nicks perform on each other. This fostering seems intended 
to mould a particular textual behaviour that I understand as an attitude on display. 
Thereafter, I will present ways in which self presentation is performed, as well as 
how self presentation is intertwined with the manifestation of taste. Concluding the 
chapter I will demonstrate an effect of the administration of rules – social control.
Preferred attitudes 
There are several ways to write in the community milieus to gain a secure social po-
sition. One way is to tell stories, as well as launching ideas and ideals that the other 
members like. Whether a story will be approved of or not is often something that 
seems to be decided by the veteran nicks. By responding in a friendly manner or by 
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correcting a nick, a suggestion is sent to the rest of the nicks, which perhaps explains 
why the preferences appear so similar.
Nevertheless, there are some ground rules, or laws of the field, to abide by before 
one can enter into presenting ideas and telling stories. One is to appear sincere. At 
first, the demand for people to be earnest is perhaps not very conspicuous, but in a 
web community there are not many signals available to give the other participants 
the impression of dealing with a person who speaks from the heart. Everything be-
gins at the keyboard. The nick either seems to understand this without much correc-
tion or she is fostered into understanding it. Either way, to create a position of status 
one must adopt certain core values embraced by the community. In the following 
section I will introduce the reader to three of these values: sincerity, coherence and 
gratitude, and how they are handled. 
Sincerity and coherence
Manifesting sincerity is presumably an easy interactional task; if the nick writes what 
she means she will be liked. However, in the field of the communities it is a little bit 
more complicated to define what sincerity is. The nick in the thread below complains 
about how the others do not like her. She describes being corrected for as long as she 
can remember, without knowing how to fit in. She is given advice by three veteran 
nicks: N2, N3 and N4, which seems to result in a suggestion situated at a distance 
from sincerity: To develop a strategy.  
5:1 But seriously? Why do I feel that so many are so pissed off by me and my 
questions? 
Why am I wrong? Or what am I doing wrong? 
How should I behave so that you won’t be angry/annoyed? 
N1 (TPP 2011) Threadstart
5:2 Below you were talking all incoherently, as if you were tired or drunk or 
affected by sleeping pills. No offence, but since you are not always like that 
it can be perceived as a provocation, especially because previously you have 
‘pretended to ask’ questions to see the reaction here. I think it’s hard to know 
what you mean, and when you’re serious. 
N2 (Answers posting above)
5:3 ?? So, are those interpretations ok? ‘no offence’…
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Pretended to ask? Because I have put it the way I wanted and not how you 
want me to?  
N1 (Answers posting above)
5:4 I feel you are very unbalanced. Like yesterday when you wrote that you 
thought a particular person was embarrassing. Then it changed into you hav-
ing heard this about yourself. You snap one second and become almost hon-
ey-mouthed the next. I don’t know where you’re at! You don’t seem sincere, 
as if you acted out a part. Or you are drunk/under the influence. Or you don’t 
feel very well. 
N3 (Answers posting 5:1)
The answer in posting 5:2 is common in the communities. If the nicks get an im-
pression that someone is pretending to ask questions or telling ‘fake’ stories, their 
response will be negative, or the posting will be mocked sardonically. The advice 
provided in 5:2 and 5:4 apparently holds sincerity as a part of the guiding ethos in 
the communities. N1, who receives criticism for her style of writing, states that she 
has no other way of being.
5:5 N3, you appear to honestly care. Thanks for that. 
The problem in my case is that I want to be the way I am. I have acted like this 
during the years and am not planning on changing it (stupid possibly).
/…/ I will never join the group and be honey-tounged just for peace of mind. 
NEVER. 
My choice is to continue as I am or leave. 
N1 (Answers posting 5:4)
5:6 If a strategy doesn’t work one has a choice. Either one changes strategy or 
decides it’s not worth it. You seem to want to be here, so then possibly it is 
worthwhile trying to change your behaviour? You’re not selling your soul by 
changing your approach. 
N4 (Answers posting above)
As it seems, being sincere needs to be supplemented by a strategy for sincerity. The 
other nicks interpret N1 as using a kind of conspicuous sincerity, as expressed in 
posting 5:2:  especially because previously you have ‘pretended to ask’ questions to see the 
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reaction here. The question appears to be how to decode sincerity, and how to un-
derstand the relation between language and intention. At first sight sincerity appears 
to stand in opposition to lies, irony or acting with overstated politeness. However, 
sincerity does not always require writing the absolute truth. The preferred sincerity 
may be one that is crafted within a community subject production preference which 
means there is a social performance involved. The strategy proposed in posting 5:5 is 
a strategy of truth. If there is something wrong with statements that N1 declares are 
from a genuine source, then subjectivity as a display of sincerity becomes a fictional 
game or a matter of sketching. If, in the eyes of the veterans, the sincerity of N1 is 
troublesome, it also highlights the manner in which the field specific monopoly is 
crafted when it comes to attitudes, and the advice from N2, N3 and N4 may just as 
well be interpreted as conservation strategies from dominant field players (Bourdieu, 
1984/1991: 133); a hint on the agreed-upon-taste which that they would like N1 
to respect. Apparently, sincerity has its own conventional manifestation, or commu-
nication ethics, correlated with reliability. It is not enough that N1 declares that she 
writes out of free will what is on her mind as that will and intention fluctuate; sub-
ject positions must be stable and in accordance with a jointly negotiated ontological 
decorum. This in turn produces an opposition between handling identity work in a 
creative manner and the ethical subjectivity demanded by the community. If subject 
production is informed by codes of how to write, sincerity itself becomes narratively 
restrained.
Gratitude 
As we will see, sincerity and coherence are not quite sufficient to gain a preferable 
position in the field. Being absolutely sincere and coherent may in fact ruin one’s 
social status if not paired with gratitude, which will be outlined in the following. 
This preference for gratitude is manifest mainly in two main ways: By the many 
postings containing excuses for not feeling gratitude when one should, and by what 
is, amongst the nicks themselves, called ‘gratitude threads’. The first postings in one 
such thread are presented below. This particular conversation was chosen to highlight 
a recurrent phenomenon in the communities – the celebration of the small details 
of everyday life. The nicks narrate cooking, baking and purchases as something to be 
grateful about.
5:7 What are you grateful for today? 
Personally it’s: 
1.That Junior liked my experimental food 
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2. That Junior ate vegetables 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for Christmas 
4. That I make such incredible tasty bread 
5. That I have my dream job 
6. That there is only one day left before I go on leave for 6 days 
7. That the evening with Junior went so well 
8. That I have stayed on my diet 
9. That I have felt so good all evening WITHOUT extra pills 
N1 (TPP 2011) Threadstart
5:8 That the extra load of work went as it should 
That I have purchased almost all the Christmas presents 
That I am free until Monday next week 
That my oldest daughter nailed 3 A* today 
That I have had a cosy lunch with my son and later had a nice afternoon of 
Christmas shopping with my mum 
That I can go to bed soon 
N2 (Answers posting above)
5:9 That my son’s stomach virus ended just as quickly as it began 
The Christmas card I got from my former colleagues  
That I’ll be having the world’s most cosy Christmas 
That I’ve got the world’s kindest mother 
N3 (Answers posting 5:7)
5:10 That the roast I made for dinner *like heaving it into the oven* came out 
and tasted very good, all spontaneously (minimal work at the preparations) 
/…/ 
?????????? ???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????? 
  
N4 (Answers posting 5:7)
Baking, cooking and scrubbing floors are celebrated and commended in this section 
of the gratitude thread.  The activities are made into something more than repetitive 
chores, i.e., they are attributed a particular value. The thread does not frown upon 
worldly chores; it is not a refusal of the world but of particular aspects of the world; 
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the dreary and sad. Whilst deeply focused on matters of the world, the nicks rise 
above this mundane level and articulate the way that the concrete household tasks 
generate positive feelings. I comprehend this celebration as simultaneously being a 
rule of conduct.
If gratitude is seemingly prescribed, negative emotions are seen as potentially 
problematic, especially if a certain nick is often tired, down or troubled. In especially 
severe cases of negativity, the correctional postings come in such great numbers that 
they amount to entire threads of their own, (followed by ‘meta threads’ a little later, 
which discuss whether or not the correction of the nick was fair). A fraction of one 
such thread can be seen below. The participating veteran nicks correct a nick (N1) 
who is writing about a stressful situation.
5:11 Finally! Christmas is over and I’m sitting here with sick kids, nothing 
unusual. Fifth day of fever.  Too damn boring. At the same time the rainwear 
of my youngest have gone missing at the day care, shit! And apart from that, 
it’s not enough that I’ve just managed to survive the death of a close friend 
last Autumn, now I’m gonna lose yet another friend =(  In other words, 
everything is crap.  
N1(TPP 2011) Threadstart 
 
5:12 But you’ve got a roof over your head and food on the table? Nobody is in 
hospital or dying? In that case you’ve got a lot to be grateful about! 
N2 (Answers initial posting) 
 
5:13 She is on the way of losing a friend. Sounds as if someone actually is dy-
ing…  
N3 (Answers posting above)
5:14 Yes my friend is unfortunately dying… But I’m supposed to be happy 
that I have got a roof over my head! 
N1 (Answers posting above):
5:15 I meant in the family. You’ve got a world to be thankful about, outside of 
the family it is sad but less of a disaster *crass and insensitive*  My children 
are alive=100 % happiness! It can never get any worse than them becoming 
sick or dying. Every day I receive, every day they live is a bonus, all the time, 
and all other sorrows will fade away. 
N2  (Answers posting above)
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5:16 How silly of me to even come here… Family…. yes, me and the children. 
N1 (Answers posting above)
5:17 I am sorry if you get pissed off, but you are not alone in living with that 
kind of stuff and it was actually a serious and benevolent posting about there 
still being good things to focus upon. There is always something that’s good. 
Always. The tiniest mite of good can be found somewhere. 
N2 (Answers posting above)
5:18 I agree with N2. Life really sucks sometimes, crappy things happen, and 
of course you need to take time to mourn these things. But it is also important 
to try and see the light in life. For one’s own sake! Not to be jaunty or because 
you_have to_, but so that you’ll get by. 
N4  (Answers posting above):
5:19 Yeah, the children have food anyway. Right now I have nothing to be 
grateful about. If you can’t be nice you should refrain from writing like that… 
N1 (Anwers posting 5:12)
5:20 I have not been unpleasant, I have just said that you have a lot to be 
grateful about, right? The thing with your friend is sad, it is always distress-
ing but that also means that when you meet the pale face of sorrow and death 
you become more open to seeing the things in life that really are a reason for 
gratefulness. A roof over your head, food in your stomach and children that 
are alive, I feel one does not need more, even if I would feel that everything 
else is fucked up! 
N2 (Answers posting above)
However exaggerated the tone of happiness may seem to the unaccustomed reader, 
the thread presented is part of a textual routine when correcting nicks who are con-
sidered overly unappreciative or sad. This goes especially for nicks who predominant-
ly write about problems, which explains the refutation of N1, who only occasionally 
logs into the community, mainly to ventilate anxieties. However, there are exceptions 
to the demand for gratitude and the prohibition against negativity. When initiating a 
new posting by making excuses for oneself, such as ‘sorry for all the whining’ before 
writing about one’s troubles, the posting will receive more helpful replies. This means 
it is not negativity that causes the nick problems, but a thoroughgoing negativity. 
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Stability in itself (the art of writing in a consistent way) is, hence, not the guiding 
code in all circumstances. It is only valued when used to deliver faith in the future or 
satisfaction with the present but becomes devalued when used for negativity. Nev-
ertheless, negativity can be tolerated in one particular situation. When the veterans 
criticise a nick who has no one to back her up, or who represents a minority opinion, 
the very negativism of the critical attitude is unlikely to be noted. Veterans seem to 
be allowed to exhibit both types of attitude but for a less accustomed nick it may 
be safer to stick to a positive attitude. Another rule is to use happiness and positiv-
ity when talking about one’s own life and allow oneself the odd case of negativity 
when talking of others. The manifestations of happiness and stability may in fact be 
a matter of distinction rather than displaying a sensation. This would explain why 
the veterans can allow themselves more negativity than the newcomers. Since they 
already have manifested the field specific capital of gratitude, stability and optimism, 
i.e., ‘good taste’, they can occasionally allow themselves to display negativity without 
losing face.
Self presentation
If the first part of this chapter has demonstrated how the nicks govern each other in 
order for the right kind of narrative conduct to materialise, it is only half the story. 
The majority of the postings are inserted with no friction or conflict but seemingly 
out of the free will of the nick. This resonates with Haman’s (2009: 38) conception 
of subjectivation – the disciplined subject’s incorporation of values so she feels an 
affinity with them. In the case of the web community, however, the work of subjec-
tivation must be put on display to be noted. Before presenting how self presentation 
looks in interaction I will demonstrate the easiest way to display a favourable attitude 
even before interaction starts. The presentation text visible below the avatar89 of the 
nick is another area of positive attitudes on display. These texts often contain a tone 
of optimism resembling the tone of voice in self-help literature. The presentation text 
may give the impression that the nick is an active and choosing subject: Moment by 
moment, second by second I choose to be the victim or the creator of my own reality, or 
it may stress the need for positive thinking: Every time we do something positive for 
someone else we send out a small ripple of hope. Before the nick enters into interaction, 
a message is conveyed to the rest of the community. The nicks who read the posting 
have, besides from the content of the posting itself, this additional piece of informa-
tion about the nick’s self-cultivation that has taken place before conversation starts. 
89 See Glossary in Appendix.
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The presentation text is a piece of symbolic capital invested before the battles in the 
field have begun: It becomes a safety net.
Self presentation when talking about other people
If the presentation texts can be understood as a kind of safety net, there are other, 
more robust, ways to achieve a position that the others like. This is mainly operated 
through distinctions; the next feature of interaction to be presented. This section will 
comprise an analysis of the ways in which ‘good taste’ is operated, first as it is used for 
launching ideals of how to live, and second as it is used for talking about the body. As 
we shall see, it is permitted to mimic content that other nicks have inserted, which 
means to become inspired by other types of postings, but at the same time it is vital 
to exhibit discernment in relation to consumer goods. 
Distinctions can be exercised in several ways and through numerous topics. No 
matter the topic distinctions appear to be crafted by expressing a certain morality 
and in what follows we will have a look at the way distinction is performed through 
moralities. The moralities are often modelled by narrating warning examples of oth-
er people’s faults and failures. A common example is asking the community what 
to do in a particular case of maltreatment of children or raising general questions 
about problematic parenthood. The following posting tells the story of a problematic 
neighbour. As we shall see, we get to know something about the two nicks taking 
part in this short interaction, although they are not telling us very much about them-
selves.  
5:21 I have tried to put her on the right track for a long time.  
Like asked – can I watch the kids so that you can take a shower? But she 
doesn’t want that.  
Said ‘Whoops, it looks messy here, can I help you tidy up a bit?’ She doesn’t 
want that.   
We live next-door and when I am in the washhouse I have asked ‘can I do 
some of your laundry, I don’t have that much myself’ but she does not want 
that.   
I have tried to introduce other and better types of food by saying like ‘I tried a 
yummy recipe for a chicken casserole yesterday, would you like to have it and 
try it?’ – Naaah, I’ll make fish n’ chips instead.   
Or said ‘I’m free tomorrow, how about we cook something new? We might 
google a recipe.’ 
But she doesn’t want that, it takes time to cook stuff that isn’t semi-prepared.
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I have also subtly asked if the three-year-old shouldn’t stop having the sooth-
er full time and perhaps not use the feeding bottle anymore cause of her teeth, 
but oh no, she’ll scream and yell too much.   
N1 (VEF 2012)
5:22 /…/ Fish n’ chips? Where are the vegetables? Where are the vitamins 
and the minerals, wholesome fat etcetera? Children need these if they are to 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of semi-prepared food like frozen chopped vegetables, canned tomatoes and 
beans etc., so sure there is super wholesome semi-prepared food, so you can 
????????????????????? ???????????’s still HEALTHY.  
N2 (Answers posting above)
One appears to be able to gain a great deal in terms of social status by the skill of 
talking about others. Status is achieved not so much because of what the nicks write 
about themselves, but through a technique of telling tales of reversed ideals, or of 
‘bad taste’.  In short, the nicks in 5:21 and 5:22 define themselves against a backcloth 
of disintegrated parenthood. When taste is separated in this fashion a symbolic re-
production of people takes place; some people are described as feeding their children 
nutritious food, while others are characterised as if they could not be bothered. There 
appears to be a distance established between these types of people and it consists in 
differences in parental skills and ambition.
Another way to manifest the right way to live goes through the skill of mimick-
ing. One nick may log into the community to tell a story of an edificatory or sound 
situation, which is well received. This story is later followed by postings that contain 
exactly the same event and the event is often named after the nick who introduced 
the story in the first place. In 2011 a nick in TPP (labelled N5 in the thread below) 
told a story about how her son, when asked, answered without hesitation that he 
knows he is loved. The following days the community overflowed with nicks stating 
that they too asked their children if they know they are loved. They do remember 
who told the story first and so they named their experience ‘doing an N5’.  
5:23 I have also ‘done an N5’… well it’s become an expression here nowadays
.  
Me: You know I love you like crazy right? 
Ben: Yes I know. 
Me: Do you know why I love you like crazy?   
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Ben: *throws lots of air kisses in my direction * 
Me: But why? 
Ben: Ehh.... cause you like me? 
Well, it’s really that simple  
N1 (TPP 2011) Threadstart
5:24 *hihi* Go Ben!  I have also done an N5!
Asked all three of them earlier. 
Me: ’Do you know that I love you?’ 
Children: ‘Yes’ (and here the 5-year-old said ’and I luv you’). *sweetie*  
Me: ’Do you know why I love you?’
5-year-old: ‘Because you do’. 
6-year-old: ‘Because you say it several times every day’. 
8-year-old: ‘Because you’re my mum’ 
So clear and simple!  
N2 (Answers posting above)
5:25 What did I miss? Why should one report a reason for one’s love? 
N3 (Answers posting 5:23)
5:26 Huh, you don’t have to of course, but it’s always fun to hear children 
reason about this and that  
N4 (Answers posting above)
The two threads presented achieve a kind of subjectivation-by-proxy. Through re-
counting the story of the problematic parent living next door or the children’s feel-
ings the nicks manifest how well they have incorporated ideals of good parenting. 
So far, this means that appealing social positions in the field can be secured through 
education performed by the other nicks, through mimicking other postings and 
through subjectivation-by-proxy, in uses of the allegedly well-behaved child or the 
ill-behaving neighbour. As we saw in postings 5:21 and 5:22, status is also achieved 
by pointing to the perceived lack of status in other groups of people; a typical feature 
of how a field geared by symbolic capital leads to segmented social structures, e.g., 
divisions between what is considered ‘high’ and ‘low’ (Anheier et al., 1995: 866). 
The segmentation also includes the child. There is a certain child – overt and public 
– that is much needed for subjectivation-by-proxy to function in the communities. 
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This feature of the moralities coincides with Collet’s (2005) finding about how chil-
dren in web community settings are used as identity enhancement. In the fields of 
the communities where certain subjectivities are the objects of fight, the child can 
be used as a weapon, but the logic is complex. It is not sufficient to simply love 
the child. Neither is it entirely sufficient that the child knows it is loved. The child 
needs to articulate this knowledge. The articulate child is simultaneously a narrative 
consequence of a preference and a field specific capital; this is how the child ought 
to be described if the nick wants to reap credits. As most nicks in the parental com-
munities have children, that asset alone would not make them stand out in any way 
and the nicks cannot – as in the case of Berg and Peltola’s study (2014) – examine 
the child themselves to establish whether or not it is a success. What remains to be 
scrutinised is the story about the child and, therefore, certain narrative conditions 
must be added. These conditions transform the child and it is converted in much the 
same way as money, although in this case on a market consisting of symbolic goods. 
Whilst rules of conduct decree that it is acceptable to mimic content, the ontological 
decorum orders how it should be presented.  
Self presentation through consumption
When the reader cruises the communities the many themes, as previously men-
tioned, seem open to everyone. One can post although one has no academic degree, 
talk of the small pleasure of having a cup of coffee and still receive polite answers, and 
self presentation is not damaged due to writing about living in a rented apartment. It 
is not manifestations of economic capital that govern interaction, but manifestations 
of symbolic capital. The matter of importance is displaying consumption choices: 
Knowing how to separate the wheat from the chaff, i.e.. demonstrating acquaint-
anceship. As it is essential to understand this feature of self presentation we will now 
take a closer look at the ways in which discernment in matters of consumption is 
carried out. 
The first narrative trick is to display a capacity to tell the difference between various 
kinds of consumer goods. The communities contain an abundance of postings on 
the skill involved in distinguishing fine art from mass-produced or cheap goods, as 
in the next exemplary posting that elaborates on differences in the way that alcohol 
is packaged. 
5:27 No, I totally agree with you. And here it comes: there IS no high class 
canned beer, and no truly fine bag-in-box wine either.
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WORTH THE MONEY perhaps, but not top class. It’s impossible to call one-
self an epicure if one _prefers_ canned beer and bag-in-box to proper beer in 
a bottle and real wine /…/ Generally, I never buy bag-in-box or canned beer. 
My husband who enjoys beer prefers to drink one or two truly fine bottles 
rather than five cans. He would probably never manage five cans by the way, 
then he would throw up or something like that. 
(TPP 2011)
Posting 5:27 makes a simple sorting of the characteristics of refinement: If wine 
comes in a cardboard box it is less refined and when it comes in a bottle it is more 
sophisticated.  Drinking for the sake of intoxication is dismissed, whilst drinking 
for the sake of flavour is endorsed. The way to distinction, hence, bypasses material 
resources such as the money needed to invest in high-quality products, and instead 
stops at discernment. Keeping this in mind, consumer choices can be narrated as 
made for financial reasons without being subject to ridicule from the other nicks, 
but they must appear to be made by a connoisseur, as advocated in the next posting.
5:28 You buy the cheapest you can find, I couldn’t give a shit, but don’t make 
it up to be as good as everything else. Sometimes you don’t care about quality, 
it’s not always the number one priority, or it’s not even possible to buy within 
the financial limits, but then you’ll have  to deal with it, and stand by it. 
I buy furniture at Ikea. Not because I think it’s as good as artisanal craftwork, 
but because that’s what I can afford right now. But I still see the difference! 
On the other hand, I don’t buy the cheapest jam from Eldorado, because it 
tastes nothing but sugar and E numbers, and I can afford 10 SEK to get a tasti-
er jam. It’s about priorities. Nothing else. There is no sense in arguing that the 
cheaper jam is better because it’s the one you can afford!  
(TPP 2011)
Posting 5:28 points out two different reasons for buying furniture at IKEA – one 
may fool oneself into believing that IKEA quality is just as good as that of an arti-
sanal craftsmanship, or one understands that the two can by no means be compared 
but prioritises the lower cost. The skill appears to concern evaluation and informed 
choice. When money is short quality can lose out, but the point is not the lack of 
money but that one knew the difference between craftsmanship and mass produc-
tion. Consequently, it is not consumer goods that are to be accumulated in the 
conversations about the relation between taste-knowledge-money. What seems to be 
at stake is displaying calibrated and calculated choices. Choice appears as the true 
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material of distinction, and the ability to demonstrate the reason behind a choice is 
to display the symbolic capital needed in this field.
Choosing what to buy is an activity that can be extended beyond craftsmanship 
and quality, as we will see next; health and ethics are also employed as components 
for distinctions. The postings below describe evaluations of potential purchases. They 
say nothing about the monetary value of the items, but about the relation between 
the purchaser and the commodity. By choosing to buy a particular commodity, a 
level of consciousness is manifested. The first example below signals consciousness in 
matters of health and the second in matters of ethics.
5:29 I think the recipes one finds on the net are only so-so, feels like they’ve 
squeezed in unnecessary calories in the shape of high-carbohydrate accom-
paniments, dressings etc. Have also checked at Pinterest, but the wholesome 
recipes there are peppered with peanut butter and white bread and the 
likes…? /…/
Stuff I eat a lot of are for instance chicken filet with grilled root vegetables, 
perhaps a cold sauce made out of low fat yoghurt, heaps of curd, vegetables, 
salads, lentil soup etc. 
(VEF 2013)
5:30 I don’t notice any differences in flavour, but I’m not so good at that…   
 
However I do know how I want the world to be. And I don’t want chemicals 
polluting nature, and I don’t want meat factories with stressed-out animals. 
So I chose WWOF-certified 90 or the likes, when it’s possible.
So quality for me lies not in the flavour but in the world in which the food is 
produced.   
(TPP 2011)
Postings 5:29 and 5:30 describe being interpellated (or resisting interpellation) by 
consumer goods and the value they represent. In 5:29 the nick is too proficient to be 
fooled by recipes with unnecessary calories and in 5:30 the nick is too ethical to be 
bothered about flavour. The question is: What kind of self presentation is achieved 
90 The Swedish equivalent of WWOF is the KRAV certificate.
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in this talk about calories, carbohydrates, chemicals and certifications? Who turns 
around to respond to the hailing, who establishes a relation to the product, and what 
happens when a consumer choice is made? One property of the conversations is, I 
think, that it is an act of becoming. The consumption choice articulates the subject 
more clearly. The position of ‘Nobody In Particular’, an indistinct subject, is con-
verted into a more visible position and a personal value is created that resembles the 
value of the choice. By avoiding unhealthy calories and by opting for ethics rather 
than flavour the two nicks in the postings above becomes distinct – one as healthy 
and the other as ethical. Differences between products are accentuated because they 
translate into differences between subjects. The subject that materialise in the post-
ings has a reasonable level of expertise to make the consumer choice, and the artic-
ulation that there is a choice implies other subjects that putatively do not make the 
same choices. When this process of becoming is rejected, as in the next posting, it 
receives no response.
5:31 The difference is not always notable, just because you’re told it’s better 
quality and more expensive it doesn’t have to be true. Sometimes it may of 
course be true but far from always… but some like to believe it. 
(TPP 2011)
Posting 5:31 does not receive any answers. One way of interpreting the silence is 
that the posting violates the ontological decorum. It breaks up the relation between 
the goods and the subject by stating that there may be no differences of quality in a 
particular product but that some like to believe it. This means the posting perforate 
the activity of distinctions. It negates the constitution whereby the subject is allowed 
to come to life through ideological applications. Instead, what is articulated is the 
mere hoax, or; the face of consumer ideology. 
Self-presentation through body talk
As noted in the self presentations described in this chapter, status is achieved by 
means of displaying discernment and through the nick staging herself as healthy or 
morally upright. So far the preference seems to lean towards immateriality: Taste and 
knowledge, i.e., capacities residing within the subject. We will now turn to the body 
and the ways it can be narrated to generate a social position of status.
The body is yet another surface for distinctions, although it seems that its mere 
appearance matters less. When the nicks discuss the body it is mainly treated as a 
problematic object and the recurrent issue is that of control. The most important 
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thing to manifest is not the right kind of body but the very endeavour to achieve the 
right kind of body. Again, the capital to demonstrate in this arena is not material in 
the sense of narrating corporal perfection, but is generated by telling a story of hav-
ing particular dispositions. This tendency is notable in the two postings below. They 
talk about setting limits for oneself, sticking to them, and controlling desire.
5:32 Second week of shaping up.   
I have been even stricter during the second week of shaping up. Only one 
glass of wine, Thursday evening when it was the husband’s birthday. Three 
small pieces of dark chocolate on Friday evening and a tiny piece of fruit pie 
as dessert after lunch last Sunday, that’s the only gluttony I have indulged in. 
Well, a handful of home popped popcorn twice. Apart from that, healthy food 
and an insane amount of exercise. Have been working out every day except 
two, and those days I walked for 80 and 120 minutes! /…/  
The result was -0,2 kilos.  During the first week of shaping up I gained 0,3 
kilos. So the result after two weeks of shaping up was +0,1 kilo; a standstill in 
other words. Feels far from fair, but that’s the way it goes sometimes. All in all 
I am stuck at my + 1,5 summer kilos.
I won’t make any big changes this week and I’ll give it another go. If there is 
still no result I’ll shape up even more. *grumbling* 
(TPP 2012)
5:33 The hardest part is becoming surprised. 
I have decided to do without sweets and biscuits. I don’t see it as me sacri-
ficing  or mortifying myself or something like that, I abstain because I know 
I feel better doing so. I have no problem with this. Most of the time. But like 
yesterday a colleague bought a whole box of cream puffs. Cream puff is my 
absolute favourite type of pastry! I LOVE cream puffs. Had I known before I 
would have pulled myself together, even asked the colleague to not buy one 
for me. Now instead I had to go through an inner struggle for quiiiiite a while. 
Should I eat mine? Never mind sort of, just one cream puff? Or should I split 
it and have half of it? One quarter? Or perhaps have it all anyway? What dif-
ference does it make in a hundred years? Yadayadayada in my head… Til’ I 
finally got sorted, that no – I don’t want it – really. As N6 says, if you need to 
negotiate with yourself it means you should refrain. Otherwise you wouldn’t 
have to negotiate! And when you leave as a ‘winner’ of that kind of inner 
struggle  your determination becomes so much stronger. And vice versa, if 
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you constantly allow yourself to deviate from promises made to yourself they 
become worthless in the end.
Today my kiddie turns 5. I will not eat his Batman cake. It doesn’t even feel 
difficult. This time I come prepared.   
(TPP 2013) 
The postings above do two things. They talk of temptations, almost as if eating has 
transformed into paranoia, but first and foremost they celebrate how the nicks rose 
above sinful thoughts and continued to live by the rules and so, the very rules ap-
pear just as important as the physical result. The postings confirm that the nicks are 
believers in a particular life style of abstaining and celebrate a belief and memorise 
codes of conduct in one move. The preferred conduct should, however, not be read 
as a mere denial of needs or a refusal of the world. I would say there are echoes of 
the Foucauldian take on askesis in the postings about resisting temptation. Through 
askesis, Foucault argues, the subject is able to grasp, or subjectivate, a reality inherent 
in the world (1971/2008: 277 ff.). One such truth might be the notion of the grow-
ing subject – a subject perpetually becoming stronger, as 5:33 articulates: And when 
you leave as a ‘winner’ of that kind of inner struggle your determination becomes so much 
stronger. When one gains strength, the sacrifices cost hardly anything. In this case the 
art of abstention enlarges the subject – when the body shrinks the mind grows. This 
also entails that eating healthy is an achievement in itself – it needs introspection and 
self-control. Narrations about toning the body, hence, achieve two things: a public 
annunciation of a system of beliefs, (the best way to treat the body) and a meditation 
directed inwards (how do I achieve this body?). At the very same time a taste display 
is performed – the taste for abstention. In that sense one may understand the post-
ings as displays of a kind of negative satisfaction. The accounts of abstention seem to 
celebrate another type of satisfaction altogether – that which resides in not enjoying 
a particular type of item that an ideological commitment has labelled unattractive. 
The way that this taste for abstention is applied will be further displayed in Chapter 
Eight, where we will examine accounts of food and social hierarchies. For now it is 
perhaps sufficient to state that the dieting body can be understood as a manifestation 
of ideology.
Just as in the case of consumption there are differences articulated in the ambi-
tions involved in training the body. Abstention is in itself a distinction, and other 
types of distinction come from clothing, as described in the next posting, and from 
measurement in the subsequent posting.
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5:34 /…/ running feels more serious than jogging. I have no ‘jazz pants’ or 
sweatshirt but real runners’ clothes, however I still want to lose weight. Nev-
ertheless, I register all my results and have a goal to become faster and run 
longer distances so I think I can call myself a runner anyhow . 
(TPP 2012)
Distinctions apparently relate to identity and the nick in the posting above staggers 
between two types of identity – ‘the jogger’ and ‘the runner’. The preferred one seems 
to be the calculated competitor: The runner. So, when discussing weight and exercise 
in the communities, the preferred narration is one of a professionalized body – work 
and leisure conflate. The preferred narrated body is characterised by abstention, dis-
cipline and measurement.
5:35 I’ve been working out about 2-3 weeks now, 1 session per day, started 
with 10-15 minutes  on the stationary bike and then I did away with like 150-
200 calories, little by little I reached 400 calories/34 minutes.
My goal is mainly to get rid of all the fat around the waist and down, and ob-
viously to lose weight. I notice that when I have cycled that much I have lost 
1, 5 kilos, but I want to exercise more to reduce the waist and the parts below 
the waist faster.
I have a treadmill at home where I do maximum of 10 kilometres per hour 
and, as I mentioned, a stationary bike.
Will it work with 2 sessions 6 days/week? and do I have any chance of re-
sults? 
(VEF 2013)
In the communities, distinctions are not hidden, coded or decided in any secret 
space for the specially invited or knowledgeable. They are for all to know: Articu-
lated, explicit, measured and published. Just how articulated and how measured the 
body can actually be is notable in posting 5:35. The body is not described as simply 
moving about, but as a data producing entity and an arithmetic number. The move-
ment itself is dismembered through the numbers produced and this dismembered 
movement is later reported in the communities. The physical exercise – and certainly 
writing about it – represents a flow of value. The exercise is assessed and the value 
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of the exercise (Am I a ‘jogger’ or a ‘runner’?) is transported back to the subject. 
According to Bourdieu (1977/2011: 88 f.) there are recurrent and coherent princi-
ples in every social practice and when we grasp the structure of these principles, we 
embody the world behind it. The world behind this social practice comes across as 
fragmented, hierarchical and public.  
Thus an appropriate self presentation is also performed in narrations of the body. 
The body does not need to be perfect, but the will must. By disciplining the body it 
is as if the interior of the subject is accessed and in that sense the prescribed conduct 
that ensures social status is rather monastic. Although the first impression of the 
parental communities is that they are egalitarian (everyone is allowed in), we see that 
in fact its social topography is defined by core values that need to be put on display 
through manifesting an on-going gratitude, by launching moralities and displaying 
discernment and discipline.
Rejected self presentations: On gender and decorum 
Nevertheless and contrary to the impression given above, the communities do not 
solely comprise of self-governed, disciplined subjects. We will now become acquaint-
ed with the reception of nicks who fall outside of the formula for self presentation. 
Occasionally a nick stands out through another type of self presentation – non-posi-
tive, non-constructive or non-balanced – without seemingly being harmed by objec-
tions from the others. Usually, most of them adjust. Either they adapt to community 
discourse or leave.91 There are, nevertheless, other ways to deal with the preferred self 
presentations when one does not fit in. One is to ignore reprimands from the others 
as best one can; another is to try and open separate threads where one invites people 
who share the same experiences. The way these strategies receive responses seemingly 
relates to gender. In what follows I will introduce two nicks whose subjectivity falls 
out of the general matrix. The first nick (N1) is registered as a man, the second (N2) 
as a woman.
The fact that N1 cannot be bothered by people’s perception of him is already ob-
vious in the way he introduces himself in the presentation text attached to his avatar: 
Same shit different day: The man who can neither debate, nor write more than 2 sen-
tences. Logged in around the clock, every day of the year. This nick apparently does not 
care much about obtaining a position of status in the community. N1 recurrently 
refers to himself as a slave, a proletarian alienated from his place of work, stating that 
91 In the VEF community it is more common to break the accepted self-presentation rules. At the 
same time the rules appear a little more flexible. Because this community has more visitors, it 
appears the rule breaking activities are lost in the vast amount of postings during one day.  
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he has no interests and describing himself as passive. He declares he has no interest 
in having a sexual relationship, that he does not want to gain friends, that he is a 
male chauvinist and that he has no plans for the future. In short, this nick ignores all 
forms of ontological decorum. He has seemingly become a hero to some groups of 
nicks, and an abomination to other groups. The latter criticise N1 persistently, but 
the reprimands seem to have no effect.
About his level of intelligence, N1 writes: 
5:36 /…/  i’m totally aware of the kind of odd muppet I am. 
(TPP 2011)
 
On the importance of sex, N1 comments:
5:37 Sex is clearly overrated. Ol’ one-eye going in and out… ha ha such a silly 
thing really. I’d rather spend time at the computer.  
(2011)
In a gratitude thread that extols the joys in life, N1 enters and make a joke about this 
community trend:
5:38 /…/ if you complain someone will come and point out that they know 
someone that has no arms and legs and he is both blind and deaf but soooo 
grateful and happy and thinking about what kind of pizza to order.  
(2012)
When considering the objections his postings receive from time to time N1 is really 
inflicting some kind of damage by expressing his negative views on life. Nevertheless, 
his postings do not belong to any dominant discourse. Instead they belong in the 
margins of community opinion and, arguably, constitute only a minor challenge to 
the preference for sincerity, coherence, gratitude and choice. Having said that, the 
predominant way of writing apparently does not influence him either – N1 does not 
seem to learn anything, neither from benign comments, nor from reprimands. He 
does not improve. Does this mean that he does not become a subject when discursive 
power hails him? Is he not interpellated?  
One way of answering these questions is to ask who the discursive calling is for. 
Are the demands for gratitude, optimism and coherence mainly assigned to the 
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women in the communities? Are these arenas mainly fields of femininity? This would 
explain why a man, when ignoring the ontological decorum, does not inflict too 
much damage, in contrast to women who fail to display the agreed-on taste. In that 
sense, N1 is less of a subject in these particular arenas of female bonding, affirmation, 
competition and speculations in value. N1 may be just a bagatelle, someone who 
provokes a slight irritation but nothing more. In that sense his rebel position is quite 
comfortable, because he simultaneously has a dominant and a subordinate position. 
He gets away with violating the rules that generate status because on the one hand 
the rules are not for him, but on the other he cannot change them.
If N1 represents a subject that is neither bothered nor embraced by the rules, 
there are other subject categories that are the target of much blame and complaints. 
One is the poor mother. Disliked subjects, such as the poor mother, sometimes cre-
ate separate threads where only nicks who share the same experience are encouraged 
to write. Separate threads are one way to prevent critique in the conversation and 
initiate support. These threads may be started to debate a variety of delicate matters 
– spouses who take no interest in the children, disease and psychiatric illness, prob-
lematic dealings with authorities and experiences of poverty or sexual assaults. How-
ever, because the communities are open the threads are obviously easy to invade, and 
the recurrent pattern is for attempts at such separatism to be interrupted by nicks, 
particularly veterans, who want to express a divergent opinion. In the next example 
a query for advice gets interrupted by the veteran nick N4. 
5:39 Hello all you ‘poor’ and/or ‘single’ parents out there! I have a child who 
is 3 years old. A wonderful daughter. Have been alone with her since she 
was a baby, because her daddy does not want to participate. I am single and 
smashing… We live in a two-room apartment in a rather big city here in Swe-
den. My daughter is at the daycare 15h per week. I’m  employed by the hour. 
We are very poor but still happy. /…/
My income looks like this: 
Salary: About 4000 SEK92 per month 
Child benefits: 1050 SEK 
Alimony: 1273 SEK 
Housing benefits: 2100 SEK
92 1 Euro is approximately 9,30 SEK.  
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That is about 8500 SEK every month. When bills and food are paid for we 
have about 3000 left to spend. In other words not much.
But now to the point:
I thought I’d ask if there are more parents living like us? In this thread we 
can tip each ther off about everything, how to save money, how to find the 
cheapest food,  low-price recipes, cheap stuff to buy, sales etc.Hope you un-
derstand. 
N2 (VEF 2010)
5:40 I can immediately advice you that with your income you are probably 
eligible for complementary economic support. I made a preliminary estima-
tion and counted with you having about 4.700 SEK for rent and electricity 
and I arrive at a deficit of about 1500 SEK for you. You probably also have 
a household insurance, fees for the residents’ association and bus card that 
would reside, so you could perhaps even get 2000 SEK a month. That’s a lot of 
money when you’re living on the edge. 
N3 (Answers posting above)
5:41 But why choose to have children when you are already in such a financial 
mess??? 
N4 (Answers posting above )
5:42 Probably it wasn’t planned. We live in Sweden so things have a way of 
sorting themselves out anyhow.  
N5 (Answers posting above)
5:43 Yes, because others pay for it! 
N4 (Answers posting above)
5:44 Perhaps you could respect and accept that one actually doesn’t want 
comments from you since you’re not helpful at all, plus simply makes stupid 
comments that no one wants to read, as you may have noticed? Moralists 
come in great numbers in VEF, so you may want to keep your thoughts and 
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opinions to yourself  /…/ 
N2 (Answers posting above)
5:45 Likewise,  nobody is forcing you to read or comment, right? Can under-
stand that you find my question stupid, because none of you seems to be able 
to answer it in any concrete manner, but yell ‘moralist’ as soon as someone 
talks back. 
N4 (Answers posting above)
The interchange presented is one example of the recurrent problems in the fields 
of the parental communities when it comes to interaction: Although a question or 
a story was never intended to create a social position of status, such a position is 
appointed anyway. Establishing a separate thread in a public environment becomes 
hazardous because of the fact that every presentation of self can be received as some-
thing it is not aimed to be, or received as a proposition about social value that has 
to be evaluated according to the principles of the field. In this case it may be that 
N4 actually reads posting 5:39 as a case of publicatio sui – a publics attempt to 
beg forgiveness for having children when poor. The self presentation is embraced as 
something it was perhaps never intended to be; when N2 inserted posting 5:39 she 
presumably did not conceive of the story as ladened with potential social value. As 
noted by Beverly Skeggs (2011: 496); if we want to perform a publicly appealing self 
presentation we need to put certain aspects of ourselves on display as investments in 
value, and conceal others. The nicks relate to a kind of market of moralities and in 
the thread above, not much social value can be excavated by being a single and poor 
mother, because it is a well-known and disliked character among the veterans in the 
communities. Whilst actually receiving some advice, N2 also receives an evaluation 
of status.
In summary, one possible reason for why N1 (registered as a man) does not de-
fend himself may be that the rules of value are not applicable to him, whilst the 
reason for the defence from N2 is because the rules actually assign a value to her. 
This is not to say that the separate threads are of no value, considering the concrete 
advice handed out in the example. Nonetheless, when one enters and registers as a 
woman, one is co-defined by the other nicks and becomes someone in particular, 
either liked or disliked. The reproaches that emerge when a woman is positioned 
outside the ontological decorum – the agreement about the world – seem to inflict 
some kind of harm.  
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The dying community and field prizes
So far this chapter has revealed generic rules for achieving social status in the com-
munities, and what can happen when the rules are not abided. This section will out-
line some of the consequences of these rules, especially when they are administered 
by the veterans and when the rules of status solidify into social control. 
Sometimes nicks articulate that they want to leave the communities because of the 
harsh tone of voice and quarrels are often initiated on the basis of rules of conduct. 
In what follows we will view a debate about ‘community climate’ in TPP, where the 
number of members began to drop in 2012. In discussions in the spring of 2012, 
some of the problems caused by veteran nicks in the community were brought to 
the fore. The veterans were considered to constitute an opinion police that scared 
people off, and some of the nicks described the community as dying. In an effort to 
recruit new members, new personnel were employed by the editorial management 
of TPP 2013. One of the tasks of the new employees was to increase the level of 
activity. Some months later an idea for improvement was launched; the idea was to 
find suitable ‘ambassadors of the community’ amongst the nicks. The ambassadors 
should initiate new topics of interest in the various themes and keep conversations 
flowing. The veterans considered this an artificial respiration that would promote 
nothing more than pseudo topics. The first posting below comes from a veteran who 
does not like the idea of ambassadors and it is followed by a response from a nick 
who does not like veterans.
5:46 /…/ I believe the idea of ambassadors is not wrong.  But sending out 
peppy ambassadors into the community may be a bit weird. I believe that a 
lot of us ‘veterans’ are reluctant to engage in all that peppy attitude and the 
‘hughsies’ and being part of the ‘TPP Family’, and in that case the ambassa-
dors do more harm than good. 
N1 (TPP 2014 answers an initial posting from the editorial staff)
5:47 It is exactly that which some of you (no names mentioned) manifest that 
causes new members to back off before even entering. The self-righteousness. 
The opinion that you are an exclusive secret assembly – better and more ma-
ture and more intellectual than other parental communities. You even have 
the nerve to spell it out! 
Although the messenger function is overheated with slander, more childish 
than in grammar school.
125
I actually think this community needs to substitute some members with more 
normal and stable parents. Who would like to use the community for the 
kinds of discussion it was meant for. 
N2 (Answers posting above)
Although posting 5:47 is immediately rejected by several veterans it may have opened 
a floodgate of latent discontent. The heterodoxy displayed in the posting apparently 
threatens the stable positions of the field and forces the veterans to speak. In the next 
posting another veteran, labelled N3, explains how the drop in the number of visi-
tors is a result of competition from other platforms rather than the climate in TPP. 
5:48 Killing competition from Facebook. When I once became a member of 
TPP (it was called Wired Parents at that time) there were no social media. No 
Facebook, no Instagram, no Pinterest, hardly even any chat channels (well 
ICQ existed, perhaps also MSN had started… ) Nevertheless, there were fo-
rums and communities and when I discovered Wired Parents93 it felt totally 
fantastic. Wow, a place where I could talk to like-minded persons, ask about 
things I didn’t know and whine about pelvic girdle pain and other stuff that 
was difficult and in return get compassion, good advice and a pep talk.
TPP’s strength resides in the ‘anonymous’ discussions. Here you can raise 
questions that are perhaps too sensitive for Facebook, questions where you 
want several approaches (the circle of friends in Facebook easily becomes too 
homogenous), debates where you want to use sharper argumentation than in 
a context where you are more personal etcetera.
This is my idea anyway. How do you see it?  =) 
N3 (TPP 2014)
This defence seems did not seem to put a damper on the discussion. In yet another 
thread on the topic the discouragement is even more outspoken, and the blame for 
the situation clearly placed upon the veterans. Several postings point to how the rules 
of status have transformed into social control.
93 Wired Parents was the predecessor of TPP. It was started in 1997 and when sold the name was 
altered.
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5:49 I think it (partly) could have been different people here, and that it could 
have been much more pleasant. That people could have discussed stuff that 
the community is designed for – that is child-and parent related issues etc. 
That one could have received support if one had a problem in one’s parenting. 
Instead there’s a bunch of veterans (you used the word yourselves!) who 
answer each question of that kind by a) picking on the writer and b) talking 
about how much better parents they are themselves and how much better 
their own children are. Plus they back each other up, make fun of everyone 
with an opinion not tolerated by the opinion police in the community etcetera. 
N4 (TPP 2014)
Posting 5:49 states that the community is not used for its original purpose – the 
arena is described as derailed. Considering the vast amount of similar criticism to-
wards the communities it would be difficult to understand why people tolerate this 
enforced control and the risk of blame. Arguably, there is something to be won by 
staying on, despite the supervision. One of the rewards in this virtually mediated 
interaction is maintaining face but that is perhaps not be the biggest trophy. Posting 
5:49 highlights the struggle about how to define, own and distribute field specific 
capital: A collectively approved identity of being a good parent. This makes the bat-
tle into a contest of control; not only does the veteran wish to control her own self 
presentation in order to secure capital, but to control the self presentation and capital of 
others. One can really establish social control in an interactive, as well as a discursive 
manner by fighting for a particular textual conduct and enforcing norms much like 
local law enforcement in charge of the symbolic violence. The importance of gain-
ing access to the field specific capital explains the relative conformity of topics and 
manners of interaction. 
Still unanswered is, however, why people keep on coming back to a place of such 
tensions? Obviously there is always the possibility of exit; to unregister and never 
come back to the particular community where one feels uncomfortable – disappoint-
ed members leave and new members register. But the more important issue is to 
understand why nicks who express a sensation of discomfort still stick around? One 
reason could be that one has private contact with one or more nicks who provide 
valuable support. There may also be other and quite banal reasons for staying. Maybe 
the contact with the others, despite the high level of conflicts around accepted ways 
of writing, makes the nick feel rewarded. The conflicts themselves may generate sen-
sations of gratification related to the very strain of combat. One of the problematic 
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features, Bourdieu notes (1984/1991: 133), in analysing any field of interaction is 
to comprehend the strain between heterodoxy and orthodoxy. This strain has a par-
ticular outcome in the communities. If the heterodoxic position aims at reformation 
(the dissatisfied nick who still stays in the community) and the orthodox position 
(the veteran nick) tries to maintain authority by preserving the structure of the field, 
we can understand the terror balance: Some nicks try to gain the possibility of de-
fining status, and are hindered by nicks who already have this privilege. Still, the 
supervision, the assignment of status and the reprimands from the veterans appear 
to be accepted. This, I think, depends precisely upon the fact that the field is not 
just a place of surveillance, but a place for rewards. There may be a consensus shared 
by everyone who participates – a consensus that the game is worth investing in and 
simply by taking part in it the value of the field prices is reproduced. This in turn en-
tails that even the revolutionists among the nicks are pre-structured into valuing the 
reward of social acknowledgement and this disposition, this pre-conceived making of 
the subject, becomes an obstacle to change. Simultaneously, it indicates the strength 
of the sensation of being assigned, or deprived of, social value. It is possibly so strong 
that surveillance now is internalised. The panoptic surveillance that makes the nick 
aware of the putative presence of other nicks would clearly describe the situation in a 
parental community. Even more important, the inmate of the ‘community prison’ is 
no longer uncertain whether or not surveillance is being carried out. She knows that 
it is and, hence, the relation is not fictitious as propounded by Foucault (1975/2009: 
175 ff., 202 ff.). By staying in the community and trying to become accepted, the 
nick needs to adapt to the rules of status. This in turn means she has to monitor what 
she is writing and so, the majority of the nicks behave as model prisoners. 
Summary
This chapter was written with the intent of introducing some of the general rules of 
status in the parental communities and the manner in which they are observed. I 
have demonstrated how the subject is crafted either together with others according 
to certain rules of conduct and ontological decorums, or performed by a willing in-
dividual – by the subject upon the subject. Particular values guide this performance, 
and particular ways of interacting.  
The most important core values to apply when ensuring a solid community posi-
tion are sincerity, gratitude, stability and coherence. Sincerity in itself is of low or no 
value in terms of community status if it is not considered to be reliable, stable and 
disciplined by the values held by the veterans. I have argued that sincerity needs to be 
understood against the background of these preferred values; it is thus a pseudo-sin-
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cerity. In this sense the world in the parental communities does not differ much from 
the world in any type of community that one enters voluntarily. The major difference 
in this case is that the rules and constraints are spelled out in words, and that they 
remain visible for every participant in the community. This implies that the rules of 
conduct need to be obeyed in closer detail than away from keyboard. 
A position of status can be achieved through different techniques of presentation. 
It can be done by describing failed subjects who are positioned as a comparison 
with oneself, by mimicking other nicks’ success stories, and by narratively evoking 
an open and articulate child. A particular way of aiming for status goes through 
distinctions, and in discussions about taste and consumption a relation between the 
purchaser and the product is established. In addition, social status can be produced 
through narrations of the body, where mastering it is described as something beyond 
becoming physically fit: A strong body is a sign of a strong subject and is character-
ised by abstention, discipline and measurement. Two features of distinction particu-
larly stand out; how materiality or material results are not made to matter. Instead it 
is discernment (when discussing consumer goods) and attitude (when talking about 
weight and exercise).  
The values and the distinctions, especially when guarded by the veteran nicks, 
transform into social control. The control itself may lead to two possible outcomes; a 
decline of activity, or rewards in the shape of the field prize of reputation, at least for 
those who manage to abide by the rules. Regardless of the fact that the terrain in the 
communities shifts depending on the participants and topic and although bounda-
ries of identity are negotiated, the stage appears set in advance – set with particular 
ideals and meanings – in a way that thwarts identity diffusion. 
Consumer ideology and distinction
In the case of the parental communities yet another feature apparently hinders dif-
fusion. Consumer ideology seems to model the subject just as much as interaction 
and rules of conduct. When applying the Althussarian view on ideology this is not 
surprising, given its far-reaching scope: There is no practice except by and for ideolo-
gy and there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subject (Redclift, 2005: 
175). Nevertheless, in the postings about consumption the double constitution de-
scribed by Althusser (1971: 171) – how ideology models the subject and the subject 
materialise in ideology – seems to be something more than a constitution. It may, 
I think, be a dependency. The commodity obviously needs a subject-in-the-flesh 
to buy it but, more importantly, the subject-in-the flesh needs the commodity to 
sharpen its contours. There is a relation established where the article communicates 
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something back to its owner; something besides its content and use and in that sense 
the product is transformative and exceeds its content. When accepting and buying 
the commodity, the subject is incorporated into its symbolic content. Hence, the 
path to distinction goes through a knowledge of what one is buying (and what kind 
of status position can thereby be accomplished), and through the competence of not 
living through and by illusions. This competence makes up the distinction, which in 
turn preserves the social world. This means that interaction in the community milieu 
constitutes limits for people, much the same as proposed by Bourdieu (1991/2012):
The sense of one’s place, as the sense of what one can or cannot ‘allow one-
self’, implies a tacit acceptance of one’s position, a sense of limits (‘that’s not 
meant for us’) or – what amounts to the same thing – a sense of distances, to 
be marked and maintained, respected, and expected of others (ibid.: 235).
Through the discussions about purchases positions of social status are defined, tested 
and accepted – both positions of the subject writing and positions of others (for 
instance people who believe that furniture from IKEA and furniture sold on High 
Street are equally refined) are affirmed. In essence, the assignment of value onto 
commodities (such as jam, furniture or wine) or onto particular practices (such as ex-
ercise, baking or cooking) enables a ranking of subjects. This ranking is the end result 
of a preference drawn from consumer ideology. The mechanism of competition that 
regulates the producer of a commodity is also visible on the side of the consumer. 
Still, in spite of the many obstacles that prevent diffusion, the game of this field 
is not invariably rigged. If disliked in one of the themes it is possible to choose an-
other theme where one’s opinions and tastes are more tolerated, and if still disliked 
there is always the possibility to bargain with sincerity, or apply a strategy of truth to 
receive a warmer response. The point is not that the nicks reach a point of no return 
and are doomed to a certain position; the point is that there are preferences towards 
which the nicks need to relate and that the preferences are less restrictive for some, 
and more so for others. 
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6. The tyranny of choice
6:1 I do believe that there are poor children. 
But that only depends on the parents prioritising like assholes and putting 
the money in all the wrong places. And the children are exposed to the family 
finance decisions that parents make. 
(VEF 2013)
In Chapter Five some of the ways to achieve status in community interactions have 
been delineated. The codes of conduct promoted a relatively stable sincerity, sen-
sations of gratitude and crafting the self as a responsible governor of the body as 
well as of the interior domains. This chapter starts with the short posting 6:1 about 
parents who make the wrong type of choices. It is taken from one of the numerous 
community conversations about the nature of poverty and it is a good representative 
of the common viewpoint about poor people, and especially poor parents. The focus 
of this chapter is another common denominator in the presentations and positioning 
of subjects; the ability – and obligation – to make choices. The responsible governor 
would, as an example, be impossible to narrate without also taking a stand on choic-
es, as the whole apparatus of distinctions is built upon an idea that the individual 
chooses who to be through consumption choices, choices of how to exercise, choices 
of how to feed one’s child and so forth. The rule of performing choices forms a 
foundation for community readings of several domains of life – the intimate spheres 
such as family life or family finance and likewise spheres outside of the intimate, 
such as professional life. Making choices is equated with assuming responsibility 
and choice and responsibility are often intertwined. While Chapter Five probed into 
preferred self presentations, this chapter will investigate the discursive foundation for 
self presentation. The aim of this chapter is to deconstruct usages of the concept of 
choice and to look into the distilled subject ideal formulated as a result of celebrating 
choice. 
The chapter will start by introducing the reader to how choice, attitude and 
change are related, i.e., the relation between choice and effects of choice, and what 
little critique there is of the notion that choice means change. Lastly, other concepts 
that help fixate choice will be introduced and we will investigate how choice, control, 
self-knowledge and responsibility buttress each other in a kind of favoured subjectiv-
ity; the Homo Eligens. 
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Choice and change  
This section will comprise a presentation of the dominant and the subordinate com-
munity discourse on choice and the effects of choice, demonstrating how the prefer-
ence for choice enables images of more and less responsible subjects. Following that 
I will introduce a conversation about a highly concrete, although imaginary, subject 
(in the conversation she is labelled Jane at Tesco) that the nicks employ to debate 
possible limitations in the activity of choosing between life options. 
The choice and attitude themes in the communities appear to belong to a highly 
dominant discourse, because they are professed by veterans, because they appear 
on a regular basis and because they are rarely contested. These themes are used in 
a number of ways. One such way is to construct differences between the preferred, 
responsible subject who knows how to choose and who assumes responsibility for her 
choices, and the problematic or irresponsible one who avoids choices and puts the 
blame for failures elsewhere. Choice is understood as a watershed between different 
types of subjects: Some are not afraid of choosing whilst others hesitate, do nothing 
at all and do not understand that it is their obligation to choose. No one escapes the 
need to make choices, as the following posting explains.  
6:2 On having choices. 
Every morning we have the privilege of waking up we make choices. We 
choose all the time. Most of the choices we make in a day we don’t think 
about but we all choose.  Whether it’s about moving to the other side of the 
country or what kind of attitude we want to have that day. Sometimes I wake 
up and decide to be in a bad mood – and then I’ll take my chances to find 
something to sulk about. That’s a choice too. Other days I may feel bad from 
physical impediments such as pain, but I decide to find the silver lining that 
day. We choose as long as we breathe. 
(TPP 2011)
Posting 6:2 represents an everyday understanding of choices and is a supposition 
shared by many. We are, according to the posting, not always aware of our disposi-
tion for choice: Most of the choices we make in a day we don’t think about but we all 
chose. This means that to choose we do not need to focus much upon cultivating the 
self, as it is what we do if we allow ourselves to act according to our nature. But the 
posting also addresses situations when we need to be more active in choice-making: 
We need to monitor ourselves to decide what attitude we want on a specific day. 
In that sense the human being moulded in the posting can be read as an expert in 
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different aspects of her subjectivity – an expert in the ability to fraction  the self into 
bits and pieces that do not have to be guarded and bits and pieces that need a little 
more attention. The nick admits that she does not always succeed in making the 
right choices, but she is aware that the bad mood on a particular day is a choice. The 
posting can be comprehended as one of a productive reminder of a responsibility on 
behalf of the subject – it does not prohibit any reactions but point to the benefit of 
some of them.
Jane at Tesco – to landscape choice
There is not much visible critique of the idea that life can be turned around by choice. 
When the concept is challenged it is usually because it is conceived as inflated; it is 
seen as invested with too much hope and too many aspirations. Nevertheless, in the 
main body of postings in both communities choice is appreciated as something that 
produces a healthy subject.  
The major tone of voice in the communities is an optimistic one. When the 
nicks relate life circumstances to the possibilities of making choices there seems to 
be no limits to the suggestions. We will now follow a section of a thread that debates 
choice. The first two postings advocate that choice is something everyone can do – 
and gain from – while the subsequent postings contain criticism of this assumption. 
The first two postings are made on the topic of what low-wage employees can do to 
improve their standard of living. The employee is given a name; she is called Jane and 
she is described as if she works at Tesco. The question in this conversation is what 
Jane at Tesco can do to make a change in her life, to earn more money and find a job 
that she likes better. As we shall notice a little bit later in this interchange, the main 
benefit of choice appears to be a reformed attitude.
6:3 I don’t think that each and EVERY ONE has a choice. Surely there is the 
occasional human being caught in a trap where it just won’t happen. But I 
think 99,99 % of all people has the possibility of choosing! Jane at Tesco can 
apply for several types of grants. She can ask around amongst friends and 
acquaintances if they know of any fun and good place to work, that’s often 
how you find a job. She can sit down and contemplate: ‘Where do I WANT 
to work?’ and then she applies for a job at the places that might be possible. 
She can start up her own business. She can apply for an apprenticeship (for 
instance through grants). She can study to improve her grades. 
N1 (TPP 2011)
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6:4 One can apply for grants AND have a job on the side as a telemarketer? 
Sell children’s clothes / make up / spices / whatever? Become damned good 
at net poker?  Bake delicious buns and sandwich layer cakes and sell them 
to workplaces nearby for their coffee breaks. One can become a substitute 
teacher or a phone interviewer for NRS [a poll institute] and work when one is 
able to. Perhaps one is amazingly good at taking photos and could do the odd 
wedding job once in a while, or one is excellent at needlework and could sell 
it at local fairs and earn money from one’s hobby. I mean there are no limits.
N1 (TPP 2011)
In the first two postings about the possibilities open to the imaginary Jane a whole 
vista of choices seems to stretch out before the reader’s eyes. Jane is painted in a 
landscape of choices (Ball, Bowe & Gewirtz 1994: 75) – pictured as both made of it 
(the present choice to work as a shop assistant) and described as soon in it (the end-
less choices that lie ahead). Landscapes, however, do not exist without an observer, 
(in contrast to rivers, mountains or forests that are there with or without somebody 
watching them). There is a difference between the land and the scape. The land in 
itself exists – the very ‘scape’ is a projection of our consciousness; it is an image. We 
put a frame around the view and the way in which we describe it represents our 
frame of mind – what we know, what we find valuable to know, and what we want 
to know (Erlich, 1987: 25). In the two postings above the land exists in the sense 
that people can and do sell spices, apply for grants and work as supply teachers. The 
only visible framing is performed by N1 who tells the reader that all this is in fact 
possible. The frame that N1 puts around the land, apparent in the unswervingly 
optimistic tone of voice, is recurrent in the communities when discussing different 
options in life. The debates on topics such as options, opportunities and planning all 
blend together, and it is as if choice was an end in itself. The outcome of the choice is 
rarely a topic of concern. We may want to call this a language of choice (Ball, Bowe 
& Gerwitz, 1994: 67). 
Nevertheless, in the thread from which postings 6:3 and 6:4 were extracted, there 
are objections to the claim that the choice itself has any capacity to change the life of 
the narrated cash assistant called Jane. The first posting below questions whether the 
choices themselves are real choices that just anybody can make; the second whether 
or not there are any real differences between the options.
6:5 Weeell it’s easy giving others advice if you possess a brain, energy and cre-
ativity. Not all of us have this brain or other possibilities to study, if you lack 
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the brain, the energy, you will hardly start up your own business. Apprentice-
ships, yeah right, like how many offers that today? Grants, how many even 
know about grants and besides everyone cannot get grants, and I suppose it’s 
not simply a matter of sending in one’s name and then getting money? 
N2 (TPP 2011)
6:6 / …/ That the supply of new jobs with better hours/salary whatever isn’t 
there for everyone for different reasons. Another job sure, in another home for 
the elderly with the same type of hours or in another supermarket with the 
same salary etcetera. 
N3 (TPP 2011)
The first objection (posting 6:5) receives a response from N1, who states that the 
content of 6:5 is coloured by an attitude problem.
6:7 But a person with your attitude can neither get a new job nor find the 
capacity to study or receive grants (because you have to make the effort of 
finding them and then applying). But you can chose to WANT to change your 
attitude, and then work for it in different ways, and be capable of both study-
ing and getting a new job and applying for grants. I am totally certain of it. 
N1 (TPP 2011 answers posting 6:5)
The second posting (6:6) does not receive a response, although it touches upon a 
conception of labour market structures beneath the discourse – the choice market in 
itself where options are countless but change cannot always be promised. Posting 6:6 
points to how there are differences between choices and suggests that some choices 
do not take you places – for some people they simply take you to the same place 
you just left. It hints at a difference between choice on the one hand and opportunity 
on the other. The posting suggests that everyone can make a choice but we do not 
have the same opportunities in life and some of us do not have very much to choose 
from. In this case another kind of difference is highlighted, that relates to access to 
resources, profitable relations and skills.
The reply in 6:7 instead equates choice with the right kind of attitude, which 
means it opts for a focus towards individual qualities rather than structural condi-
tions. What needs to be manifested, as argued in the posting, is a particular attitude, 
rather than actually turning life around. Once a choice is made it is a sign of having 
the expected attitude and the generalised subject thereby would be off the discursive 
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hook. Consequently, when choice is celebrated it is perceived as if improving the 
attitude and when it is challenged instead differences in opportunities are stressed. 
Whether or not Jane can make a change that leads up to a real material improvement 
(a better job or more money) remains uncertain. 
The thread as a whole is a typical example of the two community discourses on 
choice, the dominant one that embraces choice and the subordinate that criticis-
es the concept for raising expectations too high. Whilst the subordinate discourse 
brings in structural impediments into the narration, the dominant one leans on 
much the same type of promise that was delineated by Nikolas Rose (2000 a: 1400 
ff.); that everyone can be reconstructed into a subject of responsibility, which equals 
holding the right kind of attitudes. Whilst neoliberal politics prefers to talk about 
citizens in terms of responsibilities (Jensen, 2010; 2012), so does this local discourse 
prefer to highlight the obligation to choose, rather than tangible outcomes of choice. 
In this dominant discourse what matters is the potential self, whilst the actual self (or 
the actual result of the choice) is downplayed.  
Cloaking resources
Choice is a popular concept for several reasons. It is described as making us take re-
sponsibility for ourselves, as we saw in the dominant discourse previously presented. 
Choice is represented as something that allows us to reflect upon the way our life is 
going or enables us to change our lives and, if nothing else, choice helps us improve 
our attitudes. We have already looked into the tendency to talk less about hands-on 
resources when advocating choice, as visible in postings 6:3, 6:4 and 6:7. As a matter 
of fact, in the preferred image of choice, resources enabling choices are hardly men-
tioned at all. The next posting is an example of this downplaying of resources. This 
nick talks about prioritising between the many consumerist urges that one may have 
but it does not mention how money might influence the capacity to prioritise. In this 
fashion, choice becomes part of a particular kind of concealment that is ideologically 
structured. 
6:8 You don’t see how others prioritise. We do have decent salaries me and 
my husband but we could easily have spent it all on a more expensive house 
with higher mortages and/or an expensive car.  The same people asking 
me how we can afford to travel around the world for three months drive an 
almost new car. This has to be paid for somehow, even if they’ve borrowed 
money to buy it. And the car costs just as much as our trip…We are fortunate 
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to drive a company car which we have deliberately stripped of all excess 
gadgets, and we have another car but it is older and costs us very little.
Also, we have prioritised not to live in a house with a lot of extra square me-
ters. We made a strategic choice to stay in our detached house. For a long time 
we looked at houses with more space and a better location but they went for 
1-1,5 million more than the house we have and for that kind of money one can 
do lots of other fun stuff we figured and we prioritised our travelling.
Right now we prioritise that one of us works 80 % - that affects our ‘traveller’s 
income’ so we obviously cannot not spend that money on trips right now – 
that may also be the thing that differs. Two parents working full time natural-
ly earn more than in couples where one works 75 %.  
Surely there are those living beyond their means, but in a lot of cases lifestyle 
choices have an effect. You cannot have it all if you’re not richer than God, 
some invest in a home, some invest in having lots of stuff, some invest in 
interior design, some in designer babies’ clothes, prams and other types of 
expensive baby crap (not me as you probably have understood ;)) and some 
chose to travel. 
(TPP 2009)
The advice on prioritising in 6:8 is demarcated by two typical features: Resources are 
narratively cloaked and instead the ideal of staying in control is brought to the fore. 
Posting 6:8 talks of affording as a matter of lifestyle choices rather than of having 
the necessary monetary resources. The nick describes a situation where she chooses 
between two things conceptualised as equal: The possibility to purchase a new car or 
the opportunity to travel. The fact that the narrated husband drives a company car 
and that the family owns a second car – and thus there really is no reason to perform 
the choice in the first place – appear to have little bearing on the conclusion. The 
very resources themselves are never mentioned as facilitating the priority. Instead the 
posting stresses how it is controlling the consumerist urges that is the key to success, 
i.e., management of the interior of the subject. This is accomplished through strate-
gic choices performed by a subject with access to autonomy in a material sense. The 
posting mostly talks of the nick’s own financial situation, but when other subjects 
enter, the rhetoric switches into techniques of out-there-ness: Two parents working 
full time naturally earn more than in couples where one works 75 %. In this piece of 
fact construction differences in salaries are not included. Another example is the 
statement: but in a lot of cases lifestyle choices have an effect. You sort of cannot have it 
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all if you’re not richer than God. Here the stipulation is that everyone has the financial 
margins to make choices whether to travel or stay at home. Prioritising implies that 
one has things to choose between, just as 6:8 suggests. Because this piece of advice 
does not include the material resources behind such a consumption choice – priori-
ties become a tool for the affluent. Prioritising is supposed to give positive effects but 
the necessary condition for it, the money, is not made important. This would be one 
way of apprehending the reason for why the narrative conditions of choice are so sta-
ble: It makes the affluent come across as less endowed with money and benefits and 
instead they are made to look more dedicated to acting rational. The posting is part 
of a narrative formula of choice. This formula highlights the motives of the subject 
and downplays that which surrounds it. In other words, the posting is ideologically 
ordered in the way it uses dissimulation (Thompson, 1988: 370) – it highlights one 
dimension at the expense of another. The reality of economic acts or of privilege is 
concealed (Bourdieu, 1977/2011: 177), i.e., misrecognised. 
The result: A Homo Eligens
What was celebrated when talking of priorities was, as we noted, maintaining control 
(in this case over the urges to consume), because by maintaining calm and staying in 
control the right choice was presumed to be made. I would like to summarise these 
preferred character traits into a subject ideal labelled the Homo Eligens and which 
is described by Zygmunt Bauman (2005:33) as ‘the man choosing’. This choosing 
subject, Bauman points out (ibid.), should not be confused with the man who has 
made a choice and who settles for that choice. This subject ideal is instead compared 
with a cyclist who has to keep on pedalling to remain upright and not fall: The 
choices have to be made anew and if necessary, identity is renegotiated at every in-
stance. The Homo Eligens is a consequence of individualism acted out in the form of 
emancipation and self-assertion facilitated by the free market (ibid.: 18). In fact, the 
Homo Eligens and the market coexist in s kind of symbiosis: ‘they would not live to 
see another day if they were not supported and nourished by each other’s company’, 
and that is because: ‘[The] market would not survive if customers held on to things’ 
(ibid.: 33). In the arenas of the parental communities the Homo Eligens is demarcat-
ed not only by choice and control but in addition by manifesting self-knowledge and 
responsibility. This discursive figure of admiration will follow us through the analysis, 
sometimes as an articulated ideal, sometimes as a backcloth against which complaints 
about faulty subjectivities should be read. This section contains the first presentation 
of this subject ideal. We shall become acquainted with the ways in which control, 
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self-knowledge and responsibility are talked about in the communities, as well as the 
interpretative repertoire upon which the Homo Eligens rests.
The Homo Eligens can be described as a cliché, a stereotype and an ideal. She 
functions best in a reduced type of narration – a kind of staged example. I have al-
ready described the Homo Eligens as characterised by control, self-knowledge and 
a sense of responsibility – in other words the regular introspection performed in a 
self-help culture to ensure a kind of constant readiness (Cederström & Spicer, 2015). 
The Homo Eligens, as she is applied in the communities, is an embodiment of a 
preference that keeps on coming back in these arenas as a way to talk about choice, 
attitude and opportunity. The notion that the human mind is or can be cultivated 
into conquering the surrounding material dimensions is the foundation for the or-
ganisation of the discourse of choice and its organisational powers are so strong that 
I have understood this conception as an interpretative repertoire: Mind over matter. 
It receives much of its content from classic positive thinking and self-help literature 
stipulating that our inner sensations and the way we control them determine how 
the material side of life will turn out; if we will have a job, if we will have enough 
money, if we will live in a decent house etcetera (ibid.: 66). We have already seen how 
the preferred type of subject knows how to choose and how to control her desires in 
order to live a controlled and well calibrated life. To exercise control, however, one 
needs to know oneself and in what follows we shall look into the way control and 
self-knowledge work together.  
Control and self-knowledge
The concept of control is articulated as essential to properly know oneself (if no 
control over the situation there can be no self-inspection) but the concept seems to 
behave discursively unruly and apparently needs to be regularly discussed. Control is 
not appreciated as the same thing in every instance and in every type of conversation 
but is treated rather differently depending on the subject-matter. It is hardly surpris-
ing that the basic rule is not to lose control, as advocated in the posting to follow, 
which exemplifies with people who need to borrow money to buy furniture. This is 
understood as a loss of financial control, but as it turns out, it is actually possible to 
borrow very large sums of money and still not be described as if losing control. It all 
depends on what the money is for.
6:9 Firstly I don’t understand why you would take up a loan or a credit. If you 
lack the money for a sofa or a TV, well, you don’t buy one. Who is that poor 
that s/he needs to take a loan to buy furniture? In those cases life has gone 
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down the drain, hasn’t it? Obviously I understand if you need a loan for a car 
or a flat or as an investment to start your own business. Who can stump up 
several hundred thousand just like that? But to buy a sofa? Come on!!! 
(VEF 2012)
Posting 6:9 discusses differences between debt and debt and, consequently, differ-
ences between control and control. At the beginning of the posting being in debt is 
a sign of a loss of control: In those cases life has gone down the drain, hasn’t it? In the 
very next sentence the reasoning makes a turn: Obviously I understand if you need a 
loan for a car or a flat or as an investment to start your own business. The lack of several 
hundreds of thousands or even millions to buy a flat is depicted as the normal state, 
whilst to lack a couple of thousands to buy a sofa is sketched as a loss of control. 
The issue becomes a question of how much money one needs to borrow and of what 
kind of consumer goods the money is for. According to the logic in 6:9, bigger is 
better. The worldview in this posting may come across as drastic – when indebted 
you should ‘go big or go home’ – but the logic should come as no surprise because 
borrowing money is what most people in Europe need to do to find a place to live. 
In light of the abysmal indebtedness forced upon subjects trying to buy a home, 
posting 6:9 can be read as a way of reducing anxiety. Tracey Jensen (2014) touches 
upon this issue when she analyses poverty porn in British mass media: Some subjects 
are made to carry a sense of societal crisis, which is simultaneously removed from 
other subjects. Control, hence, may vary depending not only on subject-matter, but 
depending on which subject that is thought of as displaying it, or not.
Control seems to be a concept of a porous character, and it is not embraced by 
all nicks. Some even argue that taking up a loan, although it is an investment for the 
future, can be a problem.  
6:10 Myself, I am worried about my student loans. Cause it’s hard to get a job, 
even if everyone thought it was sooo good that I studied ‘something useful’ 
at university, I read every week about how there is a surplus of man-power 
within my field. But this is not mentioned to new students at the university. 
And my mother cannot help me, neither financially or by supplying work life 
contacts. So let’s see how it goes. I live cheap and have saved up some, but if I 
am unemployed for a year after completing my exam that money will proba-
bly not be sufficient… 
(VEF 2012)
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The perspective of helplessness in 6:10 manifests another experience of control. The 
investment is now portrayed as unreliable and unstable, and the potential outcome 
as if beyond the nick’s control. The account of control is totally different when out-
side resources are allowed into the narration. In posting 6:9, there is only one subject 
choosing, and there is only one investment made (either a flat or a sofa; either you 
start up a business or you buy furniture), i.e. two factors to compare. In 6:10 there 
is one subject choosing, and there is one investment made (education). In addition 
there is one labour market, one institution delivering the education and one mother 
who cannot aid her adult child. All in all the latter posting hosts four outside factors 
of a highly material character that could possibly determine the outcome of the 
investment. This feature of the two accounts is typical when control is ventilated: 
More factors involved in the assumed outcome seem to weaken the representation 
of control. When functioning as a prescription for how to choose, control needs to 
be reduced to minimalistic proportions. This is presumably one explanation for why 
the relation between control on the one hand and resources on the other is so vague 
– because if resources are made more specific we see that it is not really the subject 
controlling resources, but instead access to resources controlling the subject. In 6:10 
the nick voices a situation of silent despair – the money will perhaps not be sufficient 
if she is out of work for too long. If an absolute material level is accepted, it becomes 
impossible to promote control, because you cannot control something that is not in 
your possession. To make a concept such as that of control function one must down-
play the interdependence between control and materiality.  
Being such an undisputable ideal a concept such as control can also be reframed 
and used to enhance local status in the community so that one comes across as a 
Homo Eligens. The posting below is extracted from a thread about raising noisy kids 
and parents who are too permissive to really engage. In this posting, the meaning 
of the word control is remodelled. Although its obvious connection to choice is 
weakened, it relates to an idea of choosing educational strategies when dealing with 
children. This indicates that control is important not only to promote an image of 
knowing oneself – it is just as important to have knowledge of other people. When 
raising a child, the parent should go about the task in a controlled manner, and it 
should be built upon a firm and solid knowledge of the child.
6:11 my son is 3 and totally at the defiant age and he knows we think it’s tire-
some when he yells, so then he simply yells a bit more to test the limits /…/ 
and as I have argued before parents know their children best and possibly 
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that type of corrections that other adults ask for simply provokes even more 
yelling?
???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a day at the day care centre, screaming at the top of his voice. If I interfere it 
will perhaps last for 15 minutes, worst case scenario he doesn’t give in until he 
falls asleep in the car and perhaps I need to do some purchases?
So I calmly stroll along… ignore the outburst and continue shopping, talk 
loudly about what we need, receive a lot of impatient glances from adults 
wondering why I don’t drag my child off. Maximum 5 minutes later my son 
catches up with me and wonders what else we need to buy 
You as an outsider choose to judge me although I have complete control over 
the situation? 
(VEF 2013)
This posting argues that control can be achieved in different ways – and that some 
of them are less visible to the eye. Parental control, or rather, maternal control must 
be managed at all times but the techniques differ. Although bystanders in the super-
market are described as if impatiently staring at the son’s behaviour, the mother has 
calculated how the tantrum will end. The scenario looks messy and out of control to 
a bystander, but it is still a manifestation of control of another type. This viewpoint 
of control is often spelled out in quite concrete terms and also directly followed by 
placing blame on parents who seemingly cannot manage the task, as we will see in 
the next posting.
6:12 It is obviously me controlling when we leave the park, not my son. I 
am responsible for him! The kind of parents who allow the kicking and the 
screaming, it’s enough to drive you crazy… 
(VEF 2009)
This posting is generic in the way that the ideal is coupled with the warning example. 
To choose and to control is perhaps not such a complex thing; it might simply be 
about deciding when to leave the park, as the posting proposes. Suggestively, what 
is important in 6:12 is not the fact that the narrated parent decides when it is time 
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to go home, but how this parent is put up as a counter example to the more inferior 
parents who do not exercise control to the same extent.
I have described choice as affected by concepts of responsibility, control and 
self-knowledge. As we saw you must know yourself as a parent and you must know 
your child. This is not always depicted as an easy task and descriptions of control 
are sometimes ladened with tension. In a thread that debate problematic parents as 
subjects who give in to every lust or craving, (i.e., who fail to choose a strategy for 
action) a nick gives an account of her own longings, and how she manages to ignore 
them. The posting professes the idea that choices need to be preceded by self-knowl-
edge. It also shows us that control can be a lonely struggle.
6:13 Heart of flint answers: 
Personal responsibility. At some point one has to realise it’s impossible to act 
upon every craving. I have numerous times longed for a whole lot of things 
(babies, a dog, moving to the mountains or abroad) but I have allowed for the 
pale cast of thought to fall upon my ideas. You need to consider reality in all 
of the cravings, as dull as that may sound. If you cannot manage your chil-
dren when there’s four of them you’ll hardly manage better when there’s five.  
Obviously there’s no one in the world that can stop them [the problematic 
parents] from having thirty kids, so my opinions are totally irrelevant to 
everyone except myself. At every instance I start with what I can cope with 
MYSELF. I don’t take on more than I anticipate I can manage on my own. 
Several times over the years I wanted a fourth child but since the children are 
mainly my responsibility I feel that alone I cannot cope with more than three 
if I am to satisfy everybody’s needs. Consequently, I refrain, no matter how 
strong my desire is. My desire is not more important than the already existing 
children’s needs. 
(TPP 2011)
The subject in posting 6:13 stands between desire and control, and the weapon 
against the strong desires is described as the virtue of reflection. It is a fairly classical 
example of a caring for the self. Rules are repeated: One needs to consider reality in all 
of the cravings /…/ At every instance I start with what I can cope with MYSELF. I don’t 
take on more than I anticipate I can manage on my own.  /…/ My desire is not more 
important than the already existing children’s needs. In 6:13 these rules are contrasted 
with desire, and living responsively is sketched much like a duel between strong forc-
es. But this nick knows herself, her strengths and limits, which enables her to take 
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control, i.e., to act responsibly. The link is complete: Self-knowledge enables control, 
which enables the responsible choice.
The posting also demonstrates the idea that it all begins within the subject. She 
has to be able to cope using only her own forces, and she is alone in trying to make it 
work. Not only does the subject need to investigate if the parental work is performed 
properly, but she has to know – in advance – how much strain she can handle. This 
type of inspection is a test of abilities that ultimately guarantees freedom; it is ‘a way 
of continuously ensuring that one will not be tied to that which is not in one’s power’ 
(author’s translation) (Foucault 1976/2002: 64). When one knows oneself one can 
exercise control and a sound choice can be made which in the end becomes a safe-
guard against irresponsible actions. The Homo Eligens is certainly a lonely figure, 
but she is potent and she is her own coach and therapist.
Responsibility
In the previous section we saw how self-knowledge is perceived as the main factor 
for successfully taking responsibility for one’s life. The deep introspection that was 
advocated in posting 6:13 enables a policing of the soul. The key suspect is the 
subject; the interrogator is the very same subject. In other words, the preference for 
choice and the celebration of the Homo Eligens enable a fairly unforgiving view of 
individual responsibility. 
In the more extreme interpretations of how choice should be understood, 
everything is construed as the responsibility of the subject. The following posting is 
a summation of the whole discourse of choice, as I have delineated it in this chap-
ter; everything is pinned down to choice and choice is related to both control and 
responsibility. That which is situated outside of the subject (in this posting a lack of 
a job, other people, the winter season and a problematic partner) is not allowed to 
influence how she feels.  
6:14 It’s the life you have created for yourself and you cannot blame circum-
stances. (there is obviously one exception. Illness. That is something you can-
not control).
I think people are too quick to blame others instead of assuming responsibili-
ty.
‘No I feel bad because I have no job, because that person did this or that, be-
cause it’s so dark in winter etcetera etcetera’.
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No, you feel bad because you choose to feel bad. It is a choice you have. You 
don’t have to feel bad. And you can choose if you want to let other people 
make you feel bad. They can, but only if you let them. 
And yes if you have got a man who will not move his ass and help at all, or 
if he is just generally mental it is not because of him that you feel bad, it is 
because you chose him and you simply made a bad decision. Very easy to 
change. /…/ 
(VEF 2015)
Posting 6:14 composes the entire ontological decorum of choice: The link between 
choice, control, self-knowledge and responsibility inevitable leads to the dismissal of 
subjective suffering caused by phenomena from outside of the soul. Choice makes 
these phenomena fade away and become less significant, because it is possible to 
opt-out – to choose something else. Posting 6:14 axiomatically stipulates it is not 
unemployment that causes anxiety or troubles; it is the choice to allow for these 
sensations. Anxiety and troubles are represented as if signs of a loss of control. This 
viewpoint comprises the dominant discourse in the communities – if the link starts 
with choice it apparently ends with the notion of personal responsibility. This latter 
notion results in reproofs or accusations of the less fortunate; the single mother, the 
overweight, the depressed, i.e. subjects situated far away from the Homo Eligens.  
Effects of choice, but when?
So far we have seen that the construct of choice points in several directions. It is 
viewed as an innate quality in all of us but it can lead to different effects. The domi-
nant understanding is that choice leads to betterments – either because the situation 
itself changes for the better or because the subject’s attitude is improved. We also 
noted that when choice is coupled with different types of opportunity the future 
prospects seems to become bleaker, and the same goes for when it is coupled with 
access/no access to resources. Hence, to truly function as a prescription for how to 
act, choice should be described in non-concrete manners. In short, it appears that 
choice holds promises, but vague ones; we do not know when we can expect choice 
to mean change, or what that change will consist of. 
The major unanswered question when handling the concept of choice seems to 
be this: If we are promised a change will come when we choose, when can we expect 
it to arrive? The chapter will conclude by exploring the effects of choice a little bit 
further, such as the way it is thought of as strengthening the subject, and we shall 
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have another look at the promises residing in choice, especially in terms of the time 
schedules of choice. By doing so, I shall demonstrate the precarious nature of choice, 
and how it is embedded in another one of the communities’ interpretative reper-
toires: Mind over matter.
Mind over matter and the time schedules of choice
The communities view choice as a remedy for the soul. The concept is not only 
envisioned as an aid in vital decisions such as where to work or how to feel, but rep-
resented as if strengthening decisiveness even in the small, futile decisions we have 
to make on a daily basis. The exemplary posting below consists of praise directed at 
a nick who previously told of having chosen to refuse a piece of cake despite longing 
to eat it.  
6:15 Every time you train the ‘muscle of decision’ it gets stronger, and it will 
be easier the next time! Good work. 
(TPP 2013)
In posting 6:15 the virtue of choice is to become strong, and decisiveness is delineat-
ed as the exercise of a muscle. This echoes the ideals, as we saw them in Chapter Five, 
where a strong body was understood as signs of a strong will. In this case it is instead 
the will that is represented as a potent body part. Will is apparently comprehended 
in metaphors of fitness, and so it becomes a matter of exercise. The following posting 
also points towards exercise. However, although choice is seen as performing a kind 
of work out on the will, it should not be considered as an easy way out of a problem. 
The posting gives advice on how to turn into a happier and more productive person. 
This can be done, the posting claims, if you make the effort.  
6:16 It obviously won’t work to simply wave the magic wand and decide to be 
positive – toodiloo. It is working with oneself, and giving it time. 
(VEF 2013)
On the one hand, choosing makes everything easier because you become stronger 
(as argued in 6:15), but on the other hand it does not help to simply choose; real 
improvement takes time, (as we see in posting 6:16). Choice is apparently related 
to determination and hard work – it does not come for free. If work and time are 
combined the promise of improvement through choice will be kept, but there is no 
promise made of when we can expect to see the improvement. The effects appear to 
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be indefinitely postponed: We cannot know whether making one single choice will 
help us improve or if three or even five choices are necessary. The work needs to be 
done without time schedules, which makes the promise of choice into a precarious 
one. Perhaps what is promised are possibilities of change rather than visible change? 
This is illustrated in the next posting. Choice does not promise anything but a kind 
of possibilities for possibilities.
6:17 The point in realising you have choices is that you don’t have to be a vic-
tim to the same extent, you get the possibility of moving in the direction you 
want. 
(TPP 2011) 
In posting 6:17 choice is not suggested to be a miracle cure and it does not promise 
us a rose garden. In fact, not much happens at all – the posting states that when we 
understand that we have choices we simply receive a possibility of something happen-
ing. We should be prepared and ready to move ahead, out of victimhood to a place 
not defined. Choice is, once again, sketched with a precarious contour. Notably, 
the concept of choice has so far been applied to talk of future prospects more than 
promises of turning around the present situation. But there is yet another time span 
in which choice can be promoted – the past. In the next posting, choice has already 
delivered what it should and its work is completed.
6:18 Then you meet people who had a broken childhood, to put it mildly, and 
have been subjected to things you and I don’t even want to have nightmares 
about and who ended up in criminality and drugs but who made the choice 
anew. Who chose to embrace life and get ahead. 
(TPP 2011)
In posting 6:18 the conditions surrounding the subject look terrifying indeed. This 
time conditions outside of the soul are actually allowed inside the narration, but in 
6:18 the things that happened to the subject in the past were all undone by the cure 
of choice. This particular relation between elements is recurrent in the way choice 
is handled; the world outside of the subject can be narratively applied to embrace 
choice, but not to criticise it. In 6:18 the unlucky but choice-making individuals 
are bestowed a category entitlement. They are especially knowledgeable as to what 
choice can achieve. This posting is an example of how one of the parental commu-
nities’ strongest interpretative repertoires is put to work. I have called this repertoire 
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Mind over matter. Choice can command the world outside because that which is 
located on the inside of the subject (inside the mind) is perceived as stronger than 
that located on the outside (the matter). But, as posting 6:16 pointed out, choice is 
no magic wand. Despite the fact that the will can be trained to function better, and 
although the will to make choices is potentially fertile, the worldview of the reper-
toire is only true if you allow it to be.
All the same, the narrations of the indefinitely postponed effect of choice or the 
assertions of its effective achievements in the past give the mere concept an ethereal 
character. If choice is used to talk of a promising future or a heroic past, what kind 
of strong soul can be constructed for the here-and-now? If descriptions of choices 
only consists of times that have passed and times to come it comes forth as lacking 
a present. Some of the postings that advocate choice appear to call forth a subject in 
which the work is already done. The following posting gives advice on how to handle 
depression. When this posting suggests there is a choice to look on the bright sides 
of life instead of being sad, it seemingly addresses a subject who already has these 
capabilities. How to get there remains unarticulated.
6:19 And to choose to always see to what you have got? Lovely kids? The 
world’s best partner? Wonderful friends? A dog that gets happy every time 
you come home? An insanely fun hobby?    
(TPP 2013)
Arguably, the time schedules are not to be taken literarily but metaphorically. The 
concept of choice appears to establish conditions of before-after (in posting 6:15 
before and after exercising the muscle of decision), or worse-better (in posting 6:16 
waiving the magic wand as opposed to working on oneself ). These conceptual met-
aphors would give us an indication of the structure of the concept: The condition 
established after the choice is made is perceived as better than before the choice was 
made. The concept is applied in simplified and univocal narrative situations – you 
were in an addiction but chose to leave it, or you were tempted to eat cake but chose 
not to. When applied in this simplified way it structures conversation. 
To sum up, irrespective of the crude simplicity of the concept of choice, it carries 
a world of hopes and aspirations, and even if the effect of choice fails to materialise, 
it is still expected. If nothing else it is applied as an approved trope through which 
life can be narrated. The hopes for personal transformation that the concept holds 
are, nevertheless, one-sided. Posting 6:19 demonstrates the general expectations of 
what to do when one chooses – to focus upon the positive and disregard the negative 
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aspects of life. This general expectation leads to demands for responsibility, no matter 
what. The work that can be done to become a strong subject seems uniform in shape. 
As it is so uniformly articulated, the concept of choice becomes tyrannical simply 
because choosing to be critical, negative or even undetermined, are not options per-
ceived as refining the soul. Possibly, the ideal effect of choice is nothing more than 
just that; making a choice. Nothing much really has to happen once the choice is 
made. Because of the fact that the material or tangible effects of choices are seldom 
articulated we may want to think of choice simply as a lifestyle marker  – by using 
the concept a suitable self presentation is ensured. As such it may be apprehended 
as quite innocent. However, the concept also becomes a backdrop in the construc-
tions of the non-ideal subject, as indicated in the very first posting at the start of this 
chapter. It is employed as an explanatory factor for that which is considered a failure. 
Moreover, choice appears to function as the primus motor for the Homo Elector, 
making the subject ideal’s character traits just as equivocal as that of choice. What 
type of subject is advocated through the preference for choice? Perhaps it is situated 
not far from the ominous image painted by Bauman (2005: 33): ‘a permanently 
impermanent self, completely incomplete, definitely indefinite and authentically in-
authentic’. 
Summary
The aim of this chapter has been to deconstruct the concept of choice and explore 
how the effects of making a choice are conceptualised, as well as begin a mapping of 
the choosing subject, the Homo Eligens, as a type of ideal subject. This subject does 
not only choose consumer goods by way of distinction, as I demonstrated in the pre-
vious chapter, but chooses who to be and how to feel. It is a subject that inevitably 
needs to manifest a level of control, achieved through self-knowledge, in order for it 
to take charge of itself and be able to act responsibly.
The concept of choice, however, seems difficult to manage and the communities 
come across as ambivalent as to its constitution. The main contradictory feature 
resides in what choice can achieve. Although there is a discursive dictate to choose, 
choice is visualised as leading up to two disparate conditions. Either your attitude 
improves but not much more happens, or choice is understood as restrained due to 
the uneven distribution of resources and opportunities (although you choose you 
cannot always achieve a change for the better). Having said that, the general tenden-
cy is to conceal resources as factors influencing the outcome of a choice. The embod-
iment of the interpretative repertoire of Mind over matter I have labelled the Homo 
Eligens. This subject paragon is a discursive offspring of a self-help tenet promoting 
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positive thinking and affirmation and its contours are shaped in much the same way 
as the concept of choice; by leaning on self-knowledge, control and responsibility.  
A problematic feature in the narration of choice is how to deal with the timescales 
of choice: How and when can we count on choice having an effect? It appears as 
if the effects of choice are treated as if indefinitely postponed or already terminat-
ed – change will come but perhaps not in this very instance, or choice has already 
performed the miracle. In spite of the porous character of choice and its indefinite 
promises it has another function in which it rarely falters: It helps in attaching blame 
for a lack of responsibility on the suffering, weak or unfit subject. The way choice and 
responsibility is employed this blame can actually be articulated more sharply. As so 
few material or concrete resources are allowed into the narration, the culpability for 
the failure of, for instance, the poor subject is deepened. 
Existing through choice
As I have come to understand the preference for choice, it is employed as a narrative 
ID-card. When ‘choice’ is inserted into a posting what is written receives a particular 
credibility – more if one made ‘the right’ choice and less if the choice was considered 
corrupt or even worse; not made at all. Nevertheless, to make choice function as a 
concept that gives the subject credibility it needs to obliterate change. This is, I think, 
the very point where we get to study a piece of ideology. According to Martha L. 
Fineman (1991), a dominant ideology ‘is transmitted through everyday language, 
symbols and images’ (ibid.: 290). A close examination of discourse, she suggests, will 
reveal aspects of a non-articulated ideology, because ideology ‘structures the contours 
of discourse’ (ibid: 289). Experiences, phenomena or opinions seem not to be able 
to bypass the demand for choice in the communities. In almost every instance; when 
being a poor parent (posting 6:1), when borrowing money (posting 6:9) or when 
raising a child (posting 6:12) one is responsible for making a choice. Choice is in 
these accounts of everyday life not really put to the test of changing the outside world 
– the salary that Jane gets at Tesco being an example. The ideological contours of 
discourse remove the world in which the choosing subject exists, and leave only the 
interior domains: Making a choice can change your outlook upon a world that stays 
the same. This is the possibility of social existence for the subject defined through 
consumer ideology – you can and should choose because that which you purchase is 
not change, but identity. What may be purchased is a suitable self. This is, perhaps, 
the ‘scape’ in the landscaping of choice; the frame that organises the view. If what 
is to be accomplished is identity rather than a better salary or better working con-
ditions we have already achieved the goal when we celebrate choice. Choice comes 
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across as if rigged in much the same way as the Danish responsibility games where 
the questions are designed to produce particular answers (Knudsen & Åkerstrøm 
Andersen, 2014). When applying the discursive resource of choice, one must not 
look for its concrete material effects. One should look for the way the opportunity to 
choose facilitates responsibility. The invisible is prioritised over the visible.
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7. There is no society
I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people 
have been given to understand ‘I have a problem, it is the Government’s job to 
cope with it!’ or ‘I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!’ ‘I 
am homeless, the Government must house me!’ and so they are casting their 
problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are 
individual men and women and there are families and no government can do 
anything except through people and people look to themselves first… There 
is no such thing as society. There is a living tapestry of men and women and 
people and the beauty of that tapestry and the quality of our lives will depend 
upon how much each of us is prepared to take responsibility for ourselves 
and each of us prepared to turn round and help by our own efforts those who 
are unfortunate.94
The quotation above is a community matrix for talking about society. It comes from 
the former Prime Minister of the UK, Margaret Thatcher, and it was uttered after 
she won the general election for the third time in 1987. Margaret Thatcher has, at 
a quick glance, little to do with virtual communities or contemporary subject ideals 
mediated through virtual interaction, and yet she can be seen as one of many precur-
sors of a particular way of looking upon the welfare state, or the societal Commons, 
which in turn moulds the demands on the citizen-subject. The way these words have 
been received in a Swedish context is beyond the focus of this dissertation, although 
it resonates well in some publications from the same era, such as the preoccupation 
with the alleged dangers of the welfare state published in a book written by former 
Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, in 1993.  
Citizens who strive for independence in the political meaning/sense of the 
word are characterised by not trusting or assigning the State or other political 
organs to provide support or guarantee welfare. This goes for the short term 
perspective but to a higher extent for a longer perspective, lasting several 
generations. The striving for independence makes this citizen aim for financial 
independence but also to provide for his own care when ill or old by himself 
and in his more intimate settings. In Sweden that which receives attention 
is solely the opposite, when citizens are dependent on their fellow human 
94 The quote from an interview with former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is taken from 
The Spectator. The full-length interview may be found at The Margaret Thatcher Foundation: 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689.
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beings, which oddly enough is described as a big problem and is used as an 
excuse to expand the general welfare (author’s translation).95
Regardless of how rejected or embodied the Thatcherite position or the argumenta-
tion from the young Prime-Minister-to-be was in Sweden at the time, it is interesting 
to note how the quotations could stand as a synopsis of many parental community 
understandings on how to mount the subject into a context of other subjects – into 
institutional, bureaucratic, publicly and formally organised mutual responsibilities 
towards one another – that which in this chapter will be summarised as ‘society’. 
Uttered and written in the 1980s and 1990s these viewpoints were later reflected in 
the statements from the British cross-party think tank Demos on failing parents and 
character development that I presented in Chapter Two, where we also saw them 
launched in a contemporary Swedish context, in visions of a metaphorical handshake 
between politics and parents, and in the reproaches towards ‘malfunctioning parents’ 
in the editorial pages of Swedish newspapers. All of this seeps into the parental com-
munities. 
Accordingly, the focus in this chapter is directed towards the manner that the pa-
rental communities deal with society and society’s responsibility towards the individ-
ual, and vice versa. In the previous chapter we became acquainted with a somewhat 
lonely subject, interpellated by choice, the Homo Eligens. This chapter will inquire 
into how this subject is understood when she exists in organisation with other sub-
jects. If the subject is interpellated as alone, not standing in a dependent relation 
with outside structures or other individuals as much as with herself, the question is 
how can societal organisation take place? Is cooperation possible in a world inhab-
ited by Homo Eligenss and if so, how can these solitary agents of choice be made 
to work together, submit to rules or invest into society? If narration generally avoids 
material resources and structures outside of the individual, is it possible to conceive 
of a society at all?
When approaching community conceptions of society and societal organisation 
there is one premise that, by way of introduction, needs to be reiterated: The notion 
of a social contract (for a lengthier presentation of the social contract, see Chapter 
Two). This notion of contract is liberalism’s answer to how societies can be established 
based upon free subjects. When considering the liberal view of human interaction or 
organisation as subjects choosing for themselves and competing for resources with 
95 Quotation from a book written in 1993 by former Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt (term 
of office 2006-2014). The book is entitled: The sleeping people (my translation). In Swedish: Det 
sovande folket.
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other subjects, the question of how societies are possible arises. Liberalism’s answer 
is usually that this is accomplished through contract relations (Brennan & Pateman, 
2006: 184, 199). The social contract theories that emanate from the seventeenth 
century break off from more traditionalist views of hierarchies and subordination. 
The contract relations, instead, rely on a mutual consent – for instance abiding by 
the law and in return receiving legal protection. In the parental web communities 
the discursive issue is seemingly how to understand a layman version of this contract, 
and how to assess its potential capacities. As we shall see, in the layman version two 
types of subjects are presented – one who has signed the contract and one who avoids 
signing.
Opening the chapter we will look at how two opposite strands are presented, or 
opposite stances on what the contract can and should do for, or demand from a sub-
ject. This means that the focal point is the perceived responsibilities of the subject, as 
well as of society. I will continue by illustrating how these notions of responsibility 
are linked to particular favoured moralities rather than material security, which en-
ables a division of individuals into different subject-types: Those who contribute to 
society and those who solely insist on receiving support. I will furthermore demon-
strate how the latter type of subject, described as a free rider, is constructed through 
a narrative downplaying of need or suffering in favour of agency. As the nicks use 
themselves as examples of how to responsibly utilise the social contract I will round 
off by demonstrating a couple of narrative techniques by which blame is attributed 
to particular categories of people.
Way back when
In community conversations, the notion of social contracts is often applied to talk 
of the present through comparison, either to complain about it or celebrate it. In 
what follows I will present two outlooks upon two homegrown social contracts re-
lated to the ideal of responsible choice. One position leans towards a defence of the 
Swedish model of a distributive welfare politics, while the other manifests as critical 
towards the very same policies. The first exemplary posting debates the reasons for 
why children of non-academics less frequently enter higher education than children 
of academics. The posting responds to several earlier postings in the thread in which 
it was proposed that it is an individual choice to enter higher education and therefore 
not a societal problem of injustice. We will look into the posting for its account of 
responsibility.
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7:1 It was only twenty or thirty years ago when for example unemployment 
was considered a societal problem that was to be solved through politics and 
by structural changes, now we view it as an individual problem that is to be 
reduced by sanctions towards the individual. Who gains from that transfer-
ence of responsibility? And why don’t these children from families with no 
experience of studying grab the opportunities for higher education when it 
is even free of charge to study in this country? What is a genuine free choice? 
(TPP 2011)
The most important feature of posting 7:1 is, arguably, that it stipulates there has 
been a shift in the construction of responsibility, from a structural or societal re-
sponsibility towards the citizens of a state or a local community, to a standpoint 
where responsibility is linked to the individual’s management of her life trajectory. 
Two potential subjects are identified: One who nowadays is punished and one who 
gains from it, pointing to incompatible positions within the discourse of choice. 
The posting discusses a theme of blaming the individual through pointing out how 
certain concepts (such as unemployment) are elements that are not fixated but have 
moved from one end of a spectrum to another due to stake and interest. The linking 
of unemployment or lack of higher education with choice establishes a moment of 
context-free choice-making, the posting intimates. By asking who gains from con-
structing this moment, (or this stake) the posting becomes political.  
One type of societal contract can thus be advocated using the non-chooser or 
the ‘irresponsible’ subject, as a starting point. In these narrations the subject is not 
blamed but rather employed as an argument for a society built upon solidarity. De-
fenses of the irresponsible subject can also contain suggestions of institutional im-
provement that themselves are grounded in a critical understanding of the present 
state, as in the posting below. 
7:2 There really are only two options. Either you force employers to hire ‘un-
attractive’ work force, or we need higher taxes to fund society’s obligation 
for people who are being rejected. You cannot take away both of them, if we 
aren’t to accept that ‘unattractive’ and eventually homeless people should 
starve in the streets, like in the old days. 
(TPP 2012)
The two postings presented both advocate a view of the subject as dependent upon 
worldly resources, and propose a societal organisation that takes this dependency 
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into consideration. They employ precisely the notion of the citizen’s dependency 
that was embraced in the publication by Fredrik Reinfeldt, a dependency on their 
fellow human beings, only in this case the fellowship is institutionalized instead of 
intimate. Both postings are advisory (Fischer, 1970/2009: 132): They aim for us to 
comprehend the situation as one of misrecognition. They argue for another stand-
point – that politics impacts on the subject. 
Although repeated on a regular basis, these postings do not represent the domi-
nant opinion. They are strongly debated and contested and often they become the 
object of ridicule. The most common matrix in storytelling about the past is rather 
different. The following postings constitute a representative example of a standard 
narration about society, and how it has deteriorated. In much the same way as post-
ings 7:1 and 7:2, they are based upon a comparison between now and then, but the 
morality distilled is quite different. We shall look at them for the way they envision 
another type of ideal contract.
7:3 Both my parents grew up in rather poor environments, especially dad. 
None of them became thugs because of that. On the contrary. But in those 
days you had to help yourself and make the effort. Nowadays you can/shall 
sit on your arse and just receive way too often. 
(TPP 2012)
7:4 My grandmother was a single mother and my mother grew up in deprived 
conditions and wasn’t allowed to proceed to higher education although she 
performed well in school. My grandparents started a class journey when they 
started their own business and my dad started working there right after sec-
ondary school. Hence, none of my parents have a higher education but they 
have three children who became a civil engineer, a graduate economist and a 
doctor.
So how did they do that? They read to us and made sure we had lots of books 
around during our entire childhood. Taught us numbers and letters so that 
we learned to read early. None of them hassled us about higher education, I 
have never felt pressured in any way but it was sort of implied. ‘What do you 
want to study?’ not ‘Are you going to study?’
So I do the same with my own three. Have pointed out the benefit of good 
grades and later a good university degree and the freedom of choice it gives. 
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I’???? ?????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ??????????? ??? !  
(VEF 2014)
Posting 7:3 seems to articulate a broken contract relation. However, in this particu-
lar posting there is no relation to disrupt, because instead there appears to be a new 
contract installed. This contract stipulates that in this day and age one can be passive 
(sit on your arse) and still receive. If liberal contract theory was designed to avoid 
conflicts between free and solitary agents, there really appears to be no societal con-
flicts whatsoever in posting 7:3, but a regret that society is in decline. The contract 
has apparently ceased to act as an attenuator of conflicts and now works more like 
a breeder of free riders. As an alternative to this breeder state the posting celebrates 
the more industrious habits of the older generation. The second posting (7:4) does 
not speak of contracts but still hosts a vision of agreement, or convention. This 
agreement is a family affair – the transference of sound habits between generations 
and a step-by-step-amelioration for each new cadre of children being born. This 
picture of generational transference (apart from echoing the Thatcher statement and 
the aspirations for the future citizen as envisioned by Reinfeldt) constitutes the very 
remedy for the dependence on welfare state subsidies and safety nets that have taught 
people to sit down and wait for handouts, rather than perform great deeds under 
their own steam. This time the salutary contract is generational: Situated inside of 
the grandparents in their quest for betterment and the voice ending the posting is the 
grandchild, ready to carry on the investment.
The prescriptions for self-care and planning even surface on a level of everyday, 
hands-on investments. The next posting worries about people not opting for the 
driving license anymore and the major conception is one of decline.
7:5 When I got my driving license it was common to save some of the month’s 
allowance and money received at Christmas especially for the driving license. 
Plus you worked during the holidays when you still lived at home. But for 
some reason the driving license is considered less important in the last 20 
years or so (environmental brain wash?), young people who perhaps have the 
possibility of saving (living at home) have no such priorities, but waste their 
money on nightlife and other delights /…/.   
(VEF 2012)
The three postings above reverse the picture in postings 7:1-2. Although growing up 
poor, the narrated subjects in 7:3 are not affected by it and the main deficiency in so-
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ciety of today appears to be individuals lacking a sound morality. In 7:4 parents with 
a poor educational background but equipped with the right kind of moral values 
aspire to give their children the resources needed to proceed into higher education. 
In 7:5 it seems that this type of striving and the virtues of saving have gone astray. In 
the three postings a particular character from the past is promoted: A hardworking 
and diligent subject emerges in front of the reader’s eye – no self-pity and no doubts 
but only ambitions for the future. The interesting thing about these flashbacks to 
the imagined hardship in the childhoods of the nicks’ parents or way back when 
the nicks were young is that there is basically no society left in them – no welfare 
programmes and no comprehensive education are let in to help explain the success. 
Striving is the sediment that is left in these accounts and it comes across as a vehicle, 
perhaps the best vehicle, for governing oneself. All three postings rely on category 
entitlement (Potter et al., 1993: 393). Experience comes from up close (the parents 
in 7:3, the grandparents in 7:4, and the nick herself in 7:5). The morality distilled 
emanates from people who know from lived experience.
Morality comes first
So, what does this tendency to honour rectitude and ambition instead of outside 
help achieve? Why do the narratives about personal strength remain privileged? It is 
as if community narration aims to secure certain repertories. In this case the stories 
about the hardworking era become a part of a formula for the technology of the self. 
The complaining, or the sitting on one’s arse, as 7:3 puts it, equals bad rules for the 
self – rules that will not refine or enhance it. If the care of the self is a net of obliga-
tions by which the subject performs duties towards the soul, the passivity delineated 
in posting 7:3 implies a duty not completed because the soul is left unguarded. The 
stoic tradition of evaluating actions rather than qualities of thinking is reversed: Here 
the way of thinking undermines the focus upon action. To be able to perform the 
right kind of action, you must first have the right kind of thoughts, and in the com-
munities the right kind of thoughts seems be equated with the right kind of morals. 
In the next exemplary posting the right quality of thinking is articulated as as-
suming responsibility. The posting was chosen to illustrate the way that accounts on 
morality often end up in attributing blame. If the individual would only display the 
preferred responsibility, much of society’s problems would fade away. 
7:6 Where is personal responsibility in Sweden? Everyone feels sorry for 
themselves. The poor can’t afford their trip to Thailand or their caravan va-
cation? All? fat people have some kind of problem with their glands making 
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them fat (? It’s not my fault I have a disease ?) and I have to pay for that 
persons gastric bypass. No, that’s not the case, if you feel insulted by this it’s 
because you’re lazy. Stop taking up credits, never mind if you haven’t got the 
latest phone. Save money! Eat a salad once in a while.
No, this ‘allowance society’ has to end. Take personal responsibility for your-
self and your family. /…/ The solution! Get yourself an education, don’t have 
more children than you can support. Move to the places where the jobs are at! 
Have a salad! 
(VEF 2014)
Posting 7:6 is emblematic in the way it makes responsibility into a moral duty. It de-
scribes a kind of deterioration where people now want to harvest before they sow and 
if that is impossible they invent excuses. The posting exposes a taste for perseverance 
and hard work, i.e., a particular type of morality. When morality is installed (when 
people stop blaming overweight on their glands or save up money for a phone rather 
than buying one on credit), the rest will follow – morality comes before satisfaction 
of needs. But 7:6 also positions some subjects outside of a moral order (for instance 
people who take up credits and blame their obesity on their glands). There is, hence, 
an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ and a sorting of people, which according to Thompson 
(1988) should make us suspect an ideological ordering of discourse; a feature that 
will be addressed towards the end of this chapter. 
The simple axiom of Morality comes first is yet another interpretative repertoire of 
the communities that organise much of what is possible to write. The repertoire can 
explain the relentless community focus upon what other nicks are perceived to think, 
the many corrections inserted and the preoccupation with being grateful and think-
ing positive. Without these fundamentals of thinking, all the rest – living the perfect 
life – would be impossible. When the nicks talk of society the main way to under-
stand it is through a metaphor of inner growth that partly explains why the element 
of striving stays inside the narration and the element of societal organisation or civil/
legal rights are more often than not kept out. It seems that this particular stance res-
onates well with the contemporary ethopolitical proclaiming that the main rationale 
for the individual is ethical. When debating moral decay in particular it appears the 
focus is directed towards a relation between thoughts and actions. The defective sub-
ject described in postings 7:3 and 7:5 is corrupted by a changing society outside of 
her. What lies outside can apparently, in some cases, move to the inside. Put another 
way: in stories of moral decay what has to be cultivated, guarded and maintained (i.e. 
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what is threatened) is the interior of the subject. The postings reverse the moral logic 
of the German poet and playwright Bertolt Brecht: Food comes first and then moral-
ity.96 Instead the message in the postings appears to be: Morality comes first and then 
food. It is quite the opposite in stories of a less compassionate society (such as denoted 
in posting 7:1-2); that which has to be cultivated and maintained, is the exterior, 
the material dimensions of existence, the political- and civil rights of the collective 
of individuals. In these instances the subject is mainly perceived as a body that can 
suffer (such as in posting 7:2). The main reason for why the viewpoints of postings 
7:3, 7:4 and 7:5 are preferred is because they resonate well with what we already saw 
in Chapter Five and Chapter Six – they are positioned closer to the already existing 
subject ideals; ideals of individual achievement and investment that in turn resonate 
with the tapestry of individual lives that Margaret Thatcher evoked in the quotation 
that opened this chapter.  
Social contracts and free riding
To obtain a clearer picture of the two outer-points of this continuum, of which the 
preferred ideals were more fully introduced in Chapter Five, I will continue by a 
short excursion to the rejected subject positions. This is just a taste of what will be 
more fully illustrated in Chapter Eleven, but will serve as a means to also present 
the consequences of the notion of people deliberately taking advantage of societal 
contracts; they are depicted as free riders. The notion of free riders, in turn, enables 
an ideological split that divides people with little money into two separate groups.
One of the major topics of conversation in the communities’ general themes is 
how and in what way society can compensate individuals for misfortunes. In these 
themes the preferred and the rejected subject take turns in exemplifying the per-
ceived limits of the welfare state. Again, the past may be used as a reference point. 
The dominant discourse of welfare stipulates that the welfare state of the old days 
(meaning in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s) kept the free riders afloat and 
pampered them into a dangerous passivity. This passivity, however, still seems to 
threaten society and its institutions. The rejected, non-choosing and irresponsible 
subject is not only conceived of as a passive receiver as was implied by posting 7:3 
but also represented as a threat to society by demanding but not contributing. The 
threat is summarised as a lack of activity and as a moral deficit, that make it difficult 
for societal institutions to administer help, as presented in the two postings below.
96 In Swedish: Först kommer käket, sedan moralen.
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7:7 I think we already do a lot for the sick and the unemployed in Sweden but 
some people don’t want to become well again and some don’t want to work, 
nothing helps and certain people lack the drive and the motivation. People 
also need to help themselves but they seem to have forgotten that. 
(TPP 2012)
7:8 /…/ Unfortunately I see many in my surroundings that simply sit at 
home and live off  benefits and their major excuse is, there are no jobs … 
blablabla…. I just can’t understand it as I’ve always pulled my own weight. 
/…/ 
(VEF 2008)
The irresponsible subject delineated in postings 7:7 and 7:8 appears to lack the recip-
rocal disposition necessary for the contract to function. In these postings the rejected 
subject relies on a contract but has seemingly forgotten that it is supposed to take 
place in a relation. The contract appears to be grounded in a link between contri-
bution and reception, in that particular order, and the irresponsible subject simply 
disregardeds the first clause. Inclusion into rights and benefits is represented as a case 
of moral integration, or of following the rules. Because these subjects are not fully 
integrated morally, they do not want to better themselves.
It is worth underlining that the representation of irresponsibility highlights ca-
pacities for action, even among the free riders. A subject of agency resides beneath 
the descriptions of  exploiting the welfare state and its benefits, but it is as if agency 
has been transformed into a game amongst the irresponsible. They know their way 
around the welfare state terrain and are capable of arranging things so that they 
receive service but do not have to contribute. These subjects are, consequently, repre-
sented as if challenging the rules of morally upright societal behaviour – and doing it 
in a quite cunning manner. This is set out in the posting below, which was extracted 
from a long and indignant thread about the characteristics of free riders.
7:9 me and my husband we work our arses off to avoid having to live on 
benefits! To give our children everything they need. And then there are those 
who sit at home year in and year out and just receive benefits. And on top of 
that plan to have children. FUCK THAT. 
(VEF 2009)
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The subjects living on benefits represented in 7:9 are understood as kind of a homo 
economicus. Much the same as the way the shape of the homo economicus is de-
lineated by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1993: 84 f.), the assumption is that 
this subject type is a sovereign individual who intends to maximise her pleasures and 
take care of her needs, and in the posting this trickery is compared with the preferred 
subject of moderate demands and hard work. The relation between citizen-subjects is 
here presented as if mainly a moral one but in this case it is a story of betrayal. Whilst 
one party is fulfilling their part of the contract through hard work, the other is idle. 
Postings 7:9 and 7:8 allude to two different subjects of the proletariat – a freeriding 
underclass and a prudent working class. By ‘mobilising meaning in a way which 
fragments groups’ (Thompson, 1988: 370) the concept of freeriding is made to refer 
to (only) the impecunious. The moral extracted appears to be that there is nothing 
wrong with being poor, as long as you do not demand to be released from poverty.
On the one hand the rejected subject is perceived as if having no agency, no 
inner drive or motivation, but on the other hand she is sketched as capable of plan-
ning children, counting on institutional aid to get by. Two different conclusions are 
seemingly drawn from these disparate representations. One is that when the subject 
demonstrates a lack of activity or flaunts helplessness it can be difficult for the welfare 
institutions to administer help (as proposed in 7:7). The other conclusion is that 
when the subject instead displays cunning behaviour it may be morally corrupting to 
deliver help (as would be the consequence of 7:8). In both cases – when the incapac-
itated subject is passive and when it is active – support is not the solution. These two 
conclusions have one thing in common – they do not take need or suffering into ac-
count. The fact that the incapacitated subject is not narrated through elements such 
as need and/or suffering gives this subject a particular contour. I see this contour as 
relevant  for understanding how discourse handles agency – and in the long term 
culpability. We will therefore stay on the topic of need and agency.
Need and agency
If need is omitted from the possible explanations for why dependent, non-choosing, 
poor or feeble subjects exist and if suffering is taken away from the representations 
of illness (as was the case in postings 7:7 - 7:8), then agency as a resource that is 
equally present in us all can be articulated even more strongly. To invite agency into 
the explanations does two things to the ways need can be read. First and foremost, 
agency transforms need into irresponsibility. Postings 7:8 and 7:9 describe a subject 
who does not display need as much as a lust for exploiting welfare state institutions. 
Secondly, need is converted into fraud. The subject who plans to have children with 
164
no means to support them (as depicted in posting 7:9) is situated close to the homo 
economicus: The cunning poor insisting on resources that others have provided. This 
kind of agency is one of control and most certainly one of choice. In addition, agency 
becomes an explanatory factor for social exclusion – the narrated poor parent-to-be 
in posting 7:9 has reflected upon the existing choices in life and entered upon a jour-
ney away from the rest of us.
In addition, conceptions of social contracts are dependent upon another assump-
tion that relates to need, namely that benefits are often too generous in comparison 
with the salary from employment and it establishes a particular difference; that be-
tween money and money.
7:10 When I worked at McD I met some parents who were receiving income 
support but were forced to work occasionally. They said they earned less 
when they worked than what they got from the income support, so they 
didn’t see the point in working. In my world it’s clear that work should give 
you more money than staying at home. 
(VEF 2012)
Money can, as posting 7:10 intimates, carry different value. Using the example of 
McDonalds in this particular posting can be lined up alongside numerous simi-
lar postings on topics of dignified and less dignified kind of money. It is of course 
possible that 7:10 is actually arguing for salaries to be increased rather than for a 
reduction of benefits, but this viewpoint is very rare in the communities, if it exists 
at all. Instead, the predominant view is how money earned in the right kind of con-
texts (paid employment) metaphorically speaking cannot be too scarce, as the next 
posting suggests.
7:11 hmm, I would never chose an allowance rather than work. In the mean-
time one can look for other jobs or start up a business of one’s own.
If you feel so bad psychologically there are doctors to turn to for help, but you 
should not turn to Social Services for money. Even if work pays lousy! 
I don’t want my tax money to go to people that could get a job as a telemar-
keter or something else but won’t take it and rather go on the dole (i.e., tax 
money that I worked hard to provide). 
(VEF 2007)
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The message in posting 7:11 is simple and outspoken – one should work in order to 
receive money. This axiom presumes that ‘dignity’ comes before needs. Adding pa-
rental responsibility and a low-paid job to this equation the discursive consequence 
would be severe: Poor people ought to take an ordinary job, irrespective of how 
low the salary is and the number of children that must be fed on this salary, instead 
of turning towards the welfare state institutions. However, dignity is not the only 
reason for why working for money is perceived as better than money received from 
social security rights. Another reason for why the communities prefer money gained 
from employment is that recipients of different types of economic support are con-
sidered parasites preying on other poor people, as implied in posting 7:11 above, and 
in 7:12 below. 
7:12 And yes, how benefits are distributed matters because there are those 
who are not well off that are forced to pay taxes to support people even worse 
off. 
(VEF 2013)
In the type of accounts represented by postings 7:11 and 7:12 need is once again 
made less important, but this time because of an image of how some poor people 
exploit other poor people. Two types of poor subject are compared, and one is de-
scribed as if feeding off the other. The undeserving poor (Fineman, 1991: 282) do 
not only exploit the welfare state, but are represented as if disloyal enough to claim 
resources that other poor people have provided. Money and need are indeed related, 
although perhaps not as one would expect. The type of money received seems more 
important that the type of need displayed. Whilst Fraser (1990: 199 ff.) describes 
needs-talk as part of a political discourse, the communities appear to hide this di-
mension. Still, the fragmentation of groups (Thompson, 1988: 370) demonstrated 
in postings 7:10, 7:11 and 7:12 points to an ideologically structured discourse: In 
this piece of fact construction poor people are not the same, do not share experiences 
or predicaments and do not need to stick together. 
Blame yourself
We will now turn towards the particular subjects focused on in this dissertation – par-
ents. The ideals of the choice-making and self-interested member of the middle-class 
family revealed by Gillies (2005 b) and Karlsson, Löfdahl and Pérez (2013), seem to 
affect the representation of other families, positioned in other strata of society. This is 
also notable in the parental communities. I will continue by demonstrating the way 
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need is transformed into responsibility and how this displacement helps to attribute 
blame to particular subjects. The resource debated here is not money, but rather a 
socio-economic position in society and the question for debate is: Can and should 
the parent be responsible for compensating the child for a disadvantaged position? 
As already mentioned, the communities are well aware of what is going on out-
side of it and community conversations are flooded and highly influenced by debates 
in other types of mass media. Consequently, socio-economic differences are noted, 
alongside topics on the labour and housing market, psychological research findings, 
newspaper articles about educational stratification, political scandals etc. Topics that 
touch upon issues of stratification, questions of distribution and the relation between 
social class and living conditions seem to interest the communities. Debates occur on 
a regular basis about the potential links between poverty, deprivation and impaired 
life outcomes, especially when it comes to children’s living conditions and chances of 
educational success. However, it is worth noting that poverty and deprivation are not 
understood as producing negative life outcomes. Instead, an idea of how the warmth 
of good parenting strengthens the child and compensates for an uneven distribu-
tion of resources has an upper hand. The fact that, in general, wealthier households 
produce children who manage to succeed, as we see in Gillies’ (2005 a) work, is not 
interpreted in terms of that wealth, but as due to the responsible parental practice 
of the wealthier parents. Put simply: Socio-economic class is obliterated from the 
conversation; a discursive feature we will examine in more detail in Chapter Eight. 
This omission of social class will be illustrated by the next extract from an exten-
sive thread that was selected to demonstrate the way that a clouding of need paves 
the way for blame. The thread was written in response to the news of the physical 
assault on an elderly man that took place in a disadvantaged residential area of Goth-
enburg in the spring of 2012. The first posting laments the fragile state of the man, 
who at that time was hospitalised with serious injuries, but the thread soon develops 
into accusations against the parents of the teenage boys responsible for the assault. 
Not everybody agrees on blaming the parents and what is about to be presented from 
the thread is a short skirmish between two nicks.  
7:13 /… / They [local newspaper] also write that the boys’ lives are ruined 
because they have been in custody, how do you figure that one out? Yes, it is 
true that their lives are ruined but if you clobber an old man you cannot have 
had such a fucking brilliant and lovely life before that! How the hell have they 
been raising their children, I get so fucking mad – it’s the parents that have 
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ruined the children’s lives! 
N1 (TPP 2012) Threadstart
7:14 Yes it is a terrible tragedy, I DO feel sorry for the boys as well, I really do 
think so but I get so tremendously provoked by the family’s attitude to what 
has happened, teenagers that feel alright and are loved and respected at home 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????  
N1 (Completes her own posting above)
7:15 It obviously does not depend solely, or even mostly, on the parents in 
many cases, you are pretty stupid to reason like that. Especially not if you 
belong to a marginalised group in a ghetto. 
N2 (Answers posting 7:13) 
7:16 The parents can in some cases totally lose their parental powers, if they 
for example are unemployed, belong to an excluded group and in the eyes 
of the children are weak. Then the children often live their life outside of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ???? 
N2 (Completes her own posting above)
7:17 Well, then it comes from the parents and the upbringing anyway, you 
don’t lose your powers over the children just because you’re ill or unem-
ployed, respect and love are not based on what kind of social status you have 
because they are 100 % free to be earned, you can’t force someone and that’s 
probably were it all went wrong. 
N1 (Answers posting above)
7:18 With unlimited love and respect you’ll go ridiculously far, even if you 
live in a ghetto, you need to be moronic not to understand that. 
N1 (Completes her own posting above)
7:19  Well, you’re an idiot if you’??????????????????? ??????????????????????????
haven’t learned that it is not always enough just with the parents, but that oth-
??????????? ???????????????????? 
N2 (Answers posting above)
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7:20 Of course there are other factors, I won’t argue against that – but the up-
bringing and the parental influence are crucial for how they will turn out as 
adults 
N1 (Answers posting above)
7:21 No, that’s definitely not true. Take me for instance, I am a crappy per-
son to some extent, and sort of bad at child-rearing, and the same goes for 
her dad, but my daughter has always been a wonderful angel that everyone 
looks up to, grown-ups have taken her advice ever since she was a child. My 
child-rearing (or daddy’s) has nothing to do with her being a wonderful an-
gel. 
N2 (Answers posting above)
The blame attached to the parents in this thread is conveyed through suggestions of a 
work on the inner family structure of love and respect being poorly executed. In this 
case it seems the interior domains of the family, when well-maintained, will become 
a force that can beat external conditions. Posting 7:17 argues that respect and love 
are not based on what kind of social status one has; they are free to be earned. This 
dictum echoes the notion of warmth and responsibility as replacements for wealth, 
but the picture of the loving parent who compensates the child for disadvantages 
nevertheless uses one particular presumption to function: That of warmth being 
something stable. Irrespective of the hardship, warmth is presumed to be unshake-
able. It keeps up the good work and is not overwhelmingly harmed by the parental 
subject taking ill, by drugs being sold on the street corners, by cut-backs at school 
or by the parent losing the means to support the family. Warmth becomes an entity 
inside the subject that should be maintained so that it can live separately from the 
subject’s potential afflictions. Because the focus remains on the parents’ capacities 
for love: With unlimited love and respect you’ll go ridiculously far, even if you live in a 
ghetto (7:18) and teenagers that feel alright and are loved and respected at home do not 
fight (7:14), there is little room left for what the parents may need from the outside 
world. Due to the focus being on capacities as opposed to needs, the possibility to 
stress culpability is even greater.  
There may be an explanation for why parents have to be narrated as strong and 
warmth as stable. If the dominant discourse on choice and responsibility is to be 
maintained it has, arguably, to prove itself through its subjects. If this is true, what 
type of demands can be placed upon children? Apparently discourse falters in the 
face of the child. To demand self-knowledge, control and responsibility (i.e., all those 
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small parts that make up the preference for choice) when it comes to children is 
difficult and would perhaps come across as blunt and insensitive. This difficulty may 
be solved by transferring the blame from the children to the adults. One explanation 
for why the majority of all threads about children usually orbit around their parents 
(attaching either shame or praise to them) can be that discourse has left few recom-
mendations for how to handle the irresponsible subject who cannot be a target of 
judgment; the irresponsible subject in the shape of the child. This, however, leaves us 
with a peculiar ‘logic of blame’ that is never addressed in community conversations. 
If the poor child cannot be blamed, because it is a result of the parents’ faulty deci-
sions or lack of stability; at what point can the child be blamed? When turning 18? 
When leaving the home? When graduating from Upper Secondary School? What 
is it that changes between the point where the child is represented as a victim of 
circumstances (where the parent is described as the most severe and damaging cir-
cumstance) and the point that the same child loses all the status of victim and rather 
becomes a perpetrator? The incommensurable axioms of the poverty discourse – the 
axis of innocent victim on the side of the poor child and cunning free rider on the 
side of the adult poor – is perhaps never as articulate as when debating the blame 
attributed to the poor parent and trying to determine the potential guilt of their 
children in one breath.  
The defence of the parents that are inserted in the thread is ambiguous. It does 
acknowledge outside structures as potentially threatening the interior domains of the 
family, but it is at the same time based on much the same types of premises as the 
blame attributed to the parents. One such premise is that of the home as an entity 
with innate capacities to compensate for what goes on outside of it. The problem 
depicted in posting 7:16 is that the boys live outside of it, thus allowing for other fac-
tors to determine the outcome. This idea indicates a similarity between the accounts, 
because they both advocate something that is stronger or equally strong as structural 
impediment and differences in societal distribution of resources. The closing post-
ing, however, does something that is rare in the community milieu. All credits for 
having had a child who is a wonderful angel are in 7:21 renounced. Responsibility is 
normally relinquished when a nick confesses to having a child who did not turn out 
very well, but it is rare for a nick to stand back from credits for having succeeded. 
The confession of being sort of bad at child-rearing was the last posting from N2 and 
it received no answer. What makes posting 7:21 stand out is that it hints that there 
is no particular subject needed to raise a child. Bringing a child into the world is 
sketched as the flip of a coin; you can win or lose, but this has less to do with par-
enting skills and is more a matter of luck. This posting hosts no elements of choice, 
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control or responsibility whatsoever, but a self-knowledge that allows for the nick to 
state she has not been an all-in-all brilliant mother. It is one of very few break-ups 
with ideologically ordered repertoires of parenting. It combines two elements in a 
seemingly impossible chain of equivalence – ‘parental shortage’ and ‘successful child’. 
Conveying the message
So far, this chapter has mapped out how the very contract between the subject and 
society is envisioned in community conversation through a combination and sepa-
ration of particular elements. Typical characteristics of narration are the separation 
of need and resources that enable the combination of need and agency. If a subject 
with a need is represented as a subject of agency, need can be delimited to indicate 
that the subject is exploiting the welfare state. To conclude the chapter I will demon-
strate some techniques of turning need into irresponsibility. Focus will be on how 
the proliferation of choice and responsibility is made to look convincing. We will start 
out with the most common way of constructing the individual as a primus motor 
of change and achievement; the technique of using one’s own experiences as advice 
for how other people should act, and continue with the simultaneously customary 
way of handing out advice that fails to consider more than one dimension of the 
problem.
Marie Antoinette and the principle of experience
Using oneself as a point of reference is a way to convince that obviously is not ex-
clusively used in community conversation, but may be more effective in computer 
mediated environments, because the possibility of refutation is weaker. Hence, a 
narrative principle of experience is displayed in different ways. This principle means 
providing illustrative examples or telling stories of experiences that emanate from 
oneself, one’s friends, relatives, colleagues or one’s partner. Using one’s own experi-
ences can be a way of either claiming or refuting a stake but the most common way 
of applying the principle of experience is introducing an ‘I’ that has already succeed-
ed in managing the hardships and wants to celebrate it, or administers advice. This 
‘I’ has category entitlement. The following two postings apply the pattern of turning 
one’s own experience into a rule of living.
7:22 Did you read my posting? I have several times, as mentioned, been living 
way below subsistence level. It’s not always easy, I have not claimed that, but 
I promise you that my children have received what they needed and a little 
171
more than that. It’s about priorities! 
(TPP 2012)
7:23 /…/ I’ve been through some really heavy stuff, BUT I have chosen not to 
be discouraged by them but to turn them around into experiences and I think 
many many more could do that. If I can do it, so can they! 
(TPP 2012)
The rules seem to be that priorities solve poverty (7:22) and that problems should 
be mined for the experiences they hold (7:23). So, how do these moralities function, 
and what view of the subject do they embrace? To be able to state that everybody 
could do what the narrative ‘I’ did a condition of convertibility has to be established; 
meaning that the conditions of the abstract subject is thought of as convertible to 
the conditions of the nick writing and vice versa. We may want to think of it as a 
narration where forms of capital are considered to be convertible: The assumption is 
that agency is proportionally distributed amongst us all. When drawing conclusions 
from one’s own life in this fashion one does not need to take experiences of other 
people into account. When wanting to accuse the dependent subject more sharply, 
one may bracket even more circumstances or experiences, i.e., reducing the narration 
even more. When this type of bracketing is a little more outspoken all that is left is 
the narrative ‘I’ and her experiences – making the statement into a kind of Marie 
Antoinette moment.97 This more fundamental disregard for the experiences of others 
means that the advice is totally without context.
At times, the visionary advice handed out on how afflicted subjects can ease a 
troublesome situation appears endless. Some advice is based on suggestions that are 
free from the rest of the context needed to evaluate it. Again a separation is per-
formed – this time the problem (in the postings below the problem is poverty) is 
separated from the suggested solution. One example of this dislocation can be found 
in a type of community accounts that I have labelled berry-picking advice. The label 
itself is distilled from the salient community suggestions of berry-picking – aimed at 
nicks writing about financial strain. It is employed to articulate that there is always 
a solution to one’s troubles, if one is – literally – willing to go the extra mile. These 
types of advice aimed at the poor have the common characteristic of disregarding all 
97 The naming of the suggestions is obviously related to the alleged infamous utterance about the 
situation of the poor made by Queen Marie Antoinette during a famine that took place under the 
reign of Louis XVI: Why don’t they eat cake? Being bluntly insensitive about societal and material 
differences is sometimes referred to as having a Marie Antoinette moment.
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other aspects of the problem and targeting only one small part of it. This delimita-
tion has obvious associations with the alleged advice that is said to have been hand-
ed out by the disreputable Queen Marie Antoinette to the starving population of 
France. Below are cited three of the abundantly emerging postings on the particular 
topic of berries. 
7:24 There are lots of berries in the woods this year and after having read here 
[in the community] about lots of people struggling with economy, and having 
no job: Pick berries. Either you make jam or you make lemonade or you eat 
them. (Lots of vitamins that may be missing if you eat bad food) or you sell 
them and get some extra money. Also, it’s fun to pick them together with the 
children and delicious in for instance blueberry pie or homemade cowberry 
jam. 
(TPP 2009)
7:25 Take the kids on the bus to the woods on Saturday. The bus trip may take 
2 hours but so what? Get out there and pick berries with the kids. Go home 
and make jam/lemonade/bake on Sunday. Healthy stuff for the grown-ups, 
for the kids and for the wallet. And what an adventure too  
(VEF 2012)
7:26 How lazy can you get? Single parents that complain about the lack of 
money but refusing to work full time, sometimes even to work at all. /…/ Re-
fusing to pick berries and mushrooms. Expecting ripe plums to fall into their 
mouth. Really, how are you thinking? Why is it the responsibility of others to 
support you and your children? 
Am myself a single parent and I work full time and more than that. I pick 
berries and mushrooms with the children, make jam, make lemonade and 
bake and do what I can so that we can live economically. It is not impossible 
to live a good life despite being a single parent but you mustn’t be lazy, which 
I notice that many people are. 
(VEF 2012)
These postings seem to host something besides mere advice. Reflecting on the actual 
money that might be generated by a bus tour to the woods, or the short season of the 
year when berries are ripe, the presumed outcome of berry-picking would probably 
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not be impressive. This is in itself an indication of the separation of the problem from 
its proposed solution – going to the woods to pick berries will not begin to solve the 
problem of being poor. To be able to bring this entrepreneurial subject to life the 
concrete financial outcomes of berry-picking have to be excluded from the narration. 
The usage of the putatively experienced ‘I’ makes this clouding of outcomes occur – 
as the nick writing tells us that she achieves a financial safety margin by her trips to 
the woods. In these solutions, reproduced by an experienced knower (Potter et al., 
1993), the community understanding of the social contract appears in its most pure 
form. It is possibly not comprehended as a reciprocal relation between society and 
its subjects where the subject is envisioned as first contributing and then receiving, 
but as a contract between the ‘I’ and ‘I’. It is the ‘I’ that goes to the woods, the ‘I’ 
that refines the raw product and the ‘I’ that reap the rewards. It is, once again, the 
Homo Eligens – alone in her prospecting, planning and realisation. The representa-
tion of the experienced Homo Eligens is one single representation treated as if it 
was universal, and beneath representation there is an assumption of ceteris paribus, 
or the isolation of one single parameter in a model that normally consists of several 
variables. The notion of convertibility, where one subject’s experience can translate 
into advice for another subject, is treated as a case of universalism. Within the social 
contract where we first invest and then receive, we are conceived of as abstract equals. 
This may help to explain the one-dimensional advice in the postings presented. It 
is written by someone hosting a Marie Antoinette outlook upon the world: If the 
problem is that people are starving, they should eat – not pastries, but berries.  
Summary
In this chapter I have aimed to present the ways in which community understand-
ings of choice, control, self-knowledge and responsibility have consequences for 
viewpoints of how societal organisation can and should be handled. The focus in 
this chapter has therefore been directed towards community dealings with what is 
summarised as ‘society’, or a perceived social contract where individuals contribute 
and receive. The present state of this contract is in the communities often evoked 
through comparisons with an imagined past condition. The topic of concern in these 
conversations seems to be the subject who makes herself dependent on society’s wel-
fare institutions. This subject is introduced to reinforce two diametrically opposed 
arguments – either to defend the welfare society and become an incitement to main-
tain generous levels of support, or to accuse the same support of breeding weakness 
and passivity. The critics of the welfare state and its presumed incentives to passivity 
instead articulate a broken social contract where some individuals contribute and 
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others exploit. This critic stance argues that the contract instead ought to be of a mor-
al character and situated inside of the individual or inside of the family, rather than 
being formally constituted on the outside in the form of legal rights and vindicated 
benefits. This critical viewpoint dominates the communities presumably because it 
mirrors prevailing subject ideals of self-knowledge, control and responsibility, and 
because these virtues are understood to bring about subsistence and empowerment. 
The non-choosing, dependent subject presumed to result from the nation that 
breeds weakness, is comprehended in two ways that both result in the same solu-
tion – she should ideally receive no or little help. Help can be understood as either 
difficult to deliver because the subject is so incapacitated that she cannot be reached, 
or harmful because it may make the subject even more morally corrupt. This rep-
resentation of help in turn depends on how the needs are narrated. Beacuse the 
dependent subject is talked about in terms of agency (referring to descriptions of 
a homo economicus capable of reaping support and aid from welfare institutions), 
need can be downplayed. Need is also omitted from the very techniques by which 
the message can be conveyed. I have presented two of the more common narrative 
techniques by which choice, self-governing and responsibility are proliferated: The 
first one being a narrative principle of experience and the second a staging of ceteris 
paribus – which I labelled a Marie Antoinette moment. 
Exploiting exploitation
Similar to the results in Chapter Six, the general finding in the analysis presented in 
this chapter is the transportation of need into agency, which in turn paves the way 
for culpability. That notwithstanding, yet another transport attracts my attention. 
Descriptions of particular subjects as demanding without contributing to society 
enables perceptions of exploitation, albeit not exploitation in the Marxist sense: The 
assumption that owners of means of production exploit the labour of the working 
class. This particular idea of exploitation instead employs a ‘down-top’ model where 
the subject with less or no means takes advantage of a collective of individuals that 
have mutually brought their means together. We can see the idea in posting 7:3 
where people are reproduced as sitting on their arses and still expecting to receive, 
in 7:8 where poor people sit at home and live on benefits and in 7:9 that complains 
about people on benefits who have the nerve to want children. What does this dis-
cursive employment of exploitation mean and how is it used? A suggestion is that 
it enables a particular worldview, and precludes another. To allow for a notion that 
some subjects have easy access to resources and some experience a shortage (depend-
ing on the wage being too low, or on the income support being insufficient) may 
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threaten a joint understanding of system legitimacy that the abstract social contract 
enables. If subjects suffering from low wages or subjects suffering because they are 
unemployed were delineated as one group with joint interests the down-top mod-
el of exploitation would not function. This, I argue, is the reason for the general 
emphasis on the essence of the subject rather than the assets: It is a way of separating 
poor subjects from each other. The preference for immanent qualities is a work of 
ideological formation, not only a formation that makes the subject without means 
turn out in a particular way but also, and perhaps more important, a work in which 
the subject with means is crafted in a distinct fashion. I think that what we see here 
is a disguising of the self-interest economy (Bourdieu, 1977/2011: 172) in which 
the system of distribution of assets remains closeted, and it is performed through 
fragmentation (Thompson, 1988: 370). The picture is reversed – subjects with access 
to resources are robbed by subjects with no such access.
According to Bourdieu, the categorisation of the world that makes knowledge 
possible is at the heart of any political struggle, and knowledge is possible by ‘the 
almost magical power of naming’ (1991/2012: 236), i.e. by a labour of symbolic 
production. This means that for something to be socially known it has to be socially 
recognised as significant (ibid: 237). Hence, this particular perception of exploita-
tion constitutes a category of perception that the nicks view as significant: The no-
tion of a ‘down-top’ exploitation is a model for thinking. Differentiating people by 
how much they ‘exploit’ the welfare system (i.e., breaks the social contract) defines 
the same people. Because need and suffering are narratively suppressed they are si-
multaneously perceived as less significant, which means that they also become less 
significant. I understand the discourse of the inverted exploitation as an awarded 
significance that in the micro-level context of the parental community echoes the 
social contract. Society is us, just as former Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and 
Fredrik Reinfeldt seem to imply, but not in the material, collaborative or collective 
sense. What is narratively embraced is the intimate dependency and a kind of private 
contract. While these are situated inside the family, their benefits are visible on the 
outside in the shape responsible behaviour from self-contained subjects. The subject 
in community conversations is not described as if she does not need resources. How-
ever, when this need is to be made into a social contract, the focus is less on redistri-
bution and more on moral improvement. The formula for the ideal social contract 
is this: A morally healthy subject is a sound investment in society, whilst (too much) 
redistribution can become potentially harmful, because it turns the subject into an 
exploiter. If ideology shapes the contours of discourse (Fineman, 1991: 289) this is a 
piece of ideology defending class formation, and separation.
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8. No society, only families?
If the most important social contract is understood as situated inside a private fam-
ily setting, as I have put forward in the previous chapter, what is made to matter in 
conversations about society are individuals, families and kinships and the responsi-
ble choices made by them. As argued by Wendy Larner (2000: 255), new political 
problematisations involve multiple and diverse objects of governance. If the paren-
tal communities display a tendency to criticise the welfare state that is founded on 
universal societal responsibilities between its citizen-subjects and instead advocate 
self-governed individuals and families, this indicates we need to study these objects 
of governance and lay bare how the hopes and aspirations for the individual and 
the individual family are presented. That is, consequently, the aim of this chapter. It 
intends to answer two questions in particular: How is the transference of ideals and 
ethics to take place inside of the family and how is the role of the parent visualised 
within such a requirement?  
The chapter will start by mapping out community conceptions of good or 
non-problematic parenting, the way the child should be fostered and what type of 
result (what type of child) that is envisioned as the result of this fostering. We will 
continue by looking into the more subtle ways of steering the child, where it is 
groomed and nurtured more than fostered and disciplined. The chapter ends with 
an analysis of how this subtle steering forms part of the making of the middle class 
family. Initially, however, I will present a very general and comprehensive communi-
ty appreciation of what parenthood is: It is work. Arguably, this very metaphor shows 
us that what is propagated is not only a conception of the primacy of the intimate 
before institutions, bureaucracy or legal civil rights, but something else – a formal 
sector such as wage labour lends itself to a description of the family. Intimacy receives 
a particular, and indeed less intimate, shape.
A ‘workified’ parenthood: An egalitarian outlook?
If forced to submit only one result from studying community discourse on parent-
hood it would be that it is considered work, both in the meaning of an endeavour 
that can be repetitive and tiring and in the sense of an activity in order to achieve a 
result. As proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980: 3) the way we de-
scribe the world defines everyday realities. In this case, descriptions of the intimate 
relationship have a flavour of work to them, or in other words, in community nar-
rations parenthood has become ‘workified’. It can be noted in two types of postings. 
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The first type describes parenthood as exhausting and to make the point applies a 
comparison with the workplace where money is earned.  
8:1 /…/ So he has got a full time job? But you know by now that having a 
child equals work 24/7 ? Try switching the roles and you’ll see who is the 
most tired. 
(VEF 2015) 
The second type of posting describes the commitment that comes with parenthood. 
This commitment can revolve around fostering the child, equipping it with the right 
kinds of moral values, keeping it safe, or providing for the child emotionally, which 
is the topic of the next exemplary posting.  
8:2 But that’s the thing, you cannot take a holiday from the parental role for 
more than a night or when you’re at work because this child is so emotionally 
dependent on you as a parent. 
(VEF 2012)
If the activities of a parent (of fostering, cleaning, cooking and comforting and so 
forth) are conceptualised as work, as suggested in these two postings, one may need 
a holiday. Postings 8:1 and 8:2 are typical examples of the conflation of spheres that 
takes place in the communities. Working to earn money switches places with, or 
becomes nearly the same as, the time when a parent spends time with her child. The 
way this work tends to fall to the woman is illustrated in the next posting.
8:3 If you’ve got a man that works 12 hours a day it is only fair that the wom-
an who chose to stay at home also assumes responsibility for the home and 
the children, since it is YOUR job. 
I am myself a woman with children btw. 
(VEF 2015)
It is possibly the metaphor of work that enables the communities to narrate par-
enthood as a verb (parenting), more than an identity, an experience or a life phase 
(parenthood).  The number of community postings inserted that describe what the 
parent does for the child by far outnumber the postings describing the parent’s feel-
ings towards the child. This is in itself not very surprising, considering the fact that 
parental activity surrounding children and household is precisely that – an activity. 
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The axiom of action, however, receives a particular nuance in the communities: It is 
envisioned as if endowed with very strong forces. If summarising the presumed ca-
pabilities of the ideal parent it would be that her actions should have the capacity to 
overcome almost every type of hardship. The posting below uses the ideal of parental 
action to suggest that low or no education do not matter much when helping the 
child with its homework, but rather the capacity to motivate the child. 
8:4 But I get it, the risk of failure for the child is probably higher when the par-
ents lack education but that’s not an absolute truth. Ambition and the capacity 
to motivate mean more than what kind of education I have. 
(TPP 2013)
Ambition and capacity to motivate are what is promoted in this posting. This is, 
I think, a part of the workified parenthood – it is activities performed to achieve a 
result, and as we have seen in the previous chapters, interior qualities are perceived 
to matter more than the assets of the subject. The posting captures the community 
preference for how the work of formatting and supporting a child should look. It 
should not be about formal qualifications, thus skills such as training or education 
should not be allowed to influence the way we think about the parent’s possibilities. 
The posting, hence, resonates with institutional ideals of the professionalised parent, 
ready to share the burdens with the school, as described by Gillies (2005b) or Baez 
and Talburt (2008), and much the same as captured in these studies socio-economic 
differences are not considered decisive for success. However, the workified parent-
hood, as I have labelled it, differs from the professionalised parent in one important 
way: Work is not confined to cooperating with institutions or making one’s child 
benefit from the resources of institutions. Instead, when parenthood is conceptual-
ised as work it seemingly covers all areas of life. At a first glance, it is a quite egalitari-
an outlook upon parents and their capabilities: If they have an ambition for the child 
and if they try their very best the chance of success is good. 
To bring up the child
This tells us very little about what it is to succeed as a parent, and what a good up-
bringing consists of. In fact, the prescriptions for how to manage the verb, the pri-
macy of parenting, are many and at times incompatible. In the communities concep-
tions of whether or not parents do their job of childrearing fluctuate and therefore 
I will initially present three different but possible positions on childrearing. What is 
vital is not necessarily to appear as a strict parent, but to come across as a parent who 
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has a child-rearing strategy. Parenting can be carried out with more and less interfer-
ence, as is evident in the first three postings that are quoted below, which are placed 
in a continuum of fostering and guiding the child, with the most authoritarian style 
first and the most tolerant viewpoint last.
8:5 /…/ Children may be competent but they still need rules and directions. 
I seriously almost freaked out when my nine-year-old son refused to put his 
homework in the satchel and his teacher almost cried when she phoned me 
after having tried to make him put his books in the bag with a lot of pedagog-
ical efforts for about 30 minutes. I asked her what kind of approach she had 
used, and she said the only thing she hadn’t done was shout because it ‘harms 
the child’. I sneered, demanded to talk to my son and said in a sharp tone-of-
voice that it was time to put the books in the satchel and stop being silly. Five 
minutes later he was standing in the hall with the books in the satchel. 
The HELL he was harmed by me raising my voice. The only one harmed that 
day was probably his powerless teacher who truly showed how incompetent 
she is when it comes to discipline. SURE, fine, you can definitely try the peda-
gogical approach first if that makes you comfortable (I don’t) BUT you cannot 
chicken out and not discipline the child when it’s needed. Sharpen the voice, 
use the angry eyes and tell the child off. It’s very effective without damaging 
anyone.
8:6 I am by Swedish standards an authoritarian parent just like my parents 
were. However, it takes an enormous amount of love and communication 
to make this successful /…/ It is probably the cornerstone of the successful 
parenthood. Also, I think that children should learn to be polite and to behave 
themselves – this I do a lot for the sake of my child. I think it’ll be easier for a 
child who knows how to comport in the future, particularly in an internation-
al family such as ours.
8:7 I definitely don’t believe in flogging or overly authoritarian child-rearing. 
Neither do I think that Swedish children are badly raised, in that case perhaps 
Swedes in general don’t have that many social codes in comparison with other 
countries. You may say it’s right or wrong, but that’s how the culture here is. 
(VEF 2013 three separate postings)
The three postings above promote different levels of communication and demands 
raised upon the child. In posting 8:5 there is basically no communication with the 
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child articulated, or rather communication is reproduced as the narrated teacher’s 
helpless surrender. The nick describes her own blunt commanding of her son as 
successful, while the teacher’s educative approach is represented as fearful. In con-
trast, the last posting (8:7) employs a relativistic perspective by pointing out that the 
behaviour of children is related to the culture of a country and to how the adults 
themselves behave. Both postings belong to the outer poles of community discourse. 
Posting 8:6 is the most common narration of parenting. This is also the most com-
plex narration – the balance between discipline and warmth – to pull off. It is this 
balancing act that the communities display as their preference for a decisive parent-
ing strategy. 
Tough love and the independent child
The parental strategies – regardless of what strategy that is evoked – seemingly aims 
to enhance the future social value of the child. The preferred community ideal that 
guides conversation is that of tough love, because this ideal seems particularly cali-
brated to maximise the efforts. Tracey Jensen (2012) describes the ideal of tough love 
as a promise of social success and as a remedy for social immobility. Tough love is:  
the elusive, correct balance of discipline and warmth which is said to guar-
antee educational and social successes. Tough love names the crisis of social 
immobility as one of parental indulgence, failure to set boundaries, moral 
laxity and disciplinary incompetence (ibid.: 8). 
In the communities, to intertwine the capacity for love and the ability to receive 
respect from one’s children is indeed a piece of fragile narration. The mother should 
on the one hand pour herself out for her children, always be there for them and man-
ifest a love without end, and on the other hand set the moral standards and regulate 
the children’s actions. Her love must be planned and have a direction in its output. 
These conflicting ideals are situated not far from the ideal of ‘sensitive mothering’, 
presented by Valerie Walkerdine and Helen Lucey (1989): This style of parenting is 
not conceived of as shouting at or punishing of the child, but instead discipline is 
carried out through a soft imprinting more than by means of absolute boundaries. 
The following thread demonstrates how the concept of tough love functions in 
a conversation about an adult child. Its content is situated in an everyday arena far 
away from political demands on parents and it consists of accounts telling us about 
the trivial facts of life – looking for a job, moving house and sons who stay too long 
in the shower. Nevertheless, the demand for a well-balanced parenting that is oper-
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ating in the thread resonates with many of the demands from political campaigns 
to promote the responsible parent. However, in this thread the demands from these 
campaigns that were outlined in more detail in Chapter Two, are brought down to 
the world in which parents actually live; in the world consisting of the day to day 
chore of raising a child. It is, as I see it, the layman’s version of political discourse. 
The thread, which will be presented by the opening postings, concerns setting limits 
for a child and accommodates notions of pushing the child forward. Hence, what 
we will be looking at more closely is the disciplinary part of the discourse of tough 
love, but a tough love that makes the mother aim for an independent rather than a 
subdued child.
8:8 Initial posting 
I´m so neeeeervous! 
My son is about to spontaneously apply for a job. I said: go there early in the 
morning, show them that you ARE interested and offer to work for free one 
day to be able to get the training.
He woke up one hour ago. Then had a shower for 20 minutes. NOW when I 
asked him what he is waiting for, he starts to get ready…Sure, I can under-
stand that he maybe feels nervous and worries a bit but still!! Speed it up, I 
want to scream. I go bonkers with him being so sluggish… 
N1(TPP 2010)
8:9 Maybe he has become a little bit comfy? Yes, we have talked about this 
before (and I know you´ll get angry and say that it´s not at all like that, but 
right now I don´t give a  ).
I am all for supporting one´s kids in what they undertake. But sometimes one 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
lazy. He is a grown up for God´s sake! A long time ago!! 
And then I can understand that he isn´t in too much of a hurry to get a job. He 
lives super cheap and comfy with his mother?  The urgency is not great. But 
I hope though that he´ll pull himself together and go there and give the best 
he´s got, and that he gets the job! 
N2 (Answers posting above)
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8:10 Well, I think he´s more preparing in his own way. Me and M. have been 
given him a good scare about what kind of demands that he´ll be faced with if 
he is to work there, it´s sort of no playground  
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????
that sometimes? I got all my jobs through contacts when I was young. /…/
He doesn´t want to live here… he is looking for a job as hard as he can and 
has been to several job interviews. That’s more than his mates have accom-
????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
here
think you´re barking up the wrong tree    
N1 (Answers posting above)
8:11 What  I mean is that so many times you have written about how you help 
him with this and that. But of course, perhaps he just feels nervous. I´m sure 
that´s the case. 
N2 (Answers posting above)
8:12 I honestly don´t know what it is I am helping him with… he got help to 
scribble down a CV and a letter. Help. I did not do it for him. As for the rest 
he manages by himself. Does his laundry, cooks his food if we don´t help one 
another. Everybody do their own dishes since a couple of weeks back – before 
that we used to take turns but that always resulted in more for me so they 
changed that themselves…
Don´t actually know what you are talking about if we aren´t to travel a few 
years back in time… 
N1 (Answers posting above)
8:13 I´m referring to your whole attitude. How they didn´t help you unpack 
when you moved and you had pains, cause they were busy getting their own 
rooms in order, you explained. But you were also busy, right? Plus, soon af-
ter you wrote and asked for tips for one of the son´s room, because he didn´t 
have a lot of stuff there. So what was he so busy doing while you were un-
packing and had pains?
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And you often talk about how over crowded you live. But at the same time 
you sanction that two grown up men live there and have their own rooms, 
while you and little sister crowd together?  
N2 (Answers posting above)
8:14 You´re drawing your conclusions AGAIN   I said even back then that 
I WANTED to do it myself, I want to have it my way in my cupboards /…/ 
What William did… is that any of your business you mean? In that case I can 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
packed in wardrobes and shelves – he is the one with the most clothes in this 
family and he is the most meticulous regarding them – folding and putting 
into the right place was important.
No, the ‘men’ don’t have a room of their own. Helene and Kevin share a room. 
William has the small room of 9 m ².
You want to see the negative; you have your own image of how my sons are 
and will probably never change it. It doesn´t matter but I hope you could 
get that you actually have a warped image of the whole thing. You make me 
laugh cause you are so… no I can´t spell it out  
N1 (Answers posting above)
In this thread the discourse of tough love is present both in the reproof and in the 
defence. It is as if the two nicks agreed on the urgency of fostering with a grain of 
discipline.  The defences inserted aim to prove something – because the son does his 
laundry and cooks his own food (posting 8:12) he is a living proof of the discipli-
nary part being handled. For both nicks, it would presumably be wrong to create 
an irresponsible child, and for both the cure for irresponsibility is a combination of 
warmth and discipline. This, I suggest, points to a joint interpellation as well as to 
the feature of the child being the most important field specific capital in a parental 
community – fail to raise your child and you have achieved a failure from which 
there is no restitution.
In this thread the anticipated outcome of the love and discipline combination 
appears to be the independence of the child and what N2 is hinting at is that the 
son of N1 has not done so well in that arena. The formula producing the go-ahead 
capacities in a child works in two ways, as described in posting 8:9: I am all for 
supporting one´s kids in what they undertake. But sometimes one has to let them fix the 
185
shebang themselves. Just so they won´t be sluggish and lazy. Support and demands are to 
be combined, yet separated when necessary. This double and calculated movement 
appears to be comprehended as pushing the child forwards. An expression such as 
to let the child fix (posting 8:9) is a signal of how discipline is envisioned, not as a 
tool of force but as soft governing. Permissiveness would be to manifest a supportive 
love that has no demands attached and in 8:9 N2 uses the son as an example of what 
may happen: And then I can understand that he isn´t in too much of a hurry to get a 
job. He lives super cheap and comfy with his mother? Hence, being overly supportive is 
a sign of permissiveness and means that the parent risks losing control of the child’s 
outcome. This soft version of discipline appears to belong to a more controlling kind 
of parenting, whereas love and support belong to the more permissive side, but both 
versions come across as necessary for success. The trick is to keep love and discipline 
both interconnected and separated, and to calculate which type of approach is need-
ed in a particular situation. When calibrated correctly, a governable space is retrieved 
in the zone between love and discipline. Love and soft discipline are investments into 
that space.
It is vital to understand that in this thread the ideals of independence and respon-
sibility play a major part both in the blame and in the defence. The notion of chil-
dren as possible investments is part of a basic community manner for understanding 
human success, failure and striving, and it can be captured in an interpretative rep-
ertoire that I have labelled You should reap what you sow. It is based upon a morality 
already revealed in ideas about the subject’s responsibilities towards society in the 
previous chapter. N2 intimates that the investment in the son of N1 did not turn out 
very well; he now lives cheaply with his mother instead of finding a job and moving 
out. N1 is described as if she has abdicated her position of power and, hence, from 
responsibility. She has been a poor investor. 
Judging from the thread above one may gain the impression that discipline would 
be the favoured position in relation to the child. However, tough love is about bal-
ance. In some instances the governable space is comprehended as ruined when the 
parent exercises the rules too rigidly and too much discipline is construed as tilting 
the balance in the wrong direction. The following posting describes the problems 
that arise when a parent disciplines the child too much.
8:15 I think you’re creating a vicious circle at the dinner table by using those 
strict rules of yours. That he has to eat at least one third of the portion and so 
on. Among our acquaintances I have seen that too many rules only make the 
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children ‘bullheaded’. 98 don’t know if that’s what happened with your son? 
(VEF 2012)
Posting 8:15 contends that children can become obstructive when discipline is 
over-emphasised and, therefore, no character building can take place. Shaping and 
moulding the child appear to be an activity a little more complicated than being 
warm on the one hand and firm on the other. 8:15 points to yet another way to ruin 
the investment. When disciplining the child one should be careful not to trigger 
resistance.
It may seem that the topics of debate are small or futile: A child who does not 
help the mother to unpack and a small boy who is forced to eat one third of his din-
ner portion. The point is that regardless of the magnitude of the topics ventilated, the 
demands on the parent are the same. She is to monitor the development of the child, 
maintain balance both in love and in discipline, exacting neither too much nor too 
little. She is the manager of the child.
The manager
Character building and independence have destinations when debated in the paren-
tal web communities and one such destination is the labour market. We will now 
move on to parental issues of another magnitude, that of delivering a child who fits 
into society and that can contribute to it. Worries and anxieties about children’s 
chances in the labour market are recurrent topics of conversation and in these de-
bates the parents are once again represented as crucial components in the child’s 
potential success. Thus, one major part of the envisioned good parenting is a demand 
that the parent produces a well-functioning child. For this subject to happen the 
child needs some basic training and the parent comes across as the one who ought 
to shoulder this specific responsibility. The parent is, so to speak, responsible for the 
management of the child and for the resulting product. One way of discussing chil-
dren as future subjects is through narrations of cases where the parent is described 
as being incapable of pushing the child forwards. When the child is faced with a 
challenge and hesitates, faulty parental subjects tend to side with the child, as the 
posting below proposes.
8:16 It’s a difficulty that many can overcome but every now and then you see 
parents who want to free their children from tasks that are a bit more difficult 
or tough. That just screams attitude failure. To get by in life you need to also 
98 In Swedish: motvalls.
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conquer the difficulties. Perhaps you will never master them fully or feel com-
fortable with the more difficult tasks but you can work on your resistance or 
reluctance. Because, as you write, if not you cannot manage a job interview ei-
ther. Generally you hear the argument ‘it’s not so easy’ as some kind of obsta-
cle that prevents you from even trying. With that attitude we will never again 
see any participants in the Olympic Games, no surgeons, no skilled craftsmen 
and hardly any accomplished people at all. 
(TPP 2012)
The particular parents narrated in posting 8:16 fail to deliver a child capable of deal-
ing with a future full of demands. What 8:16 might be suggesting is that an entre-
preneurial type of governing from the parent is missing in certain cases. Between the 
lines one can catch a glimpse of a contract relation between the parent and society: 
In the narrated factory of the family the parents are described as managers and the 
children as products to be delivered in an acceptable condition; they should become 
subjects that society needs. This type of favoured governing resonates well with re-
search on the 21st century ideals – promoted by a vast range of institutions – of how 
to help children overcome deprivation. According to Gillies (2005 a: 838), the ideals 
include: ‘strong relationships with parents, parental involvement with education, ap-
propriate role models’.99 The parent appears to be a base from which citizen security 
can be accomplished (Rose, 2000 b). In this particular case the analysis coincides 
with the credo formulated by Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (2008/2011: 148 ff.): 
The way society is organised will define what kind of subjects is needed. One of the 
manager’s functions seems to be to deliver this subject to society.  
Planning the child’s leisure time
Above I have delineated some vital characteristics in the work of formatting the 
child: The ideal of tough love and the demand to deliver an acceptable product to 
society. This section will consist of accounts about a very different type of fostering. 
Although they are the basic requirements of parenthood, the formula of tough love 
and the duty to push the child forward are simply starting points. They are the basic 
requirements of parenthood. According to the communities, the ultimate way of 
shaping a child’s behaviour rather involves more refined techniques – forming its 
movements, its preferences and its taste – in other words through less interfering 
or visible techniques. The child should ideally be nurtured, put in the right kind of 
99 See also Bowe, Gewirtz and Ball (1994/2006: 68 f.) for a perspective on the concept of responsi-
ble parenting as displaying the traits of the ideal consumer, which presumably makes parental 
choice into a case of selecting goods from a market place.
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environments, encouraged and inspired. The governable space where the child can 
receive guidance and fostering appears  to be more for formation than for training. 
This formation is not therapeutic but close enough; a process not of forcing the child 
to become docile but of helping it find its aptitudes, its qualities and preferences, to 
‘open up a field of possibilities’ (ibid.: 147) and shaping it beyond simply learning 
rigid behavioural rules. The parent alone cannot achieve all this, but is responsible 
for facilitating the process. This may, for instance, be achieved by choosing the right 
kind of school.
8:17 Our oldest son will start elementary school next year and we have recent-
ly moved to X-town. It’s hard to know which schools are good. I’m in need 
of advice from those of you who have gone to school here, which ones are 
good? Advantages and disadvantages in different schools would be great! It’s 
such an important decision that feels so difficult to make considering we don’t 
know anyone who attended school here. The schools obviously advertise the 
very best they’ve got, which makes it even harder. So please help us sort out 
the qualities of the schools here in X-town!  
(VEF 2013)
In community conversation the ideal of a covert steering is visible not only in the 
anxieties that apparently reside in the activity of choosing the right school, but is 
visible also in narrations about leisure time. Discussions about designing children’s 
leisure time is a frequent topic in both communities – what they do after school or 
what they do for stimulation and fun. The zestful parts of life are fields of possibilities 
too and they are choreographed by the parent. In the next posting this choreography 
seems to have resulted in a busy schedule. 
8:18 My 7 year old son has the following activities: 
Guitar lessons (first term) 
Gymnastics (two terms) 
Scouting (started 1.5 years ago) 
Swimming (since he was 3 years old)
Earlier he played football too (but changed to gymnastics) and then he took 
Street Dance (but they changed the teacher and the new teacher wants the 
children to be at least 8 years so he has to wait until autumn to start again). 
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/…/ 
(VEF 2011)
When having children that do not want to engage in activities, the tone-of-voice is 
often one of concern, such as in the posting below asking for advice about how to 
handle this situation.
8:19 Have a 7 year old daughter. When she was between 3-5 years old she 
went to children’s gymnastics once a week. She really enjoyed it. The place 
where we went only accepted children up to 5 years of age, and she has not 
wanted to start any new gymnastic lessons afterwards, for older children. 
I have also asked her if she wants to sing in a children’s choir (got a note 
about that in the letterbox this spring), children’s football (she tried it when 
she was 5 years old but only went once before she wanted to quit). She hasn’t 
been very interested in the choir either. 
I am thinking about how much to push them to start extracurricular activities? 
It may well be that she just feels it’s tough to get started but when she has 
started she may think it’s really fun. 
Or should I just ask but if she says no simply let it go? 
(VEF 2011)
Why is it so important to keep the child occupied when not at school? One an-
swer that keeps recurring is that the main benefit of extracurricular activities is their 
salutary promotion. ‘Society’ seems to be viewed as simultaneously a threat and a 
terminal station – the children will end up in this society, which has more and less 
productive places to stay and ways of being. Berg and Peltola (2014) captured this 
worry when talking to Finnish parents, Glenda Wall (2010) detected the same anxi-
ety in her interviews with Canadian mothers and in many ways this feature resonates 
in the communities. Activities may foster for a particular place in society, or a par-
ticular way of being.
8:20 Extracurricular activities are super important as they keep children 
busy so that they don’t end up wrong in society. good that they start early so 
they’ve got the habit. it’s also good to exercise  
(VEF 2011)
As argued by Rose (1999: 31 f.): to govern something or someone is to fraction ex-
perience in particular ways to constitute governable spaces – populations, nations, 
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societies, economies, families, schools etc. Aside from the governable space consti-
tuted by the family, I believe that also the extracurricular activity manifests as such a 
space because it regulates behaviour, relations and time. It fractions the child’s expe-
rience, thoughts and focus, transporting her/him between different zones of security. 
We may conceive of a gated child rescued from the dangers residing in passivity and 
fostered for the most desirable subject position: The active one. When away from 
the other governable spaces available to the child, (the family and the school) but 
engaged in an activity he/she is still structured by something. The child is put in a 
landscape of activities that frames his/her view of the world. Posting 8:20 is char-
acteristic in placing the corporal benefits of exercise last in the enumeration of why 
extracurricular activities are important. 
However, extracurricular activities also foster the child for a particular position in 
society. The activities may be part of a ‘concerted cultivation’ (Lareau, 2011: 2) that 
aim to give the child a particular disposition that enables her/him to feel comforta-
ble when relating to other people, (adults in particular), endowing a sense of being 
special and entitled, as well as helping the child to become familiar with institution-
alised settings. In other words, the extracurricular activities contain hidden resources 
that help mould a suitable habitus. The child should become a particular person, as 
described in the posting below.
8:21 Of course travelling is good for children. They learn about the world, 
other cultures and habits, [they] understand that everything is not like home. 
They simply become accustomed to the world, broadminded, knowledgeable. 
And all of that through having fun!   
(TPP 2010)
Posting 8:21 focuses upon recreational activities as something that shape a person. It 
is an account that resonates the reproduction strategies highlighted by Vincent and 
Ball (2007) – because the children cannot be promised a financially secure middle 
class position in the future they must be crafted in a way that will enable them to 
achieve it through their habitus: By looking and acting like the middle class their 
chances of actually getting there are understood as enhanced. The proclamation and 
celebration of the sophisticated child who is familiar with other habits and cultures 
display one significant feature of the soft governing residing in the regulations of free 
time – it should be fun. There is no force involved in this teaching of the child, no 
rules or prohibitions or procedures. Instead, it is an offering, a free gift. The right 
kind of activities becomes a moral injection into the subject; an injection that does 
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not sting. This may help to explain the many anxious postings (of which 8:19 is an 
example) about children who do not want to participate in any activities proposed 
by the parent, or the proud announcements of how occupied the child’s time is, (as 
was noted in 8:18). Activities seem to be appreciated as both a protective factor and 
a benign moral whip and the salutary function of keeping busy is a stable discur-
sive moment. What remains unarticulated but potentially threatening is unregulated 
time. Although unregulated time is seldom described as dangerous, the very urge to 
make the children active has an element of force to it, as we saw in posting 8:19: I am 
thinking about how much to push them to start extracurricular activities? It may even be 
reasonable to exert a little pressure for the child to have fun. 
Constructing the middle class
Much of the recommended technologies for shaping the child orbit around activities 
that cost money – guitar lessons, football training and travelling abroad. The activity 
of parenting, as constructed in the communities, is not neutral and not for everyone. 
Besides expressing a sense of urgency or an obligation to protect the child they are, 
I think, a rather classic way of distinction: That of constructing the middle class. I 
will continue this chapter by examining the way ‘middle-classness’ is construed by 
identifying and highlighting differences in relation to the less affluent. 
The construction of the middle class is – apart from its material side – to a large 
extent also a symbolic battle (Wacquant, 2012: 108).100 As argued by Kim Allen and 
Yvette Taylor (2012: 18), the marking of differences between classes occurs in discus-
sions of personhood, i.e., moral character, behavioural characteristics and/or pathol-
ogies. These moral character traits form part of a placed parenthood. The placed par-
enthood surfaces in account of particular people in specific places that are described 
as if they hosted particular moralities. The subject is perceived as if ‘self-locating’. The 
thrifty middle-class mother will be found in all the right moral environments – per-
haps in the gym, in the playground with her children or attending parent meetings at 
the school. The problematic and feeble mother of the lower class will be discovered in 
the wrong type of places – maybe in junk food restaurants, in front of the television 
set or smoking on the balcony (ibid.: 1 f.). When the parental communities associate 
poor people with particular ‘problematic’ habits, such as smoking or indulging in fast 
food, they are put in precisely those kinds of places. They do not self-locate, they are 
100 The most relevant task for a sociology of the middle class, Loïc Wacquant proposes (ibid: 108 f.), 
is not to refine the criteria for inclusion in- or exclusion from the class, but to engage in studies of 
how actors  through the political work of naming can – or cannot – form a collective that resem-
bles a middle class.
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put in these places in the narration, as in the next posting that was selected because it 
sketches a particular place for the poor that allows for a distance to emerge. 
8:22 /…/ why are poor children and adults more obese than the more afflu-
ent?
Eating a lot of junk food and sweets is obviously not cheap.Understanding 
that there has to be a balance between how much you eat and how much you 
exercise is not exactly rocket science.
Choosing what is best for your child is not related to financial conditions.
I find it hard to believe that you’re a worse parent because you’re not rich.
What do you think? 
(VEF 2013)
These types of speculative inquiry into the life styles of the worst-off are recurrent in 
the parental communities and tend to orbit around leisure time, school results and 
food/exercise. The high frequency of debates about poor people’s habits and general-
ly problematic habitus may be comprehended as signs of a restoration of the middle 
class, by way of comparison. Discussing junk food and sweets is perhaps not primar-
ily a sign of concern, but junk food and sweets become part of a kind of anecdotic 
evidence of why particular people are problematic. These kinds of tropes are, I think, 
narrative places convenient for placing rejected subjects so that a presumed ‘we’ can 
debate and problematise them. Simultaneously this ‘we’ can consolidate and justify 
their own position. In that sense I conceive of this positioning as a forced location. 
Food, as Anving (2012: 183) demonstrates, enables hierarchies; and she points to 
the relation between these hierarchies and the construction of class. What Anving 
stresses is that in the construction of class food accounts appear less harsh and uppish 
than for instance references to differences in income or capital. Food accounts seem 
somewhat more innocent and are perhaps an inoffensive way of establishing the dif-
ference necessary for the cultural production of class.
The discussion about the faulty habitus of the poor is not performed without crit-
icism and ironic jokes and reproaches about ‘middle class snobbery’ are visible from 
time to time. This being said, even when the middle class receives critique, as in the 
posting to follow, the nick still confesses how the urge to produce middle class dis-
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tinctions holds her in a stranglehold. The posting tells a story of another type of force 
– as if the nick was compelled to perform in ‘the middle class way’. It talks of doing 
middle class and demonstrates how a classed practice or experience is not something 
added to the particular class in retrospect, when the class is already formatted, just as 
Wacquant (2012: 101) points out, but that it is part of the very creation of a class. 
Moreover, it is a posting that appoints places laden with putative problems; places 
that make up a gloomy relief towards the prosperous places of the middle class.
8:23 Can you vaccinate children against problems? Some seem to think it can 
be done. If only you buy a co-operative flat or a house in the right neighbour-
hood, next to the right school, place the children in the right type of extracur-
ricular activities – then you’ve made it!
‘Our little Karen will attend the French school. We think it can provide her 
with the right kind of network’
I often get worried questions about the neighbourhood I live in. Isn’t it a little 
bit… slummy? Worn out housing estates too close by? People seem to move 
to other places a lot? Discrete questions that never fully ‘speak out’ what one 
really means. And nobody is actually questioning the rundown centennial 
houses in the South?101 
Fucking middle class. And I am a part of it.
/…/
These middle class parents – they pussyfoot the most, they are the ones al-
ways talking about equality, justice, redistributive politics and psychosocial 
health. They are so politically correct you wanna puke.
101 The South is a district in Stockholm (in Swedish: Söder). It was formerly known as a working 
class district populated by poor families with children but has today gone through a major 
gentrification and become a well-known middle class district with, according to a contemporary 
urban folk etymology, a population that is largely made up by left wing academics, copy writers, 
journalists and the likes.
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Especially when you know that their children will indeed grow up in anoth-
er type of ‘hood’ where the Little House on the Prairie102 is the ideal. White, 
blonde, tall, nice and tidy, nicely combed, free from louse, well-travelled, tal-
ent for languages, strong ego…..  
(VEF 2007)
This posting is pierced with places of very different social values: the right neighbor-
hood, next to the right school, the French school, worn out housing estates, ‘hoods’ and 
the Little House on the Prairie. Different types of people may be put in all of these 
places. This posting does something that is not usually performed in the communi-
ties: It appoints some of the problem with the way that the affluent seek shelter in 
particular places, as well as pointing out the way in which these places in themselves 
appear to promise social security. It highlights something that the middle class does 
to separate itself from people in other types of places. The places in which the middle 
class seeks shelter become strategic places. The posting also argues that the middle 
class uses a kind of social awareness as a place for formation: Having a particular 
opinion about a topic can also be a way to make oneself distinct from the rest. As the 
postings points out, the middle class position thus becomes one of hypocrisy. 
Consequently, strategic places can be of different kinds. Middleclass mentality 
(the sophisticated, well-travelled and broadminded child we caught a glimpse of in 
posting 8:21) may be created precisely in the meeting with the less fortunate, and 
by sharing a strategic but temporary place with them. In the next posting a nick 
expresses her urge to place her children in a school described as ‘immigrant-dense’.
8:24 Me, I think it’s a problem that our village doesn’t have a lot of immigrants 
or refugees. I would like my son to attend the most ‘immigrant-dense’ school 
in the municipality, partly because it is a good school, and partly because I be-
lieve one needs to meet people from many different groups (not only ethnic) 
to be as clever and well integrated as possible.
What does the creation of these strategic places mean? That which Vincent and 
Ball (2007:1062) label reproduction strategies – processes of transmission of class in 
middle class child-rearing practices – is a way to act out a sense of responsibility 
amongst middleclass parents, the responsibility to ensure that the child is made to 
belong to the middleclass in an era of precarious future prospects. The narrations in 
102 In the original posting: Bullerbyn, a famous Swedish children’s story about a rural village of 
concord and harmony.
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the communities seemingly rest upon a particular sense of reproduction of the child 
and a responsibility to make that reproduction happen. The active child with a busy 
schedule comes across as a context specific asset that holds a particular value. This 
value is so strong that not even a critical nick, such as in posting 8:23, can reject it. 
Although disliking the places in which the middle class hides, she still has to confirm 
their value. Having said that, places can be strategic in more than one sense of the 
word. The appreciation of the importance of ethnic diversity for her child stated by 
the nick in posting 8:24 can only be created in a mixed school. In specific terms it 
means that certain children (for instance children with an immigrant background) 
can deliver something to the middle class child, or that the middle-class child can 
excavate something from the immigrant child. This treasure to be handed over is best 
described, I think, as competence, and having this competence of other countries or 
cultures will add to the child’s habitus. It is a specific type of reproduction strategy 
– to make the child into an omnivore (Skeggs, 2004: 144) – sophisticated enough 
to embrace and understand other habits or customs. Attending a school containing 
immigrant children is an opportunity for certain children and, hence, people from 
lower social strata become an asset to be consumed.
Distinctions and misrecognitions
Middle class distinctions do not only construct the class and part of its reproduction 
strategies, but also seem to constitute a defence of the way that middle class parents 
format their children through activities.  Next, this type of defence of a particular 
way of life will be explored. 
Self-formation and distinctions are associated with questions pertaining to a po-
tentially unequal distribution of resources that enables some to consider enrolling 
the child in healthy extracurricular activities, while preventing others from doing 
the same. Conversations about extracurricular activities thus include defending priv-
ilege, and such defenses surface in the communities on a regular basis. One way of 
defending privilege involves relativising what money can buy. In the next posting 
a nick discusses relative poverty in an apparent attempt to undermine the concept.
8:25 Can everyone afford to do just any type of sport? If that’s a measure of 
poverty I’ll freak out, honestly. Doing push-ups or running is free of charge. 
Playing ice hockey is not. So are all children that cannot afford to play ice 
hockey poor? 
(TPP 2012)
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Another way to defend oneself is to relativise the middle class privilege itself by 
pointing out the differences within this class. Just because you have money you can-
not do whatever pleases you. 
8:26 /…/ I’m excluded from [name of golf club] because I don’t want to pay 
the membership fee, so actually I live in social exclusion. The gate to the yacht 
club is closed – same thing. I’ll have to settle for the motor yacht club. My 
children do not play ice hockey – social exclusion. Life is what you make of it. 
You can see yourself as a victim or you can do the things that are within your 
reach and be happy about it. 
(TPP 2012)
The two postings borrow the term social exclusion to discuss a harmless ‘deprivation’ 
of the affluent child. By choosing ice hockey as an illustrative example as in posting 
8:26 (i.e., an expensive sport), the middle class child is portrayed as someone who 
also can be excluded from particular activities due to a lack of money, although 
the posting fails to acknowledge the fact that it really addresses differences amongst 
the more prosperous. The rhetorical point suggests that the conditions of the poor 
and the prosperous are the same – one has the choice between surrendering to a 
comparative discouragement and making the best of the situation. It is not a ques-
tion of needing something and does not concern the distribution of resources. One 
consequence of relativising resources in this fashion is how it focuses on the risk of 
envy amongst children with access to fewer resources; the worry seems not to be that 
children in relative deprivation really have fewer resources. When formulated in this 
slightly more rhetorically sharp manner, the activity of class formation appears less 
neutral. The two postings above do not only construct the middle class family, but in 
addition other people and experiences. When examined more closely we can see how 
posting 8:26 connects elements that make a lack of assets stand out in a particular 
way. The nick states that she does not want to pay the membership fee for the golf 
club and has chosen to be socially excluded. Apart from not really doing justice to 
the term social exclusion, this utterance connects exclusion with choice, (you have 
the opportunity of doing something that you choose not to do), which is a combi-
nation that presumably appears valid in the eyes of the communities because of the 
preference for choice as the driving force of human activities. Choice reappears a 
little later when the posting connects victimhood with choice: You can see yourself 
as a victim or you can do the things that are within your reach and be happy about it. 
In this sense, no victimization originates in the world outside of the subject, such as 
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structural impediments or distributional injustices. Victimhood is generated from 
the inside and results from choice. 
In matters of the family – the way that the family is construed as an ‘inner soci-
ety’ – these preferences for choice and for assuming responsibility for one’s choices 
take the shape of a whole rationality of venture. I particularly want to emphasise 
how this rationality, perhaps most visible in the repertoire of You reap what you sow, 
does not function without a misrecognition similar to the one found in the work of 
Brantlinger et al. (1997): The dislocation of class. To make the rationality of venture 
function, a lack of assets is misrecognised as a state of mind. In the next posting a 
lack of education on the part of the parent is disconnected from the child’s potential 
study results.
8:27 Exactly – one can receive commitment and support even if the parents do 
not possess the knowledge to do the homework, but they can help by talking 
to the school if help is needed, asking and encouraging, so that the child per-
forms well. Engage in school, talk about school and that it’s important /…/.  
(TPP 2013) 
In 8:27 the parents’ state of mind – their attitudes towards school – is what is deemed 
important. The posting does not separate material resources from attitude but states 
that formal knowledge is not really the key factor for the child’s success. Instead, the 
ideal parents of a school child in this posting are depicted as engaged. They come 
across as compensating for a lack of potency; delineated as lacking the criteria of 
schooling but instead possessing the criteria of dedication. Their powers lie in in-
exhaustibility, despite being portrayed as having no grades, no exams and no basic 
qualifications. 
Arguably, the rationality of venture, such as expressed in the posting above, in-
forms us about the particular political subjectivity necessary for advanced liberal 
societies to operate. When becoming a parent the liberal subject guided by ethopol-
itics makes investments in the child and parenting is comprehended by using mod-
els from the labour market. The object of investment, the child, is maximised and 
refined through self-enhancement techniques of activity and discreet transmission of 
values and taste. When formally sanctioned values  (such as education) are absent, 
the parent can compensate by displaying enthusiasm. This is misrecognition in its 
purest form – stating that attitude would be more important than formal education 
(a material asset). It is a cognitive model that helps us to think (Van Dijk, 2006) 
in a particular way and it shapes the contours of discourse (Fineman, 1991: 289). 
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In other words, it is ideological, based on a dissimulation that obscures relations of 
domination (Thompson, 1988: 370). Instead of articulating that knowledge is more 
important than commitment when assisting one’s child with homework, the posting 
equalises the two. The fact that the middle class parent in general has access to higher 
education and that this asset is an advantage that can be transferred to the child, is in 
the account of 8:27 blurred into a statement that knowledge and lack of knowledge 
are nearly the same. 
The sense of insecurity
When compiled, the postings may give the reader the impression that there are no 
doubts displayed when matters of the family are discussed and that resourcefulness 
and ambitions amongst the nicks are endless. This is not the case. Embedded in the 
discourse of achievement and tough love one can catch a glimpse of the question that 
presumably unites many a parent. To conclude this chapter I will present by far the 
most common question in the community,  albeit one that is rarely articulated: Am 
I a good enough parent?  
The demands for the perfect moulding of the child regularly provoke the nicks. 
The link between the child’s behaviour and the performance of the parent is seem-
ingly not fully embraced. Because siblings within one and the same family can turn 
out very differently from one another, there is a degree of insecurity about how much 
the parent can actually guide and influence the child. Is she, when it comes down to 
it, really the all-resourceful manager capable of the great deeds necessary to produce 
future useful citizen-subjects? The next posting questions how a parent should be 
evaluated when her children come out differently.  
8:28  But… if you ‘succeed’ with 2 out of 3 does it possibly prove that you’re 
not totally hopeless as a parent? If one child is totally different (in our case it 
has been that way from the birth, totally different!) is that due to me being a 
bad parent? Yes, I feel provoked when people talk about themselves as being 
such good parents and that others with children that have other types of be-
haviour (that is not considered equally good) are bad and that these parents 
have gone about the whole thing in the wrong way. They haven’t got a clue 
whether they would have succeeded with my child! 
(TPP 2011)  
Posting 8:28 is a good example of the protests inserted in debates about childrear-
ing, apparently objecting to the prevailing one-size-fits-all model of parenting. It 
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openly questions the frequently articulated link between parental strategy and child 
outcome, and seems to characterise the child as an element of surprise, rather than 
a product of calculation and smart manoeuvers. It rescues a kind of existential free 
zone for the child and in so doing manages to free the parent from potential guilt. 
The child in 8:28 cannot be commanded and governed into a certain desired subject. 
It receives a mystical core, an innate essence over which the parent has no control. 
Consequently, accounts about essence may be used as a tool for defence.
In one sense this posting is rare in the communities. Remaining free of parental 
guilt is not a very common narration.103 Instead, one of the big issues of concern 
is how the parenting techniques may appear in the eyes of the children. Although 
having performed to the best of one’s ability, the children make the final decision as 
to the quality of one’s parenthood. 
8:29 On the other hand I would never say that I have been a good parent to 
my children, because I am not in a position to say that. It is my children who 
own that question. They control my parent brand104. 
(TPP 2014)
The nick in posting 8:29 writes of not knowing for sure that she has been a good-
enough parent; she does not control the outcome herself. This particular account 
highlights the insecurity in the narrations about investments in the child – the in-
security of how they are embraced by the object of attention, the child itself. The 
child is in that sense an element of uncertainty. However, this particular posting also 
describes parenthood through the metaphor of ‘brand’. How is this to be compre-
hended? Does the nick sell an image of self to her children? Are the possibilities of 
understanding oneself shifting to a reification so intrusive that it seems natural to 
refer to oneself as a commodity? Posting 8:29 strips away the layers of parental ef-
forts that are supposed to affect the child and even the possibility of personal agency 
seems removed from the narration. What is left is a subject that has become a brand 
that a customer (the child) evaluates. When described in this way there is not much 
certitude left – once a brand the parent is left naked and exposed. Paradoxically, in 
the end the parent comes across as partly governed by the child’s opinion.
Notions about family thus come in at least three configurations. First of all, it 
is understood as a factory in charge of the young subjects that society needs and 
103 In Chapter Eight there is one account reported; a posting that declares the nick has been a weak 
parent and in spite of that has a child who is a ‘wonderful angel’ (see posting 7:21). 
104 In Swedish: varumärke
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where the parent is read as a kind of team leader or production manager. Secondly, 
its responsibilities towards society are described as exceeding society’s responsibilities 
towards the family, such as described in Chapter Seven where the love and respect 
generated inside families in disadvantaged residential areas were thought of as con-
quering deprivation. Thirdly, ‘family’ has become a narrative prop to defend class 
privilege. In these types of narration the child receives an important status as the fig-
urehead of the proper, non-questionable and privileged family. Still, the parent who 
logs into the community is left with the most vital question unanswered. It turns out 
that the parent is not the only subject in the family with capacities to steer, manage 
and create subjectivity.  The parent still – despite all her attributed potency – appears 
to fear the verdict of the child.
Summary
If the social contract is understood as somewhat damaged by individuals exploiting 
the welfare institutions and the cure for this societal ill resides in the transmission of 
sound morals that can be carried out inside the family, it is important to grasp how 
these aspirations are formulated and what they result in. That has been the intention 
of this chapter, which mapped out community conceptions of good or non-prob-
lematic parenting, the way the child should be fostered and what type of result can 
be achieved from this. In the concluding analysis we have seen some of the results of 
these aspirations in terms of constructing and defending class separation.
Pervading the community narrations on parenthood are two conceptual meta-
phors through which we may catch sight of the way the content is structured. The 
first is the way that parenting is understood as work and the second is how children 
are conceptualised as investments. The choice to use parenting rather than parent-
hood is a deliberate one. The fact that being a parent is delineated as a type of work 
makes the –ing in parenting possible; to be a parent is described more in terms of 
agency and action and less in terms of experience, identity or life phase (Jensen, 
2010:2). This intertwines community conceptions with advanced liberalism’s trans-
formation of social access into social effort. Education and social capital on the part 
of parents are de-emphasised in favour of commitment, dedication and interest. 
This is not to say that the nicks do not differ in the way they understand chil-
drearing. The important thing to narratively master seems to be to launch a strategy 
for childrearing. It can be more or less strict and warm, but ideally it is a combination 
of both, namely tough love.Mastering tough love indicates that a correct balance 
between discipline and love has been achieved. The tension in the zone between the 
push-and-pull factors of discipline on the one hand and love on the other seems to 
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squeeze out a distillate of independence in the child. Discipline and love are invest-
ments in a governable space and the child is the end profit of the investments. This 
feature of discourse makes the parent of a child who is too shy, too aggressive or too 
passive into a bad investor.
Nevertheless, the governing is mostly articulated in narrations that appear less fo-
cused on actually steering the child. That which is understood as moulding the child 
concerns placing it in environments and conditions that shape the child’s preference: 
Parents should nurture rather than foster. Environments need to be carefully select-
ed, whether the issue is the choice of a good school or placing the child in the right 
type of leisure activity. These person-making technologies are viewed as preventing 
the child from becoming infected by unhealthy spheres in society. Therewith, the 
technologies form part of a symbolic construction of the middle class that consists 
of taste displays, as well as transmission and usages of the less fortunate as a point of 
reference that potentially enhances one’s own position. 
The one element that that can apparently disrupt the narration is considering 
what the child thinks of the fostering. When the child is brought in as an evaluator 
of the parent, the tone of voice is less sharp. This indicates how the family, when 
narrated not solely as a producer of new subjects, is still conceived of in terms of 
fragility and tension; sometimes even experienced as a place of uncertainty. This ten-
dency can be said to co-exist with another type of insecurity for the parent – the way 
the evaluation of the parental strategy turns out. One way of conceptualising oneself 
as a parent goes through the metaphor of brand, which makes parental practices 
into commodities. Through this metaphorical understanding we can grasp another 
dimension of the concerns: What if the parent comes across as a consumption good 
with a low value?
Family – a fantasy of societal legitimacy
This chapter has mainly focused upon the members of the narrated family and the 
way the subject ideals of choice and responsibility influence the community concep-
tions of it. This means that the analysis has been restricted to subjects located inside 
a family and activities emanating from children and parents: School performances, 
dinner table rules, leisure activities and parental engagement. It may be reasonable to 
say that we have investigated the Homo Eligens intending to foster new Homo Eli-
gens. As I have demonstrated, the ideal is not to be an elite parent in every instance 
and the tendency is not to stipulate that one has to be affluent or well educated to 
manage the task, but the opposite. A pseudo-egalitarian standpoint is established: 
Anyone with a little ambition can be a good enough parent and socio economic 
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differences are in general ignored as possible explanations for parental difficulties 
and ‘failures’. The egalitarian outlook on parenting is in fact characterised by an 
ignorance or lack of interest in these types of differences. Arguably, this is enabled 
by the notion of workified parenthood. Such an outlook on parenthood means that 
the envisioned work is narrated in a context-free zone, where the precarious nature 
of some parents’ working conditions (less education, less prestigious contacts and 
less money) remains hidden. Talking about parenthood in terms of work becomes 
part of an ideologically connoted displacement of the differences in relative strength 
between parents.
The postings appear to conceive of a particular society wanting a specific parental 
practice. The words used in the cited postings (ambition, engagement, support and 
encouragement amongst others) all promote the parental character we find, for ex-
ample, in how character development is accentuated on the home page of Demos105, 
in Swedish parental education policies of the twenty-first century (Littmarck, 2012) 
or the tapestry of individuals that Margaret Thatcher envisioned in the quotation at 
the start of Chapter Seven. This indicates that the envisioned community ideals of 
families and parents are not fabricated in a vacuum, and the fact that the ideal parent 
is possibly conceptualised in narration more than acted-out away from keyboard 
does not make the demands fictitious to their nature. To narrate something could on 
the one hand mean that the desire for the responsible parent is nothing but a fiction. 
On the other hand, being made up also implies a process of formation, of construct-
ing a cultural fashion prescribing a desirable way of being. Acquiring this way of be-
ing would allow a subject to feel (and to become recognised by others as) a particular 
type of person. If parents are narratively required to foster the child to succeed with 
a future employer, or gently persuade it into embracing certain aptitudes and likings, 
it perhaps does not matter much if the existence in the family – when away from the 
public eye – is characterised by a fragile intimacy or even non-productivity. If the 
preferred tale of the family is structured in metaphors of work and achievement this 
is, at least, the public face of family to which we have to relate. 
First of all comes taste, Bourdieu proposes (1984/1991: 181 f.), and then the 
objects of the world will be chosen and organised accordingly. This potentially means 
two things. Cynically put, parents have to shape a child that can satisfy their existing 
requirements. This implies that the middle class parent has to make the child middle 
class – in order to recognise herself. The active, healthy and occupied child may be 
a context specific symbol when the middle class is to receive its narrative boundaries 
105 Demos is a British cross-party think tank. See: http://www.demos.co.uk/about for a presenta-
tion of Demo’s activities and projects.  More about Demos can be found in Chapter Two. 
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and thus it becomes a taste display. But taste perhaps also clouds the materiality in 
class divisions and the way that austerity budget discipline has hit particular sub-
jects. It points to good parenting (‘tasteful’ parenting) as the driving force for social 
mobility, instead of allowing us to ask why we have a society that is so unbearable at 
the bottom that we all have to leave that place. In short, taste seems to dictate how 
the middle class parent must behave and it clouds the material structures in which 
parents receive their assignment to ‘parent’ and, hence, taste displays makes other 
parents appear as bad investors. More than anything else, middle class inclination 
comes across as a narrative straitjacket.  
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9. Help yourself. On unfitness and 
emotional capital
So far, the analysis has focused on themes where the nicks sketch more or less ideal 
states of being (when relating to one another in the community, when relating to 
society or when inside the family) and how they delineate deviations from the ideal 
states. I have argued that the preferred state of mind should not be described as per-
fection, but rather a state of sincerity, coherence, control and self-knowledge. The 
subject’s duty is not to feel well in every instance but to know herself well enough to 
trace the sources of the affliction and to work towards betterment, i.e., be prepared 
for well-being. The ideal is not flawlessness but fitness. Remaining mentally fit pro-
vides an opportunity to continue to invest in life and what is advocated is, conse-
quently, to assume responsibility for managing life – by monitoring oneself one may 
achieve personal security.106
The call for a prudent safeguarding of personal security is deeply interwoven 
with a liberal version of self-technology (Wright, 2012) and the call is most certainly 
accepted in the communities. Nevertheless, it regularly leads to debates and reflec-
tions on how to achieve the alleged necessary fitness. Because the communities also 
contain a large amount of postings about problems – personal troubles or discussions 
about the difficulties of others – this chapter will explore expressions concerning 
sensations of unfitness. As we now know what the ideals look like, I want to look into 
narrated reasons for unfitness, i.e., what causal ontology the communities assume 
and how they envision possible amendment techniques. Because they are repeated 
on a regular basis in community conversations the topics chosen revolve around 
three images of being unfit. The first topic is that of dealing with stress, the second 
touches upon techniques to combat obesity and the third concerns ways to tackle 
the neuropsychiatric diagnosis of ADHD. Concluding the chapter I will concentrate 
on how ADHD becomes a place of tension – where the afflicted subject becomes an 
object of discursive fight in terms of approved techniques of betterment. 
106 This understanding of personal security conflates with that of societal security, much the same as 
Rose’s (2000 b: 327) description of ‘the facilitating state’. Rose argues that in advanced liberalism 
the state is thought of as a partner more than a supplier or manager of lives and individuals, 
families and whole communities take upon themselves a responsibility for security. This repre-
sents the technologies of prudentialism, also conveyed by Wendy Larner (2000). Investments in 
well-being can therefore be read as part of the political transformation towards responsibilisa-
tion. 
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Before entering into the analysis we will have a quick look at the frames within which 
unfitness can be conceptualised in community understanding. This is simultaneous-
ly the way in which I read unfitness as having a cultural meaning, or in other words 
my understanding of the particular relationship of the self to culture. 
Self-help and emotional capital
One way to wrap one’s head around subject positions and their requirements in a 
particular place and time involves exploring temporal, spatial and economic social 
practices to which the positioning relates (Lowe, 1995). In this chapter the subject 
(and the way it can be depicted as grappling with unfitness) will be analysed to some 
extent as a result of a mode of production and consumption, or in other words the 
way in which subject positions are made available through discourses resulting from 
modes of production and consumption. The way a society produces and consumes its 
goods and services requires particular subjects on the one hand, but it will also gen-
erate certain types of subjects on the other (Lowe, 1995).107 The same can be said for 
larger societal transformations. Subjectivity changed when urbanization progressed 
in Europe and people began to live in close proximity to each other, similar to the 
way that memory and perception changed with the typographic culture or with the 
invention of the mechanical clock (Lowe, 1982: 35). Today, the most conspicuous 
example is perhaps the manner in which market forces may install a sense of insecu-
rity in the subject, and simultaneously provide the solution for it (Hochschild, 2012: 
10). There is hence, a link between subjectivity and economy, or between: ‘definite 
individuals under definite conditions of production’ (Marx & Engels, 1845/1988: 
41). Presently, as Eva Illouz (2007: 1) proposes, we may have lost certain bonds to 
the concrete, material dimensions of life, whilst at the same time we have become 
more focused on the interior domains; our feelings and thoughts. Nevertheless, we 
need to understand what it is in the contemporary (political) economy that formats 
us and makes us reflect upon ourselves in a certain way.  
If the contemporary and more or less global mode of production and consump-
tion, whether we label it capitalism or perhaps late capitalism, has any type of roots 
that are possible to determine, description usually starts with the age of asceti-
cism where the individual is released from traditions and devoted to a productive 
life of self-discipline and frugality, governed by a Protestant set of ethics (Weber, 
107 This does not mean that the needs or the subjectivity of, for example, the homeless and the stock 
broker are the same. It only means that every type of society produces a range of needs or iden-
tities, and that the ways in which we try and satisfy our needs or identify with something are 
seldom freely selected or invented as we want (Lowe, 1995:2).
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1922/1978). The ascetic man intends to reach long-term goals by practicing self-dis-
cipline – this individual is governed from within. This ideal of discipline is also evi-
dent in the parental web communities’ accounts of unfitness, where it is mainly artic-
ulated within the frame of self-help culture. The link between ascetic self-discipline 
and self-help culture is characterised by an egalitarian outlook on success, and the 
main discursive promise within self-help culture is the same as that within the early 
form of capitalism; everyone can obtain success and happiness through will power 
and self-control (Engdahl, 2013: 54). However, self-help concepts are not direct 
successors of Protestant asceticism. Plainly formulated, for a self-help culture to de-
velop the asceticism needed consumer culture, and consumer culture in turn needed 
a suitable moral climate in order for it to thrive. T.J Jackson Lears (1983) points to a 
change in the way ‘salvation’ is understood nowadays – no longer in terms of self-de-
nial (asceticism) but rather in terms of self-realisation, which in turn depends on a 
compulsive interest in psychological and corporal health. This shift, according to 
Philip Cushman (1990: 599), would not have been possible without the changes in 
the economy. The fact that the market does not profit from overly contained subjects 
that opt for money in the bank, but instead craves subjects that want to improve and 
expand by consumption, points to the ‘economic constituents’ of the subject: We 
are the way we are because the market needs us that way. Contemporary focus upon 
matters of health is, consequently, a reflection of the growing industries that profit 
from it – self-help and psychotherapy or weight watching programmes and fitness 
(ibid.: 604). In sum, a dialectical relation shapes the subject. On the one hand she is 
formatted by market forces and industries telling her she is (or ought to be) a certain 
way, on the other she becomes constituted the way she is because of how she takes 
part in the market; the way she works, generates money and consumes. This double 
feature is, I believe, captured in the way Marx and Engels explain what is inside us: 
‘The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their 
material life-process’ (1845/1988: 42). 
However, the promise residing in asceticism and consumer culture is deceptive. 
In fact, as argued by Illouz (2013: 99), the therapeutic narrative is a specific capital 
that can deliver other types of benefit, or that contributes to stratifications. Applying 
the self-help discourse becomes part of a particular emotional capital.108 However, 
108 Emotional capital may be thought of as a type of symbolic capital: ‘wherein certain ways of think-
ing and acting are legitimized and regarded as authoritative in society’ (Edwards & Gilles, 2005: 
7). This means that the display of emotional capital achieves the same thing as symbolic capital in 
the sense that it manifests the status of the particular social group to which one belongs (ibid.).
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emotional capital does not necessarily generate money (although it can).109 More 
often it produces recognition and social status. Why is this? According to Illouz 
(ibid.: 89), it is because particular therapeutic narratives structure speech acts into 
genres that we have to line up behind if we want to make ourselves appealing. These 
genres are created in an emotional field populated by psychologists, authors, coun-
sellors, pharmaceutical companies, academic departments in the area of psychology 
or social work, insurance companies and so forth. Much the same as in any field the 
emotional fields are regulated by the players’ abilities to latch onto artefacts in a way 
that signals familiarity with ‘high culture’ (the emotional or cognitive styles appreci-
ated by the dominant classes or dominant genres). In the parental web communities 
the dominant players (the veterans)do not necessarily use the more obscure psycho 
analytic terms to understand life events. Instead, a more hands-on and pragmat-
ic approach is notable which appears to be inspired by self-help and guide books 
that constitute a local fashion operating in these venues. Discourse is pragmatic and 
seems to be employed in concrete everyday arenas, such as one’s family or place of 
work. Particularly the workplace is the topic of conversation in many debates about 
a particularly tricky matter that engages many nicks; stress.
Finding the cause: On stress
The fact that most examples of stress in community conversations orbit around paid 
work is perhaps not surprising: The nicks need to be able to work and remain fit in 
order to do so. The obligation to work structures many of the suggestions on how to 
think and act in relation to sensations of stress, as well as comprising the reason for 
why stress must be combatted. So, the recurrent community attempts to understand 
stress at the workplace is one of the sharper expressions of the way the causal ontolo-
gy of suffering is formulated. There is a sense of urgency mediated in the discussions 
– the problem needs to be solved. The formula for solving it is usually relatively 
simple: It is mainly the way the individual comprehends a heavy workload that deter-
mines whether or not it will cause problems. Recurrently, this is articulated in terms 
of choice – we choose to feel bad when we lack control over our thoughts and if we 
chose to regain control, stress will be reduced. Rose (2000 b: 329) describes this type 
of collective logic with its emphasis on self-governing and control as a general trend 
of responsibilisation and in the parental communities I have found this rationality 
interpreted as a kind of cost accounting. The solution is described as appearing when 
109 One way in which displaying the favoured type of emotional capital can generate a concrete 
financial gain is, for instance, understanding the rationale behind personality tests that one needs 
to master to be considered ‘employable’ for particular types of professional position. 
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counting the pros and cons of enduring a stressful situation and calculating the effect 
of a particular stress reducing technique. 
In the first exemplary thread, of which the initial part will be presented, the 
idea that we choose stress rather than become exposed to it, is spelled out also on a 
concrete word-level. The thread is initiated by a nick that asks for advice on how to 
handle a work-group that complains about stress. We begin reading shortly after the 
first posting. 
9:1 Thoughts are the strongest factor when we are stressed and stress is some-
thing we choose. Unfortunately. /…/ Cause I assume you’re not severely 
understaffed? 
N1 (TPP 2011)
9:2 Define severely understaffed… I could employ 10 people tomorrow and 
put them to work within 2 weeks if I could only find the right people.  
N2 (Answers posting above)
9:3 Severely understaffed can be that the employees constantly work overtime 
to complete the work tasks. Is that the case at your work place?   
N1 (Answers posting above)
9:4 Some do – others are better at drawing the line somewhere (and are not 
considered as valuable in salary reviews because of it).   
N2 (Answers posting above)
9:5 You can’t have it all, some can cope with stress and have the time to work 
more and it’s only natural that this is rewarded. The person who wants to 
slow down a bit and handle the work load with respect for her private life 
obviously has to abide by the consequences of that decision. 
I rather sense a problem of being clever and a situation of competition be-
tween the employees when each and every one of them really needs to abide 
by the consequences of their decisions. 
N1 (Answers posting above)
In these opening exchanges of the thread a pattern that repeatedly returns in the 
communities is revealed; that of counting pros and cons. If you choose not to work 
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overtime you cannot receive the same salary increase as your colleagues, posting 9:5 
argues, but instead you gain the possibility of having a private life. Both choices pay 
off, albeit in different types of currency. This is not encompassed as a problem of 
justice (paying different salaries to employees with the same qualifications who carry 
out the same tasks) but as a problem of an unarticulated rationality of choice. The 
employees who complain have not taken full responsibility for their own cost calcu-
lations – they almost appear unconscious or afflicted by a kind of false consciousness 
– and so the mere complaints can in 9:5 be reformulated into a competition between 
colleagues who do not acknowledge the fact that they are really competing. If every 
employee instead made the calculation articulately, unequal pay would cease to be a 
problem and become a question of knowing oneself and one’s preferences. Thoughts 
are the strongest factor when we are stressed, posting 9:5 states, and the stressed em-
ployees in this account are portrayed as if not able to think straight.  
As posting 9:5 indicates, much of the reasoning about the causal origins of stress 
employ narrative structures of contrast to comprehend the phenomenon – some 
employees are stressed, others are not; some choose to work overtime, others do 
not, and so forth. In the following we will examine the result of the way in which 
narration is structured by comparison. In the next thread individual stress-handling 
capacities are compared and the stress due to trauma is compared with stress ema-
nating from the workplace. This thread focuses mainly on possible coping strategies, 
and we will read the opening postings.
9:6 That stress is imagined ought to be quite obvious, especially when you 
consider that people can’t find the time to do what they should because they 
worry so much about it, a clear example would be people who can’t sleep be-
cause they worry so much about not sleeping enough before the alarm rings. 
Structure and presence are crucial in combating stress. That is, knowing what 
one is supposed to do and being present in the here and now, not thinking 
about what one is supposed to do later. 
N3 (TPP 2011) Threadstart
9:7 I can only totally agree! 
N4 (Answers posting above)
9:8 Imagined, I don’t know about that. Although you have planned you can 
end up in stressful situations and exude adrenaline, noradrenaline and corti-
sol. In the long run that is harmful. And gives you psychological and physical 
211
problems. So if the stress becomes drawn-out you need to seek help. Because 
it can be mastered. Look at people coming from countries where there is war. 
Some have worse injuries than others; it’s about finding the right coping strat-
egy. Exercise, religion, faith in oneself and the likes. But many choose some 
type of addiction. Shopping, sex, drugs, alcohol etcetera. 
N5 (Answers posting 9:6)
9:9 There can be no doubt that stress experienced by the brain gives you phys-
ical symptoms, but it is triggered by our thoughts – in other words by how 
we deal with life. Stress is most severe in situations where you can’t affect 
your circumstances, such as war, and even then we experience the same cir-
cumstances in different ways, but war situations include so much more than 
just stress. Now we’re only talking about stress in everyday life in a Swedish 
workplace. 
N3 (Answers posting above)
9:10 A little bit of indifference is good… the attitude that ‘I´ll find time for 
only so much’, I think it’s beneficial for most people. But it is obviously hard 
to combine that with a workplace where commitment is one of the ideals for 
the company /…/. 
N6 (Answers posting above)
9:11 You need to like your work and be committed to it and that is not contra-
ry to setting limits. Set limits and focus your attention where it’s needed, in 
other words the opposite of being torn apart. So it’s not about being disinter-
ested but rather about seeing reality for what it is. However, there are people 
who become too ‘inflated’ at work and overestimate both their contribution 
and their importance and make themselves ‘indispensable’. That’s a true rea-
son for becoming grumpy. 
N3 (Answers posting above) 
In this thread different difficult situations are compared, as well as different coping 
strategies, i.e., a contrast perspective is employed. By comparing workplace stress 
with traumas caused by war, the former is diluted, which means that comparison can 
result in a judgement about the severity of the stressor. In addition, better and worse 
types of coping strategy are compared, as described in posting 9:8. In a sudden turn 
this focus even makes people who have survived war trauma at least partly respon-
sible for choosing a sound coping strategy:  Some have worse injuries than others; it’s 
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about finding the right coping strategy. This latter comparison thus results in a judg-
ment of responsibility for one’s feelings. 
The postings favour a calibration of the mindset that the subject is to perform to 
improve. As we see in posting 9:11 there is no prohibition against having feelings 
but rather an appeal to make two types of decision: what to feel and how much. The 
suitable coping strategy would be a result of a correctly performed cost calculation – 
what do I want to achieve and what strategy should I employ in order to get there? 
The absence of an element of exterior force in the postings is another characteristic 
of the discourse: The employee is described as if dealing with stress in a narrative 
void where there are no colleagues, no merchandise waiting to be distributed, no 
patients, pupils or clients expecting to receive assistance, no team leaders waiting for 
the co-worker to fulfil her duties or no delivery deadlines that may not be met. It 
is, once again, the subject set up against herself. This voluntary mental calibration is 
defined as a knowledge of who one is (in 9:11 people without this self-knowledge are 
described as people who become too ‘inflated’ at work and overestimate both their contri-
bution and their importance), but also as maintenance work to become more robust 
(in 9:6 this work is performed by adding structure and presence to life). The one 
solution not mentioned in the thread is to transfer the problem of workplace stress 
to the employer. This absence is not hard to understand, because the problematic 
situation is considered to have arisen – and consequently best adjusted – inside the 
individual. The absence can also be explained by the very structure of the narration. 
By separating elements so that they appear not to belong to or affect one another 
(Thompson, 1988) the function of discourse is ideological.
The emotional genre of stress
That being said, the community accounts do not take on one unified shape when 
dealing with the origins and putatively fictitious nature of stress. These outer points 
of opinion – where stress is understood as imagined in posting 9:6 and as causing 
concrete physical damage in 9:8 – are recurrent when the communities discuss the 
way the world outside the subject may influence or harm her. Either the subject is 
supposed to counter and survive very harsh conditions or she is portrayed as slightly 
more fragile and open for intrusions. When made fragile physics, chemistry and 
biology appear as vital resources to protect her from potential blame, but in spite 
of invoking chemistry and biology, the level of responsibility decreases very little. 
The two outer points come across as different points of departure but the terminal 
station remains the same; responsibility. Either way the subject needs to address the 
situation. Both conceptions of the subject include control: one needs to take control 
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over imagination or use a coping strategy to reduce the levels of cortisol in the brain. 
As we have seen in Chapter Six, to make this illustration of control function external 
factors are excluded from narrations, i.e., demands over which one has little or no 
control, such as the work-rate. 
It is, however, important to point out that not all accounts exclude representa-
tions of the world outside the subject as potentially damaging. The world is some-
times described as if it could cause problems. The following posting is symptomatic 
of the community tendency to name the world as a potential source of problems, but 
assign the solution to the individual.  
9:12 Sure, now and then I also feel ‘stop the world for a second’, but then I 
have to re-prioritise and solve the problem so that the stress goes away. 
And force myself to think in a different way. 
(VEF 2010)
Posting 9:12 demonstrates that feeling stressed is not comprehended as wrong – it 
can happen to anyone. Through what Whetherell and Potter (1987: 48 ff.) call ap-
parent concession the reader with a possible experience of stress is given some acknowl-
edgement; we can all feel stressed sometimes. The very experience is neither denied 
nor ridiculed: We are allowed a reasonably high level of human frailness and in the 
encouraging advices we learn that despite this frailty, we are still capable of action. 
Hence, a posting bearing much emotional capital should be organised in a particular 
sequence: 1. External factors may be described as stressors, but 2. You should not 
place the blame on these factors. This dual message, I think, can be viewed as part 
of a particular emotional genre and posting 9:12 can be comprehended as a classic 
example of an emotional disposition of the middle class. The middle class occupy a 
position in the labour market where they are simultaneously governed by others and 
self-governed (Illouz, 2013: 101), which means that a suitable narrative on profes-
sional middle class life probably will include both elements, which 9:12 does. Thus 
the genre is heavily influenced by an ethos of responsibilisation.
When condensed these cheerful types of message about self-sufficiency end with 
the buzz word ‘choice’. 
9:13 I have a job where I do everything on my own, I am single, I study, I 
work full time, I have a disabled child etcetera etcetera and this would surely 
make a lot of people stressed but I have chosen not to be. 
(TPP 2011)  
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The posting above perhaps come across as startling in its assurance of faith in choice 
and it can be explained in several ways. One property of the account, however, par-
ticularly stands out. Although the posting does not contain one single expression 
of emotion (it actually disregards emotion by stating: this would surely make a lot of 
people stressed, indicating that stress does not afflict the nick writing), it can still be 
considered part of the emotional genre. What it does is prescribe the entity by which 
emotion can be controlled. This nick has chosen to not experience the negative emo-
tion of stress (although she could have), and so, ultimately the viewpoint of choice 
makes emotions into a kind of extra sprinkles on life – you choose whether or not 
you want them at any given instance. Emotions are not necessary. Ultimately it ap-
pears that the cause of unfitness is neither the exterior, nor having emotions pervade 
the inside. Unfitness is caused by a lack of control, or avoiding making a choice. The 
emotional genre in which accounts about stress are inserted contains incompatible 
elements – in one and the same narration the possibility that stress can pervade a 
subject is placed alongside the possibility of rejecting that very sensation.
The therapeutic laboratory and the sin of non-compliance
If unfitness arises as a consequence of not staying in control, what can be done to re-
gain command of the situation? Are we simply different when it comes to capacities 
for control and must learn to live with our differing sensations of stress? Not surpris-
ingly, the communities are full of advice and remedies when it comes to combatting 
stress and the chapter will continue by a survey of the ways in which unfitness should 
be addressed. 
To master the strains of life the communities advocate different therapeutic inter-
ventions for the soul. The interventions do not need to be performed by a profession-
al but are discussed in terms of taking an interest in oneself, being truly inquisitive 
about the way the mind functions, caring for one’s emotions and learning to harbour 
one’s feelings. The very intervention into one’s way of thinking is mostly considered 
transformative; it will eventually eradicate ‘non-constructive’ behaviour and promote 
behaviour envisioned as more functional, and the intervention can comprise just 
about anything that the individual feels is beneficial. The simple trick seems to be 
to find something that delimits emotions and formats the subject: You need to ‘buy 
into’ something – a technique, a service, a guide. In his study of Swedish nanny 
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shows110 Magnus Dahlstedt (2010: 48) suggests that the linchpin of these types of 
self-technologically geared intervention is the conviction that every individual has 
the potential for ‘functional’ behaviour but that this potential needs to be mould-
ed by someone or something. Dahlstedt interprets the therapeutic nanny initiative 
as creating a calculating subject capable of performing choices based on presumed 
consequences in the future. The viewpoints of behaviour modification notable in 
the nanny shows have a hint of ‘laboratory’: The individual is an entity on which to 
experiment and one can add certain types of behaviour or subtract other types. In 
community conversations about stress, this laboratory conception of the psyche is 
regularly manifested and there are few restrictions when it comes to possible tech-
niques. In the following postings behaviour modification, meditation and mental 
training are described as possible ways of coping with demanding situations.
9:14 There are stress management coaches who are super good. You can learn 
to master any situation with a smile. Ask Nelson Mandela for instance. 
(TPP 2010)
9:15 I would say in the morning. To start the day by having a moment to 
yourself does the trick. It is no coincidence that most religions practice morn-
ing prayer.  Shut out everything else and start the day focused, relaxed and 
ready. Easier to handle everything that comes at you. 
(VEF 2010) 
9:16 Now there are guides to correct deep breathing with guidance through 
every step and also answers to thoughts, speculations and questions that may 
arise. Deep breathing rinses through you on the inside and massages your 
organs from inside the body whilst cleaning everything that it encounters. 
(VEF 2010)
As we can see in the postings above, many types of healing technique are allowed. 
Posting 9:15 argues that giving oneself a piece of focused relaxation in the morning 
makes it easier to handle everything that comes at you and in posting 9:16 we are 
told that deep breathing cleanses everything that it encounters. That demanded of the 
110 The nanny shows are televised interventions into ‘problematic families’ where the child/chil-
dren and the parents are taught new ways to relate to each other by different types of behav-
ioural expert (in the shows called ‘nannies’). The nannies stay with the families for a week and 
observe behaviour as well as hand out instructions and manuals for how the family can improve 
its conduct. One month after having left the family the nanny returns to check the results. 
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subject is seemingly very little; choosing a technique or guide and then finding the 
time to relax. According to the logic of the therapeutic laboratory – accentuated in 
posting 9:14 – everyone has the opportunity to succeed and to feel good. If Nelson 
Mandela managed imprisonment with a smile, why should we not smile? Hence, 
the therapeutic regime in this particular context manifests itself as egalitarian and 
pragmatic – it is a mix-and-match strategy and you can select whatever suits you 
best. In this sense the logic of the therapeutic laboratory can be understood as a 
market-based cultural repertoire (Illouz, 2007: 5). If one technique fails you simply 
stroll a little further into the marketplace to find another, more appropriate one. 
Paradoxically this means that whilst taking an interest in one’s interior domains, 
one is simultaneously estranged from oneself. The market-based repertoire enables 
an alienated interest in a self that is treated much the same as a broken car engine 
and the repertoire putatively achieves a loss of a particular dimension of life – the 
dimension where we experience unresolved agony, suffering and pain. Moreover, the 
simplicity of the techniques and the promise of alleviation of the burdens make the 
subject who avoids relaxation or amendment into an enigma – why not invest a little 
time when the effort is so small? The subjects who exhibit non-compliance with the 
urge to work on the self and do not enter the laboratory of the psyche are, however, 
not left out in community accounts – they regularly become the topic of concern. 
The consequence of not taking the benevolent advice to protect oneself is a subject 
torn apart, as the next posting suggests.
9:17 Self-control is important in life for accomplishing goals and handling 
pressure, meaning that you should calculate how to cope with things that are 
difficult and rough. 
People who cannot channel their emotions are torn apart and unbalanced. 
(TPP 2011)
The frail subjects in the posting above may be interpreted as the outcome of non-com-
pliance with a healthy therapeutic regime: They have refrained from ‘channelling’ 
emotions. Once again, the advice is to make the calculations in advance, before the 
trouble starts, so that one can meet the problems properly prepared. Non-compli-
ance consequently comes with the risk of an unfortunate punishment – the psyche 
ceases to cooperate. Hence, the accounts of stress are designed in a form of askesis, 
aimed at enhancing self-control; not by refusing the world but by preparing the 
self for it. What we see is a contemporary take on the Stoic fashion of memorising 
codes of conduct with the goal of a subjectivation of the truth of how to live wisely. 
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When one enters the community the cost calculations have seemingly already been 
done, resulting in a subject who manifests a kind of inner awakening (Illouz, 2003: 
42). She is fully aware of herself and ready for anything. Although the influence of 
psychoanalysis may have affected the expressions in the postings, the seclusion inside 
the soul has a totally different goal in the community conversations – it seems to be 
useful to fit into production. To do that you need to like and be committed to your 
job (posting 9:11) and not choose stress (9:1). There seems to be something about 
work that induces these types of self-reliant account. They relate to the conditions of 
work and they can even be comprehended as an answer to the conditions at work. 
In that sense, ideologies do not descend from above but rise from material premises. 
In The German Ideology (1845/1988) we see that ideologies should not be treated as 
independent entities:
They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material 
production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their actual 
world, also their thinking and the products of their thinking. It is not con-
sciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness (ibid.: 
42).
In summary, the causal ontology in conversations about stress contains two main 
reasons for why this type of unfitness occurs. Either you have not chosen how to 
deal with external factors, or you exhibit a lack of control of yourself. Narrations are 
structured by comparison, which enables judgments about both the severity of the 
sensation and the level of responsibility for experiencing it. When debating the pre-
ferred techniques of betterment, they are not delineated as complicated in any sense 
of the word. One may perform cost calculations to estimate the cost of a particular 
investment at work or one may chose a coping strategy (such as hiring a coach, or 
trying deep breathing). Both techniques are considered to enable a calibration of the 
mindset which ultimately produces subjects who have the stamina for one thing in 
particular; they are able to work. The call for a proper care of the self therefore in part 
serves a master other than the subject – the labour market. 
Doubted techniques 
As the reader notes, discipline is crucial in the quest to obtain control of the self. In 
fact, if the chosen self-improvement techniques exhibits no form of self-discipline it 
will be doubted in the communities, or its long-term advantage will be questioned. 
The discourse of improvement that can be delineated as quite generous and that 
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permits several laboratory techniques does produce one limit that should not be 
infringed – that of wanting to improve in a way that does not include any type of 
work and does not require discipline. There is a particular genre of improvement to 
abide by, organised by the interpretative repertoire Don’t take the easy way out. The 
rest of the chapter is devoted to this repertoire. To illustrate the evaluations of the 
techniques of improvement I have chosen two themes that manifest the repertoire 
quite vividly; cases of obesity and cases of ADHD. We will start by looking into the 
way that the communities talk of techniques to overcome obesity.
Don’t take the easy way out. On obesity
Being overweight is generally not seen as reprehensible in the parental communities. 
In fact, the particular sensation of feeling unfit due to being overweight is relatively 
little problematised. Several nicks declare that they struggle with their weight and 
in the themes of training and exercise the conversations continue with little inter-
ruption. As long as a nick states that she is combating her overweight there are no 
disturbances. In these conversations about weight problems the repertoire Don’t take 
the easy way out can be employed to give advice, hand out reproaches, praise a work 
well performed, tell a success story or assign faulty character traits to a subject. But 
the repertoire never emerges as clearly as in the community annoyance about peo-
ple solving a problem through no effort of their own. The two postings below are 
examples of this and both address the topic of gastric bypass. Posting 9:18 argues 
that because the overweight person needs to lose weight before becoming eligible 
for surgery – and really does lose some – this is proof that the surgery is unnecessary. 
9:18 But as I wrote, to undergo surgery the doctor normally wants you to first 
lose some of the weight yourself. Why do you do that to become eligible for 
the surgery? Why are they given an easy way out instead of fighting for it? 
(VEF 2012)
Posting 9:19 revolves around the same topic and suggests that it is too easy to lose 
weight through surgery.
9:19 Sure as hell it’s easy to lose weight when somebody literally puts a pad-
lock around your stomach. I’ve lost 36 kilos under my own steam, laid the 
foundations for a new diet, started exercising and struggled like hell. I have 
fought for it, they have cruised the healthcare system. A gastric bypass feels 
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like ‘the easy way out’ 
(VEF 2014)
The main problem narrated in the postings above appears to be that there is no ac-
tivity of one’s own invested into the project of becoming fit. This would point to the 
community predilection for a kind of non-elaborated capitalist logic: The investing 
subject should be allowed to harvest, whilst the subject who is a poor investor should 
not be able to reap the same rewards. In other words, the idea of the ideal way of 
losing weight is organised by the interpretative repertoire You should reap what you 
sow, which we saw demonstrated in Chapter Eight. This repertoire is the normative 
appeal of how to act and enables the frustration about people who are conceived of 
as avoiding sowing but wanting to reap immediately. If people do not respect that 
we need to sow before we reap the trophy both of the proclaimed weight-loss and 
the very personal experience behind it putatively loses value. All of a sudden there is 
a way out of the whole struggle of disciplining oneself and all one needs to do is to 
pay to receive results. The repertoire Don’t take the easy way out becomes a normative 
prohibition to ensure that the appeal for discipline is observed.
Consequently, in community narration the best way to become slim is to go on a 
diet because that technique obliges the subject to invest hard work into the project, 
and the second best is opting for a gastric bypass. The communities tolerate the latter 
as a technique for losing weight, but only if dieting has been carried out first. But the 
absolute worst option is to choose to do nothing and to blame one’s appearance on 
factors that the subject cannot control, such as genes or some type of disorder. The 
posting below is formulated as an angry remark about this alleged tendency.
9:20 Obesity is always due to laziness and the wrong food. There is no magic 
disease that would make you and your entire family enormously fat in spite 
of you eating nothing but salad – that’s it. Assume personal responsibility. 
Grow up. 
(VEF 2012) 
Posting 9:20 enables a dichotomy between irresponsible acts (explaining obesity as 
a magic disease) and responsible acts as an adult (assuming responsibility and not 
making excuses). Besides descriptions of the fat person as immature, she is in 9:20 
sketched as non-active. In other words, the appeal for activity encapsulated in the 
repertoire Don’t take the easy way out is directed towards a particular subject; she who 
assumes no personal responsibility for enhancement and does not aim for self-dis-
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cipline but resorts to either technical solutions such as gastric bypass, or blames 
external factors. 
As the reader notes, the morality of improvement is not something that would 
affect each and every nick who writes about being overweight. It targets a particular 
rejected subject and is a discursive structure that organises solutions into approved 
and non-approved categories. According to this pattern, the ideal formulations when 
writing about being overweight must look like posting 9:21 below. However, this 
particular posting does not articulate the normative appeal perfectly and is repri-
manded in the subsequent posting 9:22. Although the nick inserting 9:21 states that 
she has lost some weight, it appears that her resolution is interpreted as not strong 
enough.
9:21 I registered at WW111 last Thursday but only started calculating according 
to the programme last Sunday. My weight at home on Friday last week was 
80.6, my weight today was 79.2. So minus 1.4 this first week (which is not one 
full WW-week).
Now I need to control myself during the weekend. I will not stay off sweets 
altogether and I’m not sure I’ll stick to the point frame totally tomorrow but 
I’m not going to indulge in any major excesses. 
N1 (TPP 2015) Threadstart
9:22 Well done! But why not stick to the point frame? Shouldn’t that be the 
ambition? Now it seems like you are allowing yourself not to stick to the 
frame. 
N2 (Answers posting above)
The mild criticism in posting 9:22 indicates that losing weight is associated with 
perseverance. Although 9:22 praises the achievement of losing 1. 4 kilos in one week, 
it expresses a concern that the subject will still go astray – 9:22 appears to warn the 
nick in 9:21 of the risks of becoming too carefree. On the other side of being carefree 
resides, perhaps, the risk of opting out of the game of bodily discipline, and buying 
onself out of perseverance. 
So, why is a tool such as the Weight Watcher point frame accepted with no com-
plaints or doubts? Why is it not viewed as yet another seductive and obfuscating 
111 Weight Watchers.
221
technique? The point frame, which is bought when choosing the Weight Watcher 
model, is a tool that operates on the subject from the outside and can be viewed as 
part of a calibration: What parts of the subject can be managed by the subject her-
self, and what parts must be handed over to an external agent? The craving for food 
or sweets is exteriorised to the point frame, which will take care of and regulate it. 
This means that part of the craving (the very desire of the subject) is handed over 
to another type of regime; oblivious to the feelings of the subject.  Self-control is 
commodified in the Weight Watcher model. The reason, I think, for why the point 
frame is embraced is because it still makes dieting difficult and fosters discipline. 
Dieting, according to this logic, must be a struggle. That which is engendered in 
this struggle is not only discipline, but also subordination. The very sign of accepted 
desire in posting 9:21 – visible in the account that the subject will still enjoy a few 
sweets – is as a consequence problematic. It is a sign of faltering discipline and that 
the investment may fall by the wayside. The logic derived seems to stipulate that one 
is allowed to buy into a tool or an external agent and that this act of consumption 
should simultaneously mean giving up part of one’s agency. External agents are ac-
cepted, if they still facilitate perseverance and adherence to the doctrine of discipline. 
The desired emotional capital is thus also related to manifestations of struggle – to 
narrate a little suffering becomes a way to distinction.
What does ‘easy’ mean? On ADHD
The approved techniques of betterment may appear fairly easy – stick to the reper-
toire of Don’t take the easy way out and you have adhered to the call from discourse. 
Even so, there are cases – particular unfit subjects – that obstruct the readings of 
the repertoire’s imperative, or blur the distinction between the subject conceived of 
as responsibly addressing the problem and the one described as simply avoiding it. 
One such unfit subject is the one diagnosed with the neuropsychiatric syndrome of 
ADHD. Concluding the chapter we will look at the difficulties that arise when the 
repertoire guides two very different viewpoints on this diagnosis. The matter at stake 
seems to be how ‘easy’ in the call from the repertoire should be interpreted.  The 
main conflict revolves around which side has taken the easy way out – the proponents 
of the diagnosis or the opponents. 
Below are two postings on the theme of how the diagnosis is used to avoid facing 
what ‘really’ might be going on inside, i.e., taking the easy way out. 
9:23 /…/ But I also see some risks in it. I know of several people that got the 
diagnosis ADHD and then blame it for all sorts of things. That they cannot get 
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a job, cannot get a relationship to work out, cannot keep friends etc. And sure, 
for someone with ADHD it can obviously be problematic in these areas. But 
nothing becomes any easier just because you fail to assume your own respon-
sibility and blame your diagnosis! ‘I can’t help it, because I’ve got ADHD!’ 
(TPP 2012)
9:24 I also believe that a diagnosis can be (and don’t get me wrong now) ‘an 
easy way’ of finding the cause when a child does not behave like one wished 
it to. I think there can often be other causes behind the problem – for instance 
stress (concerning home or school situation?...it’s probably easy as a parent for 
instance to want to close one’s eyes to the fact that one’s own behaviour has 
affected the child in a negative way..) or depression or that the child signals 
that he or she isn’t feeling well and this feeling may be evoked because of 
something very concrete. By giving the child a diagnosis the path to finding 
the ‘real’ problem is in a way closed – one accepts the diagnosis, and thinks 
it’s because of it the child acts like he or she does. 
(TPP 2012)
The risk associated with taking the easy way out is displayed in several ways in the 
two postings. Posting 9:23 talks of the risk of taking the easy way out and blaming 
ADHD for everything that has gone wrong in the life of the afflicted, i.e., ignoring 
the possibility to examine one’s psyche. In posting 9:24 the theme is spelled out - 
ADHD can be used as an easy way of finding the problem in a child who does not be-
have in the way one wishes. The diagnosis is described as covering other problematic 
contexts and as an obstacle on the road to finding the problem. The usage of the rep-
ertoire in 9:23 constructs the diagnosis as a questionable resolution to the difficulties 
of the subject:  But nothing becomes any easier just because you fail to assume your 
own responsibility and blame your diagnosis!  Here the repertoire works to reduce the 
impact and the reliability of the difficulties associated with ADHD. If the problems 
of getting a job and keeping friends were actually due to the diagnosis itself (if the 
diagnosis was entirely ‘real’), it would presumably be difficult to assume responsibil-
ity, much like a person with dementia would find it difficult to responsively address 
issues of forgetfulness. In arguing that a person diagnosed with ADHD ought to as-
sume at least some responsibilities for what she is doing, two things occur. First of all, 
the diagnosis is viewed as less disruptive (despite the diagnosis it is possible to shape 
up). Secondly, if it is possible to shape up (i.e., not take the easy way out) it would 
prove that the diagnosis is not entirely real – there are ways of making it non-dis-
ruptive. Posting 9:24 performs another division. To diagnose a child is delineated as 
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an easy way, whilst to understand the symptoms as being due to stress, problematic 
parental behavior or depression is defined a less easy – and by implication a more 
trustworthy – way of finding the problem. 
The next two postings are examples of the opposite side, suggesting that diagnos-
ing the child is in fact a matter of facing up to a responsibility and not an easy way 
out. As will be noted, in these postings that defend the diagnosis the term ‘easy’ is 
applied to illustrate a different viewpoint altogether.
9:25 I don’t know how assessments of ADHD differ from assessments of au-
tism but I don’t know of any parents that take their children’s assessments 
and diagnoses lightly. And, let us not forget, a diagnosis does not solve the 
problem. The child is just as demanding before as after a diagnosis. Adjust-
ments that need to be made do not come for free. Help from the school defi-
nitely does not come for free. The fact is that it would be easier to ignore the 
assessment and just leave the problem to the school. But you don’t do that 
because you see that your child is suffering. 
(TPP 2012)
9:26 ‘ I think that society has created this need for diagnoses. In the right environ-
ments with the right type of treatment the difficulties aren’t even noted’ Bella writes 
further up [in the thread] and the following posting starts off from that state-
ment /…/.
It’s true that societal demands affect the notion of what a disability is but 
I strongly disagree with the view that because of that it is not a handicap/
disability. In the society we live in now, for instance, dyslexia is disabling 
regardless of the fact that dyslexics did just fine in the Stone Age. I don’t see 
the point in not diagnosing and thereby making it easier to find tools and/
or medicine that ease life for the afflicted. Sure, you should absolutely reflect 
upon how society is designed and has developed but not draw the conclusion 
that some people should have tougher conditions just because you have a 
romanticised image of how everyone should be allowed to be themselves and 
be accepted as they are. /…/ Having trouble concentrating, a bad working 
memory, sleep deprivation and attention deficits is not a personality but a 
difficulty.
No one would dream of telling a person with no legs to refrain from using a 
wheel chair because she is so charming when she slouches on the ground and 
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because it is important that we are allowed to be different. 
(TPP 2012)  
The two postings above apply the term ‘easy’ in different manners. We can already 
observe how problematic it is to be associated with doing things the easy way at the 
start of posting 9:25, which firmly states that the nick does not know of any parents 
who take assessment or diagnosis lightly. The posting continues by claiming that the 
diagnosis itself does not facilitate life and that the problems remain. Because of the 
assurance that the problems continue the reader is led away from the assumption 
that opting for the diagnosis has made things easier. In fact, the posting states, to not 
carry through with a medical investigation would have been the easy way out. This 
statement is a reversal of the idea of irresponsibility as delineated in postings 9:23 
and 9:24. The easy way out is now depicted as pushing the problem aside or towards 
the school: The easy way is avoiding diagnosis. 
The last posting (9:26) is a response to an earlier posting in the thread, which 
was written in a rather social constructivist note on society creating the need for 
diagnosis. (This argument is quoted at the beginning of the posting). The idea that 
society needs to accept all types of personalities and character traits is here overruled 
as romanticism. The posting instead advocates that aiding a person with ADHD 
would contribute to them actually being able to be themselves. In a rhetoric move 
of out-thereness the nick states that ADHD is to be understood not as a personality 
but as a difficulty. A separation of elements is performed, where personalities are said 
to not include difficulties. In this part of the posting making life easier is actually 
defended by means of comparison. The image called forth is vivid – nobody would 
dream of forcing an individual without legs to get by without a wheel chair as some 
sort of celebration of disparity. By this comparison the reader is invited to see the 
situation in a category entitlement light – what is endowed to the physically disabled 
person (rights and privileges and a safe ontological belonging to the category of dis-
abled) should alsobe granted to a person with a neuro-psychiatric diagnosis. This is 
an inversion of the idea of guilt by association; perhaps one might label it a right by 
association. In this context, enhancing life is not the same as taking the easy way out. 
Ambiguities of the repertoire and achieving emotional capital
When comparing 9:23 and 9:24 with 9:25 and 9:26 there appears to be a behaviour 
management perspective residing in the first pair of postings and a disability perspec-
tive in the second two.  Disciplining the ADHD body and soul, as well as prescribing 
remedies and strategies, differs in the two perspectives. In the first you are your own 
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handyman who processes the material of your subjectivity (the subject faces up to 
responsibility), and in the second you are the material itself, processed by someone or 
something else, such as expert or medication. We could perhaps talk of a do-it-your-
self discourse versus a medical discourse, or an instrumental discourse. In any case 
the ADHD subjects are to be changed into displaying a more functional subjectivity.
Consequently, a repertoire such as Don’t take the easy way out is much like an 
empty can awaiting its content. It does not regulate the postings down to their in-
junctions. In both perspectives applying the repertoire implies that there is some-
thing easy (and consequently of less value) to avoid and something more difficult to 
try to obtain. In one and the same thread it is more valuable to diagnose the child, 
and not to diagnose it, and ‘easy’ receives opposite meanings. This, in turn, makes it 
difficult to define what kind of accounts generate emotional capital. Simply solving 
the problem of poor concentration capabilities and forgetfulness does not seem to 
be enough. These difficulties need to be solved within an approved setting and the 
debate presented above apparently cannot agree on what that setting is. Arguably, 
the interpretative repertoire thus fails in two respects. Firstly, it cannot ensure its user 
emotional capital as it contains two diverging personal experiences (i.e., fails to expel 
one of them) and, secondly, it cannot function as a disciplining tool simply because 
the matrix for approved betterment varies: You can try to assume responsibility for 
yourself (which may be read as exercising self-discipline) but you can also accept a 
diagnosis and medication (which would signal that self-discipline is impossible).
It may be that the phenomenon of ADHD is a discursive object exhibiting fea-
tures other than those discovered when looking into the accounts of stress and obe-
sity. On the one hand, the ADHD subject seemingly does not perform any cost 
calculations, does not plan in advance and entering the laboratory of the psyche does 
not help because the psyche allegedly works in a different fashion than in the case 
of the perceived ‘regular’ subject. On the other hand, this subject cannot opt for the 
disciplining ‘dieting model’ of amendment available in the debates about obesity, 
as the very definition of the syndrome includes a lack of self-discipline as one of its 
main criteria. One of the reasons for why defining ADHD has become a discursive 
trophy in the communities could be the fact that the two opposing sides try to define 
what having or displaying emotional capital should consist of, and the struggle is far 
from resolved.
Summary
This chapter has probed into the community outlooks upon the less active, less up-
right and less ‘constructive’ individual – the unfit subject.  I have exemplified com-
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munity opinion through three themes of unfitness: stress, obesity and the diagnosis 
of ADHD, with the aim of determining what causal ontology of unfitness the com-
munities assume and how possible techniques to combat it are narrated.
Generally there is a tendency to see negative feelings, such as the experience of 
stress, as, to some extent, chosen. They are not actively but passively chosen through 
sins of non-compliance, i.e., by avoiding doing the right thing or not choosing a 
technique for betterment. The main causes of stress can be delineated as a lack of 
control, which is thought of as the result of refusing to make a choice about strategy. 
Stress also tends to be positioned at two opposite poles of a continuum, where on 
one pole it is described as imagined, a kind of phantom of the brain, and on the 
other as biologically situated, when dangerous levels of cortisol or adrenaline destroy 
the mind. To reduce these biochemically induced dangers there is always the option 
of choosing a coping strategy. This leaves the parental communities with two basic 
remedies for the unfitness of stress: The first is cost calculations made in advance 
and the second is coping strategies carried out afterwards, when the damage is done. 
Community advice is pragmatic and functional: Everyone is free to experiment, try 
different solutions and explore a variety of techniques to change one’s mindset. But 
this, again, means that the subject who does not invest in the laboratory of the soul 
is at risk of being comprehended as a non-complier with the therapeutic regime. In 
turn, this implies that emotional capital can scarcely be generated for the subject who 
does not want to experiment but simply wishes for the world around her to change.
Instead, the discourse of unfitness launches a particular subject ideal of striving 
and hard work. It can be summarised in the interpretative repertoire You should reap 
what you sow. This chapter has, however, stayed with the repertoire Don’t take the easy 
way out; a repertoire that I understand as being the result of the appeal not to reap 
before sowing, and the latter repertoire is applied as a normative prohibition when 
the subject is at risk of becoming a bad investor in herself. In the narrations about 
obesity Don’t take the easy way out emerges as contempt towards people who blame 
their weight on factors outside their own behaviour, or concern that a gastric bypass 
spoils people by enabling them to expect that an external technique will modify 
them. In that way, the gastric bypass becomes a symbol of passiveness and irrespon-
sibility, represented as a potential seducer of a subject who instead should have been 
disciplined into the right kind of body. It is, however, vital to point out that it is not 
the fact that gastric bypass is a technique that can be bought for money that causes 
the concern but instead the presumption that gastric bypass surgery does all the work 
and the subject none. The point frame in the Weight Watcher regime is approved 
because of precisely that – it keeps the subject alert, disciplined and hard working.
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Nevertheless, the ideal of discipline still cannot unite the communities and the very 
content of ‘improvement’ or ‘betterment’ is still pending; a feature that particularly 
stands out when it comes to community debates about ADHD. Herein the moral 
imperative of improvement is both visible and dispersed. It is visible through the uses 
of the interpretative repertoire of Don’t take the easy way out, where the proponents 
of opposite positions both employ it, but dispersed in the sense that one and the 
same repertoire seemingly fails to organise opinion. The particular subject of ADHD 
becomes the object of a struggle to gain access to and define emotional capital. In 
that sense, ADHD is a floating signifier (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 2000: 50) 
waiting to be conquered.
The Homo Eligens and the economy of morality
Once again choice appears on the discursive agenda – as an offering to the subject, 
as a promise of a better future and as a tool for improvement. You choose self-tech-
nology, you choose a coping strategy and preferably a positive attitude, you choose 
between dieting and exercising on the one hand or the easy way of the gastric by-
pass on the other, and you choose whether or not to have yourself or your child 
diagnosed and then explain behaviour in accordance with the diagnosis. Everything 
seems impregnated with choice and the conversations are saturated with the many 
possible ways to go. Choice seems to interpellate the subject – it is a person-maker. 
Correspondingly, the subject who does not choose is made into a different kind of 
person. If this reasoning has any bearing, what kind of person does choice produce? 
I would like to suggest it is the Homo Eligens – made by choice, developing through 
choice and known to us through choice. We have to choose, there is apparently no 
way around it. Discursive exclusion in the communities is, thus, obtained through a 
ranking of choices. By assigning certain choices more responsibility and other choices 
less, we know how to evaluate them. This is obviously why the interpretative reper-
toire of Don’t take the easy way out is of such relevance in heated debates, such as the 
one of the particular unfit ADHD subject: Because beneath the textual exchanges 
a ranking is taking place. The activity of debating cases of stress, obesity or ADHD 
seems to be about getting the ranking right; determining what choice would be the 
best tool of distinction. It becomes a hall of mirrors, where it is not the amendment 
itself that is interesting but the way solving it looks from the outside. 
As a suggestion, the ranking does have a particular contour. We know by now 
that the communities do not see weakness as a problem as long as it is combatted. 
There is, however, one thoroughgoing preference that organise the perceptions of 
unfitness. To resort to help that is not designed to operate on the soul (such as cost 
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calculations in advance or stress management coaches) but skips responsible invest-
ments and simply fixes the problem (such as the gastric bypass presumably would) is 
comprehended as passive. Surgery as a solution for obesity and medication as a rem-
edy for ADHD implicate a violation against the norm of working with oneself. All 
of a sudden, responsibilisation is outrivaled. What is left is another type of self-gov-
erned activity in the service of the self: Autonomous consumption. What makes 
consumption dangerous in these cases is that it enables a subject who is disinterested 
in herself – a less alert, less keen subject who demands solutions to problems she 
does not acknowledge as her own. In other words, consumption potentially opens 
up for the unmonitored, undisciplined subject. The ideal subject who materialises 
in the accounts about unfitness is apparently threatened by the wrong type of con-
sumption. It seems as if self-denial to a certain extent still holds a prominent place as 
a guiding beacon and Lears’ (1983) suggestion of its disappearance is thus possibly 
a too comprehensive conclusion. It is not as simple as the instalment of a new ideal; 
that everyone wants to improve through acts of consumption, because it seems to be 
insufficient to simply consume – it is important to improve through the right type of 
consumption. Consumption may have become a sign of the morality embraced by 
the subject. This is why the demonstration of emotional capital is, I think, still about 
money; although not in the sense of having lots of it. Displaying emotional capital 
instead equals displaying that the money spent was invested in the right type of tools 
and techniques. In the communities these tools and techniques should, ideally, ad-
dress personal conduct rather than the conduct of genes, brains, or employers. 
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10. I can do it!
As we have noted, the nick writing in the communities often presents herself in re-
lation to the subject ideal of the Homo Eligens. She chooses who to be, how to act 
and respond to life events in an arena that latches on to choice as the prime mover of 
change and achievement. If wanting to perform these types of distinction one impor-
tant identity claim is to appear to be a Homo Eligens – the subject who chooses re-
sponsibly. Another identity claim made by a vast majority of the nicks is the claim to 
be a woman. Hence, apart from choice and responsibility, putatively the position of 
woman also shapes the discourse. Accordingly, this chapter will scrutinise subject po-
sitions assigned particularly to women as distilled through the preferences for choice 
and responsibility. If it is that which takes place inside the family that really matters 
for the constitution of society, as we saw in Chapter Seven and Eight, how is the 
woman positioned when situated inside of the family? To what types of choices does 
she need to relate, and what routes to responsibility lies open to her? In other words I 
want to probe into what is discursively required of the woman? I consider representa-
tions of choice and responsibility a mise-en-scène of the same type as described by 
Louis Althusser (2000/2008: 34) when he suggests what ideology does: It appoints 
subjects and makes us expect particular things from them. In sum, this means that 
the chapter will scrutinise the way a female subject is generally interpellated when 
articulated inside a heterosexual matrix (the nuclear family) that makes her less of a 
universal and more of a particular subject – who relates to a masculine counterpart. 
Because of the community preference for choice and responsibility, the themes I 
will probe are equality, and dependency versus independency. The themes are chosen 
to demonstrate the way equality and dependency function in both the social and the 
sexual contract. Both contracts involve dependency: In the social contract the subject 
accepts the rules of a society in order to gain security, meaning that the subject is 
dependent on society actually delivering security, and in the sexual contract the sub-
ject accepts the rules of sexual restrictions in marriage or partnership to be granted 
emotional and financial security. Both the social and the sexual contract share the 
presumption that we enter into it free of choice (Pateman, 1988:2). The contracts 
share yet another similarity: How they fail to consider that dependency is not evenly 
spread, as one party is usually less dependent, or has more to gain from making the 
other party dependent (Kittay, 1999). The question is how these different levels of 
dependency are described, and how they are understood when organised through the 
already established demand to choose responsibly.
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Difference and dependence: On lipstick feminism
In Chapter Seven we saw how the notions of the world, the one you can make a deal 
with through effort and investment, are enlaced with perceptions about the intimate. 
Nonetheless and perhaps surprisingly, the preferred image in the communities is not 
that caring for others (that which Kittay labels dependency work) would cause the 
subject any problems but the opposite – it is being dependent that is the problem. 
Dependency will, as the reader will note, appear in several of the threads and post-
ings in this chapter and can be embraced either as an innate essence of heterosexual 
relations, or as a defect that makes the same relation unsound. When dealing with 
the problematic sides of dependency gender equality in particular is understood as 
the perfect remedy. Gender equality is the basic chord of a home gown community 
feminism that supports independence, education and a voice for women alongside 
a celebration of feminine esthetics. It is a diluted and non-articulate version of third 
wave feminism (Scanlon, 2009) that is sometimes labelled lipstick feminism.112 For 
the unproblematic version of dependency that is necessary for this type of feminism 
to function, the stipulation is that men and women are different and therefore need 
each other. In the communities, this ‘sound’ type of dependency is discursively tan-
gled up with conceptions of a problematic side of dependency. Before we enter into 
conversations about subjects who have devolved into dangerous dependency, we will 
acquaint ourselves with the type of dependency that is considered normal. 
As community feminism demarcates itself by a celebration of opposites, depend-
ency can be let into the discourse. The right type of dependency is often celebrated 
as a case of diversity and the narrative trick for dependency to come across as normal, 
unproblematic and even sound is to insert difference into the narration. The posting 
below explains how men and women are different but have the same value.
10:1 One may believe that the woman should be equal to the man without 
signing up for all the fiddle-faddle today’s feminists are yelling about.
112 The third wave feminism, also referred to as lipstick feminism, is a movement intending to em-
brace traditional concepts of femininity, including the sexual power of women and traditional 
feminine aesthetic markers such as high heels and lipstick, alongside feminist ideas. Lipstick fem-
inism is a response to negative stereotypes, such as ‘the ugly feminist’, and it is an attempt to win 
back particular dimensions of femininity that have been comprehended as disempowering, for 
instance wearing make-up. Third wave feminism is also a response to second wave feminism’s 
more androgynous conception of gender and its advice to women to downplay femininity in 
order to access power (Scanlon, 2009: 129, 132 f.). However, I would like to point to the difference 
between lipstick feminism and the aesthetically and politically more pronounced statement of 
femme.  Regardless of the fact that lipstick feminism shares much of the pronounced feminine 
aesthetics, albeit more accentuated within the domains of femme, the two should not be equated.
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I believe that men and women are different but have the same value. Because 
we are that different one cannot manage without the other – neither within 
the family, nor in society. That women are specifically WOMEN and not weak 
versions of men is their surest guarantee of acquiring value in the eyes of the 
men…
This is what the brute feminists of today can’t understand: they think we have 
to even out all the differences between the sexes and raise the children to be 
androgynous robots in order for us to become equal. 
(TPP 2009)
If men and women are different, as assured in the posting, dependency does not have 
to be bad. The differences even make men and women need each other; differences 
are represented as the glue between the sexes. The type of dependency described in 
10:1 is comprehended as elementary. This dependency is not equated with subor-
dination but rather depicted as something inherent in heterosexual relations and 
therefore uncomplicated. The posting even contains a word of warning; if wanting to 
eliminate the differences, as some feminists are presumed to want, we may turn into 
de-humanised objects. When dependency is narrated in this fashion there is nothing 
much to discuss. It is only when dependency becomes situated close to exploitation 
that other concepts such as equality, responsibility and choice are put in. In fact, the 
feminism of the web communities does not deny that there are unjust differences 
between the sexes, such as differences on the labour market. These differences, how-
ever, can be undone through choice. The following posting is a comment on the 
unfair distribution of salaries between a traditionally male trade such as carpenter 
and the traditional female occupation of assistant nurse. A nick complains that the 
monthly payment differs despite the fact that the same amount of time was invested 
in education. The posting below inserts the concept of responsibility to counter the 
complaint.
10:2 Of course you as an individual have the utmost responsibility for how 
your life has become. Or do you consider it someone else’s fault if you did 
not choose the right type of education or if you had children with the wrong 
person? 
(VEF 2013)
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The vital feature when narrating dependence and difference is to disregard exploita-
tion and unjust distribution. In the posting above there is no critique of the structure 
in which the subject has to be fitted in, but a critique against the subject who does 
not fit. The problem is not conceptualised as a distributive problem or an unbal-
anced equity – what is apprehended as unbalanced in the posting is choices that are 
not made in the correct thought-trough manner and responsibilities that are not 
assumed. The narration apparently prefers to stress individual action rather than 
structures that discriminate against the individual. Given this preference, a lack of 
equality is considered best remedied through selecting another type of job or another 
type of education that would ensure better pay. So, if this is the rule of narration, 
how does it play out when talking specifically about the heterosexual relationship, 
and its particular dependencies? 
Mars and Venus. Heterosexual dependence and difference
In community dealings with equality lipstick feminism does not turn dependency 
away from the formula of equality, as long as it can be dressed up in the glossier fea-
tures of how opposites attract. When dependency is delineated as a relation between 
a subject and a societal structure or institution (such as in the case of the subject de-
pending upon financial support) it is apprehended as wrong, as was notable in Chap-
ter Seven. When constituting the base of heterosexual attraction it can sometimes be 
viewed as a good thing, if the dependency is moderate. In this section we will close 
in on the relation between the correct version of dependence and difference. Is dif-
ference always a good thing? Wouldn’t difference also include the risk of friction and 
if so, how would that friction be handled? What is it that makes difference function 
beneficially in a relationship?
In the communities one may note several discussions about whether differences 
between the sexes are mainly biological or relate to matters of fostering and cultural 
ideals, and the opinions are highly divergent. It is quite obvious that the parental 
communities move with the times and gender is therefore allowed several meanings. 
Nevertheless, the view that there are ‘real’ differences between the sexes appears un-
threatened, despite the fact that the debates tolerate a periodic social constructivist 
understanding. In the next posting a famous book on the topic is praised. The post-
ing claims that the book Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus113 could help the 
113 Men are from Mars, women are from Venus (1993/2002) is written by the American author and coun-
selor John Gray. In the book Gray argues that relationship problems in heterosexual relationships 
depend upon fundamental psychological differences between men and women and to describe 
these differences Gray applies the image of the sexes psychologically inhabiting different planets: 
men are from Mars and woman from Venus.
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nick and her boyfriend understand each other better. In the following posting the 
book is not embraced in the same manner, but still considered useful.
10:3 I have read half of the book now and I think it’s marvellous. I have got 
a better understanding of my partner’s behaviour. Will buy it and read all of 
it and I hope my boyfriend wants to read it so that he can get a better under-
standing of my behaviour  
(VEF 2008)
10:4 /…/ Some things I recognise quite clearly and I have laughed many 
times while reading. Both laughter of recognition and because some things are 
a little bit corny.
What distinguishes women from men is that we want to ‘spell things out’, 
whilst men often bottle up and solve the problem on their own. That men of-
ten take our comments as criticism and us women feel abandoned when men 
bottle up to think. 
(VEF 2013) 
Postings 10:3 and 10:4 acknowledge that the conceived difference between the sexes 
can sometimes be a problem, because men and women fail to understand each oth-
er’s positions, alleged different dispositions and diverse experiences. One of the reso-
lutions to the problem is an acceptance of the differences instead of useless attempts 
to even them out. Hence, differences need to be merged in order for the heterosexual 
relationship to function, and this merging cannot always be free from conflict or 
tension. The potential conflicts should, however, take place in a situation where the 
difference is acknowledged and without demands for similarity. The vision appears 
to be that a complementary sharing between two very different human beings should 
take place. The beauty of this sharing is delineated in the next posting. 
10:5 yeah, isn’t that so… I want to share my life, and I say this with an em-
phasis on share* with a man who is truly that, a MAN… and I want to be the 
woman I am!
Pretty simple and relaxed if you don’t involve a whole lot of strange values 
and prejudices
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*like in sharing the responsibility for our lives becoming just as we want it to 
be (including the scrubbing of the floors)… 
(TPP 2009)
In the narrations of the healthy and natural differences between the sexes, the differ-
ences are described almost in terms of a contract. The posting above even employs 
a clause to specify the contract on a practical level and the clarification involves 
gender equality – the scrubbing of floors. The contract should be simple and re-
laxed but still include a safeguard. This safeguard is gender equality; the factor that 
makes difference positive. The discursive preference for gender equality in the shape 
of a fair division of domestic labour is a grand one, running through several of the 
parental community themes. It not only makes difference appear healthy, but seems 
to achieve even more; it comes across as one of the main ways of living a controlled, 
calculated and responsible life. The next posting to be presented is representative of 
the preferred ways of talking about equality: It simply happens, it is the obvious, 
most sensible way of structuring life and normally it should not be preceded by any 
negotiations.
10:6 At home alone with soon-to-be three month old baby. Obviously you 
help each other with all the everyday chores. We help each other as best we 
can. Some days I can’t find the time for anything else but taking care of our 
son. Other days I may find the time for the baby, washing and cleaning. Other 
days you feel like doing nothing. Just slacking and relaxing. My partner won’t 
complain. He just says I did the right thing to relax. If I did fix a lot of stuff he 
says it looks nice at home and that I did well and he asks if I want to lie down 
for a while. Time for oneself does not exist for me and my partner right now. 
That’s how it goes when you have children and there’s nothing to it but liking 
it! We try and let the other get away with friends or exercise etcetera once in 
a while. What I am trying to say is why should the responsibility go for only 
one person? If you share all the chores and encourage each other instead of 
complaining life becomes easier and more fun! 
(VEF 2012)  
The point conveyed looks straightforward and simplistic and is positioned in the 
middle of a discursive furrow of stories about being rational, hands-on and reason-
able in a relationship. The agreement to share the work load in an equal manner is 
described as if containing no conflicts and no unfairness. In 10:6 there appears to 
be a distributed dependency – the son depends upon his parents and the parents 
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depend on each other. In spite of this web of dependencies there are no rules of dis-
tribution to follow and no articulated laws by which to abide. Distribution comes 
simply through cultivating responsibility. 
In sum, in lipstick feminism’s view on gender men and women are different but 
hold the same social value. Because of the difference the sexes depend on each other 
and through that dependency the equilibrium of value is maintained. Insofar as 
difference is not only tolerated but also celebrated it holds a particular value in itself. 
Equality and its unmentionable opposites 
Nonetheless, difference can be narrated as a problematic feature of the heterosexual 
relationship. Men and women are described as not getting along – women feel ex-
hausted from doing too much household work, some of them insert postings about 
being beaten by their husbands and some lecture the less fortunate about how to 
avoid these types of failure. Consequently, there is a faulty type of difference (and 
indeed faulty dependence) that is regularly addressed in conversation and we will 
turn to matters of how it is addressed. Who is to heal a faulty dependency, by what 
means can it be healed, and what happens if the relationship, despite the efforts to 
heal it, stays the same?  
As a consequence of the notions of the ideal difference (exciting and rewarding) 
and the ideal dependence (non-harmful), stating that one lives in an unequal rela-
tionship becomes an issue of debate. Much the same as in Chapter Seven, suspected 
free riders are rebuffed. Spouses or partners who confess to doing little or nothing in 
the household are immediately dismissed, which may be noted in the posting below. 
10:7 You’re lucky to not be my partner, because I would have thrown you out 
in one split second! 
(VEF 2012)
The dismissal of freeriding spouses has its counterpart in the replies to nicks writing 
about being exploited by their partner. The recommendation to throw the partner 
out, or leave him, is a recurrent piece of advice in the threads on inequality. This 
indicates that the conflictive side of equality is not suppressed in conversation. It is 
not prohibited to talk about disparate interests, or conflicting wills – if it is done in 
the preferred manner. As an example – when talking of conflicts, they are best articu-
lated afterwards, when the experiences are harvested and made into advice. The next 
posting articulates the tension that can precede an equal division of household work 
and tells the reader how it was resolved.
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10:8 Yes, we have experience of that kind of fuss. Experienced it just like you 
???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
I was left with the responsibility for the house and the child. When the child 
was three years old I was ready for divorce. But instead we went to family 
???????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????-
ple of years. Today we have three children /…/ Very tiring, very fair  
(TPP 2007)
Alongside the notion of equality just happening without much ado as was advocated 
in posting 10:6 there is, as we can see in posting 10:8 above, also a perspective of 
conflict, negotiation and even crisis preceding an equal division of labour. That not-
withstanding, a lack of equality is not always embraced as a clear-cut case. It is often 
conceived of as something caused by the woman, as for instance in the first posting 
below where it is apprehended as the woman through her field of expertise in the area 
of household work hindering the husband from doing his share, or in the posting to 
follow, where it is narrated as best resolved if the wife left the home.
10:9 But if you are there all the time he’ll never learn. Are you perhaps in his 
way, you being at home all the time and knowing everything? He loses con-
???????? ???????? ???????????????????????? ???? ????????????????????????????
know… 
(VEF 2012)
10:10  Get domestic help? 
Start working earlier? 
Let your man take parental leave 
Do your own errands when he comes home 
(VEF 2013)
In different ways these two postings ensure that the problem of inequality remains 
with the woman. The husband is not entirely absent from the narration, but he is 
described in a fashion that is consistent in the threads about inequality – he is made 
less of an actor. The husband is described as someone deprived of his self-confidence 
or depicted as hindered by the wife’s mere presence in the home. I understand expla-
nations such as these as discursively functioning to reduce and dislocate blame. The 
blame is transported from the passive and non-knowledgeable party (the man) onto 
the active and knowledgeable one (the woman) who stands in the way. Furthermore, 
237
the active woman can actually become the explanation itself: If the woman is too ac-
tive and too able in the home the husband becomes passive, as a consequence of her 
frantic activity. By removing the active woman (as was suggested in posting 10:10), 
there is a place rescued for the husband to act. If the word of advice is to remove an 
overly active part, narration does something more, something that is axiomatic when 
gender equality is debated in the communities. As I have intimated already, it di-
rects focus away from a possibility of exploitation. A husband who lacks confidence 
can by no means have something to gain from not participating in the care of the 
child. Accordingly, the metaphor of military command in posting 10:9 highlights 
one dimension of the notion of inequality and clouds another, namely a dimension 
of the husband taking advantage of the wife. By being narratively deprived of the 
possibilities of agency he simultaneously loses the possibility of calculation or plan-
ning; and he loses the possibility of enjoying the passive position. This tendency in 
narration exposes the same patterns as discussed by Rönnblom (2011: 36) when she 
analyses Swedish official gender equality discourse – the way in which conflicts are 
downplayed and administration techniques emphasised.  
In short: that which is not equality is not given any other name or it is renamed 
into something that has little to do with one party enjoying the labour of another 
party. A deficit of equality comes across as something unmentionable and, arguably, 
the lack of definition enables the transport of blame. Diverse calls can instead be 
placed upon the woman to step up and change the situation.  To investigate this 
transport of blame we will stay on the theme of task assignments placed upon the 
woman as a possible resolution to inequality.
Tasks in the service of equality
Conversations about more permanent troubles with equality contain a couple of 
ways to understand the situation that put the woman in different subject positions. 
The general advice is focused upon a perceived responsibility to put an end to an 
unfair division of labour, or at least not to have more children with such a partner. 
These are two, out of several other, tasks assigned to the woman who lives in an un-
equal relationship. The next fraction of a thread is initiated by a nick that complains 
of motherhood being a tiresome duty of chores that never seem to end. Her story 
highlights a kind of dependency work where the those depending on the work car-
ried out have come to take her services for granted. 
10:11 sometimes it feels insanely unrewarding to be a mum. (I am a mum). 
You’re supposed to do the laundry, clean, cook, do all the shopping, make 
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sure the children are sent to school and fetched from school, feed the baby… 
to wake up before everyone else and go to bed after everyone else… Who says 
thank you… it’s so easy to take everything for granted… today I’m so tired 
and sad and feel I have the world’s most unrewarding job... 
my husband goes off on ‘errands’ for hours… goes to the hairdresser for 3 
hours (I’ve not been to the hairdresser for a year) 
whines that it’s messy here, while I hiss ‘clean it up yourself for fuck’s sake…’ 
perhaps I take on too much but WHO the fuck will do it otherwise… 
so… just had to get it off my chest… cause this week has been shit!!!!!!!!!! 
N1 (VEF 2013) Threadstart
10:12 But that really has nothing to do with the role of mother? Why did you 
have more children with a male chauvinist? 
N2 (Answers posting above)
10:13 Yes, ouch! I would never have agreed to be a slave in my own home! 
N3 (Answers posting above)
10:14 It looks as if you need to sit down and discuss the situation. You do too 
much of the collective tasks in the household if you’re feeling like this. 
You can for example make lists of what needs to be done and schedules for 
who’s doing what on which days. This presupposes that he understands the 
problem and is willing to change his behaviour. 
You also need to put free time for you on the schedule, if that’s not happening 
by itself.
If he doesn’t realise how much you do you can try to take notes for a month 
for example, of how much laundry you do, how many minutes you tidy up 
after the others, throw out the rubbish, how many times you do the dishes, 
vacuum, cook etcetera and you give him concrete information /…/ 
N4 (Answers posting 10:6)
The nick who inserted posting 10:11 is not primarily perceived as exploited, but 
is offered advice that partly blames her for her choice of spouse and partly posi-
tions her as family manager. In the advice, different positions of responsibility are 
suggested. One of them (posting 10:14) assigns the woman a managerial task of 
household planning. The posting seems to suggest that information failure is the 
cause of the problems. If only the husband knew about the amount of work required 
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in a household, he would reconsider his own efforts. The posting implies that peo-
ple are reasonable and fair, and if not one may need to collect evidence in order to 
prove one’s point. Other postings (10:12 and 10:13) insinuate that the woman has 
brought the problem on herself by agreeing to have children with a male chauvinist, 
or slave driver. In these postings there is no blame attached to the husband at all – he 
is what he is and the main issue at stake appears instead to be the woman’s lack of 
self-preservation. 
In sum: At home the woman is depicted as either a problem herself (her mere 
presence de-activates the husband) or deciphered as someone to whom the husband 
can do negative things, such as enslave her. The narratively preferred woman avoids 
places of slavery and educates her husband, and if this does not help, she temporarily 
leaves the home. There are, hence, positions of a problematic presence and positions of 
educative absence available. These solutions are, however, handed out in the case of 
a crisis and the subject positions that materialise are emergency positions and thus 
not desirable. The fact that people depend on you is, however, not made to matter.
I can do it! Responsibility instead of oppression
Still remaining is the problem of who is to blame for the unbalanced division of la-
bour. If the woman has already tried the pedagogic techniques of absence (letting the 
husband take parental leave, as posting 10:10 proposes) or calculated presence (mak-
ing lists and providing information as posting 10:14 advocates) and the situation 
does not improve, would it then be possible to put the blame on the husband? In 
what follows I will demonstrate how direct blame is, still, not quite possible because 
of the community preference for leaving the husband outside the narration. Instead, 
the discussions ventilate issues of responsibility and demand. 
The initial part of the thread to be presented is organised around these two cate-
gories that are apparently positioned in opposition to each other: The man is depict-
ed as the party who has responsibilities to share the work-load and the woman as the 
party who needs to formulate her demands. The thread is initiated by a nick who in 
a previous thread that same day, described living with a man and taking care of his 
child from a previous marriage, as well as two toddlers, but receiving no help from 
him. She described being tired from the many domestic chores carried out whilst 
simultaneously working full time outside the home. In the thread her husband was 
called a ‘giant baby’ several times and the nick was asked how she could tolerate liv-
ing with such a childlike man. The nick started yet another thread the same day, as 
she was not content with the answers she received in the first one. 
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10:15 Concerning the discussions on giant babies below. Someone wrote that 
the mother may see it as a criticism if one points out that her husband is a 
giant baby that cannot manage anything. Then several others answered that 
that’s not the case at all, it’s the man who should feel ashamed, not the wom-
an. 
But does it work that way in reality? My experience is anyhow that it is the 
woman (me) who is criticised and questioned if the husband sits in front of 
the computer all day.  
I have been criticised by friends, acquaintances, my relatives, neighbours, 
people on the net etcetera, for doing everything myself. Has anyone ever de-
livered this criticism directly to him? No. It has _never_ happened.
So then I wonder: do you really _think_ that it is the husband who should feel 
ashamed if being a giant baby. Or do you deep down believe it is the woman’s 
fault if she is forced to grind away?  
N1(TPP 2011) Threadstart
10:16 He is the one that should feel ashamed, I really do believe. But I also 
know that shame is something that is likely to end up in the stomach of the 
wrong person and on the wrong person’s cheek. 
N2 (Answers posting 10:15)
10:17 If the two of you are content nobody has to feel ashamed? Otherwise he 
ought to feel ashamed and you need to make demands. 
N3 (Answers posting 10:15)
10:18 And if you make demands and it is met only with a grumpy face and 
talk of all the ‘important’ stuff he does at the computer? Then what do you 
do?
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????   He is 
happy, though). 
N1(Answers posting above)
10:19 I don’t think the woman needs to feel ashamed at all.  Nevertheless I 
want to shake these women and make them think about whether this is the 
way they want to live. The one thing you can change is yourself, as we all 
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know. You can set limits and say ‘This is ok for me, but that is NOT ok for 
me’.
If you choose to stay although he refuses to change I do believe you have 
yourself to blame, yes. Nonetheless, there is no reason to feel ashamed. Who 
makes you feel ashamed? 
N4 (Answers posting 10:14)
10:20 I don’t know about shame – if the couple is happy with the division of 
labour others should just keep quiet. If they are not happy it’s up to the dis-
contented party to make the change and the other party to assume responsi-
bility. 
N5 (Answers posting 10:15)
10:21 So the project of ‘putting the husband in order’ is yet another task that 
the woman needs to shoulder? He has no responsibility of his own? And if he 
does not change it is the woman’s fault? Ok, if that is the opinion of people in 
general I understand a little bit better why people choose to criticise the wom-
an. 
N1 (Answers posting above)
10:22 But N5 did write that it was up to the man to assume responsibility? Not 
only that it is up to the woman to put her foot down? 
I think you’re dislocating your responsibility. No, you have no responsibility 
for what the man does or does not do. Nevertheless you have a responsibility 
to express what you feel is ok and what is not, and make sure you are not 
treated in a way that is not ok for you. It is not as if you’re forced to stay in 
this situation? 
N4 (Answers posting above)
10:23 believe me; I do point out what is ok and what is not. 
N1 (Answers posting above)
10:24 And if he does not change his ways? Then what do you do? 
N4 (Answers posting above)
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10:25 he usually changes his ways. For a short while, a day or so. Then it starts 
again. 
N1 (Answers posting above)
10:26 And you tag along, when it starts all over again, time after time?... 
You are still there? What is it that makes you stay? 
N4 (Answers posting above)
In the opening section of this thread responsibility seems to come in two different 
shapes. One type resides with the party who is understood as fleeing from it (but 
really ought to assume it) and the other dwells within the exploited party (who in-
stead ought to formulate her demands). The responsibility of the husband is depicted 
more in the way of an almost formal, discursive duty (to live according to the ideals 
of equality) and the responsibility of the wife is described as an intra-personal duty 
to look out for herself. Nonetheless, the initial posting (10:15) states that the nick 
has done her part in terms of making demands. This assertion does not seem to alter 
the content of the rest of the thread, which still focuses upon the woman making 
a change. Towards the end of this section of the thread a short conversation occurs 
between two nicks (10:22-10:26). It takes the shape of a question and answer-series, 
and the section appears to ventilate another issue, that of who is to blame for the 
situation continuing. The concluding series of short questions and answers marks a 
change of tone. It resembles the clear and rapid questions from a prosecutor to the 
prosecuted, but with a nuance of therapy involved, as in the open questions: You are 
still there? What is it that makes you stay? (posting 10:26). It appears that N4 tries to 
establish a reason for the fact that N1 remains with her husband. Possibly N4 offers 
N1 a way out of the putative blame (if there was another hidden reason for why she 
stays) or a way of instead nailing the blame to her (if she cannot report another rea-
son for remaining). Again, the conversation on who is to blame leaves the husband 
aside and concentrates on the woman. 
There might be several reasons why the issue of responsibility stays with N1, 
apart from the fact that her husband does not participate in the thread and cannot 
be addressed. Because N1 tells a story about a problem, the other nicks may read it 
as a question: what should I do? which may explain the focus upon N1 rather than 
her husband. Another reason why attention is concentrated on N1 could be that the 
communities cannot stand hopelessness. A story of a struggle in which you lose but 
still do not leave does perhaps not fit with the narrative preference of the people writ-
ing in the thread. This suggestion resonates with Donald Polkinghorne’s (1988:14) 
proposition that narratives are normally designed to give coherence to shared values. 
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Stories hold the values of our culture in two senses – by nominating positive values 
and by presenting negative models best avoided. Being obfuscated by one’s husband 
or being exploited is not a depiction of a shared ideal but rather a negative model to 
avoid. In the thread presented it is as if exploitation was selected – and could easily be 
de-selected, perhaps because it is something our culture dislike. I would contend that 
this is one of the consequences when articulating oneself in an environment strongly 
influenced by the preference for choice: Emancipation comes across as something 
the singular subject does for herself. It is a choice made in private. Instead of the sol-
idary battle cry ‘We can do it!’114, as would be a mainstream feminist appeal, we end 
up with a solitary ‘I can do it!’. In community understanding, feministic striving is 
seemingly to be carried out in the solitude of one’s home, alone with one’s husband.
This being said, there appears to be one feature of narration missing in Polking-
horne’s suggestion. Apart from narrations proposing positive and negative models 
of social action, perhaps particular narrations in addition avoid certain topics. The 
thread above debates the topics of justice, responsibility and demands but does not 
mention need. One of the reasons why a woman stays in a situation of exploitation 
could be the fact that in certain cases dependency is non-negotiable, especially when 
vulnerable people depend on the labour of the woman. A dependency relation, Kit-
tay argues (1999: 53), has a non-voluntary nature and trying to grapple with it from 
a more formal rights-based morality does not work. In the thread above the nature of 
the work that N1 is carrying out has no place in the narration. The responsibility that 
comes with children is not made to matter – neither for the nicks participating, nor 
for the thread starter. This void in narration may be explained as a general inherent 
problem in talking about housework. Marjorie DeVault (1991: 57) has pointed out 
that housework often remains invisible, because planning dinner, remembering the 
doctor’s appointment for the youngest child and adding soap to the shopping list is 
thought work to such a large extent that the nature of the work is even concealed from 
the person performing it. In that way the premises of the sexual contract is estranged 
from the very task assignments it regulates. I believe that this feature of narrative 
negotiation is vital to appreciate the position of the female subject: In order to be a 
reliable person on whom people can depend she has to be strong, non-dependent 
and perhaps oblivious to the nature of some of the labour she performs. This, I think, 
is part of the explanation for all the ambivalent responses to women who confess that 
they are living in unequal relationships – it is difficult to acknowledge the non-vol-
114 The slogan ‘We can do it’ comes from a poster that was originally designed as an American 
wartime propaganda poster, but it has later regularly been employed as promotion of diverse 
movements of feminism. 
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untary dimension of care work without ruining the preference for female strength 
and independence, and without shaking the foundation of the sexual contract. Due 
to the fact that the nature of the thought work putatively stays hidden it is obviously 
not easy to bring it into the light of conversation. So, when we try to come to terms 
with the accounts on housework we are possibly looking at an iceberg. Equality is 
made into an ideal and as such it is visible. The non-negotiable working conditions 
that come with taking care of infants and toddlers are never spoken of; they stay 
below the surface. Thus, when a nick is being counselled to leave her husband she is 
perhaps really being told to go on a strike. Only, she cannot strike, and what is more, 
she cannot articulate that there is a strike ban attached to her place of (unpaid) work. 
In that sense, abiding by the demands of lipstick feminism becomes a gag. 
The victim
The ambivalent responses towards matters of dependency and exploitation have par-
ticular consequences. One is a hesitation to articulate the more outspoken positions 
of victimhood. A phenomenon such as ‘victimhood’ activates all the tensions that 
reside in the slim ideal of ‘I can do it!’ (What if ‘I’ cannot do it? What if there are 
limits to what a mere decision or choice can achieve, and what if the decision to 
stand up for oneself is blurred by circumstances outside the subject?) Due to this 
ambivalence the remaining part of this chapter is devoted to exploring victimhood, 
and the manner in which it is made more or less credible. 
The position of victim is one of the more complicated ones in the communities. 
The label itself can at times be applied with seemingly no friction, for instance in 
conversations about honour-related violence. Girls and women who are threatened, 
abused or murdered by relatives for the sake of protecting a family reputation are 
viewed as innocent victims and no demands to make a choice or stand up for them-
selves are articulated. Offenders are relentlessly condemned and demands are direct-
ed towards institutions and governmental projects to ease the burden for women at 
risk of becoming targets of this type of violence. The same status is attached to nicks 
confessing to being physically abused by a husband or partner. But alongside the 
status of indisputable victimhood are other positions where negotiations appear to 
be unceasing. There are a couple of narrated situations that in particular reduce the 
level of sympathy: When the abuse is not physical or the when the nick comes forth 
as feeling sorry for herself. The main problem seems to be a victim who is passive in 
some way, a feature of discourse that echoes the annoyance about passivity that we 
investigated in Chapter Nine. The exemplary posting below is inserted as a response 
to a nick who writes about having a violent ex-husband. This nick declares that the 
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situation is worse because she has no job to support herself, no higher education, no 
unemployment benefits and no possibilities to move to a bigger city in search of a 
job. The ex-husband now wants to start over again and the nick writes to ventilate 
her doubts. The response is educative. 
10:27 Of course you shouldn’t move in with your ex-husband just because of 
economic reasons. And if you live in such a small community that there are 
no jobs you might want to think about moving to some place where job actu-
ally exist (that’s what many of us who grew up in small places did, we have 
moved + went through education to sort of be able to support ourselves…) 
Alternatively ‘accept whatever comes my way’  
To stay at home full time with children and allow oneself to be supported by a 
man is a lousy idea for anybody. I am a bit harsh now but the fact is you made 
your own bed and to get out of it you must take command of your own life 
and not even consider that some man can solve your problems. 
(TPP 2012)
Posting 10:27 evaluates the choices that have led to the current strained situation and 
seems to conclude that some of the blame lies with the victim. It points to the lack of 
activity that gave rise to a situation of being supported by a husband, i.e., a situation 
of dependency. Dependency is one of the key components in the ambivalence to-
wards the position of victimhood, but this does not include all types of dependency. 
I have already argued that having people depend upon you is viewed as non-prob-
lematic, whilst being dependent is considered more troublesome. Nevertheless, there 
are another feature organising the discourse – it is only on a person believed to have 
a choice that the victim label becomes less credible. If there was even a remote possi-
bility of avoiding victimhood through choice and this possibility was overlooked, we 
cannot be sure that what we see is a ‘true’ victim. A victim can come in the shape of 
an imposter: There is victimhood and there is illusory victimhood. To some extent 
the subject as she is rendered in 10:27 is to blame for her situation and because of 
this she has to deal with the problems herself; she is assigned less credibility by being 
narratively detached from choice. The fact that the verdict on the abused woman is 
related to conceptions of choice in 10:27 is visible in how the narrative elements are 
interconnected to devaluate her credibility. In the first section of the posting three 
words are connected in one sentence: ‘move’, ‘education’ and ‘support oneself ’, sig-
nifying activity on behalf of an alleged ‘us’ that assumed responsibility for the way 
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life could be planned. In the second section two words are connected: ‘stay at home’ 
and ‘be supported’, which indicate passivity. This passivity is said to have ‘made the 
bed’ in which the nick now has to lie. This particular construction of dismissal of the 
victim overlaps with the rest of the community ideals of the active, industrial and 
positive subject that were presented and discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Nine. 
In short, the abused woman may in certain cases display a ‘deficient character’ and 
when character is insufficient, victimhood is diluted, which can explain the stern 
formulations in posting 10:27: To stay at home full time with children and allow oneself 
to be supported by a man is a lousy idea for anybody, and: the fact is you made your own 
bed. The problem, as formulated in 10:27, is not only the threatening ex-husband 
but also the passivity of the woman, i.e., her character flaws. Because posting 10:27 is 
one of many postings that sees battered woman as lacking particular character traits, 
we will stay on the topic.  
Subtypes of the victim
According to community discourse character flaws can be noted in many women 
who remain with violent husbands. They may be described as dreamers or portrayed 
as if they have an exaggerated need for affirmation, they are depicted as lacking 
self-esteem and failing to assume responsibility for themselves. I have called these 
categorisations the subtypes of the victim. In what follows we will focus upon the 
ambivalent reasoning about the subtypes.
The subtypes are described as lacking one characteristic in particular: They do not 
see reality for what it is. This avoidance of crass reality is delineated in several ways. 
One recurrent way of understanding the battered woman is that she allows herself to 
be beaten.  Women in general would not accept this type of behaviour and therefore 
the woman subjected to violence needs to be explained. In the following posting she 
is delineated as someone that who lives in a fantasy world.  
10:28 I am so tired of all politicians and pundits that constantly have to 
badmouth all the evil men that beat up their women. It is not just any man 
that beat and not just any woman that accepts living in such a dysfunctional 
relationship. Why don’t we talk more often about how we can help women 
exposed to violence to get out of their relationships and stop living in a world 
of make-believe where the man all of a sudden will become nice and become 
the way she wants him to be? 
(VEF 2013)
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The contrarious posting 10:28 seems to advocate that focus needs to be moved from 
the problematic men who beat women to the problematic women who are beaten. 
The man is depicted as unduly blackened and the woman ought to receive help. The 
help would be designed to help her leave a world of dreams where she re-constructs 
the man as potentially decent. In other words, the subject who needs to be modified 
and changed is the woman receiving the beating. In all its contradictions the posting 
is typical of the transportation of agency that is recurrent in matters of victimhood. 
While it is very rare that the battered woman is not given any type of victim status it 
is common that this status is obscured by connecting the violence of the man with a 
presumed lack of clear-sightedness on the part of the woman, thus making her share 
part of the blame.
In addition, the battered woman is apprehended as suffering from an exaggerated 
need for affirmation, as someone who lacks sufficient self-esteem and as a subject 
who avoids full responsibility. Again, what these faults of character have in common 
is a lack of acceptance of reality; a kind of irresponsibility. Some of the general no-
tions of what constitutes this type of irresponsibility are displayed in the first passage 
of an extensive thread that discusses possible reasons for a why a woman ‘chooses’ a 
violent man. 
10:29 Need for confirmation rules? 
I have thought about that. Women who find all kinds of excuse to live with 
men in spite of them being mean, jealous and all sorts of other negative things 
– if they get something nice to feed their need for confirmation once in a 
while. It outweighs the rest of the shit and makes them put up with it.
Fundamentally bad self-esteem? Is it biological or through upbringing or a 
combination of both or what is it that make so many of them feeble, cause yes, 
I consider it a distinct weakness. 
N1(TPP 2012) Threadstart
10:30 Yes, partly but I also believe there is something weird that make some 
women attracted to so called ‘bad boys’. Don’t know if it’s genetically condi-
tioned to seek strong, ruthless men that once upon a time were survivors and 
winners but there are obviously women who seek the true bastards like crimi-
nals, members of motor cycle gangs etcetera. I consider women who live with 
mean, unpleasant men as related to those women who hook up with men 
with an inclination towards criminality. Why some women don’t have that 
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gene – or if it depends on something else, like level of education for instance – 
I don’t know. 
N2 (Answers posting above)
10:31 Being with a tough guy is perhaps a shelter from the world. Perhaps it 
makes the women imagine that they too will become stronger, more invulner-
able and all of that? 
N1 (Answers posting above)
10:32 Heredity and environment in a combo perhaps? Except low self-esteem 
it can depend on accustomed patterns from the upbringing or previous rela-
tionships. I have a friend who has seen her mother being humiliated and beat-
en. Now she (my friend) has got a man who in my eyes is a real piece of shit. 
But she thinks he is amazing because he neither beats her nor drinks…. She 
sort of doesn’t get that she is worth more than that. 
N3 (Answers posting 10:29)
10:33 I also believe in a combo, but I have seen women who didn’t have that 
crappy environment in childhood still choose lowlifes over and over again. 
I have a friend who has had the possibilities of choosing a safe and good re-
lationship with a man she actually likes a lot and who likes her a lot, but she 
turns him down all the time and chooses impossible relationships instead. As 
if safety scares her. I have asked her, but she does not know 
N1 (Answers posting above)
10:34 partly it’s about self-esteem but lately I have also seen that it’s about 
‘getting’ something they can’t accomplish themselves, often it’s status and 
wealth. If one did not make sure one is independent but instead postponed 
the responsibility for oneself (supporting oneself, education etcetera) it seems 
easier to cope with slobs.
however, I don’t think the attraction to assholes has anything to do with ed-
ucation. Having an evolved intellect does not correlate with having sound 
emotions. One on the other hand if one has been raised in a destructive family 
I think it’s difficult to imagine what a sound relationship looks like and even 
harder to look for one – in that case I think self-esteem plays a major part, 
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because one settles for just enduring. 
N4  (Answers posting 10:29)
In this thread, the ways of explaining women who live with mean, jealous men are 
numerous. The majority of them share a point of departure that there is something 
wrong with the subjectivation of the woman. She, or in certain cases, her parents, 
did not install the right kind of values into her. The abusive man is not examined, 
although for a battered woman he would likely constitute a major influence. In 
this thread, the action of the man becomes subordinated to the thoughts, mental 
disposition and attitude of the woman. This is no surprise in itself, because it is not 
the violent man writing in the thread. It is nevertheless striking how many similar 
threads – discussing the nature of the battered woman – are started in the commu-
nities and how few (if any) on the nature of violent men. This could be explained 
by how decorum functions as an ontological prerequisite. According to Michael Leff 
(1999: 61), decorum orders the elements of a discourse and arranges them so that 
they stand out as a coherent product. When the nicks envision the nature of the bat-
tered woman the viewpoints are at first sight dispersed. The thread contains postings 
that claim the woman suffers from a low self-esteem (postings 10:29 and 10:34), 
whilst other postings (such as 10:29 and 10:30) see biology in the shape of genes as 
causing the forbearance. At times the explanation is a combination of heredity and 
upbringing (10:32), while on other occasions the woman is described as being afraid 
of safety (10:33). It is also claimed that education has an effect on certain women’s 
inclination to tolerate mean men (posting 10:30), in other postings this proposition 
is rejected (10:34). Despite the differing opinions they have one common denomi-
nator – decorum steers the gaze towards the interior domains of the battered woman. 
This may be due to the aversion against placing blame on the man, it may be because 
of the community focus upon thoughts rather than action, or it may be because vic-
timhood is associated with passivity: The woman has in no sense of the word taken 
care of herself and she has neglected the task of speaking the absolute truth about 
herself (Foucault, 2015: 23). If she had, she too would have understood that there 
is something wrong with the way she is geared on the inside. However, I would like 
to suggest yet another reason for the focus remaining with the woman. Perhaps the 
abused woman constitutes a sign that an ulterior point may exist, beyond which the 
subject cannot be independent and strong simply by her own free will. The battered 
woman is, I think, transformed into a token of all that is opposite to personal respon-
sibility and choice; oppression, helplessness and subjugation. Is the battered woman 
an indication of thought never entirely overpowering action, considering her failure 
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to think her way out of assault? Is she a symbol that hints of a limitation in the strat-
egies of self-government and caring for oneself? None of the preferred strategies for 
governing the self, such as choice, self-knowledge, control or responsibility, appear 
to fit her situation. Because of that, she is narratively rejected.
In that sense, this particular feminine subject position constitutes a threat to the 
fantasies of the Homo Eligens: Her existence is pervaded by the world surrounding 
her and she seems to find it hard choosing to leave that which hurts her. The percep-
tions of the Homo Eligens seem to come with a male bias that will not allow for a 
more fragile type of dependency that may be manifested in cases of abuse or violence. 
This would be an explanation for why in some cases the position of victim becomes 
the most troublesome of all – the female subject is interpellated into a responsible 
dependency that enables the reproductive arena to function and she is considered 
protected from exploitation through a sexual contract of a responsible difference. 
Men and women should want to cooperate to really make the most of the fertile 
difference. This contract, as I understand it, hosts the same type of weakness as the 
liberal social contract. It is made for an abstract individual and precisely as Carol 
Pateman points out (1988: 39), the assumption is that individuals are born free and 
equal. When women insert narrations that testify to the exact opposite, the narrative 
hide-and-seek begins.
Summary
In this chapter I have investigated the way the female subject is generally interpellat-
ed. I have found that she is made to stand in opposition to a male subject and that 
these two subjects are described as different and therefore in need of each other. Dif-
ference and a healthy kind of dependence emerge as the cornerstones of the lipstick 
feminism that prevails in the parental communities and orders the preferred femi-
nine position. In this take on feminism it appears evident that an equal sharing of 
time and resources will take place: because of men’s and women’s need for each other. 
Although dependency is mostly apprehended as a necessary outcome of the dif-
ferences between the sexes, it can still be conceived of as less healthy in some cases 
– for instance when the woman has made herself dependent on a man who will not 
treat her fairly and will not assume his responsibilities vis-à-vis the family. In these 
instances the preferred remedy is gender equality. Gender equality is sometimes de-
picted as preceded by tension and conflict but is generally described as a more or less 
natural state of relations: If not actively hindered, it will develop. The main narra-
tive difficulty occurs when the situations described are situated close to exploitation. 
Narrations exhibit a tendency to avoid placing the blame for failed equality with 
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the husband, even in cases when he is delineated as free riding upon dependency 
work carried out by the spouse. In those cases the blame is understood as shared 
with the wife, who is considered a possible solution to the problem: If she assumes 
the intra-psychic responsibility to stand up for herself, she can force her husband to 
assume his more formal discursive duty of sharing the household labour. If this does 
not work, she can leave the home so that her husband can learn and mature in her 
absence. In these types of narration the agency of the husband becomes diminished, 
whilst the agency of the wife is enlarged: She is envisioned as standing in the way of 
a husband who is made passive. In sum, when a nick states that she is overwhelmed 
by the household chores or disappointed in a husband who flees from his responsi-
bilities, these complaints tend to be dealt with in a vacuum, where particular expla-
nations are avoided.
The tendency is reinforced when the subject-matter is victimhood. Although 
there are cases where the victimised woman is treated as such, there are numerous 
situations in which victimhood in itself is looked upon with suspicion. The same 
type of positioning of blame is performed and the woman feeling sorry for herself, 
the woman conceptualised as a dreamer, or the woman narrated as less responsible 
and less active becomes an enigma; something to explain. It appears she manifests a 
kind of irresponsible dependency that articulates all the unsecure clauses in the sexual 
contract upon which the ideals of female strength and independence rest. If the taste-
ful difference (the right kind of distinction) is articulated in the nicks’ enthusiasm for 
a book such as Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus, the lack of taste is evident 
in cases where the difference consists of one party beating up the other.  
Contracts
The favourable position of femininity comes across as a position of responsible de-
pendency. The opposite position would be to depend upon someone who takes ad-
vantage of you; a kind of irresponsible dependency and this latter type of dependency is 
delineated as less attractive. This is, I think, one of the explanations for why a victim 
such as the battered wife is from time to time received with less empathy – she seems 
to destroy the beauty of responsible dependency. Her dependence is not moderate, it 
is not freely chosen and it cannot be applied to enhance heterosexual attraction. The 
rule of narration is thus that the heterosexual difference must not appear imposed 
or to be causing trouble. In the healthy and responsible dependency both the man 
and the woman appreciate that they are different and they do not use their respective 
strengths to combat each other. That which is acted out by the abusive man and the 
battered woman is, consequently, the wrong performance of difference. In this textu-
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al work of trying out models of dependency and difference (should they be regulated 
through mutual responsibilities, by demands, or by attaching blame?), the victim’s 
place appears highly uncertain but when touched upon it is viewed as problematic, 
or it is made less visible.
I have proposed that this highlighting of some dimensions of dependency and the 
concealment of others partly links the sexual contract to the social one, which makes 
Chapter Seven and this chapter interact. The linking of the sexual and the social 
contract is not new in the sense that both employment and marriage contracts share 
some of the features of the social contract, where freedom is exchanged for relative 
safety. In addition, the idea of an articulate choice preceding the contract is the same 
for social and sexual contracts. In this particular case, choice achieves something be-
sides the notion of an individual entering into a regulated relationship. In the post-
ings that respond to complaints of sharing a household with a freeriding husband, 
the question of choice returns over and over again. The complaining nick is asked 
why she chose this lazy buck passer in the first place and sometimes she is advised to 
leave him, i.e. to remake or undo the choice. If this highlighting of ‘choice’ at the ex-
pense of ‘subjugation’ or ‘exploitation’ is the outcome from the discourses of gender 
equality, the discourse is perhaps hiding something more than the matter of exploita-
tion. In her thorough discussion of the political fiction that surrounds the customary 
comprehensions of contracts (the marriage contract, the employment contract and 
the prostitution contract) Pateman (1988: 129 ff.) compares the historic situation of 
the Victorian wife as a residential servant with the situation of heterosexual women 
of today and finds the situation has not altered much. The wife in the Victorian era 
was dependent on the kindliness of her husband and could only try to acquire a nice 
and decent one. Yet the wife could not be entirely sure that her husband would be 
fair. This would be a power relation in a very basic form, still operating in our time. 
‘Our present social structure’, Heidi Hartmann infers (1981: 368) ‘rests upon an 
unequal division of labor by class and by gender’ and as it turns out, sharing a house-
hold with a man can in some instances even increase the workload for the woman. 
In short, ‘husbands may require more housework than they contribute’ (ibid.: 383). 
John Stuart Mill (1859/1989: 174), who openly criticised the oppression of women 
in the Victorian era, remarked that it should not be understood as open, but as an 
oppression that socialises women into defending it. What I have defined as a mere 
narrative consciousness in the communities (what is possible to articulate, what is 
recognisable and what is considered repugnant and distasteful) allows for a mindset 
of voluntarism but does not allow for force, power or – when considering the more 
intimate relations of a family – the non-voluntary characteristics that reside in de-
253
pendency work. The responsible dependency seems to triumphally shout out ‘I can 
do it!’ whilst the voice of the battered woman whispers ‘I cannot do it’. Because of 
the way the female subject is interpellated, such a whisper endangers the whole pro-
ject of lipstick feminism. Furthermore, apart from threatening the cherished com-
munity feminism, the victim of sexual violence overthrows the fundament of the 
social contract theory upon which the sexual one is built. 
This indicates that the community feminism is really not much of a feminism at 
all. When viewing gender equality as something that will develop if not hindered, it 
is as if discourse hints at the ‘reasonable citizen’ of Rawls (1993/2005: 217). Reason-
able men and women apply gender equality so that the division of labour becomes 
fair and no one is exploited. Reason comes to men and women by itself, and if not it 
comes when a reasonable discussion has taken place. The problem is the assumption 
that the parties are reasonable in the first place. Why, if the negotiating parties are 
reasonable, is the discussion taking place at all? If Rawls’s theory aspired for one party 
to be able to represent all the rest, why are there two parties in a negotiation about 
the division of household labour? If the postulation is that the parties are reasonable, 
the bruised and frightened woman truly threatens the discourse. She separates the 
unified discursive moment of ‘man’ (as in mankind) into ‘men’ and ‘women’ and the 
standpoints that should be dissolved instead seem to consolidate.
The corresponding feature between the contract in Chapter Seven and the one in 
this chapter is the way they are narrated as broken at times. In some cases the con-
tract was obviously not signed by the same type of subjects, positioned in the same 
way. In Chapter Seven poor people were described as ‘sitting on their arses’ (posting 
7:3), when the contract stipulates one should first sow, then reap, and some people 
were delineated as working harder than others. The main difference between the 
narration in chapter Seven and the one in this chapter is that the person breaking the 
sexual contract is rarely blamed. The narrative position of the absconding husband 
is situated very far from that of the poor mother. The contemporary oppression of 
women is perhaps as closeted and well socialised as in the era of Mill’s writings, but 
its key signatures have changed. This, I argue, is due to the way the female subject is 
interpellated – as dependent but equal, and ultimately responsible. 
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11. A spectacle of subjectivity. The 
poor mother
At this point, we have already looked into several subject positions, preferences as 
well as aversions, and we have reviewed comprehensive community notions of the 
ideal behaviour of subjects in society. In Chapter Five I mapped out some intro-
ductory and generic ideals that are necessary to present in order to succeed in the 
communities, mainly touching upon the ideals of gratitude, sincerity and coherence 
as they unfolded as taste displays. Chapter Six revealed discursive resources that en-
able the subject ideals, first and foremost the concept of choice. I demonstrated 
how choice does not only regulate consumer ideals but in addition is understood as 
deciding the whole attitude of the subject, who can choose who to be and how to 
feel. The force that is said to reside in choice and the belief that life can be governed 
by choice is captured in the interpretative repertoire of Mind over matter. Chapter 
Seven moved into society, exploring the ways society is understood as a social con-
tract where individuals contribute and receive, and how the communities host a fear 
of a breeder society enabled by a too generous welfare state. I found that the nicks 
instead advocated a moral contract, situated inside the individual or family and this 
perceived moral contract can be summarised in the interpretative repertoire of You 
should reap what you sow. Chapter Eight consisted of an analysis of the perceived 
remedy for a broken social contract; the contract situated inside the intimate spheres, 
as for instance the family. In this contract the parent is sketched as a manager of 
or an investor in the child and depicted in terms of agency rather than experience, 
identity, class position or life phase. Chapter Nine looked into some of the ways the 
subject may fail and the remedies comprehended as aiding the unfit subject. Nega-
tive feelings were generally seen as chosen by the subject, when instead they ought to 
be considered a challenge for the mindset – as something to learn from. The subject 
who tries to improve and rise above unfitness is free to experiment, as long as she 
does not resort to easy solutions; a preference captured in the interpretative reper-
toire Don’t take the easy way out. Chapter Ten continued with the female subject po-
sitions; excavating in particular positions of dependency, difference and victimhood. 
It uncovered a lipstick feminism prevailing in the communities that makes stories of 
heterosexual exploitation difficult to narrate.  
In all six chapters the postings analysed do not only point out desirable ways 
of living and being but demarcate a number of ways in which the subject can go 
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astray and become passive, negative, lost in futile dreams and hopes, irresponsible, 
non-choosing, fearful and subordinated. These pejorative attributions pierce almost 
every friendly advice, every cheerful suggestion for improvement and every conver-
sation on how to solve a particular problem; whether the problem concerns stress, 
depression, obesity, or being beaten by one’s husband. These attributions result, I 
think, in a compressed subject whose faults are presented as if countless. This subject 
hosts all of the negative stereotypes attached to the unfit subject or the victim and 
interconnects both the subject ideals and aversions into one figure of disgust. In that 
sense this compressed subject is the result of what we have discovered in the previous 
chapters, as well as the result of a particular formation and articulation of class in 
relation to the austerity discourse. In this last analytical chapter of the dissertation I 
will present an affective figure (Tyler, 2008) made out of distinctions, and encapsulat-
ing a whole affective landscape of class (Skeggs, 2004). If choice is a person-maker, 
as I claimed in Chapter Nine, this figure is a result of that. The subject position most 
narratively condensed and viewed as the most irresponsible is that of the poor moth-
er with children. She is understood as lacking many of the central characteristics 
necessary for living a responsible life and in the communities she is often labelled in 
a particular way – she is ‘White Trash’. She is the central character of this chapter.
The Chapter will be presented in two sections. The affective figure of White Trash 
encompasses most of the faulty character traits we have become acquainted with in 
the previous chapters, but to fully understand her we need to probe a little deeper 
into the conceptions about what demarcates the poor. This presentation will form 
the first part of the chapter. In the second section I will demonstrate the way these 
conceptions interplay in the creation of the White Trash woman.  
Fostering a grown-up child
The first main conception about the poor in general and the poor mother in particu-
lar asserts that she is immature. The immaturity is said to manifest itself as irrespon-
sibility: The poor mother has no sense of balance, taste or dignity, no child rearing 
skills, does not know how to prioritise, cook, or choose a partner. She is utterly 
helpless. The second conception is that the poverty of this subject relate very little to 
money. Instead, the fact that money is lacking is a result of the alleged immaturity. 
The two main conceptions are summarised in the first posting below. The posting 
is extracted from a long thread debating why/if poor people cannot afford to go to 
the dentist.
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11:1 I don’t doubt for a second that there are people who really can’t afford 
and that’s terrifying, but I am also totally convinced that several of those 
claiming they cannot afford sit there with the latest Smart Phone, cigarettes 
and booze every Friday, tattoos, piercing etc. But going to the dentist; no they 
can’t afford it, that’s not prioritised. 
(VEF 2012)
Posting 11:1 represents a key model of thinking. Alongside narrations of financial 
irresponsibility structural conditions are moved out of the representation, and a pre-
sumed dysfunctionality of the subject is moved in. All in all, mental functionality is 
what is made to matter, a feature displayed in the next posting.
11:2 I despair sometimes of all the reports of how class is the reason for why 
some children come to harm. When the actual issue is that some parents do 
not function the way they should, regardless of class?  (TPP 2012)
The accounts on the relation between class and parenting are ambiguous, as postings 
11: 1 and 2 indicate. Class is in 11:1 relativised by a notion of poor people being 
irresponsible more than poor, and in 11:2 construed as if the term class was simply a 
prejudice against ‘lower classes’. Posting 11:2 is interesting on two accounts. First of 
all it tells us that all parents can potentially be bad parents. As such it may be consid-
ered a statement that is not intended to place additional guilt upon the poor. But it 
can also be read as way to disconnect circuits of money/privilege from functionality: 
It de-emphasises a potential link between feeling safe and established, having profit-
able contacts or access to resources and the means to pass those sensations and assets 
on to a child. The term ‘harm’ seems to be defined as something a parent does to her 
child, rather than something coming from the outside – an exterior threat against 
which the parent cannot protect the child.  If class is moved out of the explanation 
and functionality is kept inside in such a manner, it appears evident that fostering 
is the main suggestion of how to improve the conditions of bad parents in general, 
which suddenly includes the poor parent. In other words, there is a possibility that 
this classless outlook upon parental harm enables a context-free notion; it is not 
principally poverty that harms the child, but the poor parent. 
Pathology and fostering: The nanny approach
In general, the poor mother is discursively situated fairly close to the position of the 
child and she basically needs two types of fostering: One type is connected to disci-
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pline and surveillance, while the other consists of a more gentle process of empow-
erment. In the following, we shall probe into these techniques for shaping a better 
functionality and in so doing note how these techniques rest upon non-articulated 
but guiding norms.
Although the same type of fostering is recommended for the poor and for the 
child, they are described differently. If the child, as delineated in Chapter Eight, is to 
be gently nurtured and groomed into the right kind of subjectivity and taste, or pro-
duced through the parental strategy of tough love, the disciplining endeavour of fos-
tering the poor is described in a more austere manner. The narrative position of child 
enables suggestions of supervision, discipline and control and the fostering is often 
described either as education or as the dressage of an animal. Poverty is transformed 
from the state of having too little money into psychology and (under)development. 
Transformations such as these form potential junctions between a discourse of pov-
erty and ideas of worthwhile restrictions. Some of these restrictions are promoted in 
the following posting where education of the poor is launched as a future demand 
for the Social Services. 
11:3 Maybe more energy should be spent on education. Perhaps long-term 
economic support should be combined with demands to take some course in 
how to deal with money, a little bit of basic knowledge about how to live sen-
sibly, economise, shop, pay bills, contact authorities etc…
Perhaps more obligatory meetings with the Social Services where they go 
through the situation and make some demands, for example abstention, reha-
bilitation, education, training or whatever would improve the situation and 
help the person back to an able-bodied condition. 
(TPP 2012)
Posting 11:3 does not mention one single problem of poor people’s characters. In-
stead, what is enumerated are several solutions that keep reappearing when the nicks 
discuss what can be done to ease poverty. The important feature of the posting is 
precisely that; every recounted solution implies a failure. It is the poor person who 
has to change and through the suggested solutions we receive a hint about what 
kind of failure she exhibits – drug abuse (where the solution is abstention), disability 
(this can be solved by rehabilitation), or low skills (to be resolved by education or 
training). The shortcomings and deficiencies are so taken for granted that only the 
solutions need to be highlighted.  
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Ideas about fostering can also be presented in a more benevolent fashion. The post-
ings tend to advocate education for the poor. Education is apprehended as an im-
printing process whereby salutary goods can directly be passed on to the irresponsi-
ble poor subject or bypassing the subject and instead directing the aid specifically to 
her children. When these softer empowerment strategies are advocated, they tend to 
be formulated less sharply, as in the next exemplary posting that urges for an operant 
conditioning of the poor. 
11:4?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????’s like that with all 
types of training.   If you praise that which is good and desirable children, 
dogs and horses and everyone else will do precisely that and probably even 
more, and less of all that other stuff and you don’t need to discipline that 
much. It is an example of your belief in the individual and an attempt to inter-
act in a positive manner. 
(TPP 2012)
By praising the maladjusted and manifesting belief in their capacities, you do not 
need to correct as much, as posting 11:4 explains. Positive imprinting is in 11:4 de-
scribed as a set of techniques that may be used to govern subjects. The techniques are 
depicted as covering a vast array of living beings; children, dogs, horses and ‘everyone 
else’. Perhaps this lumping together of species that are equally easy to govern is per-
formed to convince the reader of how relatively effortless this fostering would be. But 
what is to be produced through the fostering? According to the posting it is things 
that are ‘good’ and ‘desirable’. Explanations of what ‘good’ and ‘desirable’ mean are 
missing, but everyone can still abide by these norms. The norms seem to consist of 
top-down projections of ideals where choices of particular societal groups (groups 
that already display the desired discipline) remain invisible.  Despite the benign tone 
of voice in 11:4, the poor subject is equated with animals and children. The fostering 
of the poor thereby resembles the fostering of whole families, as laid out by Dahlst-
edt (2010: 48) in his analysis of Swedish nanny shows; it is behaviour modification. 
Everyone can improve, but the improvement has to be formatted by something. The 
unarticulated norms act as a nanny for the poor – the nanny as well as the norms can 
be strict and demanding but obeying them will eventually reward the subject. 
Housekeeping, needs and contempt
We are left with no explanation as to the content of the norms. Yet these norms 
govern the sorting of subjects that take place in posting 11:4. Therefore, the next 
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main feature of the conceptions of the poor that I have chosen to present is related to 
norms, but instead of downgrading the adulthood of the poor, these norms generate 
contempt. 
A regular discussion in the communities revolves around how relatively effort-
less it is to prepare nutritious and varied meals, with a little bit of long-term plan-
ning. The nicks seem to take great pride in displaying matron skills from the era of 
the housewife, especially when the skills are about saving money and still providing 
the family with a healthy dinner. Food and finance are narrated as interconnected, 
although perhaps not in the expected way. In the communities, money is seldom 
perceived as a problem. This is articulated in the next posting, which questions the 
budgetary skills of people who live on income support.
11:5 Agree with you. I can’t get it into my head why people whine about the 
food budget being 53 SEK per day for one (!) adult. Two fruits for 4 SEK (if 
it’s expensive), then 45 SEK remains for breakfast, lunch and dinner. Breakfast 
won’t cost you even close to 15 SEK if you eat oatmeal porridge and home-
baked bread with for instance hummus. Such a rich and filling breakfast will 
cost you 5 SEK but alright let’s be generous and say it costs 10 SEK. Then 35 
SEK remains for the two cooked meals and for that amount you can get really 
good food! 
I have 10 SEK per adult and 5 SEk per child as my budget for the cooked 
meals, same for breakfast and I have budgeted 8 SEK per person and day for 
fruit. Works just fine! We do like you, no semi-processed products, bake my-
self, etc. If you eat one vegetarian meal per day you save money to buy real 
meat for the second meal, so you escape sausages, fish n’ chips and that kind 
of junk. The question is obviously if those people who complain about how 
53 SEK is not sufficient really make oatmeal porridge and vegetarian food. 
Probably not. 
(TPP 2009)
The skills of the poor are in 11:5 compared with those of a more ‘skilled’ subject. 
By setting up a budget and showing how easy it is to stick to it, the posting turns 
the need that makes an individual eligible for income support into incompetence. 
The particular subject described above appears to be not only the consuming, but 
the administrating subject and the posting is an example of an advisory discourse 
that reaffirms old ideals: It tries to instruct and give advice about the very concrete 
skills of cooking and budgeting, because the poor seems to lack that proficiency. Ac-
cordingly, the narration about how to balance the family budget receives a particular 
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structure. According to posting 11:5, it all boils down to planning and the discursive 
element of planning eclipses that of monthly income, i.e., resources. The two basic 
elements applied to achieve the narrative structure seem to be ‘skill’ and ‘plan’ and 
when they are combined a particular type of household economics emerges. The 
posting intimates that the problem with family finances, if there is a problem, is due 
to the lack of a manager. For some people money might not be sufficient but they 
could have been. 
The norms are, however, not only applied to poor mothers but used to complain 
about all sorts of people. The next example of a posting talks about people living as 
a couple and links affordability to savings.
11:6 On the contrary… people should really be awash with funds I believe, 
and I am so surprised when people living as a couple and sharing all expens-
es say that they ‘can’t afford it’. I am single and can still ‘afford’. Because I 
SAVE!!! 
(TPP 2009)
Both of these postings celebrate the virtues of the responsible subject and are repre-
sentative examples of the manner in which the housekeeping themes include expres-
sions of contempt for those depicted as less responsible. People who state that they 
cannot afford certain things come as an element of surprise to the nick in posting 
11:6. The surprise is visible in 11:6 not only by the use of the word itself, but by the 
insertion of capital letters and the three exclamation marks that end the posting. In 
this fashion, people who cannot afford something are almost unthinkable and yet – 
much to the nick’s astonishment – they do exist. 
However, what is more important is the uncomplicated celebration of that which 
is delineated as responsibility. The true figure of admiration is the seemingly ev-
er-saving, robust and planning subject who rises above the material dimensions of 
life. There are no complaints made about the price of food and no statements that 
salaries are too low, thus the housekeeping themes make need, as well as its possible 
political dimension, disappear. As it seems, an echo from a protestant ethics puts 
in motion a relation between notions of administration, equity and legitimacy. To 
administer resourcefully leads to a situation where equity is achieved in accordance 
with the interpretative repertoire You should reap what you sow.  Its logic is as simple 
as it is old: You should be able to obtain (only) what you have invested. Insofar as 
it is fair to invest in home cooked porridge, shopping according to the season and 
saving money it is also reasonable (and thereby legitimate) to enjoy the fruit of one’s 
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labour. It is also a free choice to stand back from these efforts. Ergo, the system of 
transforming the content of the wallet into food for a month is fair, and poverty 
would diminish if people cultivated a little competence in the area of saving. This 
manner of relativizing poverty is simultaneously that which constitutes the basis of 
contempt. Through the same sins of non-compliance that we became acquainted 
with in Chapter Nine, the poor have seemingly also refrained from employing tech-
niques of self-enhancement and responsibility. The narratively suppressed question 
becomes: If poverty is to some extent chosen, why do poor people complain? The 
answer to that question relates to a transformation of need into taste, which we will 
explore in the next section of the chapter.
Relativized poverty, consumption and prohibited taste
There is one concept that has gone out of fashion in terms of explaining or under-
standing poverty. When used in the communities the word need is mocked or rela-
tivized. Another concept that seems to be employed more frequently, is taste. It is ap-
plied as a fairly simple axiom – taste is forbidden for the poor. This may at first sight 
seem strange, given that a large part of the conversations ordinarily orbit around taste 
displays. However, in this case it is exercised in another fashion. Stephanie Lawler 
(2005: 432 f.) suggests that contempt for the poor is partly crafted by allowing taste 
in one setting (amongst affluent people), while prohibiting it in another (amongst 
non-affluent people). Lawler’s comment on taste can be coupled with Karl Marx’s 
(1844) notion of the tendency to reduce or prohibit the needs of the poor, whenever 
they are delineated as above survival level. This latter tendency is illustrated in the 
following two postings 
11:7 People are dickheads. I placed an ad to donate baby stuff in a community 
for people with very little money, single mums and the likes. Everything was 
clean and nice. I’m just amazed how fucking picky people with no money 
allow themselves to be. The gate you put on the stairs was the wrong colour 
(its white!) and the baby watcher was not ok because it was only the second 
most recent model. Oh my god… Would have been easier to just throw it into 
the rubbish dump… 
N1 (TPP 2011) Threadstart
11:8 Well yeah, that’s when they become picky. *seen it from close by* They 
live just above subsistence level but can’t imagine second hand, when the 
money is gone they shop from mail order and as a result they are in an even 
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worse financial ruin. Whine like hell about money but can’t picture their child 
in a SECOND HAND overall. 
N2 (Answers posting above)
The taste displays (as in having a taste and being able to define it) that were celebrat-
ed in Chapter Five are in the postings above described as a problem. Postings 11:7 
and 11:8 discuss attitude, a concept that was deployed in notions of the choosing 
and responsible subject in Chapter Six. It now reappears in ideas of the irresponsible 
subject. In Chapter Six I pointed to a tendency to praise choice as a remedy for the 
soul: Making a choice improves the subject’s attitude. In the case of the irresponsible 
subject, attitude serves to make need insignificant – when the poor make consump-
tion choices they are read as signs of shallowness and depicted as indications of in-
temperance. In other words, this is another way of relativizing poverty, through the 
idea that the poor want more than they can expect. In the list of examples in the two 
postings we see how the poor mother will not accept the wrong colour for the baby’s 
equipment and how she refuses to buy second hand clothes, how she chooses mail 
order to repress the fact that she lacks money. Accordingly, it is not need that makes 
her shop but her much too elaborate taste and her self-indulgence. This narration 
basically exposes the tendency that Marx describes – every craving for items not as-
sociated with mere survival on the part of the poor appears objectionable, and when 
the poor want something beyond the abstract need it will be described as craving for 
a luxury item. The only thing that can be approved is the most ‘meagre form of life 
(existence) as the standard’ (ibid.).115 By being represented as having taste and want-
ing to make distinctions the poor mother is moved further away from possibilities of 
receiving sympathy. This is no wonder, considering the ideal promoted in Chapter 
Five not to buy the most expensive consumer goods on the market; the ideal is to 
know what one is buying. It is discernment (not money) that determines social value 
and when money is lacking one should refrain from consumption. 
What is more, the nick describing this elaborate taste is, much the same as in 
posting 11:6, surprised: I’m just amazed how fucking picky people with no money allow 
themselves to be. This amazement about the poor is recurrent in the communities. 
The sense of surprise may be a discreet way of expressing contempt towards the poor 
without coming across as insensitive. Stating that one is amazed (not angered) by the 
behaviour of the poor implies that one previously had no prejudices against them 
and perhaps even pitied them; one was fooled by the poor or was perhaps too kind 
115 For the quotation, see  https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/
needs.htm . 
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hearted before knowing better. Expressing astonishment may also be employed to 
point out that the rupture of the norm of consumption (to cut the coat according to 
the cloth) on the part of the poor is gigantic (hence the great surprise). The major el-
ement of surprise seems, nevertheless, to be the poor subjects’ manifestations of taste. 
Taste divides us and makes us choose differently, which is explained in the follow-
ing posting that separates different types of activity into categories.
11:9 Some things that are a sign of class divisions are not so much financial 
but rather about having different values and habits, for example concerning 
extracurricular activities, music etc. Low-skilled people smoke more and are 
more obese and they spend more money on cigarettes and junk food. I know 
a guy who earns half of what I earn but spends 3000 SEK116 per month on cig-
arettes. Included in the standard of an academic are activities such as sports 
and outdoor life (the scouts and so forth) and that hardly costs 3000 SEK per 
month. Clearly, academics often earn more than low-skilled people (although 
that’s not set in stone) but it’s also about different habits and ideas about 
where money should be spent. 3000 SEK per month for a year is a decent trip 
abroad for the whole family /…/ but if you cannot afford that because you’ve 
been smoking the money, the remedy is probably not subsidies but old-fash-
ioned … well mass-education and a little bit of tax-raising and prohibitions 
too, in order to steer people’s consumption. 
(TPP 2012)
In posting 11:9 taste and financial status are interlinked. Taste is, quite simply, inter-
preted as one reason for poverty. Several displays of taste are narrated (musicianship, 
sports, outdoor life, cigarettes and junk food, to name but a few). The pivotal key in 
this story is the introduction of the smoking friend as a kind of confirmation of the 
argument. Smoking is tentatively not a sign (or a taste) of just any kind. Smoking is 
arguably a stained sign – the sign itself portends its value and how it is supposed to 
be received – smoking is bad taste. By connecting clean signs (instruments, sports, 
scouts and so forth) with the standard taste of an academic and attaching the stained 
signs to the less educated (smoking, overweight, cigarettes and junk food), the chain 
of equivalence does not have to be very rigidly performed, because the reader is 
prepared for what is to come. A clean and a stained sign are midway to being fixat-
ed through articulation which, according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985/2008: 105), 
is ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is 
116 Approximately 300 Euro.
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modified as a result of the articulatory practice’.  By attaching stained signs to the 
narrated poor friend, the work is done. Articulation as ‘any practice’ is in this case 
clearly the practice of taste. The application of taste makes it easier to explain poverty 
as a phenomenon on the surface, i.e. by studying the very behaviour (what is visible) 
of the poor we come to understand the reason for the poverty – it is hidden in the 
performance, where taste is one obvious display. Taste and consumption becomes 
external tokens that segregate the deserving poor (who cut their coats according 
to their cloth) from the undeserving (who exhibit immoderate desires). To insert 
into the conversation a notion that some people lack resources appears to pervert 
the choice agenda, because acknowledging that all people are not endowed with 
the same amount of resources would point to an absence of something that goes 
beyond people simply wanting or craving things; it would turn poverty political 
(Fraser 1990: 199). It is thus possible that the exemplary consumption goods in the 
postings are not randomly chosen. If wanting to relativize poverty it is a wise strategy 
to disregard resources such as food and housing and instead highlight goods that are 
unnecessary for survival; baby watchers and cigarettes. Through the suggestion that 
poor mothers are vain and through the story about the friend who spends the money 
on cigarettes, the situation of the less affluent is made non-political. The application 
of a concept such as taste also enables a putative division between different types of 
poor – the deserving type that master their cravings and the undeserving that refuse 
baby equipment in the wrong colour.  
Poverty is vague 
The last comprehensive feature of the poverty discourse in the parental communities 
can simultaneously be viewed as a narrative rule: The more crude the description, the 
more unspecific the narration becomes. The most common narration technique is a 
systematic vagueness (Georgaca, 2004:16). Lawler (2005: 432) calls these types of de-
rogatory but sweeping description a join-the-dots-pathologization, where the reader is 
supposed to fill in the picture herself, simply by linking the ‘dots’. This is the case in 
the following posting where poor parents in deprived neighbourhoods are described.
11:10 Parents who don’t spend time with their children, who let them con-
stantly be with others or in the streets, parents who don’t take the children to 
the dentist, parents who don’t attend stuff at school, parents who drink and 
party, parents who fuck around, parents who fight and argue, parents who 
can never afford anything for the kids, parents who … Well, you know the 
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routine? 
 (VEF 2012)
There is a resonance of danger sounding from the posting as it sketches a particular 
unbounded subject. The ‘dots’ are familiar images of societal ills, mirrored in what 
we saw propagated in the editorial pages presented in Chapter Two – parents who do 
not monitor their children, parents who mismanage their children’s health, parents 
who exhibit a lack of effort towards school and so forth. The image is one of a moral 
rather than economic underclass and the narration relies on distance and abstraction. 
Arguably the level of reliability resides in this absence of specificity: The reader is not 
provoked to argue against the vagueness of the statement because it is as if it repre-
sented a common but unarticulated truth. We are invited to understand, to recognise 
an old and familiar painting: Well, you know the routine? By the reassuring abstraction 
of Parents who… the posting establishes a segregated space for the deviant parental 
subjects – they are not like us and furthermore, the absence of specificity makes them 
all appear to be the same. This latter feature would be manifest through the usage of 
the three dots that end the last phrase of posting 11:10. The phrase Parents who… 
functions as an equivalence of bad character. Everyone in the group of parents de-
scribed appear to manifest all of these problematic parental characteristics. Hence, 
parents who can never afford anything for the kids make poverty into one of these faulty 
characteristics and we are led to believe that parents who don’t attend stuff at school, in 
addition are poor.  
If Chapter Eight demonstrated the nicks’ tendency to enthrone parents and fam-
ilies as a remedy for a broken social contract, it coincides with the further reduction 
of the welfare state through fiscal austerity, as pointed out by Sarah De Benedictis 
(2012: 6). De Benedictis also notes (ibid.: 1 f.) the simultaneous tendency to ap-
point some parents as especially ‘feral’. All of those parental subjects affected most 
profoundly by welfare state reductions are at risk of being placed in a position where 
they are made to take the blame for the effects of such cutbacks. They are not de-
scribed as poor, unprotected or vulnerable, but as a kind of savage. Posting 11:10 is 
positioned in that discursive furrow.  
Deserving and undeserving
However, the tendency towards unspecific narration is not only visible in harsh de-
scriptions of feral poor people. Another way to launch poverty as a condition with 
vague contours is to divide the poor into large categories in which many types of 
poverty can be included. One of the recurrent descriptions comprises an imprecise 
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division of the poor into categories of deserving and undeserving (Fineman, 1991: 
282).117 The parent who makes the wrong kind of choices or fails to grab opportuni-
ties is depicted as undeserving much the same as in the next posting.
11:11 To me it’s important to separate a chosen situation from a situation one 
has not chosen. If one decides to have three kids instead of education and a 
job one has made a choice, but if one takes ill so that one can’t work it’s not a 
choice. 
(TPP 2012)
The vagueness, as 11:11 illustrates, is often conveyed by constructing situations that 
host only one dimension. The subject described in the posting has chosen between 
three kids and no education on the one hand (a behaviour of the undeserving), and 
education and a job on the other (a behaviour of the deserving). The options are in 
the posting described as situated on either side of a dividing line (separated through 
‘instead’ in the posting). It is built upon the premise that it is possible to actually 
separate situations one has chosen from situations one has not chosen. It seems that 
for vagueness to function the tropes must be extensive and in addition, the situations 
in which the subject is placed need to be mutually exclusive. When dividing the poor 
in this fashion there can be no combination of conditions. What sort of reception 
would, for instance, a poor mother with many children, a low-paid job and an illness 
receive? 
Lastly, vagueness can be applied to show that society can only do so much to aid, 
assist or relieve the subject from poverty. The next posting tries in a humorous fash-
ion to demonstrate that the poor are difficult to help.
11:12 But how can we vaccinate children against their parents’ poor decisions 
and bad capacity to capitalise on possibilities? Are we supposed to remove 
children of parents with a certain income below X SEK? 
(TPP 2012)
As noted, vagueness can be applied as a way of being extreme. The proposal in 11:12 
is constructed by surprisingly destroying the popular community discourse of pover-
ty as pathology. By the revulsion of this narrative formula, the effect of vaccination 
appears comic and distorted: If poverty is not a disease it cannot be transmitted 
117 This bifurcation manifests a historical heritage of dividing the dependent subject into more and 
less dignified groups, which in turn receive treatment in accordance to that status.
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and, hence, vaccination is a ridiculous proposal. Also, if poverty is not a disease it 
is not something that can be ‘cured’. When encountering the comic suggestion in 
the posting the reader immediately sees the impossibility in doing what the posting 
elusively proposes; the suggestion of removing children from their malfunctioning 
parents makes the audience giggle or become appalled. Furthermore, the reader is 
led to imagine that the underlying phenomenon – the existence of poor children – is 
impossible to redress, which make the posting advisory (Fischer, 1970/2009). The 
existence of poor children becomes less interesting and the extreme formulations 
make specification appear unnecessary. The concluding question of whether or not 
to remove the children from their parents proves by the practical impossibility that 
we have no reason to feel hopeful when it comes to incitements for societal change; 
the only proposal made is so vague and so preposterous that we must reject it. In 
other words, the form of the posting enables a particular view upon poverty and 
precludes another, which makes it ideologically significant (Eagleton, 1976/2006). 
We have seen that the image of poverty is made in a particular configuration 
where it emerges first and foremost as behaviour. Poverty is portrayed as if it involved 
a deterioration best addressed through dressage and education in combination with 
discipline. We have also become acquainted with what poverty is not: It is not to be 
comprehended as a case of lacking money and we have noted that one of the main al-
leged problems with the poor is that they seem unable to refrain from consumption. 
Lastly, we have seen that poverty is described in a vague type of join-the-dots-pathol-
ogisation that makes the poor appear feral and difficult to help. All of these demar-
cations are active in the creation of the most popular affective figure in the parental 
communities; ‘White Trash’, which is by far the worst spectacle of subjectivity to be 
found in community conversation. The rest of the chapter is devoted to this particu-
lar figure.  
Affective figures. The example of ‘White Trash’
Descriptions of the irresponsible subject can be launched in subtle or more crude 
ways. When narrated in a more sweeping and harsh manner the subject stands out as 
a kind of affective figure – a travesty or a distortion. The affective figure is first and 
foremost to be appreciated as a constitutive limit for the white middle class, but in 
addition as a condensed contempt against a perceived underclass of defective individ-
uals. It is a figure that manifests class struggle on a representational level and mainly 
works through distinctions – the figure is used to attribute impressive characteristics 
to groups of people that the group is discursively differentiated from (Tyler, 2008:18 
ff.). The affective figures produce emotions, mainly of disgust, which helps legitimise 
269
the fact that the figure is placed on the margins of society. To sum up, the affective 
figure has to be described as differing from a group looking at her from the outside, 
a group depicted as very different from her (ibid.: 19). This makes ‘The Chav’, as she 
is investigated by Tyler, share many features with its American sibling ‘White Trash’. 
This section of the chapter will map out the ways in which the undeserving poor 
of ‘White Trash’ are demarcated. I will show how these undeserving white poor are 
narrated as different from an implied group of ‘us’ and by what types of attribution 
this separation is performed. The section also accommodates a presentation of the 
way White Trash and parenthood is combined into a kind of disaster scenario with 
far-reaching effects. Although the descriptions peak in terms of vagueness and harsh-
ness when White Trash becomes the topic of conversation, defences are occasionally 
inserted. I will reveal how the general pattern in these defences is an aversion to the 
tone of voice of the descriptions of poor whites, rather than a refutation of the con-
tent out of which the figure is constructed. 
White Trash as differences
Two features of conversation stand out when the nicks talk about White Trash. The 
first token of this underclass discourse that White Trash are different. They differ 
from other types of poor and from a narrated group of ‘us’ that are made to repre-
sent all the virtues that White Trash cannot be endowed with. The second token of 
the discourse is defining White Trash as particularly lacking refinement. In the case 
of White Trash, refinement is often understood as achieved through education that 
leads up to cultivation and broader perspectives. We will study White Trash from 
both the angle of difference and the perspective of refinement.
In community conversation the concept of White Trash is normally employed as 
a way of separating low income earners who are to blame for their situation (i.e., the 
undeserving poor) from those with no problematic personality traits (i.e., the deserv-
ing poor). It is also used as an explanation for why certain privileges are legitimate 
and should be considered fair. The discursive prop by which this legitimation is made 
to happen is education. The posting below belongs to one of the recurrent threads 
about definitions of White Trash and describes what happens to a person who does 
not proceed to higher education. 
11:13 But education is also about, as I mentioned, getting in contact with opin-
ions outside one’s own narrow context, to get a wider outlook on big issues 
and therefore care about things such as discrimination, racism, dictatorship, 
environmental issues etc. The opposite is to NOT continue one’s education, to 
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repeat the opinions that are presented in the social circles in which you live, to 
not embrace new ideas and influences. 
(TPP 2012)
In posting 11:13 a distinction is made between people who are open and as a side 
effect of that openness caring and people who are ignorant. It is as if White Trash are 
not interested in any type of technologies of the self and do not want to be bothered. 
The alleged refinement of the middle class is represented as if disregarded by this cat-
egory of poor people. The way White Trash are depicted in the communities reflect 
the conceptual use of White Trash as rendered by John Hartigan (2006: 324) – some 
people (White Trash) are ascribed prejudices and thus these prejudices are removed 
from other subjects (the white middle class). The separation rather bluntly places 
distasteful qualities in one group and it is narrated as if these traits could not reside 
in the group of educated people. The lack of perspectives demarcates the group, as 
stated in the next posting.
11:14 To me THAT [a lack of perspectives] is much more WT than a potential-
ly weak economy. Abiding by old traditions and roles, not having an interest 
in matters other than what tattoo to get the next time, not having a clue that 
the USA has an election coming up tomorrow etc. Sure, you can have per-
spectives or an interest in society even if you don’t have any education but as 
I see it, low or no education is often accompanied by limited perspectives and 
interest in society. 
(TPP 2012)
Postings 11:13 and 11:14 are representative examples of the two narrative techniques 
performed in the construction of the especially hopeless type of poor labelled White 
Trash – the group’s ascribed difference from everyone else, especially in terms of a 
lack of refinement. Grouping the evaluations together, we can see that White Trash 
as a group is understood as old fashioned (sticking to traditions), narrow (not taking 
an interest in matters outside of the close familiar context) and/or superficial (only 
interested in what tattoo to choose the next time). These three labels indicate per-
sonality traits and combined with the assertion in posting 11:13 that White Trash 
are ignorant, we see a recurrent conceptual interpretation of poor white people that 
once again stays with poverty as personality. 
The idea that White Trash are low skilled and/or avoid education is a main discursive 
trait in the communities. It is also applied to produce differences between the white 
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poor that refrain from education and are viewed as undeserving for that reason, and 
poor black people in ‘developing countries’ who are narrated as if wanting education 
and thereby classified as deserving poor. The next exemplary posting is a response to 
a nick who objects to the idea that lack of education makes a person prejudiced or 
narrow.
11:15 All developing countries argue that _education_ is the key to a good 
future. Children need to attend school and receive education so that the coun-
try can flourish and so that democracy can grow strong, so that old traditions 
will let go of people, so that misery and poverty will be turned around into 
wealth. Especially when it comes to women they [the developing countries] 
state they MUST get the possibilities of education in the same way as boys, it’s 
an important key to women’s value and independence. 
But as soon as we talk about developed countries such as Sweden we mustn’t 
mention education as something in particular. On the contrary, it is conde-
scending to highlight education as important; it is condescending towards 
people who choose not to enter into education despite having the chance. 
People who remain in narrow environments where the light of enlightenment 
can’t reach them. 
(TPP 2012)
Posting 11:15 employs several tropes to paint a picture of the benefits of education. 
Less educated people live in places where the light of enlightenment cannot reach. If 
enlightenment is understood as a lantern with a universal power to transform people, 
the choice to refrain from education would metaphorically explain their situation – 
being White Trash is a choice. The choice to refrain from education explains inferior-
ity and justifies the subordination of White Trash: This subordination is perceived as 
stemming from them, rather than from ‘us’. In 11:15 some people cannot and some 
chose not to educate themselves. If people in developing countries are hindered from 
entering into education, it would be difficult to attach any blame to them for this 
lack of opportunities. The poor person in a developed country is instead delineated 
as someone that willingly walks away from the opportunity. If summing up the 
standpoints, they seem ordered by an ontological decorum: It is not us, it is them.
Bad taste equals subordination
So far, the alleged problem with White Trash appears to be that they produce their 
own subordination. Because they are so ignorant and so narrow, the rest of us do 
not want to interact with them and they can therefore be said to produce their own 
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exclusion. According to the communities, the ignorance and narrowness are often 
visible in the particular taste displays of White Trash. This viewpoint is exemplified 
in the next short interchange, where a nick proposes that this bad taste segregates 
and isolates White Trash from the majority society. In this particular conversation, 
however, one posting (11:17) objects to the description of White Trash as being un-
interesting to socialise with.
11:16 And how do you view meaningful exchanges of opinion with people 
who did not finish grammar school and whose main interests are shopping at 
Primark118 and going to see the latest slap-stick show119 ? 
N1 (TPP 2012)
11:17 N1, what are you talking about? My God, I want to puke. Of course all 
people are interesting to talk to. And to have exchanges of opinion with? I 
don’t get your thinking at all. 
N2 (Answers N1 posting above)
11:18 Ok? So that’s why segregation is so extensive? Why is it so if all people 
are interesting to talk to? You deliver a lot of pc opinions but open your eyes, 
that’s not how it works in society. Isn’t it better to at least have the courage to 
discuss it than putting on the pretty blinder and expressing a lot of pc opin-
ions that sound nice? 
N1 (Answers N2 posting above)
This exchange shows us a standard way of performing distinctions on behalf of others 
(as demonstrated in Chapter Five), as well as a way to protect and define the middle 
class. Using the example of shopping at Primark (as in 11:16) as an instance of bad 
taste is simultaneously marking off good taste laterally reversed, in displaying knowl-
edge of what not to like. The distinction of taste achieves two things simultaneously. 
First of all, in posting 11:18 the presumed banality of White Trash is coupled with 
segregation, which establishes a conceptual bridge of ‘personal characteristics’ (i.e. 
taste) and social situation. An undesirable disposition may produce undesirable liv-
ing conditions such as segregation, or in other words; White Trash did not only have 
exclusion coming, they brought it on themselves. Explanations such as these form an 
almost exact replica of the way personal responsibility is placed with the poor in dis-
118 Originally in Swedish: Ullared.
119 Originally in Swedish: Stefan och Krister.
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courses of contemporary austerity regimes. If austerity makes individuals responsible 
for a breakdown in the financial sectors, the same type of dislocation is performed 
in 11:18, where it is not the housing market that explains segregation, but character 
flaws. Secondly, the posting protects a field specific capital (Bourdieu, 1984/1991: 
132) of the middle class: It is the taste of this class that defines White Trash, not the 
other way around.
Two peas in a pod: We look the same
It is perhaps tempting to understand the making of this affective figure as the estab-
lishment of a solidified difference and little more. Nevertheless, there are unsettling 
elements in the descriptions of White Trash; elements that point to similarities be-
tween White Trash and the presumed reader. Occasionally, poor white women share 
the same tastes or habits as middle class women, which make distinction complicat-
ed to accomplish. We will continue by exploring this intersection between approved 
femininity and taste displays.  
As we have already seen, in the communities it is through distinctions that one 
can demarcate oneself as belonging to a narrated middle class. The problem seems 
to be that several of the approved signs of the accepted middle class femininity are 
exactly the same as those displayed within the ‘faulty’ femininity of the White Trash 
woman. This needs to be explained, tucked away, or made into something else. In 
what follows, I will demonstrate how maintaining symbolic boundaries becomes a 
struggle where forms of feminine expression are the object of a discursive fight. It 
seems that the aesthetics of decay resides on both sides, leading to frequent commu-
nity discussions that aim to unravel the differences once and for all. One example of 
this separation is presented in the next posting.
11:19 In another thread it appears that some in VEF believe that thongs = 
white trash. Is it really the thong that makes a person white trash? Can a 
woman hide her trashiness behind a pair of hipster panties?  Hardly. 
Do you think that women who shop at Sabbia Rosa (73 Rue des Saints-Pe-
res in Paris) or La Perla (24 Rue du Faubourg Saint Honore, Paris) or Yoba 
(11 Rue du Marche St Honore, Paris) or why not in the massive lingerie de-
partment on Gallerie Lafayett and buy thongs there could be titled… White 
Trash? Hardly.
What distinguish white trash women? If you ask around you usually get the 
following answers.  
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1) Lack of intelligence. She opens her mouth and out comes monosyllabic 
words and cursing. What foremost characterises a white trash woman is the 
total lack of refinement, aka no cultural appearance (she may be educated, like 
have at least managed elementary school) and a lack of codes of conduct. 
2) Tattoos and piercings 
3) Dyed hair – blonde 
4) Body language – walks ugly, sits in a vulgar manner 
5) Greasy, sagging, greyish skin covered in vulgar make-up 
6) Sees the cigarette as the ultimate accessory 
7) Fills her boobs and lips with silicone 
8) Follows every cheap fashion trend like a slave, like Brazilian waxing  
9) Consumes gossip like a nutrient 
10)Understands clothes as an expression of IQ – the less the better
But at the same time: if you take a look at what people associate with White 
Trash we know that a large number of well-educated, cultivated, sophisticat-
ed and refined women may share the visible attributes of white trash women 
– such as clothes, make-up, plastic surgery, dyed hair, smoking, choosing 
tight clothes, tattoos (just look at the Queen of Denmark) and reading gossip 
without being accused of being a White Trash woman.
In other words White Trash comes from the inside – poorly educated, cultur-
ally illiterate and etiquette dyslectic – women who do not know how to trans-
form consumer goods into something sophisticated and sexy.
If a woman does not want to come across as white trash she should get herself 
a proper education, learn the basics of civilised behaviour – not just codes of 
conduct – but in addition have a deeper cultural refinement. (like a classic 
hostess from the fifties/sixties) A woman who meets all of this is naturally 
self-confident and with a high self-esteem she will carry herself in such a man-
ner – regardless of clothes – that she stands out as sexy and desirable. Such a 
woman can put on a pair of La Perla thongs and still you would not for a sec-
ond see her as white trash. 
(VEF 2010)
The main problem to be solved in posting 11:19 is the envisioned superficial similar-
ity of the White Trash woman and the woman of a higher social standing. The latter 
can, according to 11:19, be dressed and made up in the same way, but still not be 
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mistaken for White Trash. So, if these two groups of women look the same, if they 
both smoke, wear thongs and read gossip magazines, how come we don’t mix them 
up?
The posting may be understood as a discursive leakage that has less to do with 
poverty and lack of education, than with accepted femininity. It argues that the 
sensual or sexual woman uses several attributes that are generally associated with 
vulgarity and an accentuation of the sexually connoted parts of the body. The posting 
appears occupied with sorting out how this body can continue to be classified into 
deserving and undeserving categories, respectively. We may label the operation ‘sep-
arating the deserving and undeserving whore’ (as opposed to separating the deserv-
ing and undeserving poor). The posting confirms that particular culturally stained 
attributes are accepted on the female body, but is simultaneously acutely aware of 
the problems of distinction that follow. What needs to be done is to ascribe women 
who look the same different degrees of respectability and the additional qualification 
becomes that of self technology: The women may look the same but they are worlds 
apart on the inside. There is a greasy, smoking White Trash whore who disrespects in-
telligence and curses every time she opens her mouth and there is a Madonna whore 
with a proper education and a savoir faire of social codes who bought her thongs in 
an expensive store.
However, there is still one element of uncertainty to sort out. Why do these 
literate and sophisticated women chose to buy thongs in the first place, if they are 
associated with less dignity? Would they not know better? The posting deals with a 
stained but nevertheless generic ideal of femininity and the way it is constantly at risk 
of being read as vulgarity. Because Western feminine aesthetics partly relies on dis-
playing the body, it risks slipping into readings of the woman as corporeality at the 
expense of soul, or intelligence. Feminine respectability is, so to speak, threatened 
by its own aesthetic codes. If this particular bodily appearance is indeed manifested 
by all sorts of women and if the generic ideal really is an aesthetics of the stained 
subject. it is important to keep groups of female subjects separated. In other words, 
because some of the visual appearance of feminine sensuality has borrowed attributes 
from our culture’s stereotypical images of the ‘whore’ (exposed skin and accentuated 
make-up), it means an element of degradation should be added to make the ‘so-
phisticated woman’ attractive. This is quite a different result to the sharp distances 
between White Trash and the middle class extracted from Hartigan’s study (2006) 
of the way the category is applied in an American context. The dangerous sexuality 
that has historically been situated with the working class woman (Skeggs, 2004) now 
travels between different class positions. The contraposition between the perceived 
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clean subject (the educated middle class woman) and the sexually more forward 
working class woman is undone. It is as if the sexualized body has ceased to display 
the cherished ethics of society and now only display its aesthetics. But even so, there 
has to be a difference established, and in posting 11:19 the middle class woman is 
said to differ as a result of her inner refinement. By maintaining this refinement she 
can exploit the woman labelled White Trash for her aesthetics. The trick is to look 
like a ‘whore’ without mistakenly being treated as one.
The White Trash mum. A disaster scenario
If the matrix of feminine aesthetics at times coincides, as described in posting 11:19, 
this cannot be said for accounts on parenthood. When parenthood is brought into 
the conversation about the poor white woman, all the features of the poverty dis-
course are set in motion: pathology, societal danger and faulty mental traits. What 
we see is a portrait of a disaster scenario and in this portrait there are no similarities 
represented, such as that of aesthetics which we saw demonstrated in posting 11:19. 
I will now introduce the White Trash mother and the problems she is accused of 
causing.  
The procreation of people labelled White Trash is sometimes presented as a kind 
of genetic transmission. It is articulated as a case of poor people, fat people, people 
who smoke, people described as displaying low intelligence or neuropsychiatric di-
agnoses exhibiting a tendency to procreate a larger number of children than people 
that are delineated as ‘normal’. The understanding of White Trash can be launched in 
an almost eugenic manner, as in the first posting below, or be more compassionate, 
as in the following posting. 
11:20 White trash multiplies and takes over!
Children of diagnosed people often get the same type of diagnoses, ADHD 
and autism for example. Fat people have fat children. If both parents have the 
same diagnosis the probability increases that the child will get it.
It is not just genetic heritage; it’s also about a social heritage where a combina-
tion of bad genes and bad habits is transmitted to the children and reinforces 
the effect. Unfortunately people with a similar life style and genetics meet 
and have children. It is rare that a fat person has a child with a normal per-
son, who could neutralise or compensate for the negative heredity.  Or that a 
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smoking couch potato has a child with a sporty person, which would give the 
children a normal upbringing.
This would be no problem if a natural selection operated in a way that made 
properties with worse chances of survival disappear from the gene pool af-
ter a couple of generations. Instead it is unfortunately so that these so called 
white trash people tend to have more babies.
People with no problems and with a sound life style often make the choice 
to have fewer children, to be able to give them the best possible upbringing. 
Quality over quantity, that is. Unfortunately this does not counteract the 
dominance of white trash, since it is only the number of children that will 
affect the gene pool. An increased dilution of problem-free genes in a gene 
pool where the less fortunate genetically have more babies will degenerate the 
population. 
(VEF 2012)
11:21 I think a lot of ‘WT’ consists of these groups and many actually display 
the same IQ as a lot [of people] with Downs Syndrome. If you care about 
handicapped or disabled people you should avoid the expression WT.  /…/ 
(TPP 2008)  
The ideal balancing act is in posting 11:20 depicted almost as a kind of terror balance 
(between the healthy/unhealthy, between salutary and pathological lifestyles and be-
tween coach potatoes and sporty people). Now it seems the balance is threatened. 
The bad gene pools appear to be characterised by numbers (quantity), whilst the 
good gene pool manifests a preference for substance (quality). However, impair-
ments such as obesity, Downs Syndrome or neuro psychiatric diagnoses are used 
differently in the two accounts. They may be introduced to trigger a sense of danger 
and irreversible decay as in posting 11:20, or be used as a paternalistic but benevolent 
call for mercy on the less fortunate, as in 11:21. The two positions are contemporary 
and simultaneously timelessly classic expressions of what Dorothy Nelkin (2001) 
calls ‘molecular metaphors’ – metaphors that ascribe moral value to a kind of eugenic 
fitness. In posting 11:20 the fit family leads a life that can no longer be guaranteed 
because of its moderate procreative ambitions, and the posting thereby expands the 
community readings of unfitness even further; unfitness can in this narration be un-
derstood as a threat to the societal body as a whole. Posting 11:21 appears instead to 
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vindicate people diagnosed with Down’s Syndrome, who are represented as if at risk 
of being lumped together with White Trash. The act of compassion is described as 
separating these categories. The separation performed in 11:21 seems to rescue value 
for people with other types of gene by pointing out that just because they share a 
presumed IQ level, they are not the same.
The presumed difference of the White Trash appears to be the reason for many 
discursive rescue attempts. So far we have seen that White Trash needs to be kept 
apart from black poor, from low income earners and from disabled people. The ele-
ments inserted to perform the separation are refinement (as in taste and education) 
and biology. 
Transmission of habits and taste
Having said that, the main issue of community concern is still not the bad genes 
that White Trash is said to pass down, but the bad habits transmitted to the next 
generation. For that reason we will stay on the topic of how the White Trash mother 
corrupts her children. In the next two postings to be presented there seems to be no 
governable space left at all – the parents are so White Trash they cannot lead a decent 
life and, hence, they are possibly unable to guide and govern their children. 
11:22 … well I know one who has 5 children and all of them have ADHD and 
that family is really wt, and then you wonder if the children really have it or 
just lack breeding. 
(VEF 2012)
11:23 Hahaha...reminds me of at least half the people living nearby. Spend 
the entire summer outside a caravan at the same camping site with the same 
people, they booze, smoke and yell at their naked kids running around peeing 
all over the place. Hehehe… and they ask if me and the boyfriend want to get 
a caravan.   
(VEF 2009)
There is, however, some confusion about what is transmitted, as the two postings 
above demonstrate. Posting 11:22 presents a whole family of unruly subjects and 
asks if it is the genetic transmittance of ADHD that explains the behaviour or if 
instead it is a lack of good manners that is camouflaged as ADHD? In 11:23 the 
answer is already there; White Trash do not know how to behave and they allow their 
children to misbehave as well. It seems the transfer is partly about something outside 
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the body and gene pools: The White Trash parent leaves a mark on the child in the 
shape of disinterestedness and tacky taste. In that sense, the children of White Trash 
are described as subjected to the bad taste of their mother. In the first posting below 
the White Trash child is considered to be deprived of culture and in the following 
posting it is given silly names, yet another sign of bad taste.
11:24 /…/ One thing I believe definitely distinguishes a wt is a disinterest 
in culture. Can almost be certain that a wt does not regularly visit the library 
with her children to borrow books and read to them. 
(VEF 2009)
11:25 Absolutely, I know of several WT names, and at the top we find Kevin, 
Devin, Liam, Neo, Melissa, Cassandra, preferably spelled the wrong way, for 
example Cevin ,Felikz, Cazzandra etc. Yuck! To me it’s actually lowbrow to 
spell the names so that pronunciation becomes wrong. 
Have a long list of names that I’m allergic to, but these are probably the worst. 
(TPP 2009) 
There are a couple of features in the cited postings worth mentioning. A parent 
who may be the object of suspicion in the communities (apart from the diagnosed, 
the negative or depressed, the fat, or the smoker etc.) is, as demonstrated, the poor 
mother with many children. In fact posting 11:22 hosts three commonly narrated 
traits that invite community annoyance – many children, an ADHD diagnosis and 
‘White Trash behaviour’. Postings 11:23 – 11:24 are generic, but in another manner 
– they place people in different settings to provide an example. In 11:23 the White 
Trash family is placed in a camping site, a rather classical location when wanting to 
describe the recreation activities of people from the perceived riffraff. In 11:24 the 
White Trash mother is removed from another type of location – the library. In this 
particular location refinement can be transmitted from generation to generation and 
the valuable asset of taste developed and the White Trash mother refrains from this 
reproduction strategy (Vincent & Ball, 2007): She can be found in certain places, 
whilst in others she is rarely seen. Postings 11:23 and 11:24 use place as a way of re-
producing the group. Whilst Allen and Taylor (2012: 2) apply the concept of placed 
parenthood as a way to portray the linking of certain places with social unrest and 
show how these places are condemned for weakening society as a whole, the places 
in postings 11:23 and 11:24 are even more local. They are, I believe, places of taste. 
280
By positioning the subject in a locality that is associated with a certain taste, the 
presumed reader is instructed how to understand her. 
The last example of a posting (11:25) focuses on yet another perceived typical 
characteristic of White Trash: The allegedly startling and ridiculous names they give 
their children. In the parental communities, this is thought of as a surface phenom-
enon that indicates the underlying (which in this case is bad taste). This manifests 
the other explanation for why the affective figure is applied; it is not utilised solely 
to defend the way the rejected subject is placed on the margins of society, but it is 
in addition employed as a cornerstone in the representations of the middle-class. In 
that sense I concur with Stephanie Lawler’s (2005: 430) proposition that the middle 
class self is constructed out of repulsion for ‘the low’, and because middle classiness 
cannot be produced in any other way than through distinction and contempt, the 
middle class identity is made out of it. This means that I picture the affective figure as 
both the prop for and the result of the contempt. It also implies that what we catch a 
glimpse of in the accounts of the bad taste of White Trash is the violence upon which 
the symbolic construction of the middle class rests.
So, if White trash is an affective figure, what type of affects does it produce? The 
responses to the poor white mother in the above postings are: An articulate fear of 
her procreative capacity (thus alluding to the poor as sexually unbounded), a merci-
ful  condescendence towards the low intelligence of White Trash, a distant frowning 
when looking at the badly raised children, patronizing laughter at the drunk people 
at the caravan siet, a disinterested lament over mothers who do not transfer refine-
ment to their children and an outspoken disdain for the perceived mental capacities 
of the group, as noted in the enumeration of deficiencies in posting 11:19. Yet, it is 
not the form of response that makes the affective figure so crucial; it is the way that 
the responses are forms of social abjection (Tyler, 2009: 87). 
Defending White Trash
At this point the narrated demarcation of White Trash as banal, narrow-minded, 
pathological people who have willingly embraced their own exclusion has been pre-
sented as if met with little or no protest. However, although defences of the perceived 
group are not regularly produced, they do exist in the communities. Nevertheless, 
the defences of people labelled White Trash are ineffective, and this inefficiency is ev-
ident in all defences of poor, ‘unfit’ and ‘unproductive’ subjects, who are considered 
problematic for one reason or another. Concluding this chapter we will begin a short 
excursion into the manner in which defenses of White Trash are carried out.
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In order to probe the defence we will return to the thread about the role of 
education in defeating poverty (see postings 11:13 – 11:18). In these postings the 
perceived appreciation of education in ‘developing countries’ was compared with an 
attributed aversion to higher education on the part of White Trash. In community 
conversation this construction of irresponsibility is, notably, seldom embraced com-
pletely or received unchallenged. The next postings constitute an attempt to critique 
the condescending note that underlies a label such as White Trash.
11:26 Are they BT in africa? Or perhaps CT? 
To me WT is just an expression of contempt, no matter how it’s explained 
(what you put into it, if it depends on the fact that they are poor, poorly ed-
ucated, smokers, taking up sms loans, single mothers with three daddies for 
their children etc.) is actually not interesting, it is the contempt one shows by 
labelling them the same that says something about oneself. 
N1 (TPP 2012) 
11:27 I think what you wrote now N1 was totally spot on, Right, couldn’t help 
but say it. Spot on. 
N2 (Answers posting above) 
11:28 Thanks, and yes, I get it! 
N1 (answers posting above)
11:29 I think the contempt one interprets in someone else’s argumentation 
says something about oneself and the preconceived views one has. 
N3 (Answers posting 11:23)
11:30  /…/ But the fact is that it would never be ok here in TPP to write black 
trash or coloured trash about any african ethnic group. Those who you call wt 
share their social and economic circumstances with many of their neighbours 
who are not ethnic Swedes. 
I hope the high horse is comfortable. 
N1 (Answers posting above)
11:31 You immediately jump to the conclusion that it’s about contempt just be-
cause you call a group a certain name but that’s not necessarily true. If I speak 
about brats I’m sure most people know what group of people I am referring to 
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and it’s because we have a common frame of reference that it’s about young, 
rich, spoiled people. It’s comfortable to use a terminology for a particular phe-
nomenon that can be understood by the vast majority. That this consequently 
is contempt lies in the eye of the beholder. 
N3 (Answers posting above)
Posting 11:26 points to a possible conceptual link between labelling poor white 
people White Trash and poor black people Black Trash. The overlapping interests of 
underprivileged groups are made clearer in posting 11:30 and an unarticulated false 
dichotomy of whites and blacks buried in the concept of White Trash is highlighted. 
However, the heterodoxy displayed in posting 11:26 does not seem to inflict any 
damage to the dominant perspective. It constitutes a weak critique of the affective 
figure since it mainly focuses on the attributed character traits of the group, much the 
same as the condescending perspectives do. It does mention poverty as one feature 
distinguishing the group labelled White Trash, but then the posting continues by 
enumerating choice, taste and moral values as perceived characteristics. White Trash 
is delineated as: poor, poorly educated, smokers, taking up sms loans, single mothers with 
three daddies for their children. It is as if the lion’s share of the dislocation is accepted, 
but it is rather the scorn that is viewed as the problem. The defence is thus based on 
the same conceptual metaphors as the scorn – its point of departure is taste displays, 
not materiality. When the defence of White Trash applies the same tropes as the 
one utilised in the construction of the figure, the image is strengthened rather than 
challenged. The fact that the criticism is directed towards the tone of voice applied 
in the debates about poor white people rather than how their living conditions are 
presented enables the defence in posting 11:31. Here, the scorn for the white poor 
is equated with the scorn directed towards ‘brats’ from the upper classes and this 
levelling can be done precisely because posting 11:26 never highlighted the misrecog-
nition of materiality that constitutes the disgust. The only thing posting 11:31 does 
is refute the accusation of scorn and so, the nick has not tried to avoid talking about 
materiality and resources and who has them and who does not have them, because 
materiality and resources were never the issue in the first place. Talking about the 
underprivileged or the privileged in this fashion is, I think, to abide by an ontological 
decorum of secrecy – some things are articulated and some are not. This, I believe, is 
a case of misrecognition pointing to an ideologically ordered discourse. The defenc-
es of White Trash still apply the content of the affective figure – they just prefer to 
change the type of affect displayed. They recognise the category but reject the label. 
Hence, in both types of account the poor mother remains a spectacle of subjectivity. 
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Summary 
In this chapter the rejected subject positions have been explored in greater depth, 
especially how they crystallise into affective figures. Initially I investigated concep-
tions about the poor and, subsequently, the same conceptions as they condense into 
notions about a particular white poor, labelled White Trash.
The recurrent viewpoint of the poor subject in general is that she is characterised 
by immaturity. This is thought of as entailing irresponsible acts, such as having too 
many babies. Apart from this, immaturity is evident in everything the poor subject 
does: She cannot raise her children, manage a household or repress her cravings for 
consumption. Resources such as money, or a lack of money, are excluded from the 
possible explanation for why she is poor and her functionality is placed at the center. 
Because she is made so dysfunctional, the main remedies for poverty are described 
as supervision, discipline and control on the one hand, and education and a kind 
of gentle modelling on the other. Norms guide this dressage, and although they are 
never fully articulatde, they seem to relate to middle class values. In the reaffirmation 
of the traditional housekeeping ideal planning is stressed over resources in such a 
manner that money is perceived as if elastic – money can be made to last longer by 
the right kind of manager. These ideals make a lack of material resources diminish 
into a question of thriftiness. In addition, descriptions of poverty tend to be vague 
and unspecific. Narrations use familiar and schematic understandings with few de-
tails and, hence, do not invite objections. The extreme tropes provoke few protests, 
putatively due to lack of specificity. This distillate of the vague but inflammatory 
descriptions can be noted in the idea of the particularly problematic white poor 
– White Trash. This narrated category is demarcated by two features: It is different 
(from other types of poor people as well as from ‘us’) and lacks refinement, so White 
Trash is conceptualised on the level of personality. Poor white people are narrated as 
ignorant, narrow-minded, out-dated and superficial and these personality defects si-
multaneously explain their social exclusion and their subordinate position in society. 
Despite the fact that White Trash constitutes a fairly stable discursive moment, 
this particular image of poor people stills hosts ambiguities. Although the trope of 
White Trash is employed as a constitutive outside of the middle class, the communi-
ties seem from time to time to have problems separating White Trash women from 
middle class women. Apparently femininity is an arena where mix-ups can still take 
place and the problem is the shared aesthetics – the fact that heterosexual ideals of 
female sexuality borrow so many attributes from the perceived taste of White Trash. 
The struggle to maintain the symbolic boundaries between the middle class and 
‘the low’ is never as flagrant as when the nicks attempt to sort women into the two 
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appointed categories, where both ‘types’ of women are allowed to display the body, 
but only one is defined as vulgar. The threat coming from White Trash is, hence, that 
people delineated as such would resemble the middle class too much. Yet another 
threat is described as White Trash diluting the very same middle class by unrestricted 
procreation. Genes can apparently be a source of salvation (when the middle class 
procreate) and a means of destruction (when unruly, obese and poor people do the 
same). The children resulting from problematic genes are portrayed as robbed of op-
portunities by their tasteless parents, or appreciated as sharing the defects from the 
start (such as in the trope of ADHD).
The extensive tropes are employed not only to scorn White Trash but in addition 
to defend them. The shared tropes result in a small assortment of metaphors to 
describe poor white people delineated as White Trash. The tropes restrict particular 
descriptions, such as white poor people being precisely that – poor. In that way a 
misrecognition is ensured; the notion that the problem with the white poor is not 
that they are poor but that they, because of their many character flaws, probably 
deserve to be. 
Case closed? On suspended resistance and interpellated words
There is little resistance towards the notion of the irresponsible subject as condensed 
in the figure of White Trash. When resistance is inserted, such as in postings 11:26 
– 11:31, it takes as a point of departure the same descriptions as applied by the 
dominant discourse, thereby launching the opposition from a subordinate position. 
The reason for this is, I believe, that these descriptions are a result of an ideologically 
ordered discourse.
According to Martha L. Fineman (1991: 292 f.), ideology is functional. It is a 
selection machine that gives coherence and structure to political discourses. When 
an ideology is dominant it will not be overtly challenged. It is stable, but more im-
portantly it is a whole system or cluster of symbols and beliefs and because of that 
it will be referenced in highly separate discourses. Fineman envisions ideology as a 
series of synapses that form various combinations for different appeals. The key con-
cept of ideology is one and the same: ‘its core images define the discourses produced 
by both the proponent of the status quo and its critic’ (ibid: 293). This means that 
in order to become trustworthy, oppositional positions need to apply shared aspects 
of the ideology in question. Thus, ideology can be comprehended as a bank account 
from which one may withdraw the same type of currency, regardless of the errand. 
When accused, White Trash are described as single, smoking mothers taking up sms 
loans, and when defended the description is the same. Certain words, images and 
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metaphors – entire repertoires – are made to belong to ideology. In other words, 
there are hardly any rhetorical models at hand by which to state that poor people 
are competent, stable and responsible, with the ability to manage the family finances 
very well given the scarce resources at their disposal, or that poverty is a matter of 
how resources or profits are distributed. Irrespective of whether you want to celebrate 
or reject the morals of a community, you need to adjust or relate to ‘the chances of 
material and symbolic profit which the laws of price formation characteristic of a 
given market objectively offer to the holders of a given linguistic capital’ (Bourdieu, 
1991/2012: 51). What Bourdieu envisages here is how particular accents (for in-
stance rural working class accents or inner city bourgeoisie accents) are capital that 
is given an objective value, which can be exchanged for other types of capital. My 
understanding of linguistic capital in a web community is instead the meaning and 
status given to words by the members of the community and what is invested into 
these words. If seeing linguistic capital this way it becomes, I believe, objective (i.e., 
cannot be changed due to the will of an individual), much the same as coins and 
bank notes are objective. 
In order to participate in a rhetoric game of a particular field you need to articu-
late yourself in a legitimate way. Arguably, this leads to thought becoming socialised 
by the ways of language: the mâitre a parler transforms into the mâitre a penser (ibid: 
48 f.). This explains the weak defences of White Trash. Apparently, both the scorn 
and the refutation ‘ignore the individual and world conditions which are the source 
of the ideas’ (Marx & Engels, 1845/1988: 68). Within this type of ideological inter-
pretative repertoires we can seemingly do little but underline the very content in the 
images used for the scorning, regardless of our intentions.

287
12. Results and discussion
In this dissertation I have explored the way that the perceived division of labour 
between the parent and the welfare state is expressed and negotiated in Sweden’s two 
biggest parental web communities where peers willingly interact. By so doing, the in-
tention was to map out and explain subject positions of a more encompassing nature 
– ideals that are formulated as if general and universal, and what underpins them. In 
order to fulfil the aim, postings from the public domains of two Swedish commercial 
parental communities were collected. The research questions have been answered by 
a discourse analysis, which was conducted by deconstructing the manner in which 
accounts are made to appear convincing through the interlinking or separation of 
elements that are constructed as meaningful, or less meaningful. The investigation 
also included analyses of ideology, comprehended as the fashion in which versions 
of reality are made to assume particular contours, as for instance when certain dis-
cursive elements are concealed, construed as irrelevant or portrayed as the outcome 
of unquestionable characteristics, and understood as manifesting when several dis-
courses offer the same point of view.
In this concluding chapter I intend to summarise the results from the seven ana-
lytical chapters and discuss their meaning. The first section of the chapter consists of 
a presentation of the main results, after which I reflect on the relation of the study 
to the discipline of social work and to previous research. The final section contains a 
discussion about some of the implications of the result.
Summary and results
The research questions formulated in the introduction of the dissertation have been 
answered and discussed in the seven analytical chapters. Initially, some of the pre-
ferred subject positions in the two communities were analysed and in Chapter Five I 
demonstrated that self presentation is a strategic investment that comes with its own 
prescriptions. Some of these prescriptions revolve around manifestations of mental 
stability, sincerity and gratitude, and the analysis revealed how abiding by these rules 
of narration constitutes one of the main strategies for controlling the image of self. 
Another royal road to achieving status is discussing other subjects, preferably those 
who are presented as if they embody a defective character that can be contrasted with 
that of the nick writing. One may also choose to narrate stories about subjects who 
allegedly praise the nick, for example the nick’s own child. Both of these strategies 
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can be read as subjectivation-by-proxy-strategies that pull people into the narration 
and make them highlight the narrator’s personality traits.
Chapter Six was devoted to an investigation of the discursive foundation, or the 
common denominator of self presentation – the possibility, preference and obliga-
tion to make choices. The concept of choice was deconstructed into its conceptual 
components of ‘control’, ‘self-knowledge’ and ‘responsibility’. I found that choice 
was handled as an ideal of quite an etheric character in the sense that it is not associ-
ated with any tangible effects. It is not expected that choice necessarily accomplishes 
change; choice is instead apprehended as performing its work inside of the subject, 
where it becomes manifest as a reformed attitude. In fact, the very activity of making 
a choice is viewed as the body of evidence that proves that the work on the self was 
properly realised: Making a choice is in that sense an end in itself. The etheric shape 
of the concept can be summarised in the interpretative repertoire of Mind over mat-
ter, which organises much of the content in the parental communities and is used 
in various ways. It may be applied to discursively diminish the presumed impact of 
external resources or assets on the way that the subject is made to feel, thereby stress-
ing the importance of inner capacities. In addition the repertoire forms the basis of a 
subject paragon that I labelled the Homo Eligens, a kind of narrative personification 
of the preference for choice that receives its content from the tenets of positive think-
ing and self-help discourse.
Because of this tendency to disregard assets in the material sense (money, edu-
cation or entitlements etc.) and instead focus on the inner essence of the subject, 
Chapter Seven concentrated on The Homo Eligens in cooperation with other sub-
jects, especially interactions mediated through institutions of the welfare state. On 
the basis of the findings that the Homo Eligens was delineated as free from many 
societal alignments, in this chapter I posed the question: If the Homo Eligens is so 
independent, how can societal organisation take place and how should it, ideally, take 
place? I found an operative discursive component of contracts that structures much of 
the content around societal organisation. In the communities the contract between 
the individual and society seemed to be rooted in a layman version of liberal contract 
theory, irrespective of whether the contract was applied to depict a contemporary 
morality on decline, or to represent an image of a less compassionate society that is 
no longer interested in providing for its weakest members. The former viewpoint was 
found to belong to a dominant discourse. This discourse enables representations of 
some subjects – especially those who use particular (economic) resources provided 
by the welfare state – as morally inferior and freeriding on resources that do not 
justifiably belong to them. Instead, what is promoted is a contractual design that 
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permits individual morality to be made more important than formally sanctioned 
institutional rules. This preference has its own logic that stipulates that when sound 
morals are installed in the subject the rest will follow; one will become hard-working 
and industrious and rely less upon the support systems of the welfare state. The pref-
erence was summarised in an interpretative repertoire: Morality comes first. 
In community conversation the most important contract is the intimate contract 
situated inside the family, where sound or unsound ideals are conveyed from an early 
age, either preventing the subject from becoming a burden to society in the future, 
or making her into precisely that burden. The strong preference for this intimate 
contract constituted the reason for Chapter Eight to address the situation inside the 
family. If the most important contracting party is a member of a family, and if the 
most effective transportation of norms and ideals is assumed to take place inside it, 
Chapter Eight laid bare some of its components. In this chapter I detected that the 
way the family (and especially the activities of parents) is metaphorically structured 
in terms of work and achievement. Because parenthood is outlined in such a fashion, 
it makes the communities conceive of it as yet another technology of the self – it is 
realised through commitment, dedication and interest, and the parent who sets her 
mind to it will succeed in inoculating the child with prosperity. In short, social effort 
seems to supersede social access. This rule of narration gives the notion of social class 
a particular appearance – instead of allowing unequal access to resources and acqui-
sitions to explain why parents seemingly parent with different results, a meritocratic 
principle has the upper hand – if you invest in your child you shall harvest a good 
result. This finding was condensed in an interpretative repertoire summarised as: You 
should reap what you sow. It is probably this repertoire that explains why the commu-
nities are so focused on evaluations of different investments in the child, in particular 
ways of fostering it as well as in techniques to shape its preference. However, the 
frantic parental activity to guide the child is narrated with a nuance of desperation 
and the debates in which the nicks confront each other for not being strict enough, 
or not loving enough, host an element of the precarious position of the parent. Be-
cause parenting is considered work – something you do rather than something that 
you are – and because children are conceptualised as results of that work, failure can 
only be due to parental deficiency.
Nevertheless, when studying the parental communities the notions of investment 
come across as multifaceted. The way that the subject should allow herself to be 
governed by a set of moral principles, the way in which she should invest in her own 
wellbeing and the way that she ought to transmit these values to the next generation 
apparently does not work in each and every situation. In the communities there are 
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regular discussions about how to address failures or cases of ‘unfitness’. Chapter Nine 
therefore investigated explanations for and strategies to combat cases of unfitness. 
To exemplify community conceptions of unfitness I chose three recurrent topics of 
conversation: Workplace-related stress, obesity and the neuropsychiatric syndrome 
of ADHD. I found that the theme of stress is especially demarcated by reluctance to-
wards explanations that allow the account to be influenced by external factors, such 
as the actual workload. Stress is mostly apprehended as emanating from the wrong 
type of choice; the subject who should have anticipated stress and made preparations 
accordingly failed to do so. When dealing with obesity blame is, perhaps surprising-
ly, less articulated. Instead, the topic of concern seems to be evaluating appropriate 
solutions. The preferred strategy for weight loss is diet and exercise, and resorting to a 
more technical solution such as the gastric bypass is only tolerated if the first solution 
did not work. The preference is expressed in the interpretative repertoire Don’t take 
the easy way out. The same aversion towards shortcuts, albeit less clear cut, is seen 
in debates about remedies for ADHD. Although one may note both critique of the 
diagnosis as a way of taking the easy way out and proposals that the diagnosis is not 
a sign of having chosen the easy way out, it is striking that the proponents of the for-
mer perspective attack the proponents of the latter, not the other way around. This 
tendency may be explained as a thoroughgoing community concern with instrumen-
tal improvement (in the case of ADHD this improvement would be medication) that 
putatively brackets the rule of working on oneself. The tension may also be explained 
as a result of the necessity to display emotional capital – to signal a familiarity with 
‘high culture’ (in this case dominant emotional or cognitive ways of understanding 
the psyche) – only in the case of ADHD, the issue of what is the proper emotional 
capital is not fully resolved.
Apart from the necessity of displaying inclinations towards choice and a par-
ticular emotional capital, the communities appear to also relate to a kind of gen-
dered capital, meaning that the ideals of choice and responsibility are applied to 
the particular position of woman. Accordingly, Chapter Ten inquired into subject 
positions assigned specifically to women, where the research question was: What is 
discursively required of the heterosexual woman? The analysis pointed to ‘difference’ 
and ‘dependence’ as two recurrent discursive nodes of narration. Because the context 
is thoroughly heteronormative difference is assumed to mean the difference between 
a man and a woman, where dependency is comprehended as the result of that dif-
ference. Dependency is represented in two main ways. Firstly, it is comprehend-
ed as unproblematic to have people depend upon you (especially if ‘people’ means 
children), whereas you should not be overly dependent upon people (especially if 
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‘people’ means a husband or partner). Secondly and paradoxically, dependency is 
simultaneously seen as the glue in a heterosexual relationship. Dependency between 
the man and the woman is, hence, viewed as both good and bad. Lingering through 
the narration is an unarticulated presumption of a sexual contract in which two 
responsible subjects are to cooperate and make the most of productive and fertile dif-
ferences. When discursive elements such as subordination and exploitation threatens 
the presumed fertility of difference, the narration assumes another character – the 
agency of the man is diminished, whilst the agency of the woman becomes enlarged, 
or victimhood is diluted in various ways. This particular guilt-imposing rationality 
of victimhood crystallises as concealing the unsecure clauses of the sexual contract, 
where the woman cannot control that the relation will be of an equal character, only 
hope for it.
Throughout the analytic chapters the analyses of desirable and less desirable sub-
ject positions were intertwined. The rationalities of choice, responsibility, work and 
investments that support the accounts provide prescriptions for the good life and 
explanations for why it is lacking is certain circumstances. The rationality is, as re-
vealed in Chapters Seven and Eight, visible in the ideal of the Homo Eligens, the 
choosing and responsible subject. But the Homo Eligens has a constitutive outside 
where elements are placed that cannot be associated with the figure if it is to keep its 
heroic character traits. In the final analytical chapter, Chapter Eleven, I demonstrat-
ed the ways in which the most common affective figure in the communities, the poor 
woman with children, becomes that constitutive outside. 
The summation of this affective figure is relatively uncomplicated – she is 
everything that the Homo Eligens is not; she is non-choosing, irresponsible, taste-
less, unruly, spoilt, and lazy. The analysis demonstrated that poor people are most 
often reproduced in manners that are simultaneously vague and inflammatory. 
Through narrative techniques of a systematic vagueness where derogatory images can 
be launched without having to be proved or legitimised, and of a join-the-dots-pa-
thologisation that guides the reader’s eye from one anecdotic piece of evidence to 
another, the poor mother is depicted as especially feral, which becomes yet another 
support for interventions directed against her. The chapter concluded by an analysis 
of this affective manner of presenting poverty. Whilst the postings analysed in Chap-
ter Seven and Eight celebrated the Homo Eligens, in Chapter Eleven its contrasting 
counterpart is the affective figure of ‘White Trash’. This figure is a relatively stable 
discursive moment that reiterates the unrefined character traits that are favoured in 
the communities when discussing poor people. The most pressing issue concerning 
poverty, as described in the parental communities, is poor people procreating. As the 
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analysis in Chapter Eight revealed, the middle class mother is delineated as investing 
into the child’s formation. The White Trash mother is sketched as if she neglects 
this task – if she does not ruin the child by transmitting bad genes, it is damaged by 
a lack of cultural transmission. This indicates, once again, the strong metaphorical 
structuration of parenthood as work. The main problem with the White Trash moth-
er seems to be precisely that: She does not consider motherhood work. In Chapter 
Eleven I suggested that the cogent metaphorical structuration of parenthood on the 
one hand and poverty on the other explains the limited tropes available to articu-
late poor white mothers as something other than weak, passive, parasitic or danger-
ous. This feature gives the few defences of White Trash visible in the communities a 
particular contour. Defence fortifies the disparaging descriptions instead of refuting 
them, and the issue of concern becomes the tone of voice in the descriptions of poor 
mothers, rather than the content of the description.
These are the overall results of the analysis. In what follows the results will be 
related to the specific research questions and further discussed.
The contract and the parent
As I have pointed out, one pervading metaphor guiding representation seems to be 
parenthood conceptualised as work. Although research question number one (How 
is the parent narrated and supported?) appears to have several answers, it should 
be understood as guided by this core metaphor. Work is implied in the narration 
of the parent as a manager of the life chances and future habitus of the child, as 
well as alluded to in the imposed additional demands, for instance to compensate 
for structurally conditioned inequalities and maldistribution of resources. The way 
to support these expectations is through a linking of parental activities with a soli-
dary responsibility to deliver functioning citizens to ‘society’.  Parental activities are, 
hence, not only linked to a private or personal morality but to a kind of civil one. 
It is a civic duty to provide society with well-behaved and competent human raw 
material. In that sense, being a good parent equals being a good citizen.
If parents have a duty to deliver human raw material some type of relationship 
seems to exist between parents and the welfare state. However, the answer to research 
question number two (How is the division of responsibility between the family and 
society constructed?) appears to be multi-facetted: The division is simultaneously 
narrated as quite simple and complicated. It is simple because the family is represent-
ed as the entity that holds the irrefutable responsibility. The representations of ‘socie-
ty’ are more complex. Society is represented as both a benevolent assistant providing 
resources and as a foreman requiring a certain type of subject to be manufactured. It 
293
is as if a contract had been signed – the subjects have received equal possibilities of 
refining themselves and now have the responsibility of transforming the possibilities 
into a good life. This is perhaps seen most clearly in the interpretative repertoires of 
the communities. The repertoires are versions of the world and, I would like to add, 
they are prescriptions for how the world idealistically ought to function. So, I under-
stand them as contract clauses or rules of conduct guiding the subject’s constitution, 
expectations and work ethics. Morality comes first regulates the preferred constitution 
of the subject; (once the subject is morally firm on the inside, she will be able to take 
part in society without exploiting it). You should reap what you sow revolves around 
expectations; (the subject should expect returns that relate precisely to the amount 
of time or work that she invested in a particular venture, or she should expect even 
less sometimes, since performing a responsible choice does not always pay off in a 
robust change).  Don’t take the easy way out governs the work ethic; (when working 
on one’s refinement and betterment and when wanting to achieve something one 
cannot allow oneself any type of short-cuts). In the empiric material no repertoires 
are found that regulate society’s tasks or responsibilities. The contract party seems 
to be situated on one side of the table. Municipalities, political parties, boards and 
committees, law enforcement or taxes – all of which are the result of subjects joined 
together – are absent as perceived prime movers of a subject.
Nevertheless, although society is made to shoulder almost none of the responsi-
bility, features from the outside world are reflected in the community accounts. The 
answer to research question number five (How do these various ways to construct 
subject ideals, parents and parenthood relate to broader societal contexts?) is perhaps 
best grasped by focusing on two tendencies. The first is the community assertion 
that it is interior qualifications that enable a good life for a citizen-subject or good 
prospects for a child – the focus upon essence rather than assets. This thoroughgoing 
notion has its counterpart in the calls from the political and mass media domains: 
For parents and children to assume responsibility in matters of school performance, 
in the way that editorial pages suggest that rebellious teenagers are the product of in-
adequate parents, or the fashion in which character building activities are presumed 
to foster a nation’s subjects. To the reader it is perhaps striking that specifically im-
materiality and responsibility manifest as subject ideals in community conversation, 
parallel to the startling rise in the disparity in the distribution of household incomes 
in OECD countries, Sweden included (Cingano, 2014: 8), and the reduction of 
incomes in the segment of the Swedish population that retired early, is unemployed 
or afflicted by long-term illness (Lundberg, 2007: 10). As the presumption of this 
study is that the outside world influences community conversation, one would per-
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haps imagine the opposite scenario and expect to see conversation revolving around 
isues of justice or equality. Instead, the situation appears to be reversed – the more 
the structural conditions for citizen-subjects harden, the more frequently the hope 
and/or the demands on the individual subject surface. It seems as if not everything 
situated outside the parental communities influences them, but rather what is said 
about the outside world. 
The second tendency worth mentioning is that of making societal injustices into 
persons or figures. The unemployed or those who retired early are in the parental web 
communities not described as such, but usually depicted as possessing a set of poorly 
developed character skills and the metaphor most often applied is that of White 
Trash. This narrative disposition also has its match outside the communities. The 
simpleminded, poor and chain-smoking Morran in the Swedish TV series Morran 
och Tobias, a character based on a mix of ‘hillbilly’ and White Trash stereotypes, and 
her British counterpart in the famous chav Vicky Pollard from the BBC comedy se-
ries Little Britain, resemble almost down to the smallest details the way that the poor 
white mother is described in the parental communities – feckless, immature and ab-
ject. Social media, Imogen Tyler argues (2013: 165) are ‘a critical part of this process 
in that they enable publics to shape and craft the chav as a knowable figure /…/ The 
chav as national abject is brought to life and vitalized with negative qualities through 
interaction’. That is, first the figure is launched as a fictional character and later, in 
the domain of public interaction, made real. Poor white mothers are thus not known 
to us as such, but as something else – in the communities a character named White 
Trash becomes a ‘perceptual reality’ (ibid.: 165). However, it is not only fictional 
characters that inspire conversation in the communities. When debating the poor it 
seems as if a kind of folk etymology is operating. This result in stereotypes nurtured 
by other media representations, for example by the poverty porn that Tracey Jensen 
(2014) unveils. The community accounts of people taking out loans to buy furniture 
or the latest smart phone, or the suggestions that in addition to being poor, poor 
parents have failed to provide their children with the necessary balance between dis-
cipline and warmth, resemble the dramaturgy of TV shows, editorials and political 
proposals. In sum, we see that political calls, as well as mass media interpretation of 
these calls, are found within the community setting.
Ideals
The generic ideals of immateriality and responsibility appear in the communities 
as more hands-on ideals of how to behave, who to be and how to think. Research 
question number three (What generic subject ideals emerge in the discussions about 
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parenthood? How are these ideals to be achieved? How are failures explained?) is 
perhaps best answered by returning to the subject paragon of the Homo Eligens. 
The subject is to stay in control and have sufficient self-knowledge to choose respon-
sibly and assume liability for the way that her life turns out. Perceived failures are 
explained as the result of neglecting the work on inner refinement (the opposite of a 
suitable self-technology). But failures are not only conceived as passivity; failures can 
be represented as the result of the wrong type of activity. The preferred activity is pru-
dent and calculating, whilst the rejected type is understood as cunningly exploiting 
the system, i.e., the activity is described in terms of a violation of rules.
It seems as if the ideal of the Homo Eligens is an ideal of inner freedom. The 
question is what this ideal enables, and what it precludes? To achieve the Homo Eli-
gens there are some basic rules to abide by. The subject needs to control her reactions 
to the world and ensure that she stays fit to live in it, she should not make demands 
on society in terms of delivery but such demands should be directed inwards, and she 
cannot use exterior conditions (society, money, class or materiality) as excuses for a 
problematic situation. As we can see, the Homo Eligens is achieved through a highly 
constrained self-definition. Why is that? I propose it is because it serves some other 
function besides self-definition – less tangible but still useful. It may potentially be 
a mannequin that markets something. Much the same as the mannequin is a body 
different from most concrete human bodies and much the same as window-shop-
pers know this, the Homo Eligens cannot be questioned too severely, scrutinised 
too intrusively, or condemned for not looking like the subject ‘in reality’. This, I 
think, is the reason why the world outside the subject needs to be sketched in such 
a limited way. If delineated with all its multifarious characteristics and if believed to 
have the capacity to inflict damage on the subject, the ideal of self-sufficiency would 
rupture. But the rationale behind the image of the Homo Eligens may be even cru-
eller. This subject ideal may well be a consequence of an ideology of austerity, telling 
us that being precarious does not (or should not) hurt: We can and must cope with 
it. However, much the same as when trying on the trousers that seemed perfect on 
the mannequin, subjects-in-the-flesh will lose out from the ideals. If the solution to 
fitting into the trousers is to go on a diet, the question is what the subject needs to 
do to fit into the Homo Eligens?
Women
Despite being a venue mainly populated by women, it is the life experiences of wom-
en that, oddly enough, most frequently disturb the ideals embraced in the parental 
communities. Accounts from the life of the heterosexual woman are perhaps the 
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narration that most clearly articulates the uncertainties residing in the ideals of the 
Homo Eligens and the notions of contract regulating human interaction. In com-
munity conversation the monogamous relationship of the nuclear family seems to 
be endorsed and yet survival kits are handed out, aimed at reducing the damage that 
may be inflicted in the very same relationship.  Research question number four (How 
is the female subject positioned in discussions about family, parenthood, dependency 
and intimacy?) has been answered by looking into accounts on gender equality and 
what may happen if it is not achieved. The accounts on these issues in the com-
munities acknowledge that the sexual contract comes with unsecure clauses, that 
it may produce situations of tension and most accounts advocate a rights perspec-
tive to even out potential inequalities. Nevertheless, the conversations about gender 
equality contain discursive limitations. One is the reluctance to allow the feature of 
exploitation into explanatory accounts and the other is talking about dependence in 
a way that makes it stand in the way of liberation. Discourse apparently cannot ac-
commodate the duties that come with having more fragile subjects such as children 
depending on your labour; a feature that is perhaps surprising in communities that 
use ‘parental’ in their title. This characteristic of conversation makes the woman in-
visible (or abstract) in two senses. The social contract seemingly fails to consider her 
in her ‘female predicament’ as mother in a patriarchal society and the sexual contract 
in which she is simultaneously situated cannot make her predicament as a depend-
ency worker visible. This would imply she is regarded neither as a gendered, nor as 
a generic subject, which gives the gender equality discourse a peculiarly negating 
contour, notable in the way that the nicks dissociate themselves from the notion of 
subjugation. In short, they seem not to want to belong to the side of the oppressed 
party. Instead, they often treat stories of being exploited or subordinated as an un-
reality or a misconception; something is considered lacking, or something needs to 
be explained by additional information residing outside of the account. This is pos-
sibly the most indigestible result of the analysis – the nicks do not want to associate 
themselves with subjugated women and so, they write as if this position is dubious. 
How to go on from here? Social work and research
This study is a contribution to research on parenthood in our era and its related 
subject ideals, and although not leaving hands-on suggestions to the professional 
domain of social work, it indicates a context to which, I believe, this field needs to 
relate. Next, I will link the result of the study to potential challenges for contempo-
rary social work and to questions of where to place the analytical findings in relation 
to previous and on-going research on the topic. 
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Through the analysis of the postings inserted in the two parental communities I 
hope to have presented some of the ways that norms operate in a contemporary 
setting that engages so many people. I also wished to reveal the manner in which 
norms negotiated in a local arena resonate with those outside it, as well as the way 
subjects can become the target of our benevolence or our loathing, with the very 
same norms prescribing who to embrace and who to reject. Social identities move 
with the times and for social work it is therefore imperative to understand the way in 
which subjects are ‘made to happen’. I hope to have presented the fashion in which 
negotiation about the welfare state and its subjects has become imbued with notions 
that undermine its mandate to redistribute resources and alleviate suffering. In my 
study the subjects of the welfare state seems not entirely sure they need it, or rather; 
they are not entirely sure that the welfare state should be as encompassing as it is cur-
rently crafted (although forcefully cropped during the last two decades). My results 
indicate that social work has a potential problem of credibility, or has to compete 
with a kind of ‘logic of intimacy’ i.e., a way of transmitting the logic of the small 
community (here: the family or the individual) onto a larger community. This way of 
reasoning is classic liberalism, represented amongst others by Milton Friedman, who 
considered the family to be the essential operative entity in society (1962: 33). If the 
communities view the family as the most accomplished unit of societal organisation 
we can understand why it is simultaneously considered the most problematic one. 
The reason is because all that is vital for a subject to function is presumed to take 
place there. Viewpoints such as these are not new. The family has historically been 
positioned ‘outside and above economic structuring, market forces and financial, 
legal, technological and political change, as a pillar of supposed stability’ (Silva & 
Smart, 1999/2004: 2). Instead, these images seem to have gained renewed authority. 
If the discursive tendencies detected in this study – the more structural inequalities 
are laid bare, the more hope is directed at the detached single individual to provide 
the solution – is really what has happened, social work is surrounded by discours-
es threatening the view of human organisation upon which it rests. This, in turn, 
implies that social work will need to position itself in relation to such discourses. It 
must consider external agents that influence its legitimacy, such as politicians pro-
moting the necessity of character building or newspapers analysing suburban riots 
and describing the cause as parental negligence. This overlap of opinion conjures 
an ideal of immateriality that could potentially serve a retreating welfare state. So-
cial work is, after all, maintained by institutional practices that rest upon particular 
discourses, making them affect people who use the services provided (Fahlgren & 
Sawyer, 2005: 97).
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The study was conducted in a particular Swedish context. Simultaneously, it was 
carried out in a political situation that prevails throughout Europe – that of austerity. 
Although specifically Swedish, the study is simultaneously situated at a cross-country 
junction of societal retreat and service dismantling on the one hand and upgrading 
of families as a potential factory of ‘good morality’ on the other (see Jensen, 2012). 
The dissertation shows how subjects try to understand the way they are supposed to 
govern themselves when politics disengage and lays bare the possible consequences – 
the way in which the nicks have begun sorting people into groups that are assigned 
different values and alleged different access to aid and support. It is an investigation 
into the transfer of a societal crisis embodied in austerity programmes to a sense of 
uneasiness amongst the middle class, who imagines society falling apart, not because 
of neoliberal austerity programmes but because of the people depending on them. 
If social work is not to be turned into to a policing of the social order it needs to 
consider ‘the fabrication of citizen-subjects and [of ] their relation to the social order’ 
(Cruikshank, 1993: 335). Social work addresses need and dependency. If need and 
dependency gradually become even more stigmatized it may affect public approval of 
the taxes underpinning social work. If that is the case, the welfare state is undergoing 
transformation, possibly away from a consensus that it is something that everyone 
is dependent on and to which most of us are compelled to contribute (Therborn, 
1991).
Previous and further research
This particular study is a continuation of the (mainly British and American) work to 
capture the way that demands and aspirations on the level of family politics appear 
amongst parents. My point of departure is the examination of a Swedish setting 
where both the discursive and material contexts are quite different – the officially 
promoted gender equality discourses, the long tenure of the Social Democratic Party, 
the (partly abandoned) political tradition of a more encompassing redistribution and 
the generally more positive attitude towards welfare institutions. My contribution to 
this branch of research is, apart from wanting to study the phenomenon through a 
Swedish lens, the way in which the analysis has probed a venue where subjects can 
express themselves when a little less restricted by conventional etiquette, and when 
partly protected by pseudonymity. The parental community is a venue where in-
delicate statements are presumably easier to submit, as well as statements of a more 
intimate and delicate nature. The arena is one that intertwines honesty and rhetoric, 
which makes it stand out in relation to previous research on parents’ self-concep-
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tions.120 It is, I believe, a prolific venue for investigating the subject when both visible 
to others but still maintaining a high level of agency to decide on what to write and 
what opinions to express.
The research field of contemporary parenthood – and thus of a more generic 
subjectivity – is broad and this study has investigated merely a fraction of it. Conse-
quently, in a Swedish research setting there are several routes of inquiry that would be 
productive in order to elucidate the conditions under which subjects at the present 
time can articulate the experience of being a citizen or a parent, voice the simplicity 
or the predicament involved in responding to and/or fulfilling the calls from the po-
litical domains, live up to the institutional requirements or ask for help or assistance 
in a situation of strain. The transformation of macroeconomics from the industrially 
incused 1970s to the neoliberally constituted present has entailed grave inequali-
ties, not least when it comes to the growing economic disparities (Tyler, 2013: 5). 
Although the UK or the U.S should not be thoughtlessly equated with Sweden, my 
result is situated not far from the intense parenting strategies investigated by Glenda 
Wall (2010), Carol Vincent’s and Stephen J. Ball’s (2007) finding of the reproduc-
tion strategies steering middle class mothers, Bridget Byrne’s (2006) investigation of 
middle class mothers’ ways to perform distinctions and Val Gillies’ (2005 b) study 
exposing the notion of a presumed linkage between ‘proper’ parenting and increased 
social mobility. I understand these research contributions as attempts to analyse the 
way that transformations in the areas of economics, welfare policies and political 
aims have become discourse, (often guided by an ideologically infused ideal of as-
suming personal responsibility for oneself and one’s family), and as ways of exploring 
how this discourse is personified in parent’s strategies and investments. In several 
Northern European countries, including Denmark, Sweden and Finland, sporadic 
studies have begun to deliver a deepened understanding of the manner in which 
calls for responsibilisation have been embraced in this part of the world. It is vital 
to continue this approach, so that Anglo-Saxon results are not uncritically adopted 
in the analysis of the Nordic context, where welfare institutions have traditionally 
been given another type of standing and class politics has historically been stressed 
(Svallfors, 2004: 130).
One valuable track would be to carry on with in depth studies into the rela-
tion between discursive prescriptions and everyday concrete action – a question not 
120 The study also differs from studies carried out within the empiric field itself; the parental web 
communities (see for instance Pedersen & Smithson, 2013; Taddicken, 2014 and Hargittai, 2007). 
In this research field interest has mainly been directed towards user experience or user patterns, 
whilst this study explores the actual content of conversation.
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addressed by this study. How, for example, does the intention to choose the right 
environment, the right type of acquaintances or the right type of schools for one’s 
children unfold in everyday practice? Such an ambition is notable in Karlsson et al. 
(2013) which comprises an explorative investigation into the way performing choic-
es becomes an identity claim amongst Swedish parents of preschool children. The 
sensation of choosing for the child, as a representative of the child and the very moral 
obligation to choose may indicate how advanced the policing of the parental soul has 
become, which calls for more research. The sorting that seems to take place, where 
non-choosing parents are viewed as morally inferior, may be a sign of the very same 
result that I found in the material from the parental web communities – the manner 
in which performing a choice has become equated with displaying good taste and 
thus dislocates matters of access and privilege. Moreover, such a result points towards 
questions of parental reliance on the welfare state. The allegedly strong pressure to 
choose could perhaps be a sign of a rupture in the visions of the social contract: If 
the welfare state is thought of as incapable of providing for my family, alternative 
strategies are developed. 
The analysis of the material from the parental communities indicates that becom-
ing a parent does not mean entering into a fellowship of joint interest. This could 
perhaps be labelled an almost generic result when studying parenting, bearing in 
mind the historic divides between different types of parents. To put it simply, bond 
servants and barons have in all times entered into parenthood with different oppor-
tunities and possibly with no illusions of the opposite. What has changed since then 
is, perhaps, primarily discourse. This is big enough. The pseudo egalitarian stances in 
the parental communities could be described as a kind of fool’s gold promising equal 
opportunities when in reality there are none. We would therefore need to begin an 
inquest into matters of ‘discursive damage’, i.e., the way that the alleged similarity 
of opportunity impacts on subjects positioned differently in relation to privilege.121 
In the arena of social work, that may imply continued studies of the interaction 
in parental or prenatal classes as Wissö (2012) begun in her dissertation, as well as 
studies on the way that the social workers, nurses and therapists leading these classes 
perceive parents from different social strata. Moreover, an essential part of research 
would need to direct its attention towards matters of both the manner in which 
institutional discourses of responsibility are launched and resisted. Lastly, studies on 
ideology need to be further developed, especially on austere ideology, which would 
make research leave the domain of parenthood and direct attention to matters of the 
121 Studies with these aims have, as I have presented, been carried out outside of Sweden, but would 
need to also be pursued further here.
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generic citizen-subject. In this study, she happens to be a parent, but she could just 
as well have been a senior citizen, an immigrant or a tax payer told that some subjects 
freeride on her contribution to the welfare state. In other words, we need to consider 
the subject positions of parent, tax payer and generic citizen as interrelated.
Austere ideology
This study has investigated the sorting of elements in order to comprehend the struc-
ture of discourse, i.e., its ideological functions. The viewpoint of ideology (although 
I have employed the concept of misrecognition to highlight a particular dimen-
sion of ideology) has been materialistic in the sense of viewing ideology as primarily 
decided by material conditions (Marx & Engels, 1845/1988: 30). I have labelled 
the ideology organising much of community discourse an ideology of austerity. The 
chapter will conclude by a discussion about this ideology and will address subject 
positions as they are made to look in times of austerity.
The main relation between the political economy and subject positions found 
in the analysis goes, I think, through the link austerity-precarity. Political economy 
ordains a diminishing welfare state; the subjects in this dissertation talk as if they did 
not need the welfare state. The political economy prescribes a reduced public spend-
ing; the subjects in the communities talk of the manner in which poor people exploit 
the welfare state. The political economy commends personal responsibility; the nicks 
in the parental communities accept it. This relation between the subject and society 
is, I believe, bolstered by four concepts in particular – choice, self-interest, convert-
ibility and meritocracy.
As we have seen, the concept of choice is highly instructive. The way the concept 
is used indicates an ideological structuring, beacuse it so strongly highlights one 
version of reality at the expense of another. The discourse of choice makes us abide 
by a postulate – do not focus upon that which surrounds you, do not wait for effects 
of choice and do not expect results from your efforts; focus only on your mental 
processes. This take on choice means that factors of the surrounding world become 
less important as explanatory factors. If choice functions this way it needs a subject 
who takes a great interest in her own mental processes; a subject who is ready to 
put the blame on her own insufficient capabilities. I believe it is precisely this link 
between choice and self-technologies that achieves the separation in the demands for 
responsibility, so that the demand becomes directed at the subject but not at society. 
The next link is that between choice/self-interest and convertibility/meritocracy. 
If we are all free to choose and take an interest in ourselves, we are in one sense of 
the word all the same. We all have the same opportunities of achieving a good life. 
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The notion of convertibility does in fact that which I have underlined as my main 
interest when studying misrecognition – it conceals particular aspects of the world 
and highlights other. The idea that we are convertible is visible in postings that advise 
poor people to go berry-picking, where convertibility operates quite openly: The 
nick writing says she has alleviated poverty by picking berries and now urges others 
to do the same, because if she was capable of doing it so are everybody else. Accord-
ingly, if we are all the same, the societal organisation with its administrative systems 
functions in the same manner for all of us. All services, possibilities and different 
types of investment are open for everyone. This would not be false according to the 
logic – if we are convertible, meritocratic principles would by any standard be the 
most reasonable organisation of human competition for resources. We may therefore 
change the sequence between convertibility and meritocracy – meritocracy is also 
the perfect organisation for the promotion of convertible subjects. To look upon 
the matter in the opposite way would make meritocracy fall short: If resources are 
not available to everyone it would mean they are available only for some. If the poor 
white people that the communities call White Trash were described as pushed away 
from investment, the notion of meritocracy would emerge as primarily protecting 
class interests. All in all, the two main subject types found in the empiric material, 
the Homo Eligens and White Trash, achieve one thing in particular: System legit-
imacy. By the dislocation of opportunity the legitimacy of meritocracy does not 
become a feature of the discussion.
Fool’s gold
In summary; the generic subject position in the parental communities seems to be 
made out of separations. First, economic inequalities have been disentangled from 
social class and, secondly, economic inequalities have become disentangled from the 
economy. What is left is a conception of social class that lacks both the element of 
inequality and the dimension of money. We are left with a conception of class as cul-
ture: A discursive moment has been created. Investments into a meritocratic system 
are described as solving the potential problems of social class but this solution is a 
kind of fool’s gold – something that looks like gold but really is just a piece of rock. 
It is this fool’s gold that produces the eradication of need and enables the derogatory 
accounts on dependency. It enables a division between dependency and freedom, 
where the former rules out the latter. 
Still, why call the ideals fool’s gold? For something to be labelled gold it has to 
shine or glitter, does it not? In this case the meritocratic principle and the urgings to 
invest in one’s refinement seem to produce not much more than contempt for the 
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working class and a prohibition to talk about the material dimensions of existence. 
To understand the glitter one has to see the promise residing in the abstract subject. 
We are instructed that we are convertible – if the world cannot change we can. When 
our salary is too low we are told that the solution lies in finding another job, opting 
for more education, selling spice, working as supply teachers or seeing a therapist 
to at least improve our attitude. When struggling to aid our child with homework 
although we have never studied algebra, we are comforted that as long as we stay 
dedicated, the child has every chance of success. When stressed from our work load 
we are instructed to apply techniques of deep breathing, figure out a coping strategy 
or hire a coach. When weary, distressed or angry we are told that we will be rewarded 
if we keep up the good work, if we cultivate sound moral principles and if we assume 
responsibility for ourselves. To reap we must first sow, we must never rely on resourc-
es outside of ourselves and mind should conquer matter. 
If that is not misrecognition, nothing is.
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Sammanfattning på svenska
Föräldrar, makt, fattigdom
Om val och ansvar på två föräldraforum  
Föreställningen om det dugliga föräldraskapet och dess inverkan på barn är en idé 
med många decennier på nacken. Den har varit del av skiftande politiska ambitioner, 
även om själva idealet om duglighet skiftat med tiden. Även föreställningen om det 
goda samhället har varit sammanflätad med föräldraideal och föräldraskap har där-
med inte bara artikulerats som en personlig erfarenhet eller som en särskild kategori 
av människor, utan ramarna och villkoren för föräldraskap har varit avhängigt tid, 
plats och maktstrukturer. Familjen är en plats för styrning och man kan därmed tala 
om en föräldraskapets politik (Gillies, 2008 a). Samtidigt betyder samhällets intres-
se för familjen ett intresse för hur den ideala samhällsgemenskapen bör utformas: 
Föreställningar om familj betyder också föreställningar om den ideala dispositionen 
hos den enskilde samhällsmedborgaren (Bergman et al., 2011). En betydande för-
skjutning i det senaste århundradets bild av familjen kan sägas ligga i en kontraktsidé 
– idag finns ett förbund mellan familj och välfärdsstat där den senare tänks stå för 
offentligt finansierad välfärd såsom hälsovård, förskola och skola medan den förra 
står för omsorg och närhet. Det betyder i förlängningen att barnet uppfostras och 
socialiseras på två arenor; en offentlig och en privat. Kontraktet implicerar en arbets-
delning mellan välfärdsstat och familj. Frågan är när de ena arenan ska sägas vara 
ansvarig för barnet och när den andra?
En av de senaste decenniernas kanske tydligaste trender är en från institutionellt 
håll förändrad bild av föräldern. Sammanfattat kan man säga att förälderns roll kom-
mit att uppvärderas och ses som avgörande för hur barnet kommer att utvecklas. Om 
föräldern tidigare under nittonhundratalet artikulerats mestadels i termer av möjlig 
risk kan man idag se en glidning mot att förstå henne som en potentiell expert på sitt 
eget barn; förutsatt att hon ges de professionella verktyg som är nödvändiga för att 
kunna bemöta barnet på rätt sätt (Littmarck, 2012). Den här förändringen i synsätt 
syns exempelvis i de många föräldrautbildningar som idag erbjuds föräldrar inom 
både barnhälsovård och på kommunal nivå men kan också skönjas i ett marknads-
utbud av nannyshower på TV, pedagogiska leksaker, kurser i babymassage etcetera. 
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Skiftet rör den kulturella förståelsen av föräldraskapet (och allra främst moderska-
pet). Diskurser kring familjen har blivit barntillvända och föräldraskapet har blivit 
intensifierat (Wall, 2010). Det faktum att förälderns roll har uppgraderats och kom-
mersialiserats kan förklara den trend som etablerats i västvärlden sedan åtminstone 
tio år tillbaka – den till synes stora lusten att diskutera och debattera föräldraskap 
med andra, vilket i sin tur lett till svar från marknadskrafterna såsom interaktiva 
virtuella föräldraforum där man anonymt kan logga in för att diskutera barn, barn-
uppfostringsfrågor och familjeliv tjugofyra timmar om dygnet. Föräldraskapet tycks 
bli till i en korsväg av institutionella krav på en slags beprövad vetenskaplighet, väl-
färdsstatligt utbud och omsorg och kommersiella svar på behovet av att prata om sitt 
föräldraskap  
Nittonhundratalet har kallats för barnets århundrade och i många stycken kan 
det sägas stämma, om man betänker barnets förbättrade legala status och sociala 
rättigheter (Lundqvist, 2015: 87). Barnet har kommit att ses som både kompetent 
och utsatt på en och samma gång och i dessa disparata bilder kan en föreställning om 
två typer av barn skönjas – det trygga barn som har tillgång till en kompetent och 
stöttande förälder och det barn som saknar en sådan förälder. Parallellt med sådana 
bilder lanseras alltså välfärdstjänster som tänks vara kompetenshöjande för föräldern: 
Vetenskapligt beprövade tekniker och de senaste forskningsfynden ska forma för-
äldraskapets praktiker. Föräldern görs kunnig – och därigenom ansvarig. Här ryms 
paralleller till en mer generell politikutveckling, som Nikolas Rose (2000 a) beskrivit 
i termer av en responsibilisering av medborgare. Det bärande elementet i responsibi-
liseringsideal är tanken om att när samhället ger förutsättningar för det goda livet är 
det medborgarens skyldighet att söka omsätta och realisera dessa. Härur kommer ex-
empelvis idealet om den aktive samhällsmedborgaren som tar ett eget ansvar för sitt 
välmående (Dahlsetdt, 2009 a). Det senaste årtiondet har accentuerat denna trend 
än mer, vilket kanske tydligast manifesterats efter den globala recession som svepte 
över stora delar av västvärlden 2008: Medan välfärdsstaten bantats ned har idén om 
individuell ansvarighet ökat. Relationen mellan välfärdsstaten och dess subjekt har 
förändrats (Jensen, 2012). Avhandlingen har undersökt denna relation, eller detta 
nya kontrakt mellan välfärdsstaten och ett av dess subjekt; föräldern.  
Syfte, forskningsfrågor och empirisk arena
Studiens syfte har varit att undersöka sättet som arbetsdelningen mellan välfärds-
stat och förälder beskrivs och förhandlas på två av Sveriges största virtuella föräld-
raforum där föräldrar och andra intresserade loggar in och samtalar med varandra. 
Det övergripande målet har varit att kartlägga och dekonstruera spänningar mellan 
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krav förlagda till föräldern eller individen och krav förlagda till välfärdsstaten och att 
blottlägga ideal som kopplas till dessa krav.
I en diskursanalys av inlägg publicerade på de publika sidorna på två av Sveriges 
största virtuella föräldraforum frågar jag följande:
1. Hur beskrivs föräldern och av vilka diskursiva tekniker stöds dessa beskriv-
ningar?
2. Hur konstrueras ansvarsfördelningen och arbetsdelningen mellan familjen 
och välfärdsstaten? 
3. Vilka generella subjektsideal kan skönjas i diskussionerna om föräldra-
skap? Hur tänks idealen kunna uppnås? Hur förklaras misslyckanden att 
nå idealen?
4. Hur är det kvinnliga subjektet positionerat i diskussioner om familj, för-
äldraskap, beroende och intimitet?
5. Hur relaterar dessa sätt att konstruera subjektsideal, föräldern och föräld-
raskapet till bredare samhälleliga kontexter?
De två föräldraforum som utgjort de empiriska arenorna i avhandlingen har jag kall-
lat TPP och VEF.122 Det empiriska materialet har samlats in mellan hösten 2010 och 
våren 2015 men inkluderar material skrivet så långt tillbaka som 2006. Diskursana-
lysen har genomförts med hjälp av en dekonstruktion av konversationernas bärande 
element och hur de förmåtts att förbindas med varandra, eller separeras.
Teoretiska utgångspunkter och analytiska verktyg
Avhandlingen har graviterat runt relationen språk – diskurs – ideologi och dess in-
tention har varit att avtäcka hur ideologi som formar diskurser sätter gränser för 
hur vi kan tala om den vardagserfarenhet som föräldraskap eller relationer innebär, 
och på vilket vis dessa gränser kan förstås som politiska. För analysarbetets räkning 
har det betytt att jag bortsett från eventuella personliga intentioner eller relationer 
bakom uttalandena på föräldraforumen och istället fokuserat på vilka element som 
gjorts betydelsebärande och vilka som till synes förlorat i relevans. Jag har alltså rik-
tat intresset mot textens innehåll och struktur och inte undersökt producenten av 
innehållet: Skribenten.
122 TPP är en förkortning för The Parent Place och VEF är en förkortning av Virtually Extended Fa-
mily. Forumen genererar tillsammans cirka 1,1 miljon besökare varje vecka (KIA-index, 2014) och 
når cirka 50 % av svenska föräldrar med barn mellan 0 och 6 år (Alstam, Plantin and Daneback, 
2016: 137). .
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De huvudsakliga teoretiska begrepp som använts under analysen har varit diskurs, 
makt och distinktioner. Diskursbegreppet har behandlats både i sin mer lokala an-
vändning, som tolkningsrepertoarer (interpretative repertoires), och som uttryck för 
ideologi. Makt har förståtts främst i diskursiv mening – hur tillgängliga diskurser 
disciplinerar och strukturerar det som blir möjligt att säga men också dess resultat: 
Hur en världsbild etableras och vidmakthålls. Distinktioner har förståtts som en eko-
nomisk-politisk uttrycksform, vilket betyder att jag har närmat mig de smakyttringar 
som görs på forumen som ett misserkännande/ett vilseledande (misrecognition) i re-
presentationen av människors livserfarenheter men också som ett politiskt kamou-
flage av den ekonomi som positionerar människor på olika platser och upprätthåller 
hierarkier.
Det empiriska materialet har bearbetats och analyserats genom en dekonstruk-
tion av texter insamlade på föräldraforumen. Texterna har analyserats med hjälp 
av diskursteori (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985/2008) och för att förstå hur föräldrafo-
rumen lokalt använder diskurs har ett diskurspsykologiskt perspektiv använts (Pot-
ter, 1996/2012). Det diskursteoretiska perspektivet har inneburit att jag studerat 
texterna för deras mer övergripande struktur – hur diskursiva element förbinds eller 
separeras så att utsagorna ges vissa former. Jag har förstått förbindelser och separa-
tioner som diskursens försök att etablera ett moment; ett ögonblick då den ligger 
stilla och där hot mot dess enhet har minimerats. Jag har också studerat hur tecken 
förbinds med varandra, (till exempel tecken som ”fattigdom”, ”förälder”, och ”an-
svarslöshet”), för att denna stängning av diskursen ska äga rum. När jag närläst ut-
talanden har jag begagnat mig av diskurspsykologiska begrepp. Jag har bland annat 
tittat på forumens inlägg som faktakonstruktioner (fact constructions) (ibid.: 158), 
det vill säga hur inläggen kan byggas upp för att argumentera för sin sak och hur de 
konstrueras för att förefalla sanna eller tillförlitliga. Det senare kan åstadkommas via 
två tekniker: Kategorirätt (category entitlement) (Potter et al., 1993) – att beskriva sig 
själv som särskilt kunnig i ett ämne eftersom man själv upplevt just detta eller står 
nära någon som har upplevelsen (till exempel upplevelsen av att ha varit fattig) – och 
via en särskild sorts förment neutralitet (out-there-ness) (ibid.: 393) där upplevelser 
och erfarenheter beskrivs med distans, nästan som om det inte var skribenten som 
tyckte det hon skrev; källan är inte skribenten utan en tillförlitlig agent någon an-
nanstans (denna källa kan vara vetenskap, massmedia, biologiska och medicinska rön 
och liknande).
Skälet till att avhandlingen dekonstruerat diskurser har varit för att utforska dess 
ideologiska underlag. De tre huvudsakliga anaytiska ingångarna vad gäller ideologi-
analysen har varit att söka efter utspridningseffekter (dissimulation), fragmentering 
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(fragmentation) och naturalisering (naturalisation) i texterna (Thompson, 1988). Ut-
spridning äger rum när vissa dimensioner av en erfarenhet, en händelse eller process 
beskrivs på bekostnad av andra dimensioner, fragmentering är fallet då grupper av 
människor eller erfarenheter beskrivs som i opposition eller intressekonflikt med var-
andra och naturalisering är vid handen då processer, erfarenheter eller händelser be-
skrivs i termer som får dem att framstå som eviga, naturliga eller svåra att ifrågasätta. 
Resultat
Avhandlingens övergripande resultat är att föräldraskapets praktiker – så som de 
omtalas på de två föräldraforumen – härbärgerar ett ideal om den prekära människan 
som individuellt genom självteknologier och samhälleligt genom meritokrati tänks 
kunna säkerställa resurser till sig själv och sitt barn. Den prekära situationen beskrivs 
alltså inte i första hand som problematisk utan som en drivkraft mot förbättring och 
kvalificering av den enskildes förmågor. Mellan individen och samhället verkar ett 
kontrakt vara skrivet: Om samhället erbjuder likvärdiga och nödvändiga förutsätt-
ningar, är det upp till individen att omsätta dessa till ett gott liv. Föreställningen ver-
kar inte rymma idéer om motsättning, skillnad eller förtryck, som potentiellt kunde 
förhindra somliga från att omsätta samhällets erbjudanden.
Analyskapitlen närmar sig föräldraforumen från delvis olika vinklar. I kapitel fem 
och sex introduceras sättet som interaktion och diskurs är formade. I kapitel fem, 
som särskilt tittar på interaktionsregler och hur man skaffar sig gillande på formen, 
visar analysen hur självpresentationen är en strategisk investering som handlar om 
att manifestera stabilitet, uppriktighet och tacksamhet. Ett sätt att porträttera sig 
själv är att tala om andra subjekt, antingen subjekt som presterar sämre än en själv 
i något avseende, eller om subjekt som framställs som om de prisar eller uppskat-
tar skribenten. Ett subjekt som regelbundet används som statusmarkör är det egna, 
vällyckade och trygga barnet. Interaktionsreglerna förefaller gälla mer för skribenter 
som presenterar sig själva som kvinnor, vilket betyder att reprimander och klander i 
högre grad drabbar nick registrerade som kvinnor, medan nick registrerade som män 
tycks kunna bryta mot netiketten utan större uppmärksamhet. Kapitlet visar också 
hur umgängesreglerna verkar ha stelnat till något som vissa skribenter uppfattar som 
konformitet, men pekar också mot att medlemmarna verkar ha något att vinna på 
att acceptera denna konformitet – det finns så att säga vinster att göra av underord-
ningen, som exempelvis social status och gillande.
Kapitel sex undersöker de diskursiva grunderna för forumsamtalen och särskilt 
analyseras föreställningen om det fria valet. Analysen pekar på den eteriska karaktä-
ren hos idén om friheten/tvånget att välja – forumskribenterna verkar inte associera 
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valet med någon form av märkbar effekt och man avkräver det inte heller kapacite-
ten att förändra situationen. Allra vanligast är att hantera det fria valet som något 
man antingen bör träna sig till (och på det viset reformera sin attityd till att bli mer 
ansvarstagande och ansvarig), eller i fallet den individ som redan är kapabel att väl-
ja; som ett bevis på ett välfungerande psyke. Det eteriska konceptet syns på många 
vis och summerades i kapitlet i tolkningsrepertoaren Mind over matter. Mind over 
matter är en föreställning om hur relativt lite materiella resurser eller andra typer 
av konkreta tillgångar betyder/bör betyda för subjektets välmående och repertoaren 
trycker istället på odlandet av ett ansvarigt själv som lösning på många konkreta 
problem, såsom drogmissbruk, fattigdom eller arbetslöshet. Mind over matter orga-
niserar ett helt subjektsideal, som jag kallat Homo Eligens, inspirerad av Zygmunt 
Baumans ”the man choosing” (2005: 33). Som Bauman påpekar (ibid.) ska detta 
subjektsideal inte förstås som människan som gjort ett val (i meningen nöjer sig 
med det valet), utan som den ständigt väljande människan. Bauman liknar denna 
situation vid cyklistens, som måste trampa regelbundet för att cykeln inte ska välta, 
och han argumenterar för att det är så vi också bör förstå identitetsarbetet hos den 
senmoderna människan: Identiteten förhandlas i varje givet ögonblick och därtill 
skulle arbetet inte kunna fortgå om det inte understöddes av marknadskrafter (ibid.: 
18). Vi kan här knyta tillbaka till kapitel fem, som också frilade symbiosen mellan 
just detta identitetsarbete och marknadskrafterna: Nicken tycks ’bli till’ genom sina 
konsumtionsval.
Kapitel sju ägnas åt relationen mellan subjektet och välfärdsstaten och kapitlet 
tittar närmare på hur forumen skriver om relationen mellan välfärdsstatliga resur-
ser och individens behov. I kapitlet demonstreras hur en diskursiv komponent av 
kontrakt strukturerar innehållet. Kontraktet mellan individen och samhället verkar 
i föräldraforumen vara rotat i ett slags lekmannaversion av det liberala sociala kon-
traktet där en förmodad konsensus om samhällets organisation ligger i botten. Den-
na föreställning verkar ligga till grund för den förvånade avsky forumen uttrycker 
gentemot subjekt som använder ekonomiska resurser distribuerade från välfärdssta-
ten. Denna avsky gäller dock inte alla typer av välfärdsberoende subjekt: Att behöva 
äldreomsorg, barnomsorg eller sjukvård omtalas inte som problematiskt, medan alla 
typer av direkta finansiella transaktioner såsom arbetslöshetsunderstöd eller försörj-
ningsstöd betraktas med misstro. Samtalen kring välfärdsstatligt beroende verkar 
därmed ideologiskt fragmenterande, framförallt i beskrivningarna av medelklassen, 
som tecknas som en klass utan likheter med arbetarklassen och som en klass som inte 
är lika ekonomiskt beroende. Även arbetarklassen som sådan delas diskursivt upp 
i två delar – en fattig men solidarisk del som tänks arbeta och betala skatt, och en 
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ekonomiskt beräknande men skrupellös del som beskrivs planera att utnyttja dessa 
medel för egen vinning. I analysen visas också hur den förmodade generella lösning-
en av ansvarsfrågan i forumsamtalen tänks vara odlandet och uppvärderandet av en 
mer puritansk moral. Kapitlet fångade upp denna individens ideala disposition i en 
tolkningsrepertoar: Morality comes first. Det kontrakt som förordas är helt och hållet 
moraliskt – samhället bör utformas så att individuell moral stärks och stärkandet av 
denna moral bör föregå samhälleliga rättigheter. 
I forumsamtalen föreställs alltså det allra viktigaste kontraktet vara det moraliska; 
det kontrakt subjektet ingår med sig själv om att vara hårt arbetande, rättuppståen-
de och självständigt, före det begär assistans från den kollektiva samhällskroppen. 
Förmågan till denna självständighet och moraliska kompass förmedlas allra främst, 
argumenterar föräldraforumen, inom familjens hägn. Den viktigaste kontraktspar-
ten är, kort och gott, en familjemedlem av något slag. Av den anledningen ägnade 
sig kapitel åtta åt hur forumen förstår familjen och familjens samhällsroll, samt fö-
reställningarna om hur man uppfostrar barn och vad denna uppfostran tänks syfta 
till. Kapitlet frilade en nyckelmetafor för att förstå hur föräldraskapet visualiseras: 
Det är ett arbete. Föräldraskapet skrivs fram i termer av engagemang, dedikation, 
disciplin och egenintresse – med andra ord läses föräldraskapet också som en fråga 
om självteknologi. Eftersom föräldraskapet tänks bestå av en uppsättning inre kvali-
téer betonas ansträngningen och viljan framför mer formella resurser eller tillgångar. 
Det betyder i sin tur att samtalen om det goda respektive dåliga föräldraskapet be-
traktar familjen som en enhet som delvis står utanför samhällets organisation eller 
hierarkier: Föräldern utan utbildning, den arbetslösa föräldern, eller föräldern som är 
boende i en förfördelad förort tänks i princip ha samma chanser att ingjuta framgång 
i sitt barn som den väletablerade och högutbildade föräldern. Föreställningen leder 
till ett intensivt skuldbeläggande av föräldrar som inte ”lyckas” med sina barn, eller 
föräldrar som ”skyller ifrån sig” om barnet inte beter sig acceptabelt. Med andra ord 
får fenomenet social klass en speciell kontur i föräldraskapsdiskurserna: Om alla har 
samma chanser att producera framgångsrika barn som klarar sig på arbetsmarknaden 
framstår den förälder som av någon anledning inte klarar det som än mer främman-
de och klandervärd. Idén som ligger i botten vid sådant klander är att investering och 
resultat har en relation; den förälder som investerar och arbetar hårt med sitt barn 
kommer att skörda frukterna. Tanken kan skönjas i en tolkningsrepertoar som inte 
bara återfinns i diskurser om det goda föräldraskapet, utan i samtal om hushållsbud-
get, träning eller jämställdhet: You should reap what you sow. Repertoaren organiserar 
en medelklassens diskurs om socialt kapital som måste påföras barnet, en slags repro-
duktionsstrategi (Vincent & Ball, 2007) för att säkerställa klasstillhörighet men som 
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kan tyckas alltmer ansträngd när barnets minsta rörelse ska koreograferas, i allt från 
skolval till fritidsaktivitet. Då föräldraskapet formuleras med hjälp av arbetets meta-
forer, som något du gör snarare än något du är, kan ett misslyckande från förälderns 
sida bara begripas som en brist hos den enskilde.  
Kapitel nio ägnas åt olika former av ohälsa, eller åt subjekt som inte klarar de 
uppställda idealen; de som blir stressade eller på annat vis inte lyckas välja och ta an-
svar för sina liv. Vid sidan av analyser av föreställningar om varför man inte lever upp 
till idealen, studerar kapitlet också forumens idéer om hur man kan förmå sig själv 
att må bättre. De två huvudsakliga element som förbinds eller separeras i hälsodis-
kurserna är ”ansvar” och ”kontroll”. Särskilt manifesteras detta i samtalen om varför 
arbetsplatsrelaterad stress uppstår: Ansvaret för stressen behålls hos individen och 
lösningen stavas ökad kontroll över självet. Genomgående i diskurser runt indivi-
duell hälsa återfinns alltså en tveksamhet och ett motstånd inför förklaringsmodeller 
som förlägger orsakssambanden utanför individen. Hälsodiskursen framträder som 
starkt individualiserad och i en mening som lutheransk i dess aversion mot tekniker 
som betraktas som genvägar, vilket som exempel kan skönjas i forumdebatter om 
magsäcksoperationer som lösning på fetma. Magsäcksoperationer betraktas som en 
instrumentell lösning som inte förmår öka den disciplin och egenkontroll som man 
tänker sig är nödvändig; kontroll och disciplin förläggs med denna teknik istället 
utanför subjektet. Hur skuldbördan för ohälsa ska fördelas är emellertid inte entydigt 
i forumdiskussionerna, utan det tycks bero på vilket empiriskt fall som diskuteras. 
När man exempelvis debatterar orsaker till arbetsplatsrelaterad stress tycks skulden 
för denna huvudsakligen hamna på den enskilde arbetstagaren som inte förekommit 
stressen med någon typ av teknik, (yoga, andningstekniker, stresshanteringscoacher 
etc). När man däremot talar om fetma är själva skuldfrågan inte fullt lika utstavad, 
utan fokus ligger snarare på tänkbara och lämpliga sätt att gå ned i vikt. Under 
samtalen om diagnosen ADHD är ambivalensen i skuldfrågan än mer accentuerad. 
Här utvecklar sig långa meningsutbyten där en tolkningsrepertoar tycks organisera 
innehållet. I kapitlet kallas den Don’t take the easy way out och om än som allra 
synligast i dessa diskussioner, återfinns den i alla samtal om förbättring och ansvars-
tagande för den egna hälsan. I polemiken kring ADHD blir det dock tydligt hur en 
ideologisk strukturering av diskurs inte reglerar dess användare ned till varje enskild 
åsikt. I ordväxlingarna kring diagnosen förhåller sig båda sidor, såväl förespråkare för 
som motståndare till diagnosen som sådan, till repertoaren och söker manifestera 
att deras ställningstagande regleras av den. Trots detta är ståndpunkterna i frågan 
om diagnosen är reell eller inte och åsikterna om möjliga vägar till förbättring eller 
coping helt disparata. I kapitlet diskuteras tolkningsrepertoarerna och förhandling-
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arna kring lämpliga sätt att uppnå förbättrad hälsa som en del i uppvisandet av ett 
emotionellt kapital. Det skulle i det här sammanhanget betyda att signalera familja-
ritet med ”högkulturen”; dominanta diskurser kring kropp och psyke. På forumen 
är dessa dominanta diskurser starkt influerade av en slags gör-det-själv-kultur och av 
självhjälpsfilosofi. Men, som argumenteras för i The German Ideology (1845/1988: 
42), bör ideologier förstås som avhängiga materialitet och produktion och högkultu-
ren (det tal som måste uppvisas om man vill bli bemött med gillande) i detta fall kan 
sägas sammanfalla med den prekariaritet som redan beskrivits för förälderns vidkom-
mande – individen måste vara framåtlutad, dedikerat redo att välja och välja om, att 
investera i och ta ansvar för sin utveckling, vilket i sin tur kan förstås som ett nöd-
vändigt subjektideal i tider av åtstramningar (austerity) och osäkra framtidsutsikter.
Tveksamheterna och motståndet mot att förlägga skuld utanför individen gör 
sig också gällande i forumsamtal som berör kvinnans roll i familjen och frågor om 
hemmets arbetsdelning och jämställdhet. Idealen om ansvarighet och val som for-
mar subjektsidealet Homo Eligens förefaller gälla också när subjektet omtalas som 
specifikt kvinna och kapitel tio ägnas därför åt den heterosexuella samlevande kvin-
nans subjektspositioner. Här pekar analysen mot två andra element – ”skillnad” och 
”beroende” – som förbinds och separeras. Framförallt förstås de båda elementen som 
relaterande specifikt till den heterosexuella relationen; eftersom det är ”skillnad” på 
män och kvinnor blir de ”beroende” av varandra och kittet i deras relation beskrivs 
ofta i dessa termer. Det element kring vilket det råder mest ambivalens förefaller vara 
”beroende”. Beroende skisseras i en mening som oproblematiskt, av två skäl. Först 
och främst föreställer man sig att skillnaden mellan parterna är fruktbar (man tillför 
så att säga sin egen, omistliga del i relationen) och därmed blir beroendet närmast 
eftersträvansvärt. För det andra naturliggörs andra beroende subjekt, såsom barnen 
(och ibland mannen), som kvinnan ansvarar för. Diskursen avvisar dock också kvin-
nans beroende i vissa fall, och beroende som sådant delas i två typer – ett fruktbart 
och ett skadligt. Det första beroendet är det som uppstår genom den föreställda 
heterosexuella skillnaden, medan det andra uppstår i situationer där mannen drar 
fördel av kvinnan, till exempel av hennes obetalda hushållsarbete. Att kvinnan gjorts 
beroende av en sådan man kan, argumenterar forumen, lösas med hjälp av jäm-
ställdhetsambitioner. Här uppstår samtalssituationer där diskursen slår knut på sig 
själv: När ett nick skriver på forumet att hennes partner inte agerar på ett jämställt 
vis tenderar de andra skribenterna att ordinera ett internt jämställdhetsarbete, där 
parterna ska sätta sig ned och diskutera sig fram till en situation där ingen utnyttjas. 
En situation som betecknas som inte önskvärd tänks alltså kunna lösas genom att 
helt enkelt göras önskvärd. I kapitlet analyseras denna diskursens undanmanöver 
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som en slags tystnadens kultur, där vissa delar av ett sexuellt kontrakt aldrig ar-
tikuleras, nämligen att det inte ingåtts mellan två jämlika parter till att börja med 
och att kvinnors underordning försämrar deras förhandlingsläge (Pateman, 1988). 
Kapitlet inventerar ett särskilt fall av denna tystnadskultur: Samtal om och med 
kvinnor som blir misshandlade. Här synliggörs ett mönster av skuldförflyttning där 
mannens agens förminskas och kvinnans förstoras och där statusen av offer späs ut. 
Det förefaller vara så att fall som särskilt iögonfallande manifesterar exploatering och 
underordning också i samma utsträckning förminskas till något annat. Om den part 
som föreställs utnyttja det sociala kontraktet (individen som uppbär försörjningsstöd 
som det tydligaste exempelet) generellt ses som behäftad med skuld, gäller samma 
regel inte för den part som tänks utnyttja det sexuella kontraktet (mannen som inte 
tar sin del av det obetalda hemarbetet eller som misshandlar sin kvinna). 
Det avslutande analyskapitlet fogar samman bilderna av valfrihetsdiskurser, fa-
milj, välfärdsstat och femininitet med föreställningar om somliga subjekts bristande 
förmåga att välja och bete sig ansvarsfullt och i kapitel elva granskas hur sådana 
föreställningar förbinds till en affektiv figur (Tyler, 2008) gentemot vilken forums-
kribenterna uttrycker sitt löje och sitt förakt: Den fattiga kvinnan med barn. Denna 
avskydda figur uppenbarar sig allra främst i forumsamtal om en särskild fattig kvinna 
som går under epitetet ”White Trash” – som i kapitlet förstås som en konstitutiv ut-
sida av Homo Eligens. Följaktligen framställs denna affektiva figur som allt det som 
Homo Eligens inte är: Hon är ansvarslös, bortskämd, lat, odisciplinerad, och hon 
skyller sina tillkortakommanden på andra. Hon tecknas som en särskild sorts fattig, 
den ovärdiga (Fineman, 1991). Via systematiskt vaga narrativa tekniker (Georgaca, 
2004) kan förklenande omdömen om denna figur lanseras utan att möta motstånd 
och White Trash-figuren kan därmed sägas vara relativt diskursivt stabil. Det element 
som potentiellt kunde hota stabiliteten är den feminina estetik som framställs som 
möjlig att dela mellan medelklasskvinnan och White Trash-kvinnan. Hotet om lik-
het avvärjs dock med hjälp av föreställningar om skillnader i självteknologier; även 
om de båda ”kvinnotyperna” ser likadana ut på utsidan är de väsensskilda vad gäller 
inre förfining, argumenterar forumen. 
När den fattiga kvinnans barn diskuteras konsolideras föreställningarna än mer 
och vi kan till och med tala om en alarmism i bilderna av hur hon både genetiskt 
och socialt för dåliga anlag vidare. Kapitlet visar hur det åter är den grundläggande 
metaforen för att förstå föräldraskapet, att det är ett arbete, som strukturerar logiken 
bakom avvisandet av den fattiga kvinna med barn som beskrivs som White Trash. 
Om kapitel åtta visade hur medelklasskvinnan beskrivs som en investerare i barnets 
habitus, skildras White Trash-mamman som om hon negligerade denna uppgift. Ef-
315
tersom både föräldraskap och fattigdom struktureras på bestämda vis, genom meta-
forer och ideal som de flesta på föräldraforumen generellt skriver under på, blir det 
svårt att artikulera den fattiga mamman som något bortanför passiv, lat, parasiteran-
de och ansvarslös. Det betyder i sin tur att de fåtaliga försvar av fattiga föräldrar som 
då och då manifesteras på forumen får en specifik kontur. Försvaret tenderar snarast 
att förstärka eller bekräfta de nedsättande bilderna istället för att avvisa dem, och 
lejonparten av försvarstalen för fattiga föräldrar riktar in sig på att avvärja föraktet 
gentemot dem, snarare än att söka bestrida innehållet i beskrivningarna.
Sammanfattning 
Om forskningsfrågorna kondenserat besvaras kan man vad gäller beskrivningar av 
föräldern se hur föräldraskapet förstås som ett arbete där investeringar tänks betala 
sig i form av framtida framgångar och säkerhet för barnet. Arbetet är i någon mån 
prekärt – trots att föräldraskapet i viss mån tänks vara något man gör mer eller min-
dre skickligt tycks det vara svårt att säkert garantera utkomsten. Ansvarsfördelningen 
mellan familj och välfärdsstat verkar falla ut gynnsamt för den sistnämnda parten. 
Familj och individ har det huvudsakliga ansvaret för att samhällskontraktet fullföljs 
och så länge välfärdsstaten finns som en slags sista utpost gäller det för individen att 
disciplinera sig själv till att inte behöva den i alltför stor utsträckning, och framförallt 
tillse att behovet inte inbegriper konkreta, individuella ekonomiska transaktioner. 
Familjen har också ansvaret för att fostra fram individer som omfattar samma slags 
moral. Idealen för föräldraskapet omfattar även ett större medborgarideal: Människ-
an bör hålla sig så självständig och oberoende som möjligt gentemot välfärdsinstitu-
tioner. Beskrivningarna av det ideala oberoendet gentemot välfärdsstatliga insatser 
och skuldbeläggandet av ”välfärdsberoende” individer verkar parantessätta grund-
läggande beroende av vård, skola och infrastruktur och istället accentuera sådana in-
satser som innefattar direkta ekonomiska transfereringar. Den beroende människan 
(hon som misslyckats med att leva upp till idealen om oberoende) förklaras i termer 
av ett negligerat inre arbete, det vill säga att hon beskrivs som mindre mogen och 
därmed mer som ett barn än en vuxen. Betoningen av det barnlika hos den beroende 
människan blir sedermera det som motiverar de ingripande och uppfostrande insat-
ser som föräldraforumen förordar gentemot fattiga föräldrar. Det kvinnliga subjektet 
och hennes position i familjen hanteras inom vad som kan kallas en tystnadens kul-
tur, där hennes underordnade situation bemöts med tvekan eller rationaliseras bort 
som något annat, exempelvis förstås som agens. I samtalen om kvinnans position i 
familjen blir elementet ”beroende” särskilt vanskligt att diskursivt balansera – när 
den heterosexuella kvinnan omtalas kan beroende både förstås som något gott och 
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uppbyggligt å ena sidan och som något skadligt och nedbrytande å den andra. Be-
roende som beror av en strukturellt underordnad position avvisas dock, precis som 
i föreställningarna om den fattiga föräldern.  Dessa subjektspositioner – förälderns, 
medborgarens, den fattiges och kvinnans – har i avhandlingen analyserats som for-
made av en liberal version av samhällskontraktet där strukturella villkor nedtonas 
till förmån för visioner av individens styrka och möjligheter. Särskilt pekar analysen 
mot hur liberala rättviseidéer om meritokrati förvandlar ojämlikhet i tillgången till 
resurser och privilegier till en olikhet i mentalitet och kultur.
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APPENDIX
Glossary 
Avatar: A picture one may attach to the nick name in order for the nick to become 
easy to recognise.
Chat room: A way of communicating by sending text messages to people in the same 
chat-room in real-time. 
Flamer/Flaming: A flamer is a nick producing inflammatory texts on the Internet, 
containing rude or provocative content with the aim of starting a quarrel.  
Lurking: A member of an online community who observes, but does not actively 
participate. Lurkers make up a large proportion of all users in online communities. 
Lurking allows users to learn the conventions of an online community before they 
actively participate, but lurkers are sometimes criticised for being too withdrawn or 
timorous by more active users. 
Netiquette: The rules of etiquette that guide virtual interaction. The netiquette is 
often a combination of rules put up by the owner of the site and the members of the 
community.
Nick: A pseudonym name used for protection of identity on virtual communities or 
chat rooms 
Posting: Texts produced in interaction in a virtual community. 
Pseudonym: The nick name. There are no limits to the imagination displayed in the 
creation of a nick name. In the parental web communities some nicks settle for a 
combination of the names and gender of her children, whilst others allude on fa-
mous movies, books or songs. 
Thread: The entire sum of postings produced in one conversation about a delimited 
topic.
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Thread start: The very first posting made in a discussion about a delimited topic.
Troller/Trolling: A troll is a nick producing texts of dubious character, wanting for 
other nicks to react upon it. A troll can produce inflammatory postings much like 
the flamer, but the troll can also insert odd or transboundary postings (that are not 
rude or insulting) simply to follow the subsequent reactions.
